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JANUARY 8, 1951 25 CENTS

FREEMAN

THE CHALLENGE TO CONGRESS
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ORGANIZATION FOR WAR
Lloyd W. Mints

CHINA'S RED ARMY
Raymond J. de Jaegher

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW
Theodore Komisarjevsky

TITO PLOTTED TO BETRAY US
Peter Lawrence

FOR PRESIDENT: MICKEY COHEN
Morrie Ryskind

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY FIVE DOLLARS A YEAR

the FREEMAN

with which is combined the magazine, PLAIN TALK

Editors, JOHN CHAMBERLAIN HENRY HAZLITT

Managing Editor, SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE

JANUARY 8, 1951

CONTENTS VOL. 2—NO. 8

The Freeman *is published fortnightly. Publication Office, 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and General Offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.*

Application pending for second class entry at the Post Office at Concord, N. H. Rates: Twenty-five cents the copy; five dollars a year in the United States, nine dollars for two years; six dollars a year elsewhere.

The editors can not be responsible for manuscripts submitted but if return postage is enclosed they will endeavor to see that manuscripts rejected are promptly returned.

It is not to be understood that articles signed with a name, pseudonym, or initials necessarily represent the opinion of the editors, either as to substance or style. They are printed because, in the editors' judgment, they are intrinsically worth reading.

2 RUMFORD PRESS, CONCORD, N. H.

A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

LLOYD W. MINTS is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. His special field is money and banking, on which he has written two books, "A History of Banking" and "Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society." . . . FATHER RAYMOND DE JAEGHER went to China from his native Belgium in 1930. From 1937, when the Communists occupied the country of An-Kwo (Hopeh), he had ample opportunity to know their generals and to observe their methods. After two years as a Japanese prisoner during the war he returned to his mission. Since leaving China in 1949 he has lectured widely in Europe and the United States on social conditions under the Communists. . . . ARGUS is the pseudonym of a columnist for the anti-Stalinist Russian language newspaper, *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*. . . . J. M. LALLEY has for several years had a book column on the *Washington Post* and has doubled as book critic for *Human Events*. . . . EDWIN CLARK is a specialist on the eighteenth century and reviews books on that period. . . . THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY, the famous director of drama and opera, has designed and directed productions in Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States. He is probably best known to Americans for his work in the thirties at Stratford-on-Avon. His last Broadway production was "Crime and Punishment." . . . HARRY FELDMAN is a free lance reviewer of movies and a contributor to *Films in Review*.

Forthcoming:

In our issue of January 22 look for a discussion of the advisability of a regency, by Forrest Davis. In that or other early issues we shall publish a second article by Louis Bromfield on the Brannan Plan, this time on its strange ancestry. Also one by William Henry Chamberlin on the good fortune of the Swiss.

A Correction:

In our Who's Who of December 11 we flattered the *Pittsburgh Press* by representing George S. Schuyler as its associate editor. What we meant was the nationally circulated *Pittsburgh Courier*, the largest Negro newspaper in America.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

Nothing has more nakedly displayed the complete unfitness of Mr. Truman for his high office than his response to the constructive recommendations of both the leading statesman of the opposition party and the leading statesman of his own. Whatever detailed differences of judgment may exist regarding Mr. Hoover's outline of foreign policy (which is discussed at length elsewhere in this issue), it was thoughtful, conciliatory in tone, and on a high plane. Yet the only response Mr. Truman could think of making was the cheap jibe that Mr. Hoover's program "was nothing else but Isolationism" — and the country wasn't going back to *that.*

Earlier Mr. Truman had pretended to want information on how he could possibly cut inessential expenditures. Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman of the congressional joint committee on reduction of nonessential Federal expenditures, had obligingly suggested in detail cuts totalling $7,600,000,000 in non-military expenditures. Whereupon, in response to a question, Mr. Truman said he hadn't even bothered to read the Byrd suggestions "because he did not think the Senator knew very much about the budget."

These statements emphasize the desperate situation of a nation headed by a man whose domestic and foreign policies are both leading us toward disaster, and who can yet, because of the constitutional impossibility of removing him, stubbornly persist in his calamitous course and treat responsible criticism with contempt.

It is not as if Mr. Hoover's recommendations could be dismissed as representing the views of a negligible minority of malcontents. On December 31 the Associated Press reported that letters from readers to newspapers were running in some areas as high as ten to one in favor of the Hoover program. And the *New York Times,* though editorially opposed to the Hoover program, reported on December 28 that even in the mail to Democratic Senator Lehman of New York opinion was running "better than forty to one" in favor of it, while the mail to Senator Ives was running "almost ninety to one" in that direction, and the mail to Senator Taft "topped 100 to one for the Hoover proposals."

At the last moment before he made his speech of December 29 on foreign policy John Foster Dulles announced that it would not be a "reply" to Mr. Hoover's proposals. It certainly was not. For while Mr. Dulles, like Mr. Acheson, said that the United States would "not desert its allies," neither one gave any serious consideration to three of the main facts cited by Mr. Hoover: (1) That we have suffered and are suffering a crushing military defeat, as a direct consequence of the Truman-Acheson diplomatic-military policy; (2) that though 53 member nations of the United Nations "Called for military action" to drive the Communists out of Korea, they let one nation — to wit, the United States — furnish 90 per cent of all the foreign land troops to take the action; (3) that West Europe has shown an incredible laxity in providing for its own defense, and seems to be expecting this country to furnish the manpower as well as the equipment and money to do even that. How long is our "foreign policy" going to be based on wish-fulfillment rhetoric rather than on the unpleasant facts?

Under the Truman Program increasing our armed forces the army will grow from 10 to 24 divisions. The Marines, however, will get a new increment of exactly one regiment. If this is Truman's idea of building up a mobile striking power, then the Marines had better get busy and actually hire a publicity bureau as good as Stalin's. Both they and the country need it badly.

A bilateral agreement under which India is to get some two billion dollars' worth of technical aid under the Point 4 program has just been signed in New Delhi. Among other things, the money will be used for improving Indian communications. In return, the improved Indian communication system will doubtless be used to inform us that India intends to remain "neutral" in the struggle against communism and that Marxism is all right provided it takes some "intermediate" form that stops short of the full Stalinist gloss.

Fascism, in our book, can take many horrible divergent forms; it may kill a man in Berlin for being a Jew, it may ordain a Niagara dosage of castor oil in Rome for the "crime" of exercising free speech. But fascism everywhere has one basic thing in common: government control and dictation over the forms of economic life. Simply because

many well-meaning "liberals" seem totally unaware of the bottom ingredient of fascism, we applaud a recent editorial proposal of the *New York Daily News* that the Republicans in the new Congress constitute themselves a Committee of the Whole Against Unnecessary Fascism. Formation of such a committee might do far more than trim Truman down in the matter of a few unnecessary Presidential power grabs; it might also serve to make a whole nation aware of what fascism actually is.

The Federal Reserve Board has come up with the statistic that four out of ten American families are worth at least $5000. This will be interpreted to mean (a) that the middle class is stronger than ever, and (b) that the middle class is disappearing as everybody becomes leveled off into one big classless American class. It will also be interpreted as a triumph of the New Deal and as a triumph in spite of the New Deal. But what seems to us the really pertinent fact about the $5000 net worth of the average American family is that $5000 in debased 1951 frog-skins is worth less than $2500 in 1935 dollars. A generation ago $5000 would buy a family a whole house; today it will hardly pay for the construction of a new wing to hold a third and a fourth child. Incidentally, practically everybody in Germany was a millionaire after 1919, when the German mark went to hell. Maybe every family in America will have a million dollars yet.

Note to Oscar Ewing: A Clayton, New Jersey, country medico, Dr. Benjamin Broselow, has organized a free clinic from noon to 2 P.M. every Monday for any indigent resident of Gloucester County who cares to visit him. The reason we know this is that Dr. Broselow chose to announce it to a reporter for the *New York Times*. We are perfectly sure that at least 3759 other country doctors in large states and small are doing the same sort of thing without bothering to tell it to the press. In other words, we are reasonably certain that we have been getting the benefits of "socialized" medicine all along without having to pay the costs of a centralized Department of Welfare. While we sympathize with those doctors who feel embarrassed about advertising their own good works, we wish they would all emulate Dr. Broselow and speak up. In this age of "damnable reiteration" the only way to silence the proponents of federal medicine is to drown them out with a constant repetition of the standing truth that America can *voluntarily* take care of its own. This even goes for the CIO which, despite its public commitment to the ideas of Oscar Ewing, has recently decided to open union-backed eye-care centers in Buffalo, New York, and elsewhere. . . . The CIO had better be careful or it may yet prove to even its blindest members that Mr. Ewing is neither wanted nor needed in a nation that can do wonders by the ancient method of voluntary association for agreed-on social ends.

The New York Post, in common with the rest of the "liberal" press, continues to sneer at the efforts of anti-Communists to purge the government of Communist and fellow-traveler influence, dismissing the whole business as "McCarthyism." Yet the *Post's* own enterprising labor columnist, Mr. Murray Kempton, points to a frightening state of affairs in Schenectady, New York, where labor relations in the great General Electric plant are conducted by Local 301 of the United Electrical Workers Union. Mr. Kempton tells us that UE's Local 301 is run by the Commies; that its business manager, a notorious fellow-traveler, heads a network of Stalinist party-line shop stewards with continuing access to GE's most secret electronic projects. Inasmuch as GE makes such things for the government as parts for atomic energy machinery, automatic gun sights for the B-36, and guided missile and jet propulsion devices, we hold with Mr. Kempton that something should be done to throw any potential spies out of the GE plant. But what beats us is the schizophrenic attitude of the *New York Post*, which finds it so difficult to believe that a Communist spy apparatus capable of infiltrating a sensitive manufacturing plant in Schenectady is powerless to infiltrate an equally sensitive government agency in Washington, D. C. Does Mr. C. E. Wilson, the GE man who is our new boss of war production, need any less help in spotting Commies in Washington than he did back home in Schenectady, New York?

Speaking of Mr. Kempton's allegations of Communist spying at the GE plant, we wonder how the editor of the *New York Post* would feel if Senator Joe McCarthy were suddenly to blast the *Post* for the practice of a crime henceforward to be known as "Kemptonism"?

The rising cock-a-hoopness among our public figures might have a higher exemplary value if more epidermis was bruised. Mr. Truman, it will be recalled, only *threatened* to pummel and unman the music critic. Senator McCarthy only *shoved* Drew Pearson around a bit. John L. Lewis incited his minions in the mines against Bob Taft from a safe, and it may be presumed, Olympian distance. Matters were more decisive in the brave old world when gentlemen carried canes and had easy access to horsewhips. It could even be that the uncouthness of our behavior calls for a revival of the *code duello*.

This is by no means as fanciful as it may appear. We are living in an age wherein our preoccupations are bound to be martial for some time to come. Such ages exalt the warrior, the knight, the gentleman; they are congenial to the institution of personal reprisal known as the duel. We may assume that the prospect of pistols and coffee for two at some imminent dawn would put a curb in the teeth of irresponsible statesmen and journalists, not to mention labor leaders. If custom sanctioned the calling out of men for what they wrote, Mr. Pearson, the unctuous, persecutive Hotspur of his profession, would be able to lie late few mornings. It somehow excites our knightly risibles to think of him arising day after day in the gray light of pre-dawn, looking to his weapons and scurrying toward some secluded field of honor high above the Potomac.

The Adam Hat people are about to discontinue their sponsorship of Drew Pearson's radio broadcasts. No doubt they have grown sensitive to the charge that Mr. Pearson likes to talk through an Adam hat.

Ike Eisenhower is just about to start on his job of organizing European defenses. Soon he will be looking back nostalgically on the time when all he had to do about Europe was to invade it.

FOR A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

Former President Herbert Hoover's speech on foreign policy on December 20 was not, in the political sense, a "speech." It contained no attempt at oratory, no appeal to the gallery. It was made by a man who was reluctant to speak out at all, and did so only under a compelling sense of duty. It raised the whole foreign policy argument to a higher level. It was phrased in as conciliatory a form as possible toward the Administration; it stressed the areas of agreement. It was written with the detachment and compactness of a memorandum. And like a memorandum, its great impact came, not from winged phrases, but from its calm presentation of ugly but irrefutable facts.

The reception of the speech by a good part of the press was only what might have been expected. They attempted to dismiss it, as they had dismissed all previous efforts at serious discussion, by smearing it with such all-embracing labels as "isolationism," "neo-isolationism," "retreatism," "abandonment of Europe," "appeasement." They ignored the unpleasant military facts that Mr. Hoover had set forth, and talked as if the Russian hordes could be stopped in Europe by a few American token troops if not, in fact, by sheer empty rhetoric. They were eloquent about the dangers of not "containing" communism everywhere, but silent about the dangers of more and greater Koreas.

On the other side were, of course, some newspapers that endorsed the Hoover speech for the same purely partisan reasons that others attacked it. But what was most encouraging was the large section of the press that rose to Mr. Hoover's challenge and, while they disagreed with some of his conclusions, recognized the weight of his facts and his argument and the need for a calm nonpartisan reappraisal of our situation. Unity in the right course can only be achieved in this spirit.

It is unfortunate, however, that the great bulk of the discussion that followed Mr. Hoover's speech was concerned with Europe. It is more logical to begin with Korea, where we are already involved. Whether we now try to hold a bridgehead there, or to make an orderly withdrawal, is a decision that should be left to the military on the spot, and based on military possibilities.

If we decide to withdraw from Korea because it is untenable, then we should obviously strike elsewhere to keep the military and moral consequences of this defeat from being too great. The obvious course would be to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, to hold a tenable Formosa in exchange for an untenable Korea, to bomb Manchurian and other Chinese military targets from Japan and Formosa, to supply Chinese Nationalist guerrilla forces with material, encouragement and direction, to keep alive at least the threat of a reinvasion of the Chinese mainland by the Chiang Kai-shek forces, to arm Japan and threaten a reinvasion of Korea with Japanese manpower, and to announce that this form of warfare will continue at least until the Chinese Communists announce that they are ready to withdraw from Korea and permit the United Nations to establish an independent Korea with a peaceably chosen government.

In addition, of course, the United Nations should take as a minimum the steps urged by Mr. Hoover: declare Communist China an aggressor; refuse to admit it to membership; demand economic sanctions against it, and condemn the infamous lies against the United States.

If we do anything less than this, we will in effect reward Communist China's aggression and its attack on American soldiers. Unless we take at least these measures we will teach the Chinese Communists, and Communists everywhere, that aggression pays — and not that it does not pay. We must take these steps, therefore, even for the sake of Europe — and in spite of Europeans who are too shortsighted to recognize that one of the most effective of all ways of protecting Europe is to keep reminding Stalin of what might happen to him in the East if he should attack in the West.

If we do anything less than this, and merely accept defeat in Korea, we will lose face and prestige and influence not merely in Asia but everywhere in the world, including Europe. Our promises of help will lose their value.

When we turn to our policy in Europe, we are faced with all the ugly and unpleasant facts that Mr. Hoover had the courage to cite, but which the Administration has up to now chosen publicly to ignore. We find, compared with the tremendous divisions and equipment of Russia and her satellites, that "on the Continental European front there are about 160,000,000 non-Communist people who, excluding Spain, have less than twenty combat divisions now available, few tanks and little air or naval force," and that "their will to defend themselves is feeble and their disunities manifest." As contrasted with this, we find that France alone in 1939 mobilized more than 100 divisions. And as Hanson W. Baldwin has pointed out:

> The French munitions factories, negligible in their output ever since the late Leon Blum nationalized them before the war, have not yet produced any sizable quantity of munitions since the war.

To be sure, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact both rested on the understanding that Europe would be willing to help itself; but so far our officials have not merely been content to accept paper assurances of this, but have actually encouraged Europe in its military laxity. The Gray report, for example, so far from criticizing the western European countries for not arming enough, quite needlessly warned them that "there are limits [in the rate of rearmament] beyond which they can not go without drastically undermining their economic health."

In the face of all this it is not surprising that Mr. Hoover raised his voice to say:

> To warrant our further aid [the West European nations] should show they have spiritual strength and unity to avail themselves of their own resources. But it must be far more than pacts, conferences, paper promises and declarations. Today it must express itself in organized and equipped combat divisions of such huge numbers as

would erect a sure dam against the red flood. And that before we land another man or another dollar on their shores. Otherwise we shall be inviting another Korea. That would be a calamity to Europe as well as to us.

In considering this course, there are dangers on both sides.

Obviously the Administration must at least *move in the direction* of the Hoover proposal. We can no longer keep pouring in still more promises and commitments at every European demand. It is time that we reminded the West Europeans in unmistakable terms that they have not yet begun to fulfill their part of the bargain; that they have a great deal of catching up to do, and that they will have to get over their strange theory that it is up to the United States, and not themselves, to provide not only the money and equipment but the men to defend them. And the Administration (particularly with the Korea disaster in front of it) will have to get over its own smug assumption that the Russians will not dare to march into Europe as long as token American troops are kept there, "for fear of getting involved in war with the United States." If our troops in Europe should be overrun, the disaster would be irretrievable. In war, you must either oppose the enemy with nothing or with more than enough. To oppose him with less than enough is to make him a present of it.

On the other hand, though our Administration's own past policy is in part responsible for the incredible failure of Europe to provide for its own defense, we must recognize that we can not suddenly throw this policy into reverse. The situation that has been created is one that must now be handled with the utmost delicacy. We can not repudiate the Atlantic Pact. We can not give the slightest ground for suspicion that we intend to repudiate the Atlantic Pact. We can not give the appeasers in Europe, of whom there are many, any excuse for arguing that, as the United States is about to let Europe down, it had better start emulating Benes and making peace pacts with Stalin. And we can not do anything to give Stalin the impression that it is safer for him to march into Europe tomorrow than it was yesterday.

The great function that the Hoover proposal can serve is to shock Europe into a recognition that it must immediately begin to prepare for its own defense. And perhaps the best way we can help to do this is to combine, with the firmest insistence on self-help from this point on, a "matching" program. We might agree (the figures are purely illustrative) to raise and equip one more division, say, for every three or four such additional divisions Europe raises and equips. And we need not promise to put these divisions immediately on the European continent where they could be overrun by Russian hordes before European defense was adequate. We could put some divisions in Britain and keep the rest here.

The exact scale of "matching," the timing and other details, can be worked out over the bargaining table by the military experts. But hereafter it must be, for the world's sake and for Europe's sake no less than for ours, a bargaining table, and not merely another demoralizing American giveaway table.

Military and diplomatic strategy can never be separated from each other without confusion or disaster. Every war must have a definite diplomatic objective, and any diplomatic objective is stupid or utopian if it is not within the bounds of military possibility. Today the people in charge of our announced diplomatic policy of "containing" communism everywhere never stop to ask (see Korea) what its military implementation would imply. Our diplomatists and military strategists are separated in airtight ideological compartments. This makes our diplomatic policy inane, and sets our military strategy impossible tasks. It is all very well, even highly desirable, to have ideal goals; but it is time we began to think of achieving them by realistic means.

THIS IS WHAT THEY'RE SAYING

In this issue, under the title "This Is What They Said," we begin what we plan to publish as a regular column feature to which we invite contributions from our readers. It will be devoted to quotations (usually ungilded by any comment by us) from prominent leaders — or mis-leaders — of public opinion, including many still in positions of power and influence, and still engaged in shaping and directing American or world policy.

We may as well anticipate right now some of the criticisms which are sure to be made of this feature, particularly by the people who are hit by it. This is that "it serves no constructive purpose" to "rake up" the mistakes and misjudgments "of the past"; that "*everybody* makes mistakes"; that "we are *all* responsible for these mistakes"; that it is "mere hindsight" to point out that they actually were mistakes; that a time of crisis like this is no time "to divide the country," or "to look for scapegoats" or "to indulge in the frivolous practice of taking pot shots" at our great leaders who are "seeking only the best interest of the country"; but that "we should devote ourselves solely to the constructive task of deciding what we are going to do *now*"; that "we must forget the past and think only of the future" — and so on.

All of these objections are untenable. They come with particularly bad grace from New Dealers who, regardless of their immediate opponent or the immediate issue under consideration, have been running against Herbert Hoover and the banking crisis of 1933 for the last eighteen years. But there is this vital difference between their appeal to the past and ours. Former President Hoover has been out of office for eighteen years. Most of the people whose remarks we shall quote are either in office *now*, or still in positions of great influence and prestige, in spite of the overwhelming evidence they have now supplied of their unfitness to govern or to lead opinion.

It is not true that "we are *all* responsible for these mistakes," or that it is "mere hindsight" to call attention to them today. There were plenty of people calling attention to these mistakes when they were being made, correctly predicting their consequences, and advocating a much different course. But these people were only ignored, derided or maligned at the time. Nor is it true that these mistakes are all "in the past." Some of them have been made in the last few months, or even in the last few weeks; and the identical mistakes are being repeated at the moment.

There is no more constructive thing that can be done today, in fact, than to call attention to the past record of misjudgment and incompetence of the people who, not in the least abashed or humbled by the consequences of their past misjudgments, still presume to lead us.

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

By LLOYD W. MINTS

THERE IS a widespread belief that in the event of a war of great magnitude direct controls over production, consumption and prices will be unavoidable if the war is to be prosecuted with the utmost effectiveness, and with the least amount of injustice. Raw materials must be allocated, so runs the argument, to the most essential industries. Price controls must be instituted to prevent the inflation which in the past has invariably accompanied major wars. Rationing of goods must be adopted to be sure that everybody obtains his fair share of the lessened supply of consumers' goods of all kinds. It is my contention that none of these controls is either needed or desirable.

As a preliminary to a consideration of the argument that direct controls are necessary in time of war, it will be helpful to have clearly in mind the manner in which the industrial activities of a nation are organized in time of peace. Suppose that the nation decides to embark upon a great road-building program. We shall first suppose that the needed funds are obtained from increased taxes. With the proceeds of the increased taxes the necessary materials will be bought, and the required workers hired. But there is another aspect of the problem. Because of the higher taxes the public itself will have smaller amounts of money to spend. This will mean a decreased demand for many products. Employment will therefore fall in industries suffering from this reduced demand; but this is precisely what is needed, since the increased labor and other resources for the road-building program must be obtained from other industries. Those thrown out of work will provide the necessary workers for building the roads. It should be noted that the increase in demand for various kinds of material on the part of the government would not cause a rise in prices generally, since this increased demand would be offset by the reduced demand of the public which would result from the higher taxes. There might, however, be some rise in the prices of the materials needed for road building; but this rise would facilitate the transfer of resources of labor and capital into the road-building industries, since the profits of these industries would increase, thus inducing businessmen to acquire the additional resources that were needed.

Let us suppose, however, that the government obtained the funds for road building by printing new paper money, or by borrowing from the banks. Borrowing from the banks increases the stock of money just as surely as does the printing of greenbacks. When a bank makes a loan or buys a bond it gives to the borrower or bond seller, whether a corporation, individual, or the government, a deposit against which checks can be drawn. Such deposits represent net increases in the total volume of checking accounts in the community. They have the same effect on prices as an increase in the volume of hand-to-hand currency in the form of paper money and coins. Checking deposits are in effect money, and should be and are so called by most economists. If, then, the funds for building the roads were obtained from the printing presses or from the banks, the government would go into the market for the resources it needed and compete for them with an unreduced volume of public demand. In this case products generally would rise in price, and continue to rise so long as the printing presses turned out new money. In the terminology of recent years this would be called deficit financing of road building.

How does all this apply to the prosecution of a war? War requires a large amount of materials not produced in time of peace. It requires, therefore, a change in the use of resources. Manufacturing plants must change from the production of, say, automobiles to guns, from tractors to tanks. Entirely new plants will probably have to be built for some purposes. The funds required by the government for the needed war materials, and for bringing about this new organization of industry, can be obtained, as in the case of road building, either by taxation or by the issuance of new money (from the printing presses or from the banks). If taxes are increased the public will have less money to spend, the demand for non-war goods will therefore decline, and labor and other resources will be released to the war industries. There is thus no competitive bidding up of prices by the government and the public, although, as in the road-building program, materials essential to war goods might rise in price. In this way the needed resources for the war industries would be obtained without the need for any allocation or control of materials by the government.

If we assume, however, that the government finances the war either through printing new money or borrowing from the banks, the situation is vastly different. The stock of money in the hands of the public is not then reduced, while that held by the government is increased. The effort of the public to continue consumption at the former peacetime level and the new demand of the government for materials and labor will therefore operate to raise prices.

It is only because of deficit financing — that is to say, because of the issuance of new money — that wars in the past have invariably led to inflation. This is entirely unnecessary. It is sometimes contended, to be sure, that a major war cannot be financed by taxes alone; that inflation to some degree is unavoidable. If there is any difficulty in avoiding inflation, it is political in character, not economic. If the public supported the legislature in the demand for taxation sufficient to finance the war, the political difficulty would itself evaporate. And it is by no means certain that a political difficulty of this sort exists in reality. That the legislature would not have the support of the public in financing the war through taxation, is a mere assumption unsupported by reliable evidence.

From the economic point of view it would be quite as simple to finance a war by taxation as by inflationary measures. In either case resources must be diverted from

peacetime uses to the purposes of war. This means that the public is going to have to deny itself a lot of things to which it is accustomed. The only problem, therefore, is how this denial is to be enforced, and upon whom. It is precisely in this respect that the method of taxation is greatly superior to inflation. Inflation requires sacrifices of different groups of persons in unpredictable ways, and in ways that do not accord with our ideas of justice. Those with relatively fixed money incomes find that the cost of living is rising, and therefore they must reduce their purchases; but among those with fixed incomes we find both poor and wealthy individuals. Inflation therefore fails to place the burden of the war in accordance with ability to assume it. But this is not all. The effects of inflation are felt long after the war is over. It pauperizes a large proportion of the old people who live on their savings and who have no means of re-establishing their former standards of living after the war is over.

Another important consideration will arise if we are required to make expenditures in large amounts for military purposes in the near future. When we entered the war in 1941 there were many men out of work, and consequently the increase in the stock of money that came from inflationary financing did not have so much effect in raising prices as would an equal percentage increase at the present time, since now there are few unemployed.

It is only because of inflationary financing that price controls can be considered necessary. But even though such financing is used, price controls are not desirable. Such controls seriously interfere with the usefulness of the price and profit mechanism for getting the things produced that are wanted; they are not more than partially successful even in the short run while they are in effect, since black markets and other devious methods are used to avoid them; and in the end they can have no significant effect in preventing the inflation, since the increased quantity of money will have its full effect on prices as soon as the controls are removed. Furthermore, price controls, and other controls, require for enforcement men who might better be doing productive work.

Neither can governmental allocation of scarce materials be defended. Every industry is made up of a host of specialists who know the various aspects of their industries. To give any measure of direct control over industrial operations to the government is to withdraw from those with specialized knowledge the power to make many of the important decisions, and to give it to government officials. Even though the latter are well-informed with respect to the industry, as in many cases they would be, they can not make "on the spot" decisions. They have to wait upon the collection of statistics, or act upon inadequate information, while men in immediate charge of operations might go ahead with production if they were not delayed by directives and orders of many kinds. The men in production may gnash their teeth in frustration and rage at the "stupidity" of the bureaucrats, but in fact they are not stupid. The plain fact is that the industrial system is too vast and complex for central management by men with even the best of minds. Moreover, to repeat, the purchase by the government of war materials gives to the producers of such materials the funds with which they can bid labor and other resources away from the peacetime industries to the full extent that such resources are required. Allocation of materials is therefore both inefficient and unnecessary.

Rationing of consumers' goods is likewise undesirable, either on grounds of effectiveness in prosecuting the war, or of justice. The tax system should be so adjusted that those in the lowest income groups would pay, at the most, only a small minimum of taxes. In this case their chief sacrifices would come from any increase in the prices of some individual products for which the demand continued at a high level despite the high income taxes for the community as a whole. It can not be too much emphasized that the best way to achieve justice (however we may define it) is to adjust income taxes to achieve the results we desire, rather than to rely upon the uncertain, and in many cases unfortunate, effects of price controls and rationing in conjunction with inflationary financing.

Neverthless, I think it must be conceded that rationing is much less undesirable than price controls. It does not interfere with the price and profit mechanism for allocating the resources of the nation among the various industries. I would not be greatly opposed to rationing of some very few goods which continued in great demand despite the high taxes, and in sharply limited supply. Good examples might possibly be sugar, bread and cigarettes. Even in these cases, however, rationing is not necessary. It would simply result in less undesirable influence on the organization of industry than would price control.

Such, in bare outline, are the requirements for organizing the nation for war purposes. They can be stated briefly. Income taxes should be raised to the full extent necessary to provide the government with the needed funds; the additional levies should be made in accordance with our ideas as to who should shoulder the main burden of the war (although it should be noted that it is only the middle-income group which in the aggregate has enough income to provide the necessary funds for a war of any magnitude); and direct controls in the form of price fixing, allocation of materials, and rationing should be avoided. In this way the higher profits of the war industries would promptly bring resources into the production of war materials, without the need for any governmental directives other than the mere placing of orders.

One modification of the above procedure might be desirable. If in practice there were certain industries which could most quickly be converted to war production, and if at the same time the public, despite the higher war taxes, continued to demand the products of these industries in large volume, it might be desirable to place heavy sales taxes upon the products of such industries. Whether significant amounts of revenue would be obtained from these taxes would depend upon the desired extent of the shifting of resources out of the industries in question. If the amount of military expenditure were not so great as it would be during a major war, the taxes could be made only moderately high, so as to curtail civilian demand only to a minor extent. In this case the tax on a still significant amount of civilian output would yield a large revenue. However, in a major war the objective in imposing the tax might be to raise the price of the product so much as nearly to eliminate civilian demand. In this case the tax would be very high, conceivably as much as 100 per cent or more, and a small revenue would be the best evidence that the tax had achieved its purpose.

CHINA'S RED ARMY

By RAYMOND J. DE JAEGHER

While serving as a priest in North China for 20 years, Father de Jaegher had an unusual opportunity to observe the tactics of the Chinese Communists both in action and behind the lines, and against both Japanese and Chinese government troops. The Freeman *presents these observations not only for their inside facts on how China came to her present sorry plight, but for the light they throw on the strategy of a ruthless enemy now facing the UN forces in Korea.*

EVERY soldier in the ranks of the Chinese Communists believes it is his mission to liberate the world from "imperialism." First, the fight of Mao Tse-tung's armies was directed against Japanese imperialism; then against Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government of China, represented to them as "imperialistic." Now the Red Chinese hordes have been loosed against alleged American "imperialism" in Asia. The enemy held before the Chinese Communists by their leaders has changed his guise like a chameleon, according to directives from Moscow. But always these soldiers are prepared for an international struggle, to create not only a "new China," but a new world.

The tactics of the Chinese Red armies reminded me of mercury. Strike a pool of mercury on a table, and it will seem to be destroyed as a unit. But soon the droplets, scattered in all directions, will roll back together again.

Before an enemy superior in number or armaments, the Communist troops would scatter very fast. Then they would reassemble immediately after the departure of the enemy. If the enemy is not strong, speedy mobile units will arrive in far greater number than the opposing forces, will strike unexpectedly, and will always win the battle. The Chinese Communist soldiers are trained for swift action in guerrilla warfare.

Once I visited General Lü Cheng-Tsao in Chen Wei (Po-Yeh) in the early morning. His forces consisted of about 50,000 men of the Central Hopeh's armies. In one night they had assembled from the southern part of Shulu some one hundred *lis* (35 miles) to the south. Already units were set up in villages all around, and were linked with the General by telephone.

The secret services of the Chinese Reds were very good. They always knew the exact force of the Japanese along the railroads and highways, and all about the enemy's city garrisons, even if he changed his units very often. When they saw the Japanese concentrating their strength for a mopping-up operation, the Communist forces would move into the mountains or other parts of the country where the enemy had only small garrisons at that time.

When the Communists attacked, it was always in overwhelming strength, greatly outnumbering their opponents. They would fight until the enemy had no more ammunition and would be obliged to surrender.

The formation of the armies was significant. First always came some elements of the civilian population that the Communists wanted to finish off; these men were poorly armed. For example, to take strategically important Kao Pei Tien, along the Peiping-Hankow railroad, the Communists tied local peasants together by their arms in threes — even some women — and gave them a few grenades to throw in front of them when they were marched against the enemy. These poor people were sacrificed just for the purpose of wasting the enemy's ammunition.

Behind the masses of the people came the "*min ping*," the local militias. The Reds always give some military training to their civilian populations. The best among the village militias will be taken into the regular army, where the danger is not so great and a soldier's family enjoys many advantages. Hence the boys in the villages will work hard to improve their militia.

Bringing up the rear are the Red shock troops, who arrive at the end of the battle to deliver the final blow. Their attack is launched only when the first two groups have been practically annihilated or have found a way to slip out of the danger zone. By this time the enemy has been surrounded, and can not get further supplies of ammunition except by air — which is very difficult when a contingent has only a small space in which to defend itself. The shock troops I saw were composed of very young men, strong physically and well-equipped. They are trained in mountain bases from which reinforcements are sent continuously to keep the units at the same strength.

The Communists used to send word before an attack, warning of their strength and announcing that the enemy would be permitted to retreat if they left behind part of their ammunition. Many times I have seen boxes of ammunition left for the Reds by the Japanese, particularly at Ta Ly Ko Chwang and at Ta Wu Niu, both in the district of An-Kwo.

Most of the great battles for the possession of Chinese cities were fought during the night — to prevent action by planes — and at some distance from the city. For example, the battle of Peiping, one of the fiercest in North China, took place in two small towns between Peiping and Kalgan; the combined Communist forces numbered ten times those of their adversaries.

The three qualities that the Communist leaders praise most in their soldiers are: *Yeh Yen* — eyes that can see during the night; *Tieh Kiao* — feet strong as iron, trained to travel fast; *Chen Hsien Tou* — a stomach that requires little food.

The officers of China's Red Army are nearly all Communist Party members, accustomed to obeying rigid party discipline without a word of discussion. Only party members can be promoted quickly. The officers live on the same level with their soldiers, except that they have more responsibilities. When there is no fighting, officers must meet with their men every day to give them special

ideological training, explaining why they are fighting for a New China. Most of the soldiers are peasants who have left their homes for the first time and have no desire to fight. But they are systematically indoctrinated with the idea that they must battle for a great international cause.

Infiltration of the Nationalist armies by secret agents helped bring about the Communist victories. During the war against Japan these agents were sent in large numbers to "volunteer" for service with Chiang's armies. They even penetrated the national military academies, where they showed ardent patriotism and tried to work themselves up to key positions — from which they could spy and propagandize. Inside the armies Communists created cells to spread propaganda.

Here is an example of the effectiveness of this Red undercover work: Immediately after V-J Day, General Sun Lien-Chung, commander of the Eleventh War Zone, came to Peiping to accept the surrender of the Japanese Army in North China. He was appointed governor of Hopei Province. A brave officer and an honest man, he had won important victories over the Japanese. But Communist elements had worked hard among his staff. His chief of military operations, General Sie Che-Yuan, was in the service of the Communist Party. And at the head of the Planning Committee for Hopei Province was Yu Sui-Ts'ing, a former Protestant pastor who was linked with General Li Chi-Shen, now a prominent Communist.

General Ch'eu Fong-Ch'eng, who served under General Sun, had a leading Communist Party member as his chief of staff, but was unaware of it. This chief of staff had all General Ch'eu's bodyguards replaced by Communists who could take control of the provincial government in Paoting, where General Ch'eu was garrison commander.

Such men in high positions under General Sun were responsible for all his defeats in North China. When these activities inside headquarters were finally discovered, it was too late. Most of the territory under his command in Hopei Province had been lost, and even a part of the territory in the strategical triangle of Peiping, Tientsin and Paoting. An important railway junction controlling four provinces, Shih Chia Chwang, had been lost, and Generalissimo Chiang was obliged to remove General Sun from his command. More than 2000 generals and officials were on the inside of this vast Communist plot.

The same tactics were used by the Communists in Mukden and Tsinchow, which led to the disaster of the national armies in Manchuria. The fall of Mukden was China's Stalingrad; its loss marked the beginning of Communist victory.

In the battle of Peiping in 1948–49, the overall commander of North China's armies, General Fu Tso-Yi, had strong support from the people. It is true that he made a few mistakes in the great battle of Peiping and Kalgan. But a major reason for his defeat was the fact that one of his trusted generals, who had been with him for twenty years, was a top Communist, General Teng Pao-Shan, who revealed his true identity to his commander in the midst of the battle. General Fu also discovered too late that his secret code officer was a Communist.

Through their secret agents the Communists always knew the exact strength of the national armies and of the neighboring garrisons. They then surrounded these small garrisons and took them one after the other with all their forces. They treated the Nationalist prisoners well. Giving them a few dollars, they would send them back home or to the National armies just for propaganda purposes. The Communists also distributed cards, telling the Nationalist soldier or officer that if he would come over to them with the card and his weapons, he would be welcomed and given the same grade and position in the Red Army.

Mao's men had a high-sounding slogan, "Chinese will not fight Chinese," and another, "No more civil war," which they used in their attempts to demoralize the National armies. But they never pointed out that the Communists had been the first to attack the national troops and the first to wage civil war.

A slogan the Chinese Communists use among themselves, however, is: "To win, three-tenths military strength is needed; and seven-tenths political and propaganda strength." Communist newspapers, books and leaflets were left by the Red propagandists among the troops of the National armies, in a continuous effort to break down morale.

The National Government of China allowed Communist newspapers to be published in Chungking, the Nationalist capital, but never would the Communists allow a Nationalist newspaper to be published in Communist territory. Communists everywhere preach about the "freedom of the press," but they do not practice it. In China they had "bamboo curtains" from one Communist region to another, and kept strict control over publications in their regions. But if the free Chinese wanted some control over Communist publications, all the Reds and their sympathizers in that region would protest against "imperialistic and oppressive measures taken against freedom of thought."

A young Catholic boy of Tunglu bought, shortly after the war with Japan, a copy of Chiang Kai-shek's book, "China's Destiny." The Communists discovered that he had the book and immediately executed him as "a special agent of the Kuomintang."

A top Chinese Communist once said to me: "We Communists have three great enemies: first, the U.S.A.; second, the Catholic Church; third, Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek." But he immediately added that within China the order was not the same, but should be classified: first, Chiang Kai-shek; second, the U.S.A.; third, the Catholic Church. All the Chinese Red leaders whom I met from 1937 up to 1949 have always recognized that they owe their highest allegiance to Soviet Russia.

We've been measuring the noises made over the loyalty investigations. Winners of our preliminary tabulation, by a few hundred decibels, are those "liberal" columnists, editors and radio commentators who, only a few years ago, saw the Moscow Purge slaughter justified by the fact that, thank God, our Russian Ally had got rid of a fifth column. Raymond Gram Swing and Max Lerner look like top contenders for the "Joseph" — a cute uranium statuette which the Freeman *will award annually to the year's top performer in the "liberal" art of double-entry bookkeeping.*

THE CHALLENGE TO CONGRESS

By EDNA LONIGAN

Washington

THE NEW Congress, which has just taken office for two years, represents an uprising of the American people. The voters, determined to re-establish their sovereignty over executive folly, ignored party labels and voted for the men who promised a total change in American policy — on security, on foreign policy, and on the fifth column at home. For convenience let us call the winners the Insurgents.

Is the Congress ready to accept the mandate given it by the American people? The answer is: No.

A distinguished visitor from abroad recently asked a member of the House: Do the Republicans have a policy and a program to put into effect in January? The Congressman answered, "No. They have hundreds of individual plans, but no joint plan or policy."

Every move of the USSR fits into a precisely coordinated strategical plan made by its politico-military General Staff. The Soviet General Staff will not be outwitted by an American Administration sunk in confusion and heavily infiltrated by Soviet agents or dupes. Neither can it be outwitted by a Congress which remains a debating society with "hundreds of plans" for matching Soviet grand strategy. But the issue is survival. If Congress does not rise to the challenge, there is no other political power in the nation which can preserve our national security.

The burden does not rest on the Republicans alone, because our parties are no longer tools for political action by the voters. It rests on Congress as the deputies of the American people, especially on the Insurgents, those members of Congress who put the national interest first.

Due to the special character of our political system, the people speak on election day. For the next two years they can not act. They have given their political proxies to their "representatives," their agents in the business of governing. In the period between elections, the sovereign power of the American people rests in Congress.

Congress can carry out its mandate, or it can fail. But it can not shift responsibility to the electorate. If Congress fails to meet the problems of the next two years, the American people are helpless to direct events.

Far beyond any differences between Republicans and Democrats, we face today a constitutional crisis, if we are to mobilize our energies to resist Soviet attack. So far in American history, the Congress has had to carry only the legislative function within an agreed-on constitutional framework. Now it must take over the basic parliamentary or constitutional role of guardian of the people's sovereign power to impose its will on the executive.

Those who know how deeply the American executive establishment has been debauched over the last seventeen years, and how well the Soviet leaders have learned to manipulate it through its weakness, will watch the new session of Congress with dread and hope.

The American "government," that is, the executive establishment, is now a monstrosity. Behind the paper curtain which separates federal operations from the public and from Congress, a sprawling mass has grown up, fed by easy money and loose powers. We still have the residue of the juvenile New Deal which, like a Don Quixote, set out to charge the windmills of capitalism. To that was added the global New Deal which made our military and political strategy in war time. Another group, the international Socialist elite, dreams of blocking communism by setting up a benevolent despotism under their all-knowing eye. In addition there is the combination of local political machines, labor union politicians, "liberals," and others, held together through the PAC-ADA to furnish the votes necessary to keep the combine in power.

Such a congeries can not win a war. Though 95 per cent of the people in the Administration are patriotic and hardworking, their energies are wasted. This Administration is older, tireder, more confused, more deeply infiltrated than in 1945 when it lost the peace. It is unthinkable that this confused mass could outwit the Russian strategists. Promises to "crack down" or to "declare an emergency" or to draft every last man or dollar, are noisy substitutes for the ability to think.

If we have not studied the change in our executive, the Communists have. They know every inch of the terrain as they know the terrain in Korea. Their agents are strategically placed at key points. The Soviet plan for our destruction is to use the Administration's confusion, its gross overextension and disorder, to help us make the wrong strategic decisions, to do too much and too soon, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, while the critics who would save us are denounced for "disunity"! The Soviet Union can ignore all our military preparations, and count on its ability to win the last battle, so long as this senile Goliath makes the strategy for using our mobilized power.

The American people did not re-elect this Administration in 1940, 1944, or 1948. The voters were kept from making a choice by the use of money and mass propaganda on one side, and virtual abdication of party responsibility on the other. So long as the issues were domestic and abstract, the voters did not care. On June 25 their indifference vanished. Now, under our political system, there is no way to repair the damage except through Congress.

Can the American Congress make this crucial turn in its own role, beset as its members are by the confusions and alarms that harry all of us?

Since 1933 (or longer) the Congress has been in retreat. Except for the magnificent fight against packing the Supreme Court, the Congress as an institution has not been able to cope with the new type of executive, built on printing-press money, mass political organization and its

own press. Members of Congress, like most Americans, clung to logical and rational arguments about the Constitution and "free enterprise," while the Administration was skilfully using the arts of psychology, dream fantasies of welfare, and secret consolidation of key positions.

Everything changed on June 25. Due partly to an avalanche of letters from home, partly to seeing come to pass what they had really expected all along, partly to simple patriotism, most members of Congress have had only one thought — our national security. Congress has tried to convert itself from an acquiescent council, managed by the executive and its political machine in the districts, into a body of "representatives" responsible for the nation's survival. It has tried valiantly to compel the Administration to clean house and get on with national security.

Concretely, the problem before the legislators was to find out what the professional military men recommended to protect us, and who was trying to block that program either through palace politics, diversionary programs, propaganda, or manipulation of the hidden wires of UN.

In 1950 Congress did not, with all its efforts, break the stranglehold of the State Department on military strategy. It could not block President Truman's interference with Chiang Kai-shek's attacks on the invaders of his own country. Congress has not yet insisted that the military make a military plan for our national safety. It has not touched the problem of our economic survival in a bigger and more terrible war economy.

If we look at the reasons for its frustrations and defeats since June, we can see what Congress will have to cope with in the present session, if it is to compel the executive power to serve our national interest.

Congress can get the right information. Its members have done a fine intellectual job in analyzing our foreign and military policy. But they have hesitated to insist on their judgments.

The hearings on ECA, for example, ran to thousands of pages. In those hearings alone members of Congress brought out all the information necessary to protect us *in advance* against the debacle in Asia. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was kept in the public eye by the Administration, was securely under the thumb of the executive, through Connolly for the Democrats and Vandenberg nominally representing the Republicans. But the House Committee on Foreign Affairs did an excellent job. Walter Judd brought out all the weaknesses of both our European and our Asian policies. Alone he asked the questions that would have saved us. Jackson of California, John Davis Lodge, Smith of Wisconsin, and others, pressed hard on the witnesses who parroted the State Department's party line. They tried to find out what our professional military men thought of our defense policies. They wanted to know why ECA was not coupled with an arms program for Europe before we "set the table" so richly as to tempt the invader. They wanted to know by what strategy we could defend ourselves in Europe if we announced that we were abandoning our flank in Asia.

The Insurgents in both houses voted against economic aid for Korea when State refused to let Syngman Rhee, that "little inferior Chiang Kai-shek," as Lattimore called him, have a few guns and tanks to defend his people. They demanded to know why we had abandoned our friends — and proved anti-Communists, to boot — like Free China and Poland, while we played footie with Tito. They asked what line we would hold if we abandoned Formosa and Korea: Would it turn out to be California, Washington and Oregon?

Congress was unable to save us in Asia for two reasons — because it did not have communication with the people, and because it contented itself with criticism, and did not accept its constitutional duty to lay down policy and tell the executive agencies to follow it, or else.

The public could not hear what the legislators were saying, partly because the news of Congress is no longer fully and fairly reported to the public. Garet Garrett and others have pointed out for years the political danger in this vacuum in the news. The Administration and its "liberal" allies have filled the vacuum with a vast propaganda machine, which carries the State Department story out through the labor union press, the women's clubs, church groups, and schools and colleges, to create a synthetic "public opinion."

It would be impossible to exaggerate the danger to our safety from this curious political control of the "market of men's minds." The free press no longer covers the whole American scene, to light us on our way. A combination of the more aggressive federal agencies and of "liberal" pressure groups, controls a large area of the exchange of ideas, and the Communists, as always, have put some of their best people into key places in the apparatus. Every important Administration policy today is supported not by free public opinion but by this well-financed propaganda machine, and woe to those who try to oppose it. Congress is as helpless as private citizens in its attempt to present the opposition viewpoint.

Congressmen know that much of the "public opinion" which reaches them is synthetic, but that is not the worst evil. The price we pay for centralized control over the flow of ideas is that our political ideas are not properly formed or sharpened in debate. Our people have to depend on slogans, like the people of a politically infantile nation. This is not a passing handicap. It is the signature of the struggle of today that power first tries to confuse public opinion. That will go on as long as power is unrestrained. Because it is so, we have to fight this war "as on a darkling plain . . . Where ignorant armies clash by night."

In the absence of a sound public opinion, the public could only demand that "something must be done about" Korea. Trying to avoid one error Congress fell into the ditch on the other side. It did not say, "Before we do something in a hurry, we must find out what is the right thing to do. Before we vote for universal military training, or price controls, we need to know whether we should be in Korea at all, whether we should have sent in ground forces or the Navy and Air Force, whether the best defense of Korea is to arm our friends in Free China, or ask for air bases in Iran, or change our UN representatives."

The war with Soviet Russia requires first, thinking; second, thinking, and third, thinking. Congress has men of great ability, ready and able to think. But it does not yet see that its business is to think through all basic policies, and find out how to report to the American people.

The weakness of Congress in the Korean period was that it still followed its New Deal habit of waiting for directions, and left to the Administration the framing of

policy. It kept to the negative role of criticism. But that in itself is a concession to the leadership principle, the trend to totalitarianism. In a free society, the people, through their representatives, lay down the policies, and the "government" executes them. Roosevelt and the elite he trained knew that you can not stop a policy with a fact. Anyone who has made a policy is in a stronger position than his critics. A synthesis can not be defended by an analysis. All the facts in the world will not help anyone to think. Between facts and policies is a gap the mind must leap by great effort. Strategic thinking uses the creative mind, even when it is for destructive purposes. The only answer to a strategic plan is another strategic plan.

It was not enough for Congressmen to vote against economic aid for Korea for good reasons — because no military aid was attached. They were certain to be pressured to give in, and they had no ground on which to stand. Their only choice was to make and to announce a counter policy such as, "No economic aid without a military protecting wall." If that involved deciding on Formosa, Japan, the Philippines and Europe, so much the better. No real answer to anything was possible until the military had made the overall strategic plan for our security, and for defeat of Russia if she attacked us.

In pursuit of a military plan for their base line, Congress would have been forced to deal with another question raised by Representative Judd — were the military making our military plans or was the State Department doing it? Again, who took the teeth out of the Truman Doctrine, and worked out the plan for European economic aid without arms? Who picked our Defense chiefs? Who forced Denfield out? Who put Marshall, darling of the State Department, into the top Defense job? Until Congress was willing to tear open all those mysteries, it could not save us from defeat.

Because the lawmakers were not ready to assert control over policy, the Administration was able to keep Congress bogged down during the fatal weeks of the Formosa debate in a wrangle over the Defense Production Act, which the abler members knew perfectly well was a rehash of the Administration's bill for governmental control of all industry in peace time, the infamous Spence Bill.

This diversion is worth more than passing notice. Congress still believes that we can win this war by "all-out production." But that is the fatal military error of "winning the last war." The first World War and the second were won by American production. The third will be lost that way if we do not wake in time. Our all-important problem is grand strategy — what to do and where to do it. The best way to keep people from making strategical decisions is to give them busy work. This is the assignment of Russia's agents in our government. If the American people can be kept milling about making quantities of guns and tanks, shutting their minds in the name of "national unity," they will certainly lose the chess game with Russia, and the penalty is national death.

If it is to lead us away from our errors of the past, Congress will need to disengage itself both from popular demands for "all-out production" or mobilization, and for Administration demands (skilfully abetted by the Communists) for vast sums and vast powers for more giantism in place of thinking. If Americans rely on mass output to win this war, they will be like the little boy who flexes his muscles to knock out the neighborhood bully, while the bully slips a banana peel under his feet. On the world stage, in the decisive battle of civilization against barbarism, that is not amusing.

Officials like to pretend that they have more and better information than Congress. But that is pure bluff. They have more "inside" information, more slanted information, and more undigested information. An Admiral Mahan or a Homer Lea, sitting alone in his study, could make better plans for our security than all the vast machinery of the Defense establishment. Senator Taft could see the truth about Nuremberg, Millikin could point out the illusions of Point Four, Nixon and McCarthy could bring out more about communism in the State Department, Wherry had better information about Yalta, than all the blind Administration experts who would not see.

Yet even today Senator Taft hesitates to take the vacant place on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, because "the President has primary power in that field and members of the Foreign Relations Committee can play only a secondary role." He is referring to a favorite idea of the schoolmasters, that the President is supreme in foreign policy. The Constitution says the President may *act* to meet a crisis, but it does not imply that he can pursue the wrong course indefinitely. The doctrine of the professors ignores the living reality of foreign policy — national security. In a government under law, Congress is responsible for setting goals in foreign policy.

Another issue that will confront the Eighty-second Congress is congressional abdication on UN. No one believes the myth that our delegates sit and wait for UN to think. They have instructions — on Korea, on Formosa, on the seating of Communist China. What are their instructions? If the State Department does not report openly and frankly to Congress, then Congress will have to make our policies, and give them to State.

Practically all the competent men in our armed forces believed it was unwise to defend Korea and suicidal to send in ground forces. Who made the military strategy, if it was not the military? Only Congress can find out. It must find the best military men and let them decide.

The executive establishment is too obese to make plans to defeat Russia, and the clever few in the Administration can not be trusted to make American plans. The American people have voted their proxies to Congress. The Grand Strategy for freedom can be made only by Congress, by the Eighty-second Congress.

After 1918, Italy, Germany, Hungary and Spain found themselves in the position we are in today — with Communist armies threatening to attack from without, aided by a Communist fifth column even in government, and the decay of official virtue from within. In the European countries the parliaments failed in their task of rallying the people for defense of their nation. In their desperation, the people turned either to a military dictator like Franco, or a "savior" from the masses, carried to power on waves of outraged patriotism. Americans do not want either solution.

Can representative government in America meet the crisis of a Laocoon struggle with communism? The new Congress will give the answer.

THE VESTING GAME

By FRANK CHODOROV

THE BASIC problem of civilization today is neither the atom bomb, nor war, nor even the progressive system of education. Rather, it is this: will society prosper better if it is rid of its property by the hold-up man or the confidence man? That is the riddle of the twentieth-century sphinx.

In that part of the world comfortably ensconced behind what we call the Iron Curtain the problem has reached a solution. The forthright and definitive methods of the hold-up man have prevailed and society has settled down to a regimen of black bread, cabbage soup and the glory of the fatherland. Since that is the sum-total of property the individual may aspire to, he is unperturbed by hope; proving, if proof were necessary, that man can get along on plenty of nothing.

It is only in countries enjoying the blessings of democracy that the problem is still rampant. There, too, the disposition to regard property as an evil is strong; the only question is how to get rid of the evil, so that all may be showered with abundance. At this writing, the majorities favor the soporifics of the confidence game: gradualness, protocol, and Keynesian economics. Taken as a whole, these methods are known as socialism, although in America the proponents prefer some native nomenclature, like New Deal, Fair Deal or the Welfare State. There is general agreement that communism, the direct method of confiscation, is as distasteful as private property itself. The confidence man is preferred.

England is about to provide an example of his magic. January 1, 1951, New Year's Day in most of the Christian world, was celebrated in that corner of civilization as Vesting Day. For, according to the calendar of the Socialist government, that day formally ushered in the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain, the new state controlled and operated monopoly. The property of 92 of the largest producers of iron and steel will be taken over by the benign government, the lesser fry will be put under state license. Henceforth, no Englishman may smelt a ton of iron or make a bobby pin without permission of the Minister of Supply. Private property in all things ferrous will have disappeared. It will have been done by protocol, the democratic process, not by the ruthless methods of communism.

We are not here concerned with the future generations of Englishmen. Their propertyless millennium is assured. Before the advent, however, many thrifty Englishmen had put their savings into the iron and steel business. These savings they called their property, and it is in the manner of their divestment from it that the fine hand of the confidence man is shown. When, in due time, the stockholders of the United States Steel Corporation are confronted with nationalization, the British pattern will probably serve the American confidence man; we should therefore examine it. No dentist ever pulled a tooth more painlessly; no woman was ever seduced with greater promise.

Quoting from the statement issued by the British Information Services, the holders of the securities of the companies about to be taken over

> are to be compensated by the issue of such British Iron and Steel Stock as in the opinion of the British Treasury is or was at the general date of transfer of a value equal to the value of the securities, regard being had (in estimating the value of the stock so issued) to the market value of Government bonds at or about that date. . . . The methods of calculating the "take-over" price vary, but basically the method is to calculate the average of the market prices of the securities on two groups of dates — one group in 1945, the other in 1948. The higher average price is taken as compensation price.

It should be pointed out that the word "stock" in British usage does not always convey the idea that Americans attach to it; in the present case it does not signify a proprietary interest in the new monopoly, but a certificate bearing a specified earning power guaranteed by the government. The corporation will apparently include this fixed rate of interest in its operational costs and price its products accordingly. However, should the outgo exceed the income — a probability with state monopolies — the tax-fund will make up the deficit. In the words of the confidence man, "you can't lose."

When you look into the consequences of this forced sale of iron and steel securities you see that their value will shortly evaporate, as intended by the Socialists. But, before we go into that, we might ask why the Socialists do not issue government bonds in exchange for these securities, as they did in the case of the Bank of England and several other nationalized industries. At the office of the British Information Services that question was put, and the only answer received from the circumspect young man was, "The owners of the Bank of England did very well for themselves." A more definite answer is provided by Wall Street quotations on British government bonds; some issues can be bought at less than half their face value, and thereby hangs a tale.

The more bonds a government issues the lower their value, especially when taxes, the only security behind the bonds, have reached the point of discouraging production. That goal has been achieved in England. The economy of that country, even with American gratuities, simply can not stand an increase in taxation, and any increase in the national debt must result in a further dilution of the value of the existing bonds. The issuance of stock instead of bonds as purchase price for the iron and steel industry is done with the hope that this dilution will be retarded. It is a fatuous hope, because the stock, like the bonds, is a charge against the taxing powers of the government. However, the appearance of something different is effected, and it is in appearances rather than in realities that the art of the confidence man consists.

Well, then, the iron and steel investors get stock instead of bonds as "compensation." What will be the

value of this stock? The value of any security is determined by the "higgling and haggling" of the market; but if there are no "higglers and hagglers" what is its value? Who will bid for the stock issued by a politically-managed corporation? Those who are about to receive the stock are not bidding for it; they are compelled to accept it. They will be stuck with it. The best they can hope for is that the aggregate of interest payments will equal their original capital. Even in this hope they will be disappointed, simply because through taxation they will be paying themselves the interest they receive.

Putting aside the question of stock values, can the Iron and Steel Corporation operate at a profit, so that it can pay the stipulated interest out of income? Since it is an absolute monopoly, protected from internal competition by prohibition and from external competition by tariffs, it can fix its prices so as to include interest obligations, no matter what its operation costs might be. However, as prices rise consumption falls off and so does income; to offset that consequence, the government must resort to ordering the manufacture of things nobody wants or is willing to pay for; to pay for such "pyramids" it turns to taxation. This it can continue to do until the rubber band snaps — until people lose all interest in production and concern themselves only with existence and reproduction. When that time comes, as it must, will the "compensated" stockholders receive the stipulated payments? From what source?

The very idea that a government can or should run a business for profit is preposterous. That is not within its province or competence. Government is, at best, an instrument for rendering service, presumably for the benefit of the citizenry as a whole. Even if it were possible for political management to run a business so that its income from sales exceeded its operational costs, political considerations would compel it to lower its prices. It is "our" business and why should "we" price its products so as to continue paying "tribute" to its erstwhile owners? Indeed, the very premise of socialization is to wipe out profits, the basic evil of society, and it must be presumed that just as soon as it is politically feasible the "compensated" stockholders will be completely uncompensated.

Already we can see in the plans for this new state monopoly how political considerations will affect its management. In the first place, the supreme head of this corporation is the Minister of Supply, a politician, not a manufacturer of steel. He will appoint the managing board. Will he appoint Conservatives or Laborites? No matter how sincere and disinterested he might try to be, can he appoint to the management men who, regardless of their competence, are opposed to the whole scheme?

In the Act establishing the corporation, provision is made for the establishment of a Consumers' Council, "which shall consider any matter affecting the interests of consumers (including prices). Consumers may make representations to the Council." Also, "The Council has powers to appoint other consumers' committees." In a competitive market the council of consumers are always making representations to the company by buying or rejecting its products. With a nationalized industry, however, the council of consumers must resort to the political weapon; they must become a pressure group, a lobby, and their representations then consist of asking for privileges, with votes as the *quid pro quo*. Will they countenance profits in favor of stockholders?

And, of course, labor must have something to say in the management of the business, so long as laborers are voters. "The conditions of employment, pension rights, compensation to officers, etc." shall be determined by an Iron and Steel Arbitration Tribunal. This Tribunal shall be appointed by the Lord Chancellor [another politician], and will be empowered to settle any dispute by "arbitration under the Act." The Tribunal will most assuredly have regard for the claims of the politically potent working force; in time, compulsory arbitration will render this force impotent, but in the meantime its demands for prerogatives, including higher wages to meet the higher tax levies, will take precedence over the legal claims of the stockholders.

If this were not enough to liquidate the fiction of "compensation," there is evidence of another sort. In other parts of the British Empire, particularly South Africa and India, private initiative is engaged in the building of iron and steel plants. We can take it for granted that these plants will be more efficiently run than the state monopoly in England, and will be able to undersell it. Unless the Socialist government is prepared finally to dissolve the Empire by prohibiting importations from these Dominions, this competition will just about reduce the Iron and Steel Corporation to a ghost enterprise. What, then, will the holders of its securities receive as "compensation"?

All of which adds up to the dictum: "Never give a sucker a break."

MIDAS

Survival is the gold
For which man steals and slays,
Thinking to seize and hold
In fierce, felonious ways
A shield against sure death,
A deed to ceaseless breath.

Such colored currency
Pays for a tinted power
That keeps no mortal free
And, in his failing hour,
Fails him who failed it first
By thinking mildness worst.

Has not man seen a small
Tangle of vine-roots pierce
And blast a masoned wall
And never once be fierce;
By simple growth alone
Outdoing deathless stone?

Why then should he whose vine
Of understanding strains
The creviced, mortared line
Of time, crave power that wanes,
Like his who got too much
Being given the golden touch?

RAYMOND HOLDEN

AT THE OLD STAND

By GEORGE LANGDON

FROM October 3 to 15 there took place in Lucknow, India, a sustained anti-American orgy of oratory and debate. This was the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations. For days on end Asian delegates lambasted the United States. They echoed the Soviet propaganda line which represents this nation to the Far East as a soulless, resources-grabbing, imperialistic, warmongering conglomeration of predatory colonialists. The fierceness and ignorance revealed by these attacks by self-styled Asian intellectuals shocked a lot of people here at home. So the questions were asked: How does it happen that, while the United States spends billions in aid to Asia, we are still being pictured as imperialist gangsters? How does it happen that allegedly well-informed Asians have such distorted notions of American aims and motives?

There are many answers to these questions. Some of them have to do with Asia's self-conscious racialism, which keeps crashing through the thin overlay of professional liberalism. Then there is Asia's inferiority complex, its ambivalent attitude toward American technological efficiency. But let us concentrate right now on one answer. It is this: Asia has been learning about United States policy from the same "experts" who have been telling the American people what to think and do about Asia. Above all, the very Institute of Pacific Relations which sponsored the Lucknow meeting has for years been acting as a two-way clearing house of facts and ideas between Asia and America.

For the past few years, the IPR has tried hard to rid itself of its Communist taint. The leading position which Communist Frederick V. Field formerly held in the Institute influenced the selection of research and editorial personnel; as a result, the organization's publications gave aid and comfort to the Communists year after year. Lately, the IPR has protested its purity and innocence. But the Lucknow conference illustrates once more that the association's administration has failed to cut itself loose from its disastrous affiliations. That is doubly dangerous because graduates from the IPR research mill have entrenched themselves in such key spots as the State Department's Far Eastern Division and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The men and women selected to attend the Lucknow conference as United States delegates indicate the manner in which the IPR continues to operate. Among them was Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, research director of the Foreign Policy Association. Mrs. Dean, who for many years has been a leading apologist for Russia, reviewed the Lucknow conference in a series of eight articles in the *Christian Science Monitor*. She was billed as "an authority on Far Eastern affairs," which is like calling Owen Lattimore an expert on the Scandinavian labor movement. But the *Monitor*, which lately has printed the output of Harold R. Isaacs, leading U. S. champion of Indo-China's Communist rebel leader Ho Chi Minh, seems to have new and fluctuating standards of journalistic accuracy. Anyway, Mrs. Dean, whose writings usually adorn the pages of the *Nation*, well illustrated IPR-ism when she asked in her concluding article:

> Is the United States in a position to take the leadership of the revolution that is sweeping Asia, or will the trend to the right manifested by American public opinion cause Washington to stake the nation's manpower and material resources on an all-out attempt to support any government or group, no matter how reactionary, provided it undertakes to oppose Russia and communism?

Obviously, Mrs. Dean thinks American public opinion should be ignored and that the appeasement technique that lost us China should be applied to the rest of Asia. Obviously, she looks with disfavor upon any support for the few genuinely anti-Communist forces and regimes still left in Asia. And, obviously too, she thus advocates the very thing the Communists would like to see happen. To cite once more her draggy prose:

> The important thing now for the United States is to see Asia as it is, not as we would like it to be, and decide whether or not, irrespective of our domestic preferences or antipathies about socialism and communism, we are willing to help the Asian peoples to complete the revolutionary process through which they are now going, even if this process may result in changes at present advocated by the Communists.

What, exactly, are we supposed to do? Presumably we are to abandon Indo-China to Ho Chi Minh, the Philippines to the Hukbalahaps, and invite Mao Tse-tung to extend his "revolutionary process" throughout Korea and the Malay peninsula. Mrs. Dean's interpretation is printed under the heading "Asians See Misgivings in U. S. Antileftist Stand." It may be suggested that this particular authoress, now that her pro-Russia apologias have become thoroughly unfashionable, has transferred her old predilection for "revolutionary processes" in eastern Europe to the Far East; only now it is not the anti-Communists of Hungary, Poland or Rumania that are labeled as dikes blocking the wave of the future, but the "reactionary" groups of Asia.

Among the speakers at the Lucknow conference was Harold M. Vinacke, professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati and a veteran of OWI during its Lattimorean Period. Professor Vinacke explained to his Asian listeners how the Republicans made things tough for the idealistic Democratic policy-makers in the State Department's Far Eastern Division. Republican criticism, Vinacke told the Asians, "was primarily directed toward embarrassing and weakening the Administration rather than toward establishing sound lines of future development." In documenting his paper, Professor Vinacke relied heavily on IPR publications, including the writings of Mrs. Dean. This is characteristic of the merry-go-round technique of documentation by

these "experts": they keep quoting each other, thus strengthening the prestige of their own small clique.

For instance, another American delegate, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, quotes the writings of Lawrence K. Rosinger — formerly one of Mrs. Dean's research associates and a champion of Chinese communism, who is now a fellow research associate of Finkelstein with the IPR; and he also, of course, relies heavily on the writings of Harold R. Isaacs. So the merry-go-round keeps turning, without any sign of ever breaking down. Finkelstein, in talking at Lucknow, typified the masochistic attitude of our Asia "experts" toward the Far East. Instead of expressing an American point of view, dictated by the interests of the security of the United States, these "experts" keep scraping and bowing before Asian "intellectuals." Far from telling these Asians that the United States does not share their naive notions about the anti-colonialist and pro-nationalist aims of communism, they keep lambasting their own compatriots for being better informed and more mature in their comprehension of the Soviet menace, and for having minds of their own. These "experts" would have Americans imitate the dizzy wishful thinking of Sri (formerly Pandit) Nehru; they keep writhing under and apparently enjoying the blows that Asians direct at the United States.

Finkelstein, a new research star on the IPR's horizon, bemoans the "inadequacy of American policy which stems from a failure to understand soon enough the revolutionary flavor of contemporary Asia." He says, just like Mrs. Dean, that "to influence the direction and content of the revolutionary tide in Southeast Asia, the United States would have to embrace it." And he laments the fact that "by the demands of crisis in Europe which required alliance with the very colonial powers against which revolution in Southeast Asia was in part directed," the United States embraced a "psychology of fear which has permeated the American body politic, displacing reason." This naturally sparked the abusive oratory of those Asian intellectuals who ridicule America for its "hysterical" attitude toward communism.

The Lucknow conference failed to present even one documented American address analyzing the history and aims of world communism in Asia. Instead of telling Asians the facts about the Kremlin's Far Eastern aspirations, American delegates castigated their own homeland before a delightedly receptive alien audience. Disregard for American security was further illustrated by George McT. Kahin, who addressed the conference on the subject of Indonesia. Mr. Kahin is a protégé of Owen Lattimore at Johns Hopkins University, where he is assistant professor of international relations. His thesis was that the United States must keep pouring money into Indonesia, and back that nation's expansionist demands for western New Guinea. He disregarded the fact that the Indonesians, in contrast even to such fence-sitting countries as India, declared themselves neutral on Communist aggression in Korea, that they threatened their nationals with loss of citizenship should they volunteer to serve the United Nations in Korea, and that in case of world conflict the New Guinea naval base of Hollandia would be impotent in Indonesian hands.

Instead, Lattimore's protégé argued that American terms attached to economic assistance would "strengthen the psychological conditions favorable to the growth of Soviet influence in Indonesia." In other words, the United States should bow to whatever demands there are, and let itself be blackmailed with the give-us-what-we-want-or-we'll-go-Communist gimmick.

The Lucknow meeting was financed with monies supplied by the Rockefeller and other multi-million-dollar institutions and foundations, who thus chipped in for their own ultimate destruction. The Americans in attendance, if they did not aid and abet the anti-American orgy with their own contributions, were of the caliber of *New Republic* editor Michael Straight — earnest left-wingers awed by the shadow of Gandhi and easily ecstatic at the sight of a rice paddy. Living under the illusion that everyone east of Suez has bathed soul and mind in a mixture of mellow Confucianism and Buddhist serenity, they were no match for the abuse heaped on the United States. *New York Times* correspondent Robert Trumbull observed that most American delegates "had no previous experience in India" and were "stunned by the nature of the attacks."

Once again the Institute of Pacific Relations crowd has served the cause of democracy very badly indeed. It keeps telling Americans that we just don't understand Asia, its mysticism, its spiritual heritage, its ancient wisdom. But perhaps the time has come for Asians to try and understand the wholly unmysterious people of the United States. These people, who reside in the northern part of the Western Hemisphere and number 150 millions, have suffered more than 30,000 casualties in an Asiatic country known as Korea. By doing so, they tried to help other Asian nations to remain free from Communist tyranny. These American people have learned that they can expect little or no thanks for their sacrifices, or for the food and technical aid they send abroad.

They are getting tired of wiping the mud off their faces every time some semi-informed Asian intellectual holds forth on the wickedness of "American imperialism." They are also getting fed up with the Asia-loving "experts" in their own midst, who keep whining in academic vernacular that they are ashamed of being Americans.

THE KISS OF DEATH

The Kremlin recently decided it was high time to give Owen Lattimore a friendly pat on the shoulder. This was done in the characteristic, clumsily devious Bolshevik manner. In the authoritative magazine *Novy Mir* for November 1950 appeared a long and exceedingly favorable review of Dr. Lattimore's book, "The Situation in Asia," published in 1949. The review is prefaced by the familiar statement that since the liberation of Europe and Asia by the glorious Red Army there has been a wonderful resurgence of the Asiatic peoples against their Anglo-American exploiters.

Novy Mir calls Dr. Lattimore "an outstanding Far Eastern specialist of the United States Department of State," "one of the few collaborators of Acheson who is actually acquainted with conditions in the Far East," and "a bourgeois with a sober approach to Far Eastern problems."

"Lattimore's views," says the review, "are entirely different from the wild, nightmarish views of American re-

actionaries." The Johns Hopkins professor is presented as understanding the true nature of Soviet democracy, and as knowing that it is Soviet propaganda which attracts the Asiatic peoples. He also knows, according to the Moscow journal, that colonial peoples "who are shot at from American guns see more and more clearly that Russia is their true friend"; that it is "sheer madness to oppose the admission of [Communist] China into the UN."

Emphasis is laid on the high esteem in which Owen Lattimore holds the Soviet Union and everything Moscow stands for. "The utterances of this bourgeois American observer," says the magazine, "are an indictment of the ruling circles of the United States, and of the entire postwar policy of the imperialist camp." *Novy Mir* is pleased to note that Dr. Lattimore's indictments are directed exclusively at the United States. He indicts America's intervention in the civil war in China; he indicts our policy in the Philippines, Japan, Iran, Indo-China and elsewhere in the East — Far, Near and Middle.

The review ends with a strong condemnation of the United States Government for not having followed the course outlined by Dr. Lattimore. The ruling circles of the United States, *Novy Mir* maintains, have refused to accept the advice he has so magnanimously given. This saddens Moscow no end. ARGUS

TITO PLOTTED TO BETRAY US

By PETER LAWRENCE

IN 1943, Marshal Tito, leader of the Yugoslav Communist partisans and ally of the United States and Great Britain, offered Nazi Germany his support against the Western powers. Although Tito had been maintained almost exclusively by Western support and supplies, he did not hesitate to turn against his trusting allies when, in the interest of communism, this seemed expedient.

The story of the Tito-Hitler alliance has escaped American attention. As a contribution to the debate on unconditional American aid to the tottering Yugoslav dictator, I want to put on the record these generally unknown facts about Tito, the "good" Communist and would-be beneficiary of State Department gullibility.

The authority for this new and astounding revelation is Walter Hagen, a key member of the German secret service. Hagen told the story in a fascinating book entitled "Die Geheime Front," just published in Zurich, Switzerland (pages 263 to 268). The veracity of his statements has been checked; he is a well-informed and trustworthy witness who speaks from first-hand knowledge.

Early in 1943 Tito's men captured a detachment of the *Organisation Todt.* Although the partisans ordinarily killed their prisoners, and in this case shot the Croatian members of the detachment, they sent the highest ranking German prisoner to the German Commanding General at Zagreb, the Austrian quisling Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, who had been a cabinet minister in Austria. The partisans offered to release their eleven German prisoners in exchange for one partisan woman held by the Nazis. Glaise naturally accepted the offer. Without waiting for the woman's liberation, Tito released the prisoners, stating that a German general's word was enough for him!

Shortly afterward Tito sent the Communist General Velebit — who later was to become Yugoslav Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs — to Glaise and initiated negotiations for a general exchange of prisoners. During these negotiations, Tito suddenly asked the Germans whether they would be willing to conclude an armistice with the partisans, to be based on the principle of "live and let live": If the Germans would relinquish western Bosnia to partisan rule, Tito would stop guerrilla and sabotage activity in Croatia.

While still debating the merits of this offer, the Germans learned that Tito was preventing British and American observers from gathering intelligence about the partisans. He had ordered systematic efforts to mislead and deceive the British and Americans. There were many other indications that Tito was beginning to view his friends as enemies in the making. German intelligence about this change in Tito's relations with the West came from intercepting orders from Tito to his subordinate commands. Therefore it was authentic.

The Germans were wondering what to make of these developments when a Communist courier sent from Stalin to Tito was arrested at Pecs, Hungary. The courier revealed to his captors the message he was carrying to Tito: According to Soviet intelligence, the Western powers would invade the Balkans and land on the Adriatic coast. If this should happen, Stalin authorized Tito to throw in his lot with the Nazis and, together with the Wehrmacht, attack the British and American invasion forces.

Secret instructions from Moscow to Tito customarily were sent through more than one channel. Hence the Germans were certain that Tito's behavior soon would show whether or not the courier's information was a plant. Sure enough: within a few weeks Velebit, who in the meantime had become the honored house guest of Glaise-Horstenau, informed the Germans that the partisans had decided to prevent a Western conquest of the Balkans. They stood ready to fight together with the Germans against the expected Anglo-American invasion.

To the more realistic Nazis, Tito's offer of alliance was a life-saver. The wires were set buzzing and Ribbentrop hurried to Hitler. Fool that he was, Hitler rejected Tito's proposal with the words: "You don't negotiate with rebels. You shoot them." Tito returned to the Western camp, temporarily a faithful ally of the United Nations.

During the Rajk trial at Budapest (September 1949), the Communists revealed part of this Tito-Nazi plot. Naturally, the Zagreb negotiations were represented as a treasonable act, undertaken on Tito's own initiative, without authorization from Moscow. It was asserted that Tito had discontinued negotiations only "when the great Red Army victories of 1943 convinced him that the Germans could not win the war."*

Was not Allied help withdrawn from the Chetniks because they had negotiated with the Germans? Was not General Mihailovich executed because, for reasons of survival, he arranged a *modus vivendi* with the Germans — a "crime" far smaller than Tito's proposed betrayal on the battlefield? Is not the switching of sides during combat the most treasonable of all treasonable acts?

Query to the State Department: How reliable is Tito as an ally?

*Derek Kartun, "Tito's Plot against Europe." New York: International Publishers, 1950. p. 43.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

SELECTED By J. B. MATTHEWS

This must be a year of anxiety for the Republicans. The people of California will decide whether Gov. Warren has given them all they desire or whether they wish to try the Democratic party and a younger man.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, New York *World-Telegram and Sun*, November 7, 1950

The Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination. The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things.

OWEN LATTIMORE, *Solution in Asia*, quoted in *Soviet Russia Today*, July 1945

Perhaps the greatest triumph of the Russian dictatorship to date is this: it has taught the lesson that has been implicit in the specialization and interdependence of the machine age — plan or perish.

NORMAN THOMAS, *New York Times Magazine*, February 13, 1949

In the five months I spent with the Chinese Communists I saw not the slightest tangible connection with Russia. There were no Russian supplies — no guns, planes, or equipment. There were no Russian military or political advisers.

HARRISON FORMAN, *Report from Red China*, p. 176

Knowing Aglipay [Communist leader in the Philippines] gave me the feeling of having been as close to history as if I had known Jefferson, or Lincoln, or Bolivar, or Garibaldi, or Juarez, or Lenin, or Sun Yat-sen . . . Aglipay was an utterly charming personality, friendly and natural . . . I have met only one other person with the same warm, compelling humanity and appeal — General Chu Teh [Red China's top general].

NYM WALES (Mrs. Edgar Snow), *The Protestant*, March-April 1946

Marshal Stalin looked well, strong and unworried. I was again impressed with the modesty, practical common sense and wisdom of this extraordinary man. He is a quiet man; but he reflects an immense fortitude, courage and innate power.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES, *Soviet Russia Today*, August 1943

The United States will at once stop the production of bombs from material currently produced. This includes the preparation of sub-assemblies and all other procedures involved in the fabrication of bombs.

For one year, which would be a reasonable time for the commission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the Governments concerned, we will stop accumulating purified plutonium, and uranium-235, which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs. The plants which produce these materials will be kept merely in a stand-by condition. For this purpose they will run at the minimum rate compatible with maintaining them in good order, but they will not accumulate the resulting purified and fissionable products. As produced, these will be eliminated by appropriate means, such as dumping them into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture.

Proposal by PHILIP C. JESSUP *et al*, *New York Times*, February 16, 1946

For what else is our country, "the country that is building socialism," if not the base of the world revolution?

JOSEPH STALIN, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 75

It was impossible not to love these good-looking, gay Red Army soldiers.

QUENTIN REYNOLDS, *The Curtain Rises*, p. 71

We should recognize that no matter how much we may disagree with communism, dislike Communists, resent their activities, they are no real menace within this conservative country of ours . . . I can conceive of no more stupid strategy for liberals to pursue than to permit the enemy to establish the line of battle; to surrender to hostile propaganda; to split apart; to fight among themselves because some will and some will not permit Communists to share in the battle to save our liberties and protect our institutions.

STANLEY M. ISAACS, New York City Councilman, *New Republic*, May 20, 1946, p. 733

In the future when we make an estimate of Soviet leadership, we will see that it is based upon the finest of democratic principles, the cultivation and the development of the people by providing proper education, proper health, proper hospitalization, and proper social opportunities. I cannot speak personally of any of the leaders of the Soviet regime. I do not know them. But if "by their fruits ye shall know them," we must call them true leaders of men.

SENATOR ELBERT D. THOMAS, *New Masses*, June 22, 1943, p. 10

J. B. Matthews has been kind enough to launch this department, which we plan to make a regular column feature open to our readers. The Freeman *will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.*

THE EDITORS

FOR PRESIDENT: MICKEY COHEN

By **MORRIE RYSKIND**

THE RESULTS of the probe of Los Angeles by the Senate Crime Investigating Committee, headed by Senator Kefauver, may not become apparent immediately but, in the opinion of local politicos, the hearings may have given us a new Presidential candidate in the person of Mickey Cohen.

I do not know whether Mickey is a Republican or a Democrat, but I regard that as of small consequence: the recent elections showed that the American people can cut across party labels when the issues are clear. And if Mickey should run, let nobody tell you that he wouldn't prove a formidable candidate.

It obviously was not the intention of Senators Kefauver, Tobey and Wiley to interfere with the political ambitions of Truman, Eisenhower and Taft, but history may yet record that they built better than they knew. The more they grilled Mr. Cohen, the more he looked like the man for 1952.

The senators and their counsel invaded Mickey's privacy with a barrage of insulting questions that, to this observer at least — and I think I may speak for Alistair Cooke — violated every right guaranteed him by the Constitution and at least eight provisions of Magna Carta itself. To those of us who care about Civil Liberties, it was a shocking example of Kefauverism at its worst. (Indeed, there is serious talk among the more liberal members of the movie colony about reviving Hollywood's famous Committee for the First Amendment and flying the same group of world-renowned stars, directors and writers who did such notable work for the Hollywood Ten to Washington to consult with former Senators Pepper, Taylor and Thomas, all fellow-members of the First Amendment Committee. The plan has been held in abeyance until the new Congress convened, in order that Messrs. Pepper, Taylor and Thomas, all of whom were voted their sabbatical leave by a grateful electorate, might have more time to listen.)

Through this ordeal of slander, innuendo, character-assassination, guilt by association and other forms of inquisitorial witch-hunting, Mickey stood his ground. He faced only hostile, prejudiced interrogators; there was no kindly Senator Tydings to lead him gently through the savage jungle and anoint him with holy water afterwards. Yet Mickey emerged smelling of roses and dew. Truly, one could say with Horace, "*Integer vitae scelerisque purus . . .*"

They probed and probed. They probed into his bank accounts; they probed into his sex life, accusing him of consorting with prostitutes; they even probed into the sex life of his parents by asking him when he was born! They brought into the testimony the names of dead men, unable to defend themselves from the slurs cast upon them by these ghouls. They cunningly introduced dubious police records purporting to show that Mickey had been arrested some thirty times on charges ranging from murder to embezzlement and assault, matters totally outside their province. They glossed over the fact that Mickey had beaten the murder rap with a plea of self-defense; that in the assault case he had been let off with a fine; and that the embezzlement, which occurred in Cleveland eighteen years ago when Mickey was a very young man, had resulted only in probation, pardon and his restoration to full citizenship. It was the same old reiteration of the same old charges. One waited patiently for them to ask him whether he was now or ever had been a member of the Communist Party. But there they stopped. Whether for shame, whether for fear of another editorial attack in the *Nation*, for whatever reason, they never asked the dreary $64 question. In that way only did this exhibition differ from similar spectacles in the House.

And for all their probing, what did they come up with? Nothing but a collection of incidents that paralleled to an amazing extent the career of another man, grievously traduced by the Eightieth Congress, who found vindication at the polls in 1948. Mickey, too, is a haberdasher who failed: his store on the Sunset Strip, into which he poured his money, his faith and his energy, stands vacant today, mute witness to what can happen to the little businessman forced to compete with the gigantic corporations made possible by Republican-controlled Congresses (like the Eightieth). His worldly wealth, which he produced at the hearings, is $236, and he owes over $300,000. In short, his is the plight of the average man. And don't think that doesn't sway votes.

Mickey, too, has been shot at: and I do not mean to speak disparagingly of any other candidate when I point out that he has been shot at not once, but on six different occasions. Further, his house has been bombed. He uses several bodyguards and would, if elected, know how to cooperate with the Secret Service.

Early in life, Mickey — he is but thirty-seven today — became a member of a Mid-Western machine in control of gambling and rackets. Unfortunately, this was a Chicago outfit that had no connection with the neighboring Kansas City machine or Mickey might have been in the Senate today, doing some investigating of his own. But, like the man who flew to Kansas City to attend Tom Pendergast's last rites, Mickey is not one to forget a friend. He has consistently attended the funerals of all his old cronies, including those who were killed by shots intended for Mickey himself. And, if I'm any judge of character, will continue to do so, no matter what honors destiny may have in store for him.

These are troubled times and, before I commit myself fully to a candidate, I want to know where he stands on fiscal matters. I've already noted the $300,000 Mickey owes: he told of borrowing $25,000 from a New York manufacturer; $15,000 from Harry Rothman, a bodyguard slain in one of the numerous attempts on Mickey's life; $13,000 from the owner of a supermarket; $25,000 from the late Bugsy Siegel; and $35,000, interest-free and without security, from a Hollywood bank president. ("I guess he just likes me," he explained, when questioned about the last item. You could literally see the envy on the faces of the three Senators.)

"You owe all this money," sneered Rudolph Halley, counsel for the committee, "and you have only $236 in the world. How do you expect to live from now on?"

There was no hesitation on Mickey's part. "Borrow," he said.

In that one word, Mickey summed up the fiscal policy that, in recent years, has governed America. No hemming,

no hawing, no gobbledygook, no double-talk about balancing his budget (he lives modestly in a house the Committee values at $200,000), but simple, clear, direct English. Mr. Morgenthau took years to say what Mickey cut to two simple syllables. The American public can understand a man like that.

Let me offer one final word for my candidate. If the President of the United States ever meets with Stalin again, I should like that President to be Michael (Mickey) Cohen. I guarantee we would do better than we did at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

FROM OUR READERS

The Seversky Idea

In your issue of November 13, discussing universal military training, you doff your hat to Major de Seversky:

> Not being military experts, we hesitate to give unqualified endorsement to the Seversky idea. But at least it is worth more talk than it is getting.

If you will talk to people who make airplanes, to people who design airplanes, and to people who fly military and commercial airplanes, and who have bothered to read Seversky's words, you may find that you are giving the Seversky idea more talk than it is worth.

Seversky always predicates his recommendations upon the supposition that aircraft capable of performing certain feats are available. During the last war he showed us how we could win the war by using the next war's airplanes. Unfortunately they were not available, and now Major de Seversky is also proposing to achieve victory with airplanes which have not been designed or built. . . . His arguments have the unfortunate quality of being logical, and consequently are very confusing to those who do not realize that his basic premise does not exist in fact.

It seems to me from reading the rest of your editorial that you belong to that school of thinking which is known as the "pants down" school, and in which so many of our Congressmen are found. This school takes the position that because we have won two wars, in spite of the fact that we were caught unprepared, we should prepare for the next war by keeping our pants down.

As to voting, I agree that citizens should not be compelled to exercise a choice, but I'm afraid that the duty to bear arms is not a matter of choice. If one must bear arms, he should be trained in their use.

I like your new paper, and disagreement is healthy.

Oyster Bay, Long Island E. S.

The Roll of Honor

I nominate the *Freeman* as the outstanding publication to emerge during this generation of crisis.

I am placing the editors, John Chamberlain, Henry Hazlitt and Suzanne La Follette, on the list which I have named and published, entitled "Great Americans in This Crisis." George E. Sokolsky, John T. Flynn and Ralph de Toledano are already on this list. On the basis of their articles in the *Freeman*, I am also adding General Fellers, Isaac Don Levine and James Rorty.

I am referring the *Freeman* to friends far and wide as "must" reading. JOHN B. CHAPPLE

Managing Editor, Ashland, Wisconsin, *Daily Press*

Chain Reaction

Your embryonic lighthouse, the *Freeman*, is getting the darndest amount of free — and good — publicity and promotion I ever saw. People are sending in subscriptions for others . . . thus far I've been favored this way three times, even though I subscribed for myself. I had a letter the other day from Cincinnati, couched in the most glowing terms, urging me to help get it into schools, libraries, etc. More power to you.

Detroit, Michigan FRANK RISING

That Man Re-Examined

By the manner in which some radio commentators and press columnists excoriate President Truman and his Administration, one is almost led to believe that his initials stand for Hammer and Sickle Truman. However, there are others who would not venture so far, but would instead only say Horrid Socialist Truman. I prefer to apply to him the epithet Head Strong Truman. My wife, as usual, objects to what I say and offers instead the primary stopper, President Hardly Suitable Truman. Well, everyone to his own beliefs.

Chicago, Illinois DICK ROBERTS

P.S. Did I hear someone mutter "Heaven Sent"?

More Pay for City Officials

A lot has been said about getting what is called "the right type" of men and women in political offices. But how can this be accomplished when the salaries are so low? For the last seven years I have covered a wide suburban area for a metropolitan newspaper. I've reported many stories about these low-paid officials, most of whom try to do a good job.

Take the town of West Seneca, New York, adjacent to Buffalo, as one example. The West Seneca 1951 budget showed that many officeholders received pay raises. For example, the town clerk's salary was raised from $4000 to $4200. The salaries of town councilmen were raised from $2000 to $2200 — still far below a living wage. Of course the councilmanic job in such a town as this is considered as "a part-time job." Even so, it is small pay for a legislator.

The police chief of this town, who received $3600, won a $100 raise. The highway superintendent gets $4300 in 1951, whereas he had earned only $3800.

In Lackawanna, New York — about 30,000 population, and a home of the great Bethlehem Steel Company — the police have repeatedly asked for pay raises. For 1951 they want a $600 yearly increase. And yet the 1951 city budget provides for the addition of 14 new policemen! None make more than $3600 yearly. Is that a living wage? A cop's starting salary in this city is $2700. He receives a $200 yearly increase until a maximum of $3300 is reached. That's for plain patrolmen.

Such pay problems — and other political and official problems — are duplicated all over the country. And yet citizens wonder why they do not have first-class men in office! Until such a time as the pay of appointed and elected officials is adequate, we may expect disruptions. An underpaid official will naturally be tempted by graft.

Perhaps the major fault of a democracy is this: it underpays the very men expected and supposed to carry on the democratic way of life.

Buffalo, New York MONTGOMERY MULFORD

G. B. S.

By THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY

THERE WAS a dense smoke screen, the color and almost the consistency of pea soup, over London that night. On my way home after the performance, I was circling around my house in Bloomsbury, imagining I had lost my way altogether, until I bumped into a neighbor who led me gropingly to my doorstep.

That night I met G. B. S., as Shaw was called by those who knew him, for the first time. It was thirty years ago, after the first performance of my production of Chekhov's "Uncle Vanya" — with Franklyn Dyall, Leo Quartermaine, Cathleen Nesbit and other fine English actors in the cast — at the Court Theater, Sloane Square, London. Naturally, I was thrilled to hear that, regardless of the weather, Bernard Shaw was in the audience.

Eleven years before, in my heyday, I had produced his "Caesar and Cleopatra" in Russian in the imperial city of St. Petersburg, which was then one of the most magnificent capitals of the world — the "northern Palmyra," where the arts flourished and, strange as it may seem to misinformed reporters, where people lived as bounteously and freely as anywhere else in the world.

After the end of "Uncle Vanya," Shaw found me backstage, shook my hand, said something about the fog and vanished. Though the press was kind to my production, I was worried because I thought that G. B. S. did not like my work. Before long I met him and his wife — a medium-sized, slightly portly, neatly dressed, agreeable and intelligent, though not loquacious lady — at lunch in the home of J. B. Fagan, a noted London manager and producer known as J. B. I discovered then that G. B. S. had liked my "Vanya," after all. J. B. was going to stage Shaw's "Heartbreak House" himself, but G. B. S. (over a plate of greens and a glass of water, while everybody else had roast beef with Yorkshire pudding and hock wine) said, pointing his beard at me: "He ought to do my play, not you. I thought of it during the performance of his 'Uncle Vanya'." The uncomfortable feeling created by this remark was offset by a smile and some jokes — the usual Shavian artifice. Of course, J. B., not I, did "Heartbreak House."

G. B. S. was not a clown, as many say. One should not forget that, having started writing in his early days, he met with many disappointments and rather harsh treatment until he was over fifty. If it had not been for G. T. Grein, a remarkable Dutchman residing in London, a critic and founder of the Independent Theater (1891–98), as well as for the fact that G. B. S. lived unusually long, I am sure that his plays would never have become anything near to popular. Other uncommercial "highbrow" productions that contributed to Shaw's success were those of the Stage Society, Miss Horniman's Repertory and Granville Barker's 1904–1907 seasons at the Court Theater; eleven out of thirty-two plays that Barker produced were written by Shaw.

On the Continent, particularly in Germany, Austria and old Russia, Shaw's plays were appreciated long before he was acknowledged as a first-rate dramatist in England. A second-rate German playwright, Trebitsch, started translating Shaw's plays, and G. B. S. made an English adaptation of Trebitsch's play, "Jita's Atonement," as a gesture of gratitude. The Russian versions of Shaw's plays, as a rule, were translations from the German. Unfortunately, there was no money in the central European and Russian productions. The Russians did not pay any royalties, and the Europeans paid little in comparison with the English. In the United States, the Theater Guild first produced G. B. S. in 1916, when he was already sixty years old.

From early experience Shaw learned that it was impossible to interest the average theatergoer in philosophical thoughts, even if expressed in a popular dramatic form. Unfortunately, people do not go to the theater to think, and theatrical managers have no respect whatsoever for mental exercises. Usually it is the bawdy and the criminological that most interest them.

"When I first began to promulgate my opinions," said Shaw, "I found that they appeared extravagant and even insane. In order to get a hearing, it was necessary for me to attain the footing of a privileged lunatic, with the license of a jester." In other words, to make abundant use of "laughs," cherished so dearly in the commercial theater. However G. B. S., though born in Dublin, was an Englishman with a Cockney sense of humor, and, besides, a man of taste; so his laughs were not of the usual gag variety.

Shaw also found out that without aggressive and noisy publicity one can not get very far, and that the best way to advertise himself was to irritate the public. "If you don't say a thing in an irritating way, you may just as well not say it at all." Thus he began masquerading, and cleverly went on masquerading all his life, as an aggressive, irritating jester and as a kind of publicity maniac. Mainly because of his sagacity, social outlook, humor and longevity, he became known, with Aristophanes, Molière, Gogol and Wilde, as one of the great writers of satirical comedy.

While living in London I was a member of the Author's Club, which is in Whitehall Court in the same building where Shaw had a flat overlooking the Thames. We used to meet quite often in the hall of the house. "Hello, Komisar," his greeting was; and after saying whatever he wanted to say, he would walk briskly into the street, holding himself straight like a young man, in spite of his eighty-three years or more of age.

Once, Shaw was briefly my rival. The management of the Shakespeare Memorial Theater at Stratford-on-Avon couldn't decide which of us should stage Macbeth. In spite of the fact that Shaw liked directing plays, he refused the production for some unknown reason, and I got the job. Though G. B. S. wrote appreciatively to me about my productions of Shakespeare at Stratford,

his published views on the work of a director — in the main, very true and much more valuable than any others published in English — clashed with mine in some ways. In opposition to me, he thought that "the producer [director] has no concern with the doctrine [idea] of the play," that "no regard should be given whether the actors understand the play or not"; he also thought that the best director of a play is the author himself.

I couldn't say from observation whether G. B. S. was as good a director as he seemed to be, judging by his "Rules for Play Producers" or his "Art of Rehearsal" or his letters to Ellen Terry and other works. I saw him rehearse only once, at The Duke of York's Theater. Mrs. Patrick Campbell, an extremely difficult actress, was acting the part of Eliza in "Pygmalion." That tumultuous rehearsal ended with Mrs. Pat telling G. B. S. to leave the theater at once. He did so, while the temperamental star proceeded to direct the play herself, and in her own way, too.

At that rehearsal G. B. S. seemed to me quite ingenious about showing the actors how to do things on the stage. From what he was saying, I could gather that he was a patient and tolerant director and an enemy of star acting. He was plain-spoken on the exhibitionism of stars in "The Art of Rehearsal":

> To the star actor the play does not exist except as a mounting block. That is why comparatively humble actors, who do not dare to think they can succeed apart from the play, often give much better representations than star casts.

With Shaw's passing has passed forever that fine generation of Englishmen of the theater which included himself, James Barrie, Arnold Bennett, John Galsworthy, Granville Barker, Charles Rickets, A. D. Rutherstone, Forbes-Robertson, Martin Harvey, Norman Wilkinson and some others, whom I have been fortunate to know. Whether dramatists, producers, scenic designers or actors, they believed in the theater as a forum for pure ideas and true feelings, and were masters of theater craft. They were all begotten by what is known as the "dramatic renascence" in England.

With the seventies of the last century, the stagey and commonplace began disappearing from the theater, and the era of idealistic realism was inaugurated. That was due to some foreign influences and to the efforts of the playwright Thomas Robertson and the actor-managers Squire Bancroft and his wife.

Matthew Arnold, one of the promoters of the new era, wrote:

> The attraction of the theater begins to be felt again, after a long period of insensibility, by the middle class also. The human spirit has a vital need for conduct and religion, but it has the need also for expansion, for intellect and knowledge, for beauty, social life and manners. The revelation of these additional needs brings the middle class to the theater . . . eager and curious, though a little bewildered.

At the end of the century, new artistic and social tendencies were added to the idealistic content of the renascent British theater. One was that of individualists, esthetes and symbolists — the young Maeterlinck, some French poets; Morris, Ruskin, Toynbee, Wilde, Beardsley, Max Beerbohm, William Sharp and others. The other was that of social reformers — realists like Hauptmann, Zola, Tolstoy, Gorky, Brieux, Ibsen and others. The work of the great Norwegian dramatist had particular influence on Shaw, as did also the ideas of Henry George and Karl Marx.

Although it is no business of mine to speak of G. B. S. in any aspect other than that of a man of the theater, I would like to say that he was by no means an orthodox Marxist, as I understand him. Though he allowed the Bolsheviks to photograph him in Moscow minus tie and even minus shirt-collar, they still did not much approve of his plays. Besides, his understanding of "creative evolution" was different from theirs. Also, G. B. S. was searching for the superman, was interested in outstanding individuals and even in expounding such a "counter-revolutionary" doctrine as the need for Jesus in our time. Though Shaw's Jesus was not the Jesus interpreted by the Church, still He was the Jesus of the Gospel, whom the USSR has "liquidated."

For Shaw, as for all the men of the "dramatic renascence," the theater was not a show of tricks, artifices, egoistic exhibitionism, clichés and rubber stamps, but a source of ideas, of truth, of poetry, of style and education. In one of his letters to me, written before the last war, he says that the majority of commercial managers are not "fit for anything but a museum." It goes without saying that for Shaw the theater was not a matter of financial speculation, either. His famous watertight contracts were intended to save him from being exploited by the people whom he, in his mind, most thoroughly detested.

In matters of staging, Shaw wanted the directors and the actors to make the audience "believe that real things were happening to real people," and thus he followed the principles adopted by Robertson and the Bancrofts in England and by Lady Gregory and the great Yeats in Ireland. According to these principles stage settings became more realistic, costume and make-up were considered an art, and no actor attempted to eclipse his fellows or to monopolize the attention of the audience, a method disapproved by Shaw but legitimate and even praiseworthy on the commercial stages of our day.

The actor John Hare wrote that "nature was the basis" of Robertson's work. "He sought to make actors understand that it should be theirs. He thus founded a school of natural acting which completely revolutionized the then existing methods." The playwright W. S. Gilbert said some time after Robertson's death that "stage-management, as now understood" in England had been "absolutely invented by him." According to Pinero, he and the Bancrofts, while directing plays, threw "a clear and natural light upon the manners and life of people. . . . When the history of the stage and of its progress is adequately and faithfully written," the names of the Bancrofts and of Robertson "must be recorded with honor and gratitude." And so, without doubt, must be that of George Bernard Shaw, not only as a playwright, but as a play director and pioneer of the idealistic theater.

"If you have not enough energy to face all the strain of theater work," said G. B. S., and "to go through the grind I went through, you had better keep out of the theater altogether."

CRISIS IN HOLLYWOOD

By HARRY FELDMAN

THE MOST significant event in the film world during the past month has hardly even been noticed by the reviewers in the daily press. Fifteen neighborhood theaters in Chicago have either shut down completely or are expected to close soon, customers' receipts having been insufficient to meet the costs of overhead. The first-run houses in the Loop district report a 20 to 25 per cent decline in business during 1950, while attendance in the neighborhood theaters reached the lowest point in a decade. Nor are such conditions peculiar to Chicago. *Variety* has consistently reported a nation-wide decline in motion picture attendance, more than five hundred theaters in various cities having been obliged to shut down in consequence.

The reviewers, of course, have been too busy watching the latest "colossal" exhibits from Hollywood to observe this phenomenon and to reflect upon what it portends. The decline in business, however, indicates a crisis in the film industry which has been threatening ever since the end of World War II. In Hollywood people refer to this crisis in hushed tones, while the responsible leaders of the industry publicly deny its existence but are privately succumbing to panic. This is in accord with the Hollywood mentality, which has never been too keen upon facing reality. It is easier to deny that a crisis exists than to resolve it.

There is a tendency in Hollywood to blame the crisis upon television, but this is essentially a form of projection, a psychological mechanism by which an individual blames others for his own faults. The crisis is really internal — the result of Hollywood's own failings and anti-social policies. For more than twenty-five years Hollywood has deliberately rejected the services of its greatest artists. It eliminated the pioneer figure of the late D. W. Griffith, who, with all his weaknesses and failings, his sentimentality and Victorian outlook, and his tendency toward excessive moralizing, must be ranked as the greatest of American directors. It ostracized his disciple, Erich von Stroheim, who, with all his alleged waste and extravagance, and in spite of his personal eccentricities, was capable of realizing films roughly comparable to such novels as Theodore Dreiser's "An American Tragedy" and Jules Romain's "Men of Good Will," and who, regardless whether his works made or lost money, should have been subsidized because of his genius. I can forgive the industry every mistake, every weakness — its divorces, its scandals, its Sybaritic luxury, the reams of fake publicity, and the endless array of cheap gangster films: every mistake, that is, except its failure to recognize the few men of genius who have arisen in its midst.

Francis Jeffrey, the nineteenth-century critic, was correct in his appraisal of hundreds of mediocre writers, but because he could not recognize the poet, John Keats, the one man of genius whom he encountered, posterity has branded his name as infamous. Hollywood could profit from his fate.

The industry has also crushed its lesser creative talent. Such figures as King Vidor, Henry King, Josef von Sternberg, John Ford and Alfred Hitchcock, who showed promise in the twenties, the thirties, or the forties, have been reduced to virtual artistic impotence. Their works tend to show a progressive decline. King Vidor's most powerful film, "The Big Parade," was made in 1924; Henry King's masterpiece, "Tol'able David," appeared in 1920; von Sternberg himself regards "The Salvation Hunters" (1925) as his outstanding filmic achievement. John Ford's recent production of "Rio Grande" is feeble compared to "The Informer" (1935) and "The Grapes of Wrath" (1940). Alfred Hitchcock in Hollywood never achieved the force and intensity of his earlier works, "The Thirty-Nine Steps," "The Girl Was Young" and "The Lady Vanishes."

The spectacle of an art-industry deliberately wasting its outstanding talents is probably without parallel in history. If you can imagine the Italian opera in its greatest period rejecting Verdi and Puccini and debasing such lesser composers as Donizetti, Bellini and Rossini, you would have a comparable phenomenon. What would the American theater be like if it had ostracized Eugene O'Neill and degraded such lesser talents as Maxwell Anderson, S. N. Behrman, Philip Barry and Elmer Rice?

It is easy to imagine that the result of such a policy would have been bankruptcy; and this is precisely what is happening in Hollywood today. The industry nearly collapsed in 1929 because of its policy of rejecting its outstanding creative talent; but the coming of sound and speech saved it. Today it is facing the crisis of 1929 all over again. The public is surfeited with the endless repetition of humorless comedies, passionless love stories and musical monstrosities. It is tired of seeing the same situations all the time — the eternal fights between the "good guy" and the "bad guy," the automobiles frantically chasing one another, the airplanes unable to land because of thick fog, etc.

Hollywood today is suffering from its own incompetence. It has been unable to maintain in 1950 even in its own stereotyped genres the level it achieved in former years. No "Western" of 1950 could compare even remotely with Victor Fleming's "The Virginian" (1930) and John Ford's "Stagecoach" (1939). No "musical" of 1950 achieved the grace and sparkle of "Down Argentina Way" or "That Night In Rio," which appeared about a decade ago. Even the quality of screen kissing declined in 1950. No osculation of this year matched the passion of Garbo kissing Taylor in "Camille" or Gable caressing Leigh in "Gone With The Wind." The industry has not even been able to make a decent anti-communist film, such exhibits as "The Woman on Pier 13" and "Guilty of Treason," being hardly worthy of critical notice.

While the quality of films has declined, however, the price of admission in both first-run and neighborhood theaters has been increased. This is the immediate cause of the crisis in the movie industry. You do not have to be a professional economist to know that one sure formula for driving away customers and ruining a business is to lower the quality and raise the price of its product.

I do not know whether Hollywood intends to survive the current crisis or whether, like the Bourbons of old, it intends to learn nothing and forget nothing and to be overwhelmed by the deluge. I can only say that this problem presents a more fascinating spectacle than is to be found in any movie of 1950.



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Most critics will trim occasionally, whether out of considerations of tact, or of deference to the whims of an editor, or of respect for a reigning shibboleth or point of view. Most critics will adapt their approach to the medium, writing one sort of review for a quarterly, another sort for the *Herald Tribune* or the *New Yorker*. But not Edmund Wilson, as his "Classics and Commercials" (Farrar, Straus, $5.00) demonstrates anew. Wilson always sounds like the same stubborn, quietly embattled Wilson no matter where he appears. To paraphrase the legend below the post-office pediment, neither enemy nor friend nor trend nor fashion of the day can stay Edmund Wilson from the swift completion of his appointed critique.

In an age when all things are in flux, it might be accounted a good thing that Edmund Wilson definitely knows his own mind. For myself, I always read Mr. Wilson with profit and enjoyment. I like many of his quirks and share many of his prejudices. He is bored by mystery stories and so am I. He hates bureaucratic man and so do I. He responds to every last fragment of F. Scott Fitzgerald, and so do I. He doesn't give a damn what the boys are saying about him either in the office of the *New Republic* or in the circles that make a god out of Franz Kafka, and I would like to think that I am equally oblivious to the snipers who try to enforce the orthodoxies of the standardized literary *avant garde* and the equally standardized Left. But in the final analysis of Mr. Wilson's work, one is forced to echo Isabel Paterson's immortal query: "Can writers think?"

Mr. Wilson, as Mrs. Paterson has pointed out, has a wonderful gift of narrative. He can make a moving romance out of Karl Marx's tenderness for his wife Jenny, or Lenin's loyalty to his brother. In "Classics and Commercials" he does a wonderful job with such things as Alexander Woollcott's youth in a socialist phalanstery at Red Bank, New Jersey, or Max Eastman's early career as an editor, or the history of Oscar Wilde's losing struggle with the spirochaeta pallida. Mr. Wilson can suggest an intellectual atmosphere or parody a style or explode a fakery or reduce a complicated subject to a few clear lines as no other critic in America can. His virtues as a writer are so positive and so manifold that they almost serve to hide his one glaring deficiency. But after one has read a few score pages in "Classics and Commercials," which consists of a selection of Mr. Wilson's work over a decade in the *New Republic*, the *Nation*, the *New Yorker* and elsewhere, it becomes more and more apparent that Mr. Wilson has no immediate intention of trying to make his basic assumptions add up. He is a man who seems doomed to be perpetually at war with himself, and he manages to give the outward impression of solidity and composure only by an adamant refusal to question the intellectual loyalties he picked out of the air in his youth.

Mr. Wilson has long been disillusioned with Soviet Russia and the American writers of the Stalinoid persuasion, and his remarks on Joseph E. Davies as a stylist and on Dorothy Parker's collapse into the "expiatory mania" of the Hollywood swimming pool proletariat are calculated to make one chortle. Nevertheless, Edmund Wilson still insists, in the face of all the mounting evidence, that socialism and human freedom can be made to fit into an equation that actually equates. He writes twelve pages about Max Eastman without ever grappling with the really essential point of his subject, which is Eastman's utter rejection of the idea that socialism can be had without coercing people's tastes, compelling their economic services, and maiming or killing their bodies. Mr. Wilson respects Mr. Eastman's courage, but he doesn't know wherein Max's courage actually exists. Eastman's supremely courageous act was to change his mind not only about Marx but about all the Fabian dilutions of the socialist gospel, as well.

Mr. Wilson hates the bourgeois. It is a standing obsession with him, and it blinds him to reality. He can not see that the middle class is the only class in history that has ever sought to make legal "rights" the universal possession of all men. The "bourgeois" may despise the Bohemian, but he is willing to leave him alone. The bourgeois is even willing on occasion to pay the Bohemian's bills. But in spite of the dependence of Bohemian upon bourgeois, Mr. Wilson speaks of the "boring diligence of commercial activity." He commends a Kafka story because it reads "like a Marxist-Flaubertian satire on the parasites of the bourgeoisie." He tosses off the cliché about the United States of "the trust-ridden eighties and nineties." And he reserves his praise for the America of the early nineteenth century, when "the country was still uncommercialized." To listen to Mr. Wilson's strictures on a business culture, one might think him an anchorite, or a hermit on the order of Thoreau, or a rather Spartan poet who actually prefers a hard cot in a cold winter attic.

The internal evidence offered by some of Mr. Wilson's verbal by-play, however, is not that of a man who really hates and rejects the products of an advanced business system. He speaks on one occasion of the good "steel penknives, good erasers and real canned sardines" which one could buy before World War II. The steel in a good penknife depends, of course, on a hardening alloy brought, let us say, from the Congo or the Caucasus by very commercial-minded businessmen. Good erasers depend on the organization of rubber plantations in the East Indies, and who organizes a plantation better than a member of the

bourgeoisie? As for good canned sardines, they require the interacting commerce of the fisherman, the maker of machinery for Bolivian tin mines, the producer of olive oil, and the retail grocer on the corner of a bourgeois city street. Mr. Wilson might hope to eat good canned sardines under a socialist system, but wouldn't he rather gag at the idea of swallowing the product of slave labor?

Mr. Wilson has never faced up to the mechanics involved in socialist production of goods and services. If a government is to plan production, it must have control of all the factors of production. But the factors of production come down in the last analysis to human energy. So it is the human being who must be controlled. How can a government establish control and force a plan except by persuading (i.e., propagandizing) or coercing people to do what it wants? And what if large numbers of the people object? Mr. Wilson thinks he has disposed of the menace of compulsion when he attacks the idea of "State socialism." But is there any other type of socialism? True, there have been voluntary socialist colonies in the United States, but they have been kept from coercing or bulldozing people solely because there has been a route of escape from their walls into the free world outside. Similarly the "socialism" of the Scandinavian world has been kept palatable by the presence of a large free market outside of the socialist preserves of the State. In other words, socialism is only good when there is a going capitalist concern outside of it to keep it humane. The more capitalism there is, the more the check on the coercive aspects of socialism.

Mr. Wilson is not an economist. Economics is a "dismal science" to his completely literary way of thinking. Actually, Mr. Wilson's socialism is a pure verbal fetish. He really belongs to a tradition that either predates Marxism by a matter of decades or that grew up alongside Marxism without much reference to it. His real animus against the modern world is Carlylean and Ruskinean — which is to say that he looks back to an aristocratic order of society. Wilson is, *au fond*, an esthetic critic of capitalism. But capitalism doesn't have to be non-esthetic any more than it has to be vegetarian. To the extent that people develop esthetic tastes, capitalism is perfectly willing to cater to such tastes. The willingness to give people what they want, to satisfy the consumer, is what justifies capitalism. Witness the case of Mr. Wilson's "real canned sardines," which were made and sold in the market place because people wanted to buy and eat them.

There may be something to Mr. Wilson's hunger for an aristocratic pre-capitalist world. Certainly the old aristocratic order knew the virtues of craftsmanship. But, as Ludwig von Mises is fond of pointing out, only 6,000,000 people could make their living by the practice of their various crafts in an aristocratic, pre-capitalist England. By going over to capitalism England was able to increase her population to 42,000,000. Mr. Wilson is entitled to his preferences for the good old days, but is he willing to ordain the liquidation of 36,000,000 Englishmen to get back to them? The answer is "no," yet in spite of his "no" Mr. Wilson is not yet ready to question the ultimate reference-points of his own snarled-up philosophy.

TRUE GERMAN HISTORY

Bismarck and the German Empire, by Erich Eyck. *New York: Macmillan. $3.75*

Most of the German historians depended for their living upon a job either with the universities, all of which were state universities, or with the state archives. There were virtually no independent historians in Germany. Germany lacked a class to whose members private means warranted freedom of thought, the class from which such eminent historians as Gibbon, Grote and Buckle sprang. The German historians were government employees who first of all had to please their boss, the cabinet minister of education. Their duty was to glorify the policies of the kings and kaisers. Once a Rector of the University of Berlin, the famous physiologist Du Bois-Reymond, in his presidential address, proudly called his university "the intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollern." The German historians did their best to live up to this reputation. The way in which they treated modern German history was simply scandalous.

But now a new day dawns. Doctor Erich Eyck, after a long, successful career as a lawyer and journalist in Berlin, was forced to go into exile in England when Hitler seized power. There he dedicated himself to rewriting German history of the last hundred years. He started with three volumes of a Bismarck biography, which is in fact a history of Germany from the revolution of 1848 down to the year 1890. Then he published a book on the reign of William II, and now he is preparing a history of the Weimar Republic. The present book is not a translation of his voluminous book on Bismarck. It is based on a course of lectures delivered in the Hall of Balliol College in Oxford.

The book makes exciting reading. It entirely demolishes the official legends. It shows how the trend of Prussian and German policies as inaugurated by the kings of Prussia was bound to end in the crushing defeats of the two World Wars and in the disintegration of Europe's political structure. It discloses the germs of Nazism implied in the methods of Bismarck.

Professor Hans Rothfels, although by no means an uncritical supporter of the traditional legends of his former German colleagues, has raised objections to Eyck's portrayal of Bismarck's policies. Bismarck, says Professor Rothfels in *The Review of Politics* (Vol. 9, pp. 362–380) was not a forefather of nazism; he belonged to "our world," to the old school of people who were Christians and abided by the rules of international law. Let us examine these two points by referring to two well-documented statements quoted by Eyck.

In 1870 Bismarck told an English diplomat, Edward Malet, that he had decided to hang all Frenchmen who were found armed without wearing uniform, and added: "I attach little value to human life *because I believe in another world.*" Are these the words of a Christian?

In the sixties Napoleon III planned to annex Belgium. The protestations of the powers which were guarantors of Belgium's independence and neutrality frustrated his ambitions. In a note which Bismarck wrote to his ambassador on June 7, 1869, he observed that Napoleon had mismanaged the affair. The right way would have been "to march into Belgium and to wait whether other powers

would come forward for Belgium and attack France for her violation of the treaties." This is precisely the prescription which Bethmann-Hollweg followed in 1914, and Hitler when he violated step by step the essential clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. It is impossible to consider this Bismarck principle as consistent with the rules of international law.

This reviewer does not in every respect agree with Doctor Eyck's interpretation of events. But he cannot help stressing the fact that Doctor Eyck's writings are a most valuable contribution to modern European history and that they lay the foundations of a new epoch in German historiography. It is very fortunate that Eyck's ideas and conclusions are now accessible to the English-reading public. Nobody who wants to learn how the present desperate state of European affairs originated should neglect the careful study of this excellent book.

LUDWIG VON MISES

THE WESTERN MIND

Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thought, by Crane Brinton. *New York: Prentice-Hall. $6.00.*

Professor Brinton's survey of the biggest of the Big Ideas that have excited the imaginations of men between the age of the Ionian philosophers and that of the French and German existentialists seems to have been conceived primarily as a textbook for the "greats" courses that have lately been added to the curricula of many liberal arts colleges and made obligatory in some. One purpose of these studies, I take it, is to restore some of that largeness of vision and awareness of tradition that were formerly supposed to result from long and rigorous exercise in humane letters. Another, perhaps, is to remind us that most of the vexatious problems that confront us at this uncertain juncture of history are not novel to the experience of the race, and that no easy or permanently satisfying answers to them have yet been discovered. Anyway, the book is published in a trade edition for the general reader who may be seeking to know precisely what is meant by "the Western tradition," and why — now that it is said to be threatened from without and within — we should be so much concerned about preserving it.

Yet with Professor Brinton as his guide and cartographer, the general reader may fail to discover any mainstream of Western thought, but only a bewildering succession of estuaries, inlets, eddies and cross-currents. When the professor comes at the end to the necessity of some kind of summary, he observes that the one clear and persistent characteristic of the Western mind has been the tension of contraries, the unending conflict between ideality and actuality, between what ought to be and what is, between imagination and reason, poetry and common sense. Beneath this conflict he discerns, although somewhat dimly, a steady insistence upon the importance and dignity of man, a more or less constant belief that the life of virtue and happiness can in some way and in some degree be realized on this earth, and a continuing effort to justify this belief by establishing an orderly constitution in the natural universe. Says the professor:

> *Natural law* did not mean exactly the same thing to a Stoic, a Scholastic, or an eighteenth-century philosopher, but did to all three mean a faith in the substance of things hoped for.

All this sudden emphasis in the schools upon the importance of intellectual history may be merely a reflection of the new philosophic cult of historicism, exemplified in such writers as Ortega and Whitehead, which has become fashionable and influential enough to be denounced by Pope Pius XII. The general principle is that of *Weltanschauung*, or the notion that each epoch of thought is directed by a special and peculiar cosmological vision from which is derived the "general form of the forms of ideas." But again, this new concern with intellectual history may be the response of the pedagogues to the bitter reproaches leveled against them. The burden of these reproaches is that their successive departures from the ancient liberal pattern of studies has produced a race of scientific barbarians, and has brought about a confusion of tongues and a kind of cultural schizophrenia, or, as Professor Brinton, who is evidently less perturbed by it than some of his colleagues, prefers to call it, an increasing "multanimity." Surely, where there is no common stock of general ideas there can be no common referents of abstract words and consequently no language much better than a pidgin dialect, consisting wholly of concrete terms, and barely sufficient for commonplace needs. All the rest is sounding brass and tinkling cymbals, the sort of jargon we are accustomed to read in newspaper editorials and government reports and the literary columns of highbrow reviews.

Nowhere is the absence of a common language more evident than in the sphere of politics, where no two of us any longer attach identical or even proximate meanings to such terms as "democracy," "freedom," and "justice." Ultimately this confusion makes possible that inversion of categories whereby the Nazis could speak of their nihilistic violence as a New *Order*, whereby the Bolsheviks now speak of their prison states as "people's republics," and our own politicians speak of wars costing thousands of lives as "police actions," and of wholesale destructions of towns and villages as "liberations." Yet there is a kind of comfort in the knowledge that this degradation of language is not a phenomenon peculiar to our times, but is apparently characteristic of all ages of revolutionary violence and of frenzied struggles for power. There is a famous example from Thucydides, cited by Professor Brinton, of the civil war in Corcyra, when words became so far detached from their accustomed meanings that prudence came to signify cowardice and fanatical recklessness manly virtue.

Professor Brinton's opinion seems to be that our present confusions arise not from the loss of a tradition but from the enormous accretions to it in the course of twenty-five hundred years. "Our culture," he says, "is an almost incredible palimpsest in which nothing is ever suddenly or wholly blotted out." Christianity, for example, notwithstanding its divisions, is still a powerful and vital force in our world; but so, too, under various forms is the anti-Christian spirit which is our legacy from the Enlightenment. Marxism, despite its now discredited scientific premises, and the disclosure of its historical fallacy by history itself, remains "a growing and a fighting faith." But an even more vigorous faith is the nationalism over which so many premature requiems have been sung.

No further proof is needed that the nationalistic genius is still alive and lusty than the contemporary effort to fashion world states with the parochial instruments of American nationalism. As far as Dr. Brinton can see, Western man of the mid-twentieth century is still the devout and trusting child of the Enlightenment; for we should not, he warns us, mistake the voices of a few disenchanted and fearful intellectuals, crying for a new synthesis and a new faith, for the voice of the generality. It is true that a dominant tendency of the moment is in the direction of what our professor calls anti-intellectualism, manifest in the influences of Freud, Pavlov, and Pareto. But though this effort to disparage the rational character of human beings is, like the early nineteenth-century romanticism, a revolt against the smug optimisms of the Enlightenment, it is in another sense the fruit of them, as in the case of the logical positivists who have established their own callow metaphysics to prove the worthlessness of all metaphysics.

There are points at which Dr. Brinton seems to agree with the literary critic who a few years ago asserted that the most that can be hoped for from our twentieth-century Babel is that somehow somebody will manage to "orchestrate the confusion." Dr. Brinton does, of course, acknowledge this confusion of voices, and he finds the visual counterpart of it in our eclectic and heterogeneous architecture. The ages that have followed the age of the Enlightenment are the only ones that have possessed no characteristic manner of building, for the only effect of the "functional" architecture of the twentieth century has been "to add another ingredient to the hash." This is a matter of some interest because, as the professor has been careful to show, each alteration of the *Weltanschauung* had formerly been reflected in some radical alteration of architectural style, as for example in the transition from vertical to horizontal building after the humanistic Renaissance.

Professor Brinton, as it seems to me, is least successful in dealing with the culture of the Middle Ages. This is not because he follows the rationalist affectation of dismissing them as an historical nightmare of ignorance, superstition, cruelty and dirt, nor yet because he accepts the neo-romantic view of them as times of pious conviviality, sanctified craftsmanship, economic serenity and theological enthusiasm. He is at much pains to catch what he takes to be the accurate proportion of light and shadow, to give his reader a fair understanding of mediaeval thought, of the importance of the Thomistic synthesis, of the significance of the long quarrel of realists and nominalists. His difficulty comes in part from following the historical convention of treating a thousand years full of change and movement as a single and sharply-defined epoch; in part from the fact that, for all his good intentions, he finds the mediaeval ethos somewhat alien and uncongenial, exhibiting fewer evidences of the "multanimity" that he considers to have been present in Western thought from the Eleatics onward to today.

He is much more at home in classical antiquity, especially in its Hellenistic and Roman phases, where he can point out all the numerous analogies and contrasts to modernity. But he is best, of course, on his familiar and well-explored ground of the eighteenth century, in examining all the influences which have given shape to all our present ideas concerning man and society. The eighteenth century infused an entirely new and highly combustible element into the cultural complex — the notion of inevitable and illimitable progress, coinciding, whether by chance or by inscrutable historical design, with the earliest phases of the industrial revolution. Dr. Brinton traces the germinal growth of this notion of progress from the seventeenth-century French debate over the relative merits of ancients and moderns. Eventually the modernists carried the field against the antiquity-worshiping humanists, and their cause was strengthened by the appearances of progress, such as better roads, new household comforts and generally rising living standards, that could now be observed in the course of a single lifetime. Meanwhile had come the revelation of the marvelous new mechanical and self-winding universe of Newton and Kepler. This universe might, as was at first generally acknowledged, give evidence of a divine artificer; but since He had fashioned so perfect a mechanism nothing further was required of Him, not even an occasional oiling of the wheels, far less any miraculous intervention in earthly affairs. The way of happiness now lay in collaboration with nature, and the means of collaboration were readily discoverable by reason. But of course the reign of reason could not come until the mind of man had been freed from bondage to Christian "superstition."

Thus the Enlightenment, which represents the beginning of the American political tradition, was for its French prophets a conscious breach with tradition. The breach, however, was less complete than they supposed. The Christian doctrine of sin and redemption might be incompatible with the concept of a perfectibility in man, Christian supernaturalism with the concept of an all-sufficient, all-benignant nature; but the ethical ideals of Christianity were retained. And after the romantic reaction an uneasy working compromise could be struck, at least in England and America, between Christian orthodoxy and the new spirit of progress.

Bourgeois democracy and Marxist communism are the legitimate, if disparate, offspring of the Enlightenment. Marxism, says Professor Brinton, stands in much the same relation to the Enlightenment as Calvinism to Christianity. The Communist, in other words, is the rigid puritan among bourgeois rationalists. Just as the Calvinist believes that nothing he or others may do can interfere with the eternal ordinances of God, so the righteous Communist believes that nothing can thwart or hinder the operations of the inexorable deity that he calls dialectical materialism; and he is even surer of his place among the elect of history than the Calvinist of his place among the predestined saints.

> For the Marxist the state of grace, the thing that marks off the faithful from the heathen, is simply the ability to see the universe in Marxist terms.

In the Marxist eschatology the revolution is Judgment Day and the classless society the paradise to come. Nevertheless the Marxist, like the Calvinist, feels the compulsion to do battle for what he knows to be in any case inevitable. But in the end he, too, is impaled upon the Western dilemma of the ideal and the actual. His

vision of paradise grows vaguer as he strives grimly to enlarge and intensify the class-power of his Russian co-religionists. Historically, says Professor Brinton, the Communist has been far less successful than the liberal democrat in easing the tension between liberty and equality created by the formulas of the Enlightenment. For nowhere, save in the incorporeal world of Hegelian dialectic, can we "achieve an end by trying to achieve its opposite."

J. M. LALLEY

FAITH AND FORCE

I Believed, by Douglas Hyde. *New York: Putnam. $3.50*

The Pope, to answer Stalin's cynical question, has no divisions. Yet the faith of Catholics is one of the two strongest forces that today confront the evil combination of faith and force that is communism. The other is the industrial and military power of the United States. We have no unifying faith unless it be the fading inertia of our belief in material and technical progress; and at present we have too few divisions.

Douglas Hyde, once managing editor of the London *Daily Worker*, has made the circuit of faith from Methodism to communism to Catholicism. His book is one of the best and most instructive of the ex-Communist testaments, and some of our best people would appear to need the instruction it contains.

Again and again one reads that communism can not be defeated by military force alone. It is quite true, but the full implications of the statement are rarely grasped, let alone acted upon. We have a faith to forge at the same time that we are mobilizing our factories, our farms and our manpower. If we had faith to match our material power, we would long since have seized the political and psychological offensive in our struggle with the Kremlin. Instead of fighting weak and defensive propaganda actions, we would be conducting aggressive subversive warfare everywhere behind the Iron Curtain, as well as against the Communist fifth column at home.

Hyde helps us to understand both the strength and the weakness of the Communist faith that we are fighting. Communism, one is made to realize all over again, is Marxism; the balderdash of dialectical materialism, plus the amoral methodology of Lenin. To young Hyde, who grew up during the between-wars economic and social bankruptcy of a Welsh "black area," Marx said, in his Eleventh Thesis: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways: the point, however, is to change it." Certainly, the condition of the coal miners needed changing, and Marx challenged Hyde's youthful idealism when the don'ts of the Methodist creed left him cold. So Hyde became a Communist wolf in the sheep's clothing of a Methodist lay preacher about the same time that a whole generation of Protestant theological students were similarly masquerading in this country, for similar reasons.

The point, as Hyde makes it later in his book, is that although Communists routinely lie, cheat, and when in power torture, murder and enslave, the best of them don't start out as political adventurers, crooks and power-crazy morons. In appraising his former comrades, Hyde writes that some of them were supercareerists capable of any enormity, but that the "majority would make magnificent Christians if once they were given a better cause in which to believe."

What precipitated Hyde's break with communism was the switch in the party line that occurred after V-E Day, when the wartime policy of active collaboration in social and economic construction was changed to one of calculated obstruction, opposition to the Marshall Plan, and sabotage in the unions. What made him turn to Catholicism was his early delight in Chaucer, in medieval plain songs and in the beautiful pre-Reformation churches of his native Wales, together with the evidence supplied by contemporary Catholic publications that the continuity of Catholic culture, with its emphasis on the moral aspiration and discipline of the individual, had not been broken.

The amorality and spiritual aridity of communism causes its more sensitive adherents to suffer from a kind of moral inanition and self-hatred. Even the Kremlin's steel-hardened cadres — NKVD officials and journalistic hatchetmen — sometimes suffer from this occupational disease, as Boris Shub has shown us in his recently published "The Choice." Hyde was eventually forced to admit to himself that he no longer believed in either the methods or the ultimate aims of communism, and the psychosomatic consequences of this faithlessness brought him close to physical breakdown the year before he broke with the party.

Chambers, Budenz, many other ex-Communists, have traced a similar path of moral evolution and crisis, an experience that our totalitarian "liberals" are barred from understanding by their own spiritual mediocrity and pharisaism.

As chief sub-editor and eventually managing editor of the London *Daily Worker*, Hyde, like Budenz in this country, knew everybody and saw everything. Well-known figures like Dr. Alan Nunn May, convicted in Canada's atomic espionage trials, and Harry Pollitt move in and out of his narrative. Party members and fellow-travelers were expected to, and did, betray their country during and after the war, as a routine matter of course, by transmitting secret documents to Russia. In England, as in this country, scores of the "best people" were doing it — frivolously, faithlessly, idiotically. "Communism is the child of unbelief," writes Hyde. "Bad social conditions are only the things on which it feeds."

The Church that Hyde rediscovered and to which Budenz returned is not the only repository of faith on which disillusioned ex-Communists can draw. Chambers became a Friend. Others repudiate Communist materialism and amorality, but remain agnostics.

That is scarcely enough either for an individual or for a society fighting for its life, as ours is. Hyde writes:

> One of the greatest errors of our time was put into words by the Webbs who grandly disposed of the Soviet rejection of religion with the statement that there the worship of God has been replaced by the service of man. It has been that sort of facile thinking which has opened the way to the destruction of the culture of the west. . . . The sanest things on earth are those for which the allegedly reactionary, unscientific, obscurantist Church stands and for which she is doing battle.

One can agree with that without being a Catholic.

JAMES RORTY

POLITICS EN CHEMISE

The Telegraph: Book Two of Lucien Leuwen, by Stendhal. Translated by Louise Varese. *New York: New Directions. $3.50*

In 1831, when Henri Beyle was appointed to the French consulate at Civita-Vecchia, he was almost fifty. "The Red and the Black" was behind him; "The Charterhouse of Parma" still ahead. He was restless. His job, which consisted in checking passports and overseeing an office of petty assistants, made no adequate demands on him. Local society was unattractive. "I am the most beautiful sight the passengers see when they come ashore," he complained. He spent as much time as possible in nearby Rome; otherwise, in the next half dozen years, he began and left unfinished no less than five large-scale narratives, all part of what he later described as "a history of my time."

The most ambitious of these was to have been a triptych of novels about a young man named Lucien Leuwen, whose education, sentimental and worldly-wise, would enact itself against a broad satiric portrait of French society under the Citizen King Louis-Philippe. Only two of the three parts got written; no exact titles were ever settled on; and the whole manuscript remained unpublished at the author's death. It took fifty years for a complete edition to appear in France (as "Lucien Leuwen"), and it has taken another fifty for a translation to appear in English. For this, which comes to us as "The Green Huntsman" (published last spring), and now "The Telegraph," we are indebted, for a lively and scrupulous job of rendering, to Louise Varese, and for a prosperous and imaginative job of book-making, to New Directions.

"Lucien Leuwen" has been called a novel of ideas. To the extent that its characters are dramatized largely in terms of what they think and believe — as, say, the characters in "Major Barbara" are — this is true. But it is not *about* ideas; and it is certainly not a *roman à thèse*. Like any real novel, it is first and foremost about people, and studded as it is with wit and insight, it should never be thought of as belonging to the same genre as the novels of Peacock or Godwin, or even Silone or Koestler. For Stendhal's people always have autonomy; they *contain*, they are greater than their opinions, and are never present as mere mouthpieces; moreover, they are frequently seen quite independently of any ideas at all, simply as human beings, as Jane Austen might have seen them:

> Not one of her rivals could compare with her insofar as her complexion was concerned. Consequently she took great delight in prolonging the balls she gave till morning and having breakfast served to her guests in the full light of the morning sun with all the blinds wide open. If pretty women thoughtlessly stayed on, Madame Grandet triumphed.

In "The Telegraph," young hero Lucien comes to Paris (in "The Green Huntsman" he had been playing soldier and falling in and out of love in Nancy); and here, under the worldly aegis of his banker-father (very much like Major Barbara's), he obtains a position as private secretary to the Minister of the Interior. In the adventures that follow, one gets as densely convincing, and hugely entertaining, a portrait of politics *en chemise* as, I think, exists in literature. The episode of the Caen elections alone — in which Lucien is sent into the provinces with one hundred thousand francs and orders to prevent at all costs the election of a certain candidate — is a masterpiece of machination. Lucien talks, connives, bribes, telegraphs (a trump in those days), but still, when a member of his own party deliberately throws away the crucial votes he controls in a fit of jealousy, is defeated.

Lucien accepts the lesson for what it is worth.

> M. de Seranville had vomited, and now looked up in his anguish with a moribund air. The state of this spiteful little man touched Lucien; he saw in him simply a suffering human being.

Unlike the engineer, who uses very reliable steel, the politician must always work, whatever his intentions, with a very intractable medium, this "suffering human being." And whether he is framing an election or the Good Society, he must never expect to proceed as efficiently, as unconditionally, as the engineer constructing a bridge. He must, in fact, be willing to lose at least half of the time, something which too many of our most ambitious theorists, from Plato to Marx, and the fascisti of all ages, have either never realized, or chosen to ignore.

ROBERT PHELPS

YOUNG BOSWELL

Boswell's London Journal, edited by Frederick A. Pottle. *New York: McGraw-Hill. $5.00*

The "Journal" of James Boswell, written in 1762 and just recently published, is the most extraordinary book of the year both in its history and content. It was composed in a spirit of candor unacceptable to common usage, and yet it was intended for publication — but not when it would injure Jamie! As a heroically ambivalent character, Jamie would have it both ways. A hundred years ago Macaulay would have nothing to do with Boswell. He dismissed him scornfully as a tosspot and a toady, though he neglected to explain how a sot could have written the greatest biography in English. What on earth would Macaulay have said had he known there existed an autobiography by Boswell compared to which Rousseau's "Confessions" appear pallid and artificial? Macaulay's reply would doubtless fill a whole issue of the *Edinburgh Review*, proving that Boswell was two other fellows.

As autobiography, the "Journal" emphasizes contrariety of behavior, for in Boswell the romantic and the practical were constantly at war. Over a period of three years the Laird of Auchinleck and his eldest son carried on a running debate as to whether the latter should study law or go to London. Jamie had published poems and otherwise conducted himself scandalously, so much so that his father considered disinheriting him. Finally, on his plea that he try to obtain a commission in the Guards, Jamie was granted a Scot's allowance and set out for London, which was "all life and joy" to him. With sustained rapture Boswell prospected London, calling on politicians, Lords and even a Duke, not neglecting the noble ladies, to further his commission. The Lord of Auchinleck, aware that with the end of the Seven Years' War the army was disbanding fast, made doubly sure Jamie wouldn't suc-

ceed by letting it be known to his London connections that he would consider it no favor to have Jamie granted a commission. It was a hoax worthy of the best jest of Boswell, because for months he pursued the elusive commission even to the office of the prime minister. It wasn't that Boswell fancied being a soldier; he just wanted any post that would keep him in London.

Boswell's efforts to make his way in the world were certainly beset with cross purposes and hilarious and drab episodes. Jamie shuttled back and forth between high and low life. He bounced about London with all the crude gusto of a stallion. Yet Garrick welcomed him to his home and a most varied assortment of people invited his company. What this early "Journal" reveals clearly is that Boswell was that rare phenomenon, a born writer. Furthermore, he practiced the art intensively and persistently. He was a steady notetaker and shrewd observer. His selectivity in the development of material in his "Journal" demonstrates the skill of the artist. What he observed he projects with a highly developed sense of detachment. Nothing will stop him from accurate reporting. He even sets down the most embarrassing things against himself, for he truly says: "I am scrupulous to a nicety about truth."

He spares himself nothing in recording the ironic amorous affair with the actress Louisa. This could stand alone apart from the rest of the "Journal." It is a piece of ironic comedy that is rendered as well as any comparable episode in Fielding. It indicates plainly that Boswell could have been a major novelist, perhaps even the superior of Fielding because of finer sensibility and imagination. Why didn't Jamie become a novelist? Simply because it wasn't respectable for the son of a Scotch Lord to be connected so irretrievably with the arts.

There was nothing hard-boiled about Boswell for all his roaring around London. He fancied he was acting the part of Captain Macheath, the highway robber hero of "The Beggar's Opera." It was only fancy. Boswell was months in London before he dared look at Newgate Prison — and then the impact haunted him. For at Newgate he saw executed a highwayman that resembled Macheath. He couldn't get the scene out of his mind; it plunged him into deep melancholy and gloomy terror. He actually dressed again after retiring, going to the home of friends for a week, rather than sleep alone after seeing the execution. He was obviously shocked, "Newgate being upon [his] mind like a black cloud."

A good deal of the material about Dr. Johnson which appears in the "Journal" was used by Boswell in his "Life." Some of the material is identical, other items have interesting variations. Just as Tristram Shandy isn't born until the end of the third book celebrating his character, so Johnson doesn't appear until the later part of this "Journal." Once on the scene, he directs Jamie into ways that should be those of a future Lord of Auchinleck. Still, even without Johnson's aid, Boswell had much to be proud of in being accepted on intimate terms by Garrick, Goldsmith, and Johnson himself. Despite Macaulay, he was no lickspittle to the famous. What is most delightful to recall of these early memoirs is that Jamie might have met Johnson five months earlier through Tom Davies, the bookseller. Davies had invited Boswell to Christmas dinner because Johnson was going to be there, but Jamie never went. He had been all too apparently bewildered and frustrated by the wiles of Louisa to remember his engagement to dine with "Dictionary" Johnson.

EDWIN CLARK

COLONIAL FRAGMENTS

Time in New England. Photographs by Paul Strand. Text selected and edited by Nancy Newhall. *New York: Oxford. $6.00*

The fragments from Colonial writers have been selected with taste by Nancy Newhall, and the remarkable photographs, by Paul Strand, of a tombstone or a stark church facade, are done with plain honesty, lacking any of the camera cant which sometimes makes the rude, pilgrim villages a sham Canaan.

There is the 1629 fragment, by Francis Thompson, chronicling the hopes of the voyagers who saw "yellow gilliflowers on the sea" and a Massachusetts shore that was a ripe, May meadow. But from the next piece, by James Pierpont, we see the tender, summery faith succeeded by January hardships, tears and prayers and long wilderness rains. Then there is Captain Edward Johnson's mention of early American artisans, the coopers, the glaziers, the nailors, the blacksmiths — men whose skills are almost as defunct today as some of the comely, but residual, epitaph towns like Ipswich, Salem and Concord, for which a megalopolitan, macadam American pines.

The text and the photographs make a clean and truthful American parable; one has, however, some niggling criticism to make. It is regrettable that the Ann Bradstreet poem has been included. Some university trade academic is always tormenting his students by getting out a book of some bad or negligible Colonial muse. Some one is always spuriously fattening our Parnassus, giving us the famine kine, the Ann Bradstreet poems, while neglecting the good, doughty writing of "The Simple Cobbler of Aggawan," by Nathaniel Ward.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

THE NIHILISTS

The crows of all the world with silken bustle
Assail the corn: O hear upon the air
Their dark wings drifting and their crepen rustle!

They rive the mounded earth, disturb and tear,
And prey upon the future's golden seed.
O sowers of the world, beware, beware!

Shall we plant grains of beauty but to feed
These hounds of the winds of death, whose raucous baying
Proclaims destruction as their only creed?

O fiercely guard your dream of green leaves swaying
Toward mellow harvest! — lest these wings of night
Shall intercept the Spring in dark waylaying.

Meet death with life: destroy the stealthy spite
Of these destroyers of the seeds of light!

E. MERRILL ROOT

FREEDOM IS CONTAGIOUS

From One Friend To Another

While the editors of the Freeman were laboring on the first issue, a friend of ours suggested we send the charter issue to a group of people on a list which he submitted.

"These people," he said, "will be greatly interested in the ideals for which the Freeman stands."

On the list was the name of an eminent American statesman. Within a week we received from him a list of people for whom he wanted subscriptions to the magazine.

On his list was included the name of a Chicago businessman. Just the other day we received a letter from him asking if we would enter subscriptions for some twenty persons he desired should become regular readers of the Freeman.

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Subject More People to its Influence

Now that you have had an opportunity to read the Freeman, we wonder if you haven't some persons in mind to whom you would like each issue of the magazine sent during the coming year.

It might be well in constructing such a list to give thought to acquaintances who have lost sight of the basic concepts of freedom. Why not send the Freeman as a missionary to aid in the fight against complete centralization of government so readily accepted by those who are so eager to embrace the security-minded welfare state which retrieves doubly with its right hand what it tenders with its left?

To these persons the Freeman must penetrate if the task of halting "creeping socialism" is to be accomplished.

Won't you send us your list today?

Send Them a Subscription to:

the FREEMAN

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