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FREEMAN

APPEASEMENT BRINGS WAR
An Editorial

OUR TEEN-AGE DRUG ADDICTS
William Manchester

BRITISH SOCIALISM IS DEAD
F. A. Voigt

HOW NOT TO FIGHT RUSSIA
Asher Brynes

MEN WHO SCUTTLED CHINA
John Chamberlain

Editors: **John Chamberlain · Henry Hazlitt · Suzanne La Follette**

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JUNE 4, 1951

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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KYON ARGOS, also a pseudonym, conceals the identity of a noted social scientist who has definite ideas about the denizens of the political "dog-house."

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MORTIMER SMITH is a frequent contributor to magazines and the author of several books, including the recent "And Madly Teach," a controversial study of current public education.

HAROLD LAVINE is an associate editor of *Newsweek* who spent four months in Korea covering the war. Next he will go to Europe "to see how Ike is making out," he writes. "Between such assignments, I specialize in politics."

ROBERT SIMPSON is on the foreign desk of the *New York Times*, and contributes to magazines and book-review periodicals.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

So far from improving its position by testifying against General MacArthur, the Administration steadily makes it worse. After the President had assured the American people, and had got Secretary Marshall and General Bradley to assure Congress, that the reason for MacArthur's dismissal was his letter to Congressman Martin and even his cable of April 5 to the *Freeman*, Mr. Truman in his press conference on May 17 declared that he had been considering dismissal of MacArthur off and on "for about a year." This was tantamount to an admission that he had all that time been pursuing a two-faced policy. General MacArthur found it "difficult to reconcile" this reply "with my appointment by him as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, and the number of most commendatory messages he sent me during that period, the last one being as late as the past January." So the next day Mr. Truman changed his story again, and dated his dissatisfaction from last August. As we go to press Mr. Truman is basing his dismissal of MacArthur primarily upon the latter's effort of March 25 to secure a cease-fire agreement from the enemy commander in the field. But as General MacArthur has pointed out, "such action on my part could only be regarded as supplementary to and in full support of any political move toward peace *unless an agreement was in contemplation on the enemy's own terms.*" (Our italics.)

Certainly General Bradley's testimony did nothing to help the Administration's case. His epigram that General MacArthur's proposed strategy would involve the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy" took only a few days to boomerang. It was too pat a description of the present war in Korea. The Bradley epigram assumed the fantastic fiction that we are not *already* fighting the Chinese Communists. And by openly wondering whether the Russians "can afford to lose in Korea," General Bradley was in effect implying that even on his own strategy we could not afford to seem on the verge of winning, lest we provoke Russia.

If Russia came in as a result of following the MacArthur policy, it would spoil General Bradley's epigram anyway. On his own and Secretary Marshall's testimony, we would then at least be fighting the right enemy. Whether it would be also the right war at the right place and the right time is something that Mr. Truman should have asked himself on the night of June 26 when he made the personal decision, without consulting Congress, to throw American troops into Korea. For the Chinese intervention, and the feared Russian intervention, were implicit in and stem from that decision, and not from General MacArthur's belief that, now that our troops are there, they should at least be allowed to fight without their hands tied.

As a footnote to Asher Brynes's article in this issue on "How Not to Fight Russia" (see page 561), we can not refrain from commenting on a recent column by Walter Lippmann. Pontificating on the subject of the mind of the Kremlin, Mr. Lippmann seems reasonably sure that Stalin and Molotov want to fight the next war in the Far East. "For the Soviets," says Mr. Lippmann, "the Far East is the safest and the most advantageous place to have a world war break out . . ." We seem to recall that the Russians once fought a "safe" war in the Far East. That was back in the early years of this century, and the Russian opponent was the supposedly "inferior" nation of Japan. The Japanese, as we remember it, licked the spots out of the Russians, who could not supply their troops over the constricted arteries of the trans-Siberian railway system. In this connection we want to ask two questions. The first is, "Has the trans-Siberian railway system been greatly improved since 1904?" The second is, "Is the United States of 1951 inferior in power (including the power to command the sea lanes) to the Japan of 1904?" Mr. Lippmann seldom bothers his head with such questions, but they seem to us rather important to a proper consideration of his subject.

As we go to press, the Rosenbergs, two "little people," are waiting in Sing Sing to die for the crime of divulging atomic secrets to the Russians back in the heyday of the Grand Alliance. No doubt the Rosenbergs deserve their punishment; nevertheless it gave us a rather strange sensation to read, in the May 5 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*, a quotation attributed to Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia. Said the Ambassador, back in 1946, "Russia, in self-defense, has every moral right to seek atomic-bomb secrets through military

espionage if excluded from such information by her former fighting allies." The Rosenbergs clearly lacked "influence"; they had no high connections in political circles. Yet was their crime any greater, for example, than the one perpetrated by the influential, well-connected people who helped deliver China to the Communists? The whole business recalls an old English rhyme from the days of the Enclosures Acts. It goes:

> They put in jail the man and woman
> Who steal the goose from off the common
> But leave the greater felon loose
> Who steals the common from the goose.

It seems that there is a thing called the ORO, or Operations Research Office of the Department of the Army. The super-secret business of the ORO is to evaluate the effectiveness under war conditions of any new secret weapon the armed forces are thinking of adopting. ORO is affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. A quotation from a speech by Alfred Kohlberg printed in the *Congressional Record* asks: "And who, just last year, put the ORO . . . under the School of International Studies of Johns Hopkins University?" The head of the School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins, incidentally, is Owen Lattimore.

Mr. Oscar Ewing, the Federal Security Administrator, got his voice clipped. The House of Representatives did it. Into an appropriation bill it wrote that he should stop using the taxpayers' money for "publicity or propaganda not heretofore authorized by Congress." That would probably, though not certainly, bar such a publication as the one entitled "An Interpretation for the Staff in Public Assistance Agencies," in which appears the following: "Social security and public assistance programs are a basic essential for the attainment of the socialized state envisaged in democratic ideology, a way of life which so far has been realized only in slight degree."

Who is Mr. Ewing to be promoting the socialized state? He is one of the bureaucrats who run the government, whether the government knows it or not; and within his bureau are little Socialist bureaucrats who run the bureau, whether he knows it or not, and so it works. It is probable that he never saw that particular piece of propaganda, and probable, further, that if he had seen it he would have said: "Tut, tut! It's all right of course, but don't you know that we have to get our money out of a reactionary Congress? Find a disarming substitute for 'socialized state.' Remember your semantics. Call it the Welfare State. It may be safe to go as far as that." And so the acid of socialism keeps dropping into the bowl of crustaceans, to make them swim all together toward a way of life that so far has been realized only in slight measure. What would full measure cost? Ask England.

The Connecticut Congressman-at-Large, Antoni N. Sadlak, has taken the trouble to tabulate his first thousand replies to a write-your-Congressman public opinion poll stirred up by radio commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr. Answering Mr. Lewis's Question No. 1 ("As of today, would you vote for Harry Truman for President?"), three of Representative Sadlak's constituents said "yes," while 996 said "no." To the question, "Should Chiang Kai-shek be permitted to send his Nationalist armies against the Chinese Communists?," 969 said "yes"; only 21 said "no." A mere seven out of a thousand believe that Truman is making a sincere effort to cut out unnecessary government spending; only three out of a thousand believe the President's statement that all Communist sympathizers have been weeded out of the government. We realize the shortcomings of public opinion polls that are undertaken without due regard to the principles of so-called scientific sampling. However, it seems to us significant that Congressman Sadlak thinks the replies to the Lewis poll "reflect rather accurately the views of the people of the State of Connecticut." Like most Congressmen, Sadlak has ears that operate very well when close to the ground.

Missouri formula for peace, the good world and America First: "I want every Democrat to be a patriot and an American first. Convert as many Republicans as you can to the same idea and we will win the peace." — *Harry S. Truman.* Derived axioms: Politics as usual for Democrats only. Let no Republican on the porch. Hit him in a vital spot. If you loved your country you would have been born a Democrat.

Commenting on Ike Eisenhower's refusal to return to Washington to give evidence that might counteract the popularity of MacArthur, *Human Events* notes that "some White House retainers feel that the General has let them down and bitterly remark that now Eisenhower is thinking only of his political future." To which we might add, "instead of *their* political future."

The British House of Commons has solemnly pronounced the obsequies of witchcraft. The Witchcraft Act of 1735 will be repealed. But witchcraft was the lesser of two delusions. The greater was that there was power in a law to exorcise demons. So long as people believe that, the most they can do is to change demons, inventing new ones in place of the old. England's new demon is capitalism, which is believed to be the evil that makes the rich to be rich and the poor to be poor; and the delusion is that poverty can be abolished by laws to abate wealth.

In its issue of February 12, the *Freeman* announced its sponsorship of a seminar on basic social and economic problems, to be held by the distinguished economist Professor Ludwig von Mises, from Monday, June 25, through Friday, July 6. The response to this announcement was gratifying. The editors of the *Freeman* are happy to announce that altogether 39 applicants were accepted, ten of whom were granted fellowships to defray the cost of their transportation to and from New York and other expenses. We regret that we were unable to admit still more applicants, but the space available in the board room of the New York University Faculty Club, in which the seminar will be held, is limited. A seminar of this type would fail of its purpose, moreover, if the number of participants were allowed to become unwieldy. Those accepted for the seminar include college and high-school teachers, writers, research workers and graduate students in the field of the social sciences.

APPEASEMENT MEANS WORLD WAR III

THE CHIEF rebuttal of the Administration, endlessly repeated, is that the policy General MacArthur has recommended in Korea will bring Russia into the war against our forces and precipitate World War III.

Any detached analysis suggests exactly the opposite conclusion: if anything will bring Russia into the war and precipitate a major conflict now, it is precisely the policy being followed by the Administration.

The Administration policy is so contrary to everything that common sense suggests that it is difficult to present the logic of it as the Truman-Acheson-Marshall group see it.

We are at war with Communist China. Even the Administration admits this — though not officially. Even in the State Department, in fact, no one has been heard to declare within the last few weeks that the soldiers who are attacking and killing Americans are "volunteers" or a species of as yet unidentified Asiatic Communists, but that if we bomb Manchuria we may bring Communist China into the war.

The objection to bombing Chinese Communist military bases in Manchuria, in the form in which it is usually phrased, rests on a transparent ambiguity. The objection is that such bombing would "extend the war." Now this is true only in the sense that it would extend the war into the enemy's own territory as well as into the territory that he has aggressively invaded. Not only is there no rational objection to "extending" the war in this sense; such an "extension" ought to be part of the very objective of this as of any other war. When one has been forced into a defensive war, the first aim is to throw the enemy out of the territory he has invaded. The next is to carry the war into the enemy's territory. Only if we do this, or only if he fears that we intend to and can do this, has he any reason to sue for peace.

The Truman-Acheson-Marshall notion (to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders in the field seem obliged to lend their support) that after we have killed enough Chinese Communists in Korea the Chinese Communists will be forced to sue for peace, simply makes no sense on its face. Why should they sue for peace? Truman, Acheson and Marshall have practically guaranteed them that our forces will never invade and lay waste Chinese territory; that our forces will not even move to the borders of the Korea that the Chinese Communists have invaded, and will at worst move only a small, undefined distance above the 38th Parallel.

So whenever the Chinese Communists feel that they are getting the worst of it, they may simply withdraw, rest, regroup, rearm — and make another attack at any time most advantageous to themselves. They have the guarantee of Messrs. Truman, Acheson and Marshall that they will be allowed to do all this peacefully and at their leisure; that we will never pursue them into their own territory, never bomb their concentrations or military installations, and never peep too curiously with our air reconnaissance to see what they are up to.

At worst, the Chinese Communists can now figure, they can simply withdraw at their own convenience and stop fighting us altogether. Under the Truman-Acheson-Marshall guarantees, they will have no reason whatever to sue for peace, or even to announce any intention to stop fighting. It will be much better for them just to keep our forces guessing in Korea, tied down, in constant suspense, waiting for possible new attacks, while our home front drains its strength to supply them. And if the communist world decides to strike elsewhere, it will have the advantage of knowing that our army is safely tied down to Korea.

It is some time since we have heard the argument being made by the Administration that the Chinese, for some undisclosed reason, are throwing only part of their available forces at us, but that if we bombed their bases in Manchuria they would *really* get mad, and *really* make war on us. It is now being freely admitted, even by Administration spokesmen, that the Chinese Communists are already throwing in their maximum available effort under the circumstances. No other assumption, indeed, makes any sense.

So in this respect, also, the rational conclusion is not only that we have nothing to fear from air attacks on Manchuria, or from the use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on Formosa, or from aid to all anti-Communist guerrilla forces on the Chinese mainland, but that such attacks and aid would force the Chinese Communists to throw far *fewer* and less-well-armed forces at us in Korea than otherwise. For we would weaken the Chinese forces both by destroying their supply points in Manchuria and by forcing them to divert more forces to the Chinese mainland.

The only answer Secretary Marshall has had to make to the policy General MacArthur has suggested is that in his "judgment," or in the "judgment" of the Chiefs of Staff, only negligible results would be accomplished by such bombing or the use of loyal Chinese forces. He never gave very convincing reasons for this "judgment," nor did he explain why, if a military judgment like this was what was really involved, the decision should not be left to the judgment of the theater or field commander on the spot — whether his name happens to be MacArthur or Ridgway or Van Fleet.

We need not give much weight to a political argument that is usually invoked when the alleged military arguments become transparently absurd. This is that, if we bomb Manchuria, the "United Nations" won't like it, or

our "allies" won't like it, and will leave us. The blunt truth, as everybody now knows, is that none of our "allies" took the "United Nations" as seriously as we did. They have thought of it as something that might possibly help them but not as something that they ought to help. After a year of warfare in Korea they have got around to contributing only about 10 per cent of the total non-Korean ground forces on our side, leaving the United States alone to contribute some 90 per cent of the ground forces and considerably more than that of the matériel. It is more than doubtful that the loss even of all these allies would offset the military gains of carrying (or even threatening to carry) the war into the enemy's territory. And it is more than doubtful that we would in fact lose the most important of these allies if we took this step. It is they who will need our help in Europe, not we theirs.

And yet the Administration persistently talks as if the situation were the other way around. As these European governments are calmly allowing us to take far more than our share of the defense of Korea, they will also, if we permit them, demand that we carry far more than our share of the defense of Europe itself. It is time that we ended the preposterous situation in Korea in which the United States pays the piper while other nations call the tune; in which we do nine-tenths of the fighting while they lay down the conditions not only of the peace but even of the fighting itself.

We come now to the main argument to which the architects of our present Korean policy have resorted. This is that, if we bomb the Chinese Communists' supply points in Manchuria, or support the Chinese Nationalists or anti-Communist guerrillas, we shall bring Russia into the war and precipitate World War III — or at least that we run the risk of doing these things.

The argument on this is no clearer than the arguments that have just been discussed. Why will Russia come into the war against us under such conditions? Russia and the Chinese Communists have a treaty, General Marshall replied. Do you mean, he was asked by Senator Hickenlooper, that the Russians would precipitate a third world war merely on the theory of supporting a treaty obligation . . . as a matter of honor? No, "not as a matter of honor," General Marshall replied.

Then why? Obviously Stalin acts on a very simple principle. He goes into wars that he expects to win, and stays out of wars that he expects to lose. If we bombed Manchuria, would he expect to win any more than if we did not?

Clearly the situation is, if anything, precisely the other way round. If we started bombing Manchurian military installations, we would not only do something likely to bring the Korean war to a conclusion in our favor, but we would also remind the Russian Communists that this might happen to *them*. But by failing to bomb Manchurian bases, by confessing to all the world that we are *afraid* to bomb Manchurian bases, we tend to lead Stalin and his advisers to think: "The United States must be very weak. It is too timid, too fearful, even to bomb a third-rate military power like Communist China over its own territory, and even though China has few planes. America must be so fearful of offending us that we can safely give still further aid to the Chinese. America must know more about its own weakness than we do. This looks like the time to strike. We may never have another such opportunity."

In other words, by appeasing Communist China, by publicly proclaiming their desire at any cost not to give offense to Soviet Russia, the architects of the Truman-Acheson-Marshall policy are *inviting* Russian aggression. They are running a far greater risk of bringing on a third world war than a policy of all-out war now against the Chinese aggressors could possibly bring.

There is nothing paradoxical or strange or new about this conclusion. It is the conclusion to which all history points. Signs of timidity and weakness always tempt and invite aggression. Need we go once more over the origins of World Wars I and II? Need we recall the conclusion that if England had declared unequivocally in advance that she would go to war if Belgium's neutrality were invaded, the Germans might never have marched through Belgium? Need we recall that if Blum and Daladier in France, and Baldwin and Chamberlain in Britain had taken a strong clear line with Nazi Germany in the first place, and if the two countries had refused to tolerate Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, World War II would have been snuffed out before it started?

After the horrors and destruction of two world wars have we still not learned that appeasement of the aggressor is not only the most shameful, but the most costly and most *dangerous* course that peace-loving countries can follow? Must we reverse all the lessons of logic and experience simply because the aggressor's name is not nazism but communism, not Kaiser Wilhelm or Hitler, but Stalin?

SUPPOSE IT HAPPENED NOW

IT IS a favorite device of our leaders who fear war to lay their plans on the assumption that the foreign aggression they fear is going to take place two years from the moment at which they happen to be talking or planning. The date of the assumed outbreak of war keeps receding as our leaders approach it, like a carrot hung on a stick in front of a donkey's nose or the mechanical rabbit that keeps ahead of the whippets in a dog race. It *remains* two years ahead.

This kind of estimate and planning occurred in the democracies until the very moment when Hitler struck. It is occurring now vis-à-vis Stalin. Less than a month before the Communist attack on South Korea, President Truman announced (doubtless acting on the information in the hands of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) that the world was "closer now to permanent peace than at any time during the last five years."

This tendency to place the evil two years ahead has deep psychological and political causes. Few of us can bring ourselves to think that a greatly feared danger may be immediate. But the assumption also has definite political advantages for the politicians in power. By predicting war they are able to frighten us all into accepting tremendous expenditures and economic and political controls — all of which increase their own power. But by putting the war two years off they reconcile us to the fact that we are not ready for it *now*. The

war will wait, we are assured, until we are fully prepared for it.

Rumors and private advices have been flying thick and fast that Russia may attack *now*, within a matter of weeks or days. Whether these rumors are warranted or not, they are not inherently implausible. And nothing could be more appropriate or profitable than to consider what our own position would be if Russia did in fact strike now.

The attack could come at any one of many possible points or in any one of many possible forms — a drive into western Europe, into Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East; an attack with the cooperation of the Chinese Communists at some point in Asia; an atomic bomb attack on our cities; a drive to annihilate our army in Korea.

Suppose the drive were made against western Europe. It could hardly fail, in the first instance, to be successful, as Hitler's drive against Holland, Belgium and France was successful. Russia, it has been estimated (as of March 1), has 175 divisions available for such a drive and its satellite troops are estimated at 1,000,000. Of the western European forces, on the other hand, France's eight divisions are dispersed throughout its empire, and the same is true of Great Britain's seven divisions; Italy has five divisions and Belgium one; Holland has 80,000 men not organized in divisions. Though the United States has 100,000 military personnel in western Europe, it has only two organized divisions. Compare this with the situation in 1939, when France alone put 100 divisions into the field.

In short, the Eisenhower army is today a paper army. It is merely a proposal, a hope, a vague promise. General Eisenhower himself is today not so much a commander as a mere symbol. Instead of preparedness, in Europe, we have had exhortation to preparedness. Instead of divisions, we have had rhetoric.

And it seems altogether probable that Europe is less rather than better prepared today to resist Russian Communist attack because of our intervention. American officials have encouraged European governments to use our handouts under the Marshall Plan to improve the standard of living in their countries rather than to improve their defenses. Our own ECA propagandists have cautioned European politicians and ourselves against imperiling the "social gains" of Europe by putting a burden of too great expenditures for defense on their economies. The realities show that this warning was quite superfluous.

By our over-anxiety we have tempted European governments to think that they were refusing to turn Communist *as a favor to us*, that they were arming *as a favor to us*. Under the Marshall and arms aid plans we have created in Europeans an attitude of dependence; an expectation that the United States will maintain their standard of living and guarantee their defense; in short, a habit of not acting for themselves or on their own initiative.

This accounts for the growth in Europe of the preposterous doctrine of "neutralism" — the theory that the real fight is between Russia and the United States; that the United States is in danger, and not themselves, and that Europe should stay neutral and above the battle and let Russia and the United States fight it out.

By their own attitude and by their plans, our own officials have unintentionally encouraged this neutralism. When, in order to stimulate Europe to do more for its own defense, it was suggested here that America propose a "matching" plan, under which we would pledge more divisions to Europe in proportion as Europe showed a willingness to help itself, this suggestion was repudiated by Administration spokesmen as a low form of bargaining. Europe was then led to suppose that the help it got from us would not depend in any measurable way upon the help it provided for itself.

In short, though the Administration has thrown away billions of American dollars in Europe, its policy has tended on net balance to make Europe less, not more, prepared to resist a Russian attack.

If the Russian attack came in the Middle East it is doubtful whether a united force could be mobilized against it with sufficient rapidity to be effective. The Atlantic Pact nations, for example, have snubbed Turkey, though Turkey has given evidence of a greater will to resist than any nation in western Europe.

A direct atomic bomb attack on American cities seems a remote possibility, but if it should occur, the plans for meeting it, either in Washington or in the individual cities, still seem very vague and nebulous.

If a Russian attack comes anywhere but in Korea, our army will be effectively bogged down there and unable to help. But suppose that the attack does come in Korea — that Russia throws in tremendous manpower, airpower, and its submarines, in an effort to annihilate our army in Korea?

This seems the greatest danger at the moment, and perhaps the most likely. Are the chances of our army better because the policy of the Administration has been followed rather than the policy of General MacArthur? Obviously not. If such an attack occurred, the official interdiction would presumably at least be removed on bombing the Communist military bases in Manchuria and even beyond.

But the bombing would come a little late. The Communist bases would already have been built up. They would be protected not only with more anti-aircraft guns but with airpower. The knockout of a munitions plant, we must remember, does not count much in that day's fighting, but in the fighting weeks or months later.

Any talk of enlisting the help of Chiang Kai-shek's army of 600,000 on Formosa, or of activating anti-Communist guerrillas on the Chinese mainland, would also seem very academic once such an all-out attack were launched; for the decision would be reached in a matter of weeks.

The danger to our army in Korea, in short, lies not in the strategy proposed by General MacArthur, but in the fact that the army is there. And it is there by Mr. Truman's decision and Mr. Truman's order.

When we contemplate realistically what the consequences would be of an immediate attack by Soviet Russia anywhere in the world, in fact, we are brought face to face with the bankruptcy of the Truman-Acheson-Marshall policy. This is the situation to which that policy has brought us six years after the end of World War II. Though we had spent many billions on defense prior to

the outbreak of the Korean war, that event showed how little real defense had been bought for those billions. Though we have thrown out billions in an effort to get allies, we are left with very few allies upon whom we could depend, but a great many so-called allies who depend on us. During each year since 1945, our position vis-à-vis Russia, at the beginning incomparably in our favor, has steadily deteriorated.

The Truman-Acheson-Marshall policy always seems to make us relatively weaker in the present than in the past. But it is always about to prove a glowing success — two years hence.

THE EXCUSES RUN OUT

FOR SIX YEARS an apologetic excuse has been offered for the originators of our China policy. The excuse has been that they mistook the Chinese Communists for agrarian reformers. They thought that Mao Tse-tung was an Oriental William Jennings Bryan, and that his followers were Jeffersonians who believed in small agricultural freeholds, et cetera, et cetera.

The agrarian reformer rigmarole was, of course, just plain and palpable idiocy on the face of it, but it somehow salved the national conscience to believe that Truman, Acheson, Marshall and the rest were deluded innocents, not villains or people with the historical insight of unsentient clods.

It came as a rude shock to many, therefore, when Secretary of Defense Marshall, testifying before the joint Senate Committee, announced that he had all along known that the Chinese Communists were Marxists. "When I . . . got out to China," he said, "and looked . . . *there was no doubt that the leadership of this group were Marxist Communist*, and so stated in my presence, and insisted, in my presence, that they were." (Italics ours.) In other words, General Marshall undertook his mission with his eyes open; he tried to bring the leaders of the Chinese Communists into the government of China with full knowledge that they were as Red as Stalin, as Leninist as Lenin, and as Marxist as Karl Marx himself.

Marshall's confession — for that is what his words amount to — makes it almost impossible for a rational person to believe that our China policy was originally conceived in the supposed interests of the United States. For if the Chinese Communists were known to be Marxist in 1946, the obvious corollary is that the makers of United States Asiatic policy tried to hand China's 400,000,000 people to a group whose sworn purpose is to pull down the whole Western democratic world.

True, there was a lot of gabble at the time, both among the Chinese Communists and their Western supporters, about the need for a "bourgeois" period in China's development. Lacking an industrial machine with its city proletariat, China was supposedly not in a position to go "socialist" overnight. But Russia itself was far from being an industrial country in 1918 — and the American State Department can hardly plead ignorance of what happened in Russia.

The Russian Revolution was made by a few key Bolshevik operatives, but it would never have come about if the "agrarians" hadn't been in on it lock, stock and barrel. Indeed, Lenin's most effective slogan was "The land belongs to the peasants." And so it did — for a brief moment of historical time. When the shootings of the landlords had died away, however, it was shortly disclosed that the land belonged to the *muzhik* in a sardonically Pickwickian sense. The land belonged to the peasant only for the brief interim between the murder of the Czar and his family and the coming of the collective.

General Marshall must have been aware of Russia's history; he must have been aware that the Chinese Communist leaders, being true Marxist Communists, would treat the Chinese peasants in the time-honored Marxist way. Certainly the men in the State Department who "edited" the directive of Marshall's Chinese mission — John Carter Vincent, Dean Acheson — must have known all about Lenin's manipulation of the peasants.

The excuse has been offered that John Carter Vincent, Dean Acheson and George Marshall hoped that Mao Tse-tung would become a Chinese Tito. But in 1946, the first year of Marshall's mission to China, Tito was still a full-fledged minion of Stalin and no one then envisioned the possibility of his defection. So the excuse of hoped-for Titoism just won't hold as an explanation of the genesis of our China policy. No matter how hard one tries, there is no way of evading the awful truth:

The American State Department wanted Marxist Communists to win for Marxism and communism in China.

Was this, in 1946, a treasonable proposition? Not, perhaps, in the technical sense; we were not then at war with Soviet Russia, or with the Red Chinese satellite of Soviet Russia. Technically treasonable or not, however, our China policy was never an American policy. It was conceived from the start in the interests of an alien power, a power sworn to the destruction of all our individualistic and democratic institutions. On his own testimony, General Marshall supported our pro-Marxist China policy with his eyes unblinkered by innocence.

One is privileged to believe, of course, that Marshall, Acheson and John Carter Vincent hoped in 1946 that Marxist communism might some day become "civilized." But this is tantamount to saying that our policy-makers knew nothing of human nature, nothing of human history. How can you get "civilization" out of a movement dedicated to the liquidation of whole classes of human beings? Haven't Marshall, Acheson and John Carter Vincent ever listened to the prophetic words of the Red song, the "Internationale," with its appeal to the "final struggle"?

We are faced with a startling alternative; either we are at the mercy of a pro-Marxist conspiracy in high places — or we have been victimized by ignoramuses.

Though it may be comforting to believe the latter, it is, nonetheless, a mighty cold sort of comfort. Small wonder that the disillusioned American has lined up on General Douglas MacArthur's side of our Asiatic policy controversy with a feeling that at last he has found a leader who combines common patriotism and common honesty with common sense. The fact that MacArthur does not engage in double-talk has been like the gushing of fountains in a desert land.

As a matter of ironic fact, the Administration itself has had to admit, in a roundabout sort of way, that MacArthur is right. The foremost American general was fired because he could not support Truman's policy in the Far East. That is, he could not acquiesce in the idea that the Chinese Communists should be permitted a stalemate in Korea. He could not acquiesce in the idea that Formosa should be traded to Mao Tse-tung, that the Red Chinese should be seated in the UN, that Chiang should be sold down the river as were Mihailovich, Mikolajczyk and the rest of our brave World War II allies, that we should apologize for our role in mediating the Russo-Japanese War, that the British should continue to sell rubber through Hong Kong to the hostile Chinese mainland, and so forth and so on.

Well, ever since MacArthur was fired the Administration has been hastening to take over his position, at least for purposes of public consumption. Pressure has been brought on the British to stem the flow of war goods to Mao Tse-tung's ports. The UN Political Committee, at American instigation, has voted an arms embargo against Communist China and North Korea. Marshall has said that he is against allowing the Red Chinese to shoot their way into the UN. He has also said he is against letting Formosa fall to Mao Tse-tung's soldiers. (Remember, MacArthur was muzzled because he said the same thing to the Veterans of Foreign Wars last summer?)

All of MacArthur's proposals save two have been sanctioned by Administration spokesmen, the exceptions being the proposals to bomb the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria and to use Chiang's troops on the mainland. If Russian-made planes begin appearing in numbers over Korea, and if Russian "volunteers" begin moving into Korea, how long before MacArthur's full list of proposals will be in effect?

THE APPEAL TO FEAR

"Don't Budge; Don't Breathe"

SPEAKER RAYBURN has warned the Congress of imminent disaster; Secretary Acheson has warned of possible "unimaginable disaster"; and President Truman has harped on the same theme. Both President Truman and Secretary of Defense Marshall have explained that General MacArthur first had his hands tied, and then was dismissed, because his least word or act might have caused the loss of our allies (*sic*) or an immediate all-out attack by the Soviet Union. It is clear that these men, charged with the security of the Republic, fear that one false step may plunge us into Armageddon. And General Marshall made their reasons unmistakably clear. In the last five years, he told the joint Senate Committees investigating our foreign policy,

> the U. S. has been engaged in a unique struggle against Communist imperialism and aggression.

Yet during four of those five years the Administration failed to build up our military forces, with results described by the Secretary in his testimony:

> SENATOR BRIDGES: You have said before that we should build up our allied forces in Europe, and if we do that we could successfully defend ourselves, certainly by 1953.
> GENERAL MARSHALL: That is roughly correct.
> GENERAL MARSHALL: When we turn to this country I think we must keep in mind throughout that we had almost nothing in the summer of 1950 in the way of available troops in this country other than one airborne division, the 82nd, and a part of a Marine division.
> Everything else has been built up since that time.

In the light of this colloquy, the following question and answer assume a special significance.

> SENATOR BRIDGES: Do you think Russia has the atomic bomb?
> GENERAL MARSHALL: I assume they have.

These and other statements adumbrated a picture of all-out war with the Soviet Union in 1951 or 1952. Let us assume it would start with atom bomb attacks on our principal ports from Russian freighters which now visit our harbors on supposedly peaceful missions. At the same moment, Soviet B-29s would bomb our northern industrial centers without warning — as President Truman predicted.

Soviet submarines might play havoc with our supply lines to Korea; Russian paratroopers might capture, and either hold or destroy, our air bases in Japan and Alaska. Because, during four of those five years "of struggle against Communist imperialism and aggression" we failed to arm, and only now are slowly preparing the first stages of rearmament, it is hardly to be assumed — if we are to credit the leaders who first neglected our defenses and now warn us of the consequences — that Stalin will wait until we are fully armed before starting the inevitable conflict. If he does not attack before the end of 1952, only two logical explanations would seem possible.

1. He does not have the atom bomb, or does not have it in sufficient quantity.

2. There are internal difficulties behind the Iron Curtain far beyond our imagining.

But what if Stalin does strike? Picture the "unimaginable disaster" — the ruined and partly ruined cities, the halt to our rearmament effort, the millions of dead, wounded and burned, and the activities of the hard core of Communist spies, saboteurs and agitators in our midst, particularly on our East and West coasts and in our industrial Middle West.

Add to this disaster and confusion the wails of the millions of Americans who signed the Moscow-sponsored Stockholm Peace Petition. Their cries for peace terms to

stop the slaughter and destruction will reach the ears of the three men who, if they survive, must decide the fate of the Republic.

Harry Truman and his Secretaries of Defense and State must — if their present defeatism proves to be prophetic — decide either to call on Stalin for armistice terms, or to call on the nation to resist to the death, regardless of the odds. As Commander-in-Chief Harry Truman will hold the fate of the Republic in his hands. His response to that situation no one, not even Harry Truman, can know today. Inevitably, his mind must go back to the afternoon of Franklin D. Roosevelt's death when he humbly asked the reporters to pray for him.

Who will pray for him then, for the American Republic, for the 350,000 Americans in Korea, for the mass of loyal Americans, for the RFC beneficiaries, for the recipients of deep-freezes and platinum minks, for the business-as-usual, and labor-gains-as-usual groups, for the rights of leftists to confuse-as-usual? How many of the Americans who will then pray for Harry Truman and for their country will recall the 600,000,000 fellow human beings whom we have pushed into or abandoned to Soviet slavery since 1945? And how many will repent the evil they have done, or permitted?

And if they do not resolve to undo that evil, will their repentance be sincere in the sight of God, and will He hear their prayers?

Let us pray, now?

Americans Don't Know Fear

IT IS false for Americans to be afraid. They have never known how to be afraid. They are not afraid now. An Administration that tries to sell them an evangel of fear will be trampled underfoot, not only because their intuitions tell them that a foreign policy founded on fear is ignominious and fatal, but because it is an Administration that totally misconceives the American character.

A people who possess the paramount military power of the world, who have in their hands more than half the productive capacity of the world, who during five postwar years saved England from ruin and restored the economy of Europe by sharing their wealth — these people are told by their Secretary of Defense that:

1. Against an Asiatic power they are engaged in a war they can not win, and,
2. By a barbaric power they are threatened with a war in Europe they would probably lose.

They do not believe it. Their not believing it is more important than the obedient conclusions of the Secretary of Defense, more important than all the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, more important than the judgment of a scared little man who happened to have the power to dismiss the one great military authority who is not afraid. That is the essence of why MacArthur was fed to the appeasers. He would not subscribe to fear.

Take this from Secretary Marshall's testimony before the Senate committee:

> SECRETARY MARSHALL: I should say that if the Chinese Communists continue in force in North Korea with the potential additional reinforcements that might be made available, and with our situation where we visualize no considerable reinforcements of the United Nations army, that they could not be driven out of North Korea, and I have my own doubts as to whether the actions recommended by General MacArthur would bring the conflict to a victorious end.
>
> SENATOR RUSSELL: Wait a minute. Do you mean to say, in your opinion, there is doubt even if we do bomb them whether they could be driven from there?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: Yes, sir.
>
> SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that what you wanted to state?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: That is what I wanted to state.

And this:

> SENATOR BRIDGES: General, is it your opinion that the aim of Soviet Russia is to destroy or take over the free world?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: I think their purpose is to dominate the whole free world.
>
> SENATOR BRIDGES: Now supposing the worst should happen and that Russia should override Europe and the skills and resources of Europe came to be at Russia's disposal, would Russia then in your judgment be able to threaten the security of the United States?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: I think very clearly they could do so. That would be a terrific loss to us.
>
> SENATOR BRIDGES: At the present time do we have enough strength in Europe to prevent that?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: Not at the present time.

And on the next day:

> SECRETARY MARSHALL: We are not in a position now to take measures which, we will say, are characterized by General MacArthur as the opposite of defeatist measures. We do not want to become involved in a world struggle prior to the time we are reasonably prepared to meet it.
>
> SENATOR JOHNSON: You do not think we are reasonably prepared to meet it?
>
> SECRETARY MARSHALL: I am quite certain we are not.

Shoot, Russia. Shoot now!

The logic of this position was correctly stated by Senator McCarthy:

> What he is saying to the American people, in effect, is, No. 1, that we will do nothing which might possibly cause Communist Russia to come in; and, No. 2, Communist Russia will come in if there is any danger of Communist China losing. Therefore, the function of the United States, and our strategy, should be to prevent Red China from losing.

And what does the President say — the President of the mightiest people living on the earth? He says Secretary Marshall exactly expresses his mind, too, and then, thinking of the Russian bomb, which may or may not exist, he adds, "Even if we win."

History attend! Even if we win. Imagine Washington saying at Valley Forge, "Even if we win." Imagine Lincoln saying at Gettysburg, "Even if we win." Imagine after Pearl Harbor that anybody had said, "Even if we win."

When MacArthur says, in effect, "Let us put forth our strength and live or die" — when he says, "Suppose we have to fight on two fronts at once, will the enemy not be divided also?" — he speaks a language that Americans understand.

If what the Administration says is true, only fear could have made it true. Only fear could have made it possible that our life is not in our own hands. It is not true. It is what the enemy wants us to believe; and to tell the people what the enemy wants them to believe would in the purposeful case be criminal.

OUR TEEN-AGE DRUG ADDICTS

By WILLIAM MANCHESTER

LEXINGTON, Kentucky, capital of the blue grass region, breeds horses, raises tobacco — and cures drug addicts. Lately doctors at Lexington's U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, better known as the Narcotic Farm, have begun to wonder if the rest of the country is not just breeding drug addicts.

For the hospital, the only public institution in the nation devoted to the treatment of addiction, is crammed. Cots have been set up in corridors, a waiting list has been established, and, to deal with the overflow, three hundred beds have been taken from veterans at the Federal hospital for psychoneurotics in Fort Worth, Texas.

The doctors are alarmed, not just because there are more junkhogs, but because the entire character of their population has changed. There was a time when the typical newcomer to the hospital was either a professional thug, a former alcoholic who had switched habits, or a refugee from chronic pain. Today, like as not, he is fresh from the classroom, the playground or the YMCA.

In 1940 Lexington had one patient under twenty-one — a student nurse. Now there are three hundred. Since 1946 admissions under twenty-one have increased twelvefold. The age of the average patient has dropped eleven years. Children as young as fourteen, their bodies pocked with needle scars, are being taken in to twist and scream on the Narcotic Farm's withdrawal wards. Suddenly and frighteningly, dope has come into vogue among certain of our younger countrymen.

This sounds as though it were taken from the pages of a Sunday supplement. It happens to come from the pages of Treasury Department reports and Criminal Court records in half a dozen cities — from New York, where there are an estimated 5000 addicts in their teens and where, until recently, the password "Yankee Doodle" brought heroin capsules out from under the bubble gum in pinball emporia, or from Baltimore, where three series of holdups have been traced to youthful hopheads, where mothers have confessed to providing their children with drug money to keep them from crime, and where, one sun-spangled afternoon not long ago, two little boys collapsed on the street and died of heroin poisoning.

Not since the Harrison Act was passed in 1914 have narcotics been such a national problem, and not since Napoleon fed a broth of opium to 2000 wounded Frenchmen who were hampering his army at the siege of Acre have so many innocent people been hooked to dope.

Dope, or, to dip into the underworld argot, "junk," or "sugar," or "Old Steve," is available to susceptible adolescents in our large cities in three forms: heroin, morphine, and cocaine. Opium is rarely seen in its pure form. Some is available on the West Coast, but not much. This does not mean opium is not imported illegally in huge shipments, or that it is not farmed in other countries with an eye on the American market. Morphine and heroin are opium derivatives, and any peddler, or supplier of a peddler, can cook them out if he has stocks of raw poppy cake.

Such stocks come from Turkey, India, Burma, Malaya, and Iran, which last year grew enough opium to satisfy the world's legitimate needs three times over. Since the war, when trade with Asia was restricted, poppies have been cultivated in Mexico, and narcotics agents have seized several shipments of contraband this side of the Matamoras international bridge. Cocaine, whose illicit consumption is largely limited to the Southwestern states, comes from the green coca leaf which flourishes in the Andes Mountains of Peru. Among veterans of the needle, it is known as "Charlie Cotton." The other two Cotton brothers are "Mike," or morphine, and "Harry," or heroin. The most popular of these is heroin, a drug five times as powerful as morphine. Heroin has no legitimate medical use and has been outlawed in the United States.

Of course it is preposterous to argue that the entire youth of the nation is threatened with slavery to the needle. The average American adolescent has never seen a heroin capsule and, unless the traffic gets completely out of hand, is not likely to. But however small the areas in which peddlers operate, within those areas dope is a serious threat, and there are urban neighborhoods in which substantial numbers of children have taken the first step toward the formation of a drug habit.

That first step involves the smoking of marihuana, or hashish. Marihuana, as is generally known, comes from the dried flowerings of the cannabis weed. It strikes the cerebral cortex, the mantle covering the brain, and perverts all sense of time and space. In the purest sense of the term, hashish is not a drug. It does not build tolerance or alter the body's chemistry, as true narcotics do. But it does give the marihuana smoker a lift he finds pleasant. In time the smoker, or "viper," as he is called, discovers "Mary Warner" is letting him down. However much he smokes, the thrill is gone. Yet the impulse which led to the original experiment remains. The viper is ready for the heavy stuff.

Marihuana is peddled chiefly in dance halls where youngsters in clothes of exaggerated cut gather to hear eccentric jazz. There vipers are recruited, often by other youngsters who sell the cigarettes in return for a marihuana commission. Inevitably the herd instinct, a powerful factor among adolescents, draws a crowd, and when the sensation begins to pall, the peddler moves in on the more susceptible of his jaded clients. For that tired, let-down feeling he suggests a sniff or two of heroin.

"Snorting" — absorbing the drug in the mucous membranes of the nose — is the first step toward addiction. To the snorter it seems innocent enough. For a dollar he has a jag which lasts for hours and the envy and admiration of his gang. So he snorts his way through his spending money, and then his lunch money. Marihuana is be-

hind him now; he has begun to build a habit; if he misses an appointment with Old Steve he feels it, and the feeling is not pleasant. Bit by bit he is obliged to increase his dosage until snorting has become an awkward form of administration. When this happens, he is primed for the hypodermic syringe and needle. These the peddler happily supplies. For a price.

The snorter has graduated. He is now a shooter. In the beginning he probably confines himself to "skin shots," avoiding the veins in his arm. He may have heard that "main line shooting" produces pock marks which are easily identified by police, or that it builds up scar tissue which in time destroys the vessels. In either case he has heard correctly. But skin shooting, like snorting, is for tyros. The boy with a habit running to three or four grains a day is no longer a tyro; his craving, which is more and more frequent, demands quick appeasement. And so he begins to go into the vein, or, as it is quaintly known to the trade, the "sewer pipe."

Into the sewer pipe goes capsule after capsule of the brothers Cotton, until the body has a hunger as real as its hunger for food. But dope costs more than food. A tiny number nine capsule retails for anywhere from a dollar in Los Angeles to three dollars in Baltimore, and within six months a young physique can build a habit requiring from six to eight capsules a day, more than the most liberal spending allowance can afford, even with the inevitable stinting on meals. And so the boy begins to pawn his possessions, then his clothing, and, finally, odds and ends around the house he knows will not be missed. When the neighborhood hock shops are glutted with the family's trivia, he turns to petty crime. Sooner or later he is picked up. Sooner or later his mother and father appear, soggy-eyed and confused, to ask justice for a second chance.

Like as not, you may say, they were at fault in the first place. Like as not you are right. The histories of adolescent drug addiction are written against backgrounds of homes broken and rebroken until all sense of identity with the parents has been lost. But to assign the cause is not to remove the condition, and certainly society must interest itself in the removal of a condition which spawns rapine, larceny, and now and then a murder. Television gawks may find it exciting to gape at bookmakers on idle afternoons, but when night shuts down and Senate subcommittees go home, they want security from crimes against property — the kind of crime which produces the cash the hopheads need.

The possession or sale of narcotics is a Federal offense. Yet Federal narcotics squads are pitifully undermanned. For every forty FBI men in cities where the drug trade flourishes there are two Treasury Department agents hunting peddlers. Municipalities have been obliged to take the initiative; New York now has a forty-man dope squad; Los Angeles, a thirty-man squad. But enforcement remains spotty and inept. Surely, if even a token resistance to the trade is to be offered, the Federal Narcotics Commissioner must be provided with more than the token force he now has.

Even so, it is doubtful whether the final answer lies with policemen. At the height of its affluence, the Prohibition Bureau employed over 1500 agents, under whose noses many of the drug peddlers of today were first introduced to the techniques of law evasion. And narcotics are far easier to bring into the country than liquor ever was, chiefly because so little means so much. One pound of marihuana, which can be grown in any tropical back yard, provides enough weed for 1200 cigarettes, which retail for fifty cents apiece in an open market. With cocaine the risk of importation is negligible. Only the sharpness, or perhaps the virility, of an agent in Hidalgo, Texas, brought a Mexican smuggler to book a few months ago. The smuggler was a woman with what seemed to be extraordinary endowment. In her brassiere she carried $5000 worth of the drug.

Controlling the sources is virtually impossible. Iran has agreed, at the request of the United States, to cut down its opium farming. But no one knows how sincere the agreement was or how effective its enforcement will be. Certainly Peru, in its present troubled state, can not be expected to police the coca growers in its mountains. And even if the Peruvians and Iranians and Malayans and Turks and Burmese and Indians suppressed all illicit narcotic cultivation, there would remain the inscrutable Chinese Reds, who in March of this year dumped on the international market the staggering load of 500 tons of opium — enough for some 6,000,000,000 very satisfying pipefuls, even by the sophisticated standards of the Orient.

The Reds offered this cargo — under circumstances very like those which caused the Opium War of 1840, when the English were in the peddling game — to America, in exchange for cotton. When it was rejected, they approached a British firm, which also turned them down. The 500 tons are probably still in China, though it is unlikely they will stay there if the Chinese can find a buyer, legitimate or illegitimate. Nor will the supply end there if a handsome market presents itself; the profit from poppy growing is five times that from any other crop in China. During the upheavals of the twenties it was customary, in some Chinese provinces, to distribute seeds among the husbandmen and exact a tax from them when they reaped the hellish harvest. The Communists have simply socialized the whole business, using coolie labor and machine production.

So far as is known, their only object now is profit. The Reds have a valuable, if sordid, crop and they want to turn it into matériel. But if the war in Asia spreads, they may have a second and even more sinister motive for peddling their poppies to the West. The role of drugs in Oriental warfare is older than gunpowder and at least as respected. Hashish was used in China 500 years before the birth of Christ, and in the eleventh century a group of assassins, organized by a colleague of Omar Khayyam, smoked it to fortify themselves during business hours. The Chinese are not likely to have forgotten the use to which the Japanese put opium during the softening up of Manchuria. They would use it against us if they could. That they could seems fantastic. But the wards at Lexington, crowded with suede-shod, marcelled hops, each a draft-board loss, seem fantastic too. Yet there they are.

BRITISH SOCIALISM IS DEAD

By F. A. VOIGT

London

THERE ARE severe critics of our Socialist government who watch its apparently approaching end with relief and even with elation, and yet maintain that its long tenure of office has, on balance, been for our good. It is hard to prove or disprove this verdict, but this much good has at least been done:

Poorer as we may be in other ways, we are the richer for an experience we shall not forget for a long time to come!

Socialism, in its various forms, became the most powerful movement of modern times, and perhaps the most powerful secular movement of all time, through the plausibility of its dazzling promises, the simplicity of its doctrines, and the fervor of its exponents. We need only scan the literature of the early — and even some of the later — Socialists to see that what they promised was nothing less than a condition of universal felicity.

They attributed the evil inherent in human nature to capitalism and imperialism alone. Like all enthusiasts in all ages, they saw no good but only evil in the objects of their animosity.

They enjoyed an inestimable advantage in the early days, for, while no intelligent student of capitalism and imperialism could honestly deny that there was some evil in both, even if he believed that the evil was outweighed by the good, no pragmatic disproof of socialism was possible, however strong a case might be made against it on theoretical grounds.

This advantage has disappeared, for socialism has been tried — in Russia, in Germany (for National Socialism is certainly a form of socialism), in Italy (for, although fascism is largely non-socialist in its original composition, during the war the Fascist government became as socialistic as our own government is today), and, last of all, in England.

Our Socialists would strenuously deny that Muscovite communism, German National Socialism, and Italian fascism are "true socialism." But they can not deny this of their own socialism, at least not without implying that they themselves have been grossly incompetent and have broken the promises they made during the electoral campaign of 1945. Wherever socialism appears, they can not forever go on saying "this is not true socialism." The Western world, at least, which has experienced socialism in various forms and various countries for a whole generation, can not be expected to remain for ever in a state of suspended judgment, though it may be that the peoples of the Middle and Far East, who have not had the same experience, are willing to put socialism to the pragmatic test in the years to come.

Our own Socialists had exceptional maturity (with much practical experience both of national and of local government), they were supported by a powerful public opinion, they commanded a crushing majority in the Legislature, and they have held office for nearly six years. If their work is not a work of "true socialism," the critical observer must be pardoned if he comes to the conclusion that "true socialism" is not possible in this world.

Not only did the Socialists believe, and induce increasing millions of men and women to believe, that a state of universal felicity is possible; they also believed it to be inevitable, even if they did not say so as often as the Communists are in the habit of doing. Sidney Webb was one of their more cautious spirits, and yet he could write of "the irresistible momentum of the ideas which socialism denotes" and of "our irresistible glide into collectivist socialism." [1]

The Socialists imported an element of messianic hope which became a mighty incentive in carrying their followers undaunted through defeat and frustration. To them, every defeat was a victory, for from it the "workers" would "learn to do better next time." Final victory was assured in advance and it was the duty of all to make it swift and doubly sure. They all hoped, and most of them believed, that they themselves would witness the advent of "the new world" which would be securely theirs and their children's.

When our Socialists made their successful bid for power in 1945, they did not express themselves with quite the same simple fervor as of old, for they had to satisfy many practical demands that were unrelated to socialist doctrine. Much of what they said differed little from what the Conservatives were saying. This caused them some embarrassment which they assuaged by asserting that "the Tories say it, but we mean it." Nevertheless, the messianic optimism of earlier days was apparent beneath more mundane promises such as "good food in plenty, useful work for all . . . comfortable labor homes . . . a higher and rising standard of living."[2]

The writer of this article, who had witnessed the triumph of National Socialism in Germany, was struck by a certain resemblance — *mutatis mutandis* — between the exaltation of our Socialists and the German National Socialists, as well as between the despondency of the defeated in the one country and in the other. It was not mere perversity on the part of George Lansbury that made him find Hitler so enthralling; it was the attraction of like to like (radical as some of the differences between them were) and the contagion of that enthusiasm which Lansbury, the most beloved of all our Socialists, was willing to share with any responsive person (including Mr. Lloyd George who was also deeply impressed by Hitler, though, unlike Lansbury, he was not a little alarmed).

Our Socialists are not cynics, and they sincerely believed in their doctrine and in their own ability to carry

[1] Fabian Essays, 1889, pp. 20, 60

[2] "Let Us Face the Future" issued by the British Socialist Party before the election in 1945

it out. They were not in the least daunted by the prodigious task that was before them. They are not without courage, and they were borne up by the optimism which is characteristic of secular religions.

The general view which they took of the future when they had formed their government after their great electoral victory was as follows (in words addressed to the writer at the time by several Socialists who included one of the most respected members of the new Cabinet):

> England will become a land of stability in an unstable world. America will plunge from crisis to crisis while her prices will go "rocketing up." English prices will be controlled. There will be vast unemployment in America, but in England the Socialist Administration will solve "the problem of unemployment." As for Russia, "we Socialists know the Russians (who naturally distrust the Tories)." Only a Socialist government can "deal with Russia." And we shall not be "appeasers"!

When the victory was won, the strong and confident feeling that they were the masters ("we're on top now") pervaded the urban working class *as* a class. There was little, if any, vindictiveness or desire to avenge "past wrongs" although these "wrongs" had been represented as heinous. The Conservatives were "out," they "belonged to the past," to the "era of mass unemployment." In fact, the Conservatives were hardly worth bothering about!

The Conservatives themselves were correspondingly downcast. They were honest in recognizing the magnitude of their defeat and did not shrink from searching self-criticism. Few, if any, relied on the "swing of the pendulum" to carry them back to office. Some of our Conservatives even endorsed the opinion of many Socialists that "the Tories will never come back."

The optimism of Liberals is perhaps more intractable, even, than that of the Socialists. Liberalism, to them, is so obviously right that no doctrines are needed to sustain it. And as right must prevail in the end, liberalism must persist! Our Liberals were hardly disconcerted even by their heavy losses in the elections last year, for they confidently believed that they would "hold the balance" in the House of Commons and perhaps form a government. But the Liberal always emerges from the most ignominious defeat with the light of victory in his eyes!

Within a short time after their victory in 1945, the Socialists found themselves in the following situation:

They had to defend the remnants of that capitalist system which they had always denounced as a supreme manifestation of evil on earth, and to undertake the armed defense of that Empire which was the twin manifestation of the same evil. They had to engage in even closer cooperation with the greatest capitalist Power in the world in ever-growing antagonism with the greatest socialist Power (and, very soon, they had to begin warlike preparations against the latter in military alliance with the former).

Russia has yet to "be dealt with," and the conduct of foreign policy has now been entrusted to Herbert Morrison, who was a conscientious objector in the first World War and, together with almost all his fellow-Socialists, devoted to the cause of universal disarmament between the first war and the second. But it does not follow that the choice is the worst that could have been made, for Mr. Morrison is much tougher than Mr. Bevin was and much shrewder than, though almost as platitudinous as, Mr. Eden who is likely to succeed him.

The Socialists can say truthfully enough that we have relatively little unemployment today; but the reason for this gratifying phenomenon is not to be found in the potency of socialist principles. It is to be found in the aid given by the greatest capitalist Power — despite the efforts of the greatest socialist Power to increase unemployment by spreading disaffection. It is estimated that if we had not received Marshall Aid in the most critical years, we should have had about 2,000,000 unemployed.

During the early part of 1947 we were shivering in our unheated homes and reading by candlelight for the first time in the era of coal and electricity. The publication of venerable journals like the *Spectator*, which had continued through the Jacobite Rebellion, two world wars and a general strike, was interrupted in the second year of England's first socialist Administration.

During that same period something happened which would have caused dismay if people had been less afflicted by cold and gloom. The British Government informed the Government of the United States that Great Britain could not continue to help Greece and that, unless the United States would help, she would have to withdraw "with the probable consequence that Greece would fall, Turkey would be encircled, and the whole eastern Mediterranean and Near East would fall under Soviet Communist domination." [3] Greece, itself a semi-Socialist Welfare State, was sacrificed because we placed "opulence" before "defense" — the opulence of our Socialist Welfare State before the defense of the eastern Mediterranean.

The writer was in Athens at the time and will never forget the release from darkest apprehensions which came with Mr. Truman's message. Greece — and much more, including England's honor and Mr. Bevin's reputation — was saved!

The Socialists were soon to make the unexpected discovery that socialism is very expensive. When people can afford it, they do not want it. When they want it, they can not afford it. For the first time, the "workers" experienced direct taxation — the increased wealth they received under their new socialist state was taken away again by rising prices and in taxation by that same state.

It was Adam Smith who wrote that "defense comes before opulence." The truth of his observation, so well understood by Gladstone, has at least been understood afresh, not too late, perhaps, to avoid a war, but so late that a gigantic effort which will condemn us to years of restriction and abstinence has become unavoidable.

The Welfare State is no less a conservative than a liberal or a socialist conception. In its origins it belongs mainly to the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. But the Socialists, in taking it over and claiming it as their own, have pushed it to an extreme from which it may have to recede, for the means to sustain it are failing.

Sheer necessity has compelled the Socialists to do some unpopular things, and it is to their credit that they did them. Had the Conservatives been in office, they would have been under the same necessity. But socialism, according to promises reiterated in an immeasurable multitude of books, articles and speeches for two generations,

[3] John Foster Dulles, "War and Peace" (p. 44)

was to have been something different, a "new world" much better than the old. It turns out to be rather like the old world, only worse.

If the Welfare State is not specifically socialist, what is? The nationalization, not of this or that industry, but of all industries or at least of the key industries, and of the means of supply! Nationalization came to be the essence of British socialism both in theory and practice. With regard to many other matters, the Socialists were pragmatic, for they are not without some sense of responsibility. But with regard to nationalization they were uncompromisingly doctrinaire, even to the point of threatening unconstitutional action. In the debate on the Iron and Steel Bill, on November 16, 1948, Sir Stafford Cripps asserted that the privately owned industries were "citadels of power" and that the "only alternative" to the bill "would be to show that such a change can only be brought about by other and violent means."

This was nothing less than a threat of revolution by one of the most respected members of the government.

There was a case for the nationalization of coal. It had been proposed by the Sankey Commission after the first war, not as a concession to theory, but in response to the well-founded criticism of those who held that the industry suffered from chronic mismanagement and was lamentably out of date. When it was nationalized by the socialist government, there was no determined opposition. But it is in no happier state than it was before.

There was no case for the nationalization of iron and steel, and the Socialists have not been able to advance one serious argument in its favor. Sir Stafford said in the debate that the owners "of this class of property" must be deprived of it because they have no right to "the power of control over the industrial life of the whole country."

Whatever exorbitant power they may have had in the past had long ceased to exist. Sir Stafford was speaking in terms of a bygone age. And the reasons *he* gave for the bill show that he had no valid case for nationalizing an industry which has long been the pride of the nation.

It was the Socialist claim that socialism would "eliminate waste" and alone could insure the highest degree of efficiency. But we have not, in modern times, had an administration as wasteful as we have now. Its extravagance would have horrified Gladstone! Its inefficiency has been appalling. If any private firm had been responsible for failure so glaring as that of the Groundnuts Scheme and the Gambia Poultry Scheme there would have been a judicial inquiry, perhaps even a prosecution. But the Socialist government has been able to write off more than £30,000,000 (representing the dead loss on the Groundnuts Scheme) without any consequences disagreeable to itself except a loss of votes.

The government has had to resist some of the more exorbitant claims of labor. And, paradoxically, the trade union movement, while never so powerful as today (more powerful by far than the "owners of capital") has less control over the strike movement than it had before, though its control over recalcitrant individuals is tyrannical (the victims of the "closed shop" almost recall Stephen Blackpool in Dickens's "Hard Times").

In the nationalized industries, the human relationship has gone. Before, even when it was troubled, it was still human. The employer was a tangible opponent. The "workers" no longer win victories in "the war against capitalism," for the opponent is the impersonal state. And it is the public that pays the entire cost through rising prices.

Much, beyond a doubt, has been achieved for the workers — at a sacrifice borne mainly by the middle class which, by supplying the socialist movement with its intellectuals like Professor Laski, G. D. H. Cole, Bernard Shaw, the Webbs, and a multitude of minor poets, prophets and propagandists, has helped to bring disaster upon itself. The working class believed in itself; the middle class did not. It has been punished for its disloyalty, for there is a due to one's class as well as to one's country.

But the reward which the workers have won is not an inexhaustible capital. It has reached, or even passed, its limits.

The glory has gone. The dream is over, and socialism is dead. It can not come to life again even if the present government is returned to office. Socialism was obsolescent even before the Socialists won their great victory in 1945. The "capitalism" and "imperialism" they were talking of in those days had long ceased to exist. The public control of industry, which they had demanded in the past, had become a reality or was rapidly becoming one. Socialism is no longer an issue in England. The issue today is power!

If we scan the copious and seemingly interminable streams which have fed the vast ocean of socialist literature from the pens of countless writers (the writings of G. D. H. Cole alone arouse astonishment that one man could have written so much), we find ourselves in a landscape and an atmosphere which today seem infinitely remote.

The humanity and the magnanimity have departed with the glory. We look in vain for the "plain heroic magnitude of mind" which marked men like Keir Hardy, Philip Snowden, W. C. Anderson, and others — the men incapable of telling a falsehood or doing a mean thing, incapable of prevaricating, incapable of pharisaical posturing, incapable of perpetrating inexcusable failures without feeling deep personal contrition.

Where the old fervor has not been turned into indifference, it has become malignancy. The extreme "Left," at one time the pure, if rather heady, distillate of the nonconformist conscience, has soured and clouded, a venom instead of a tonic in the national organism. The descent from the high principles and high spirits of the old *Nation* and the old *New Statesman* to the present *New Statesman and Nation* is perpendicular descent, not from the sublime to the ridiculous but from the noble to the ignoble.

The old Socialists would have been shocked by the cruelty and mendacity of the modern Communists. It is hard to imagine how they could have tolerated the species known as the fellow-traveler who is, in the words of Tacitus, *neque fidei constans neque strenuus in perfidia* — neither constant in faith nor strenuous in perfidy. This, at least, must be said for the Communist — that he is constant in faith and strenuous in perfidy!

Even the atmosphere of the elections in 1945 is hard to recapture — so recent a memory, and yet so unreal (as it seems now), so dreamlike, and so far away!

What is socialism about? What relevance has it to the Western world today? We are at a loss for an answer. Intelligent Socialists of the younger generation are suing for terms. Their problem is eminently pragmatic, the problem of reconciling state enterprise with free enterprise — our chief domestic problem in the next few years!

It is extremely hard to describe the present condition of England. Political and economic analysis tells us little. Words like "apathetic" and "indifferent" have a qualified relevance. There is a kind of miasma over the land. The English used to be the finest of debaters. They still debate, but passion has become sentiment, and abstractions, taken over from the American and French revolutionary heritage and embalmed in sundry charters, have replaced principles.

Because principles have come to matter so little, there is little difference between one newspaper and another. Some are good, some are bad, but as socialism recedes as an issue, they all say much the same things in not very different ways. The quick, instinctive response that used to be in the people is vanishing. Tavern talk is losing its savor and London, great and heroic city in the last war (and to be so again in the next, if there is a next) has lost her sweetness. The word "people" has long ceased to have any relevance to the real people. It has become a shadowy abstraction, and the demagogue who uses the word too often is suspected, and rightly so, of being a shady character.

Two things that did so much to make England great have declined perceptibly — quality and enterprise. Liberty threatens to become an abstraction — it will always decline when, in the words of Edmund Burke, it is not attached "to a sensible object." The growth of delegated legislation, which began long before the Socialists took office, has become monstrous, despotic in its cumulative effects. And whereas hitherto we had civil servants, today, for the first time in our history, we have bureaucrats.

Moral indignation was a powerful promoter of liberty in the past. Today it has become too easy. It is no longer attended by any danger. It is a vote-catcher. It eases the path to office, and is much cultivated by the vain and the ambitious. The "Left" used to oppose tyranny in all its forms — today the threat to freedom comes almost exclusively from the "Left." Terms like "equality" and "democratic rights" have become as tiresome in public debate — and as suspect — as the words "God" and "conscience" in the Cromwellian Parliament.

The whole of western Europe is stricken with the leprosy of indifference, but it has not gone as deep on this side as on the far side of the Channel. It has begun to corrode the mind of the English people, but not the heart as yet. That is the reason why the English are not defeatist as the French and Germans are. They will fight as a nation once more if the necessity arises — but not more than once!

Europe can not be saved unless there is a revival of the national spirit in England. Although it is not certain that the Conservatives will be much better than the Socialists if they form the next government, there will, if they do, be a certain loosening, a new tone, and some dispersal of the miasma. In a strange, intangible way, and despite appearances, Europe looks to England rather than to America for leadership, although it is not so much the material power as the vitality of America which has begun to impress the Europeans.

Recovery can not come from the government, not even from a better government than the Conservatives can be expected to provide. It can not come from "new ideas." The "new ideas" or "ideologies" (or "demonologies," as they should be called) belong to the European revolutionary era. That era, which began in 1789, is finished. Socialism is the last of the "ideologies" to fall, the last of the utopias in free Europe. Recovery can not come from any systems, projects or "charters." It can only come from the heart of the people.

Will it be tenacious enough? When it begins to stir, as it will as soon as the Socialist government is removed, will the Conservative government stifle it afresh? Will it undergo a relapse? These are matters on which opinion is divided. In the opinion of the writer (for what it is worth), England has a chance — just a chance — in which case Europe, too, has a chance.

A FAIRY TALE FOR GROWNUPS

By **EDMUND J. KIEFER**

IN THE land of the Fair Deal stood a great mountain, the High Cost Living or the H. C. of L., as it was commonly called for short. It was very high, indeed, and difficult to climb because it rose sheer upward with a surface of slippery glass.

At its summit was a castle wherein lived a fabulous princess called Security, who waited for some man to scale the mountain and claim her hand. Countless ambitious men of high and low degree were forever attempting to make the ascent on their mounts, or salaries, but never were able to gain firm footing; and so the luckless riders crashed down into surrounding valleys of debt, despondency and despair.

One day a bright lad came along to make the venture. He had no mount, or salary, but his hopes were higher than the mountain. He set a snare and caught an eagle of the species known as Capital Gains. Holding onto the eagle's claws with both hands, he soon was lifted to a plateau close to the top of the mountain. Ahead of him gleamed the castle, and in between a garden of golden apple trees. Tying his Capital Gains securely to the trunk of one of the trees, he filled his pockets with the golden apples, stamped Tax-Exempts.

As he proceeded toward the castle, he was confronted by a fierce dragon known as the Internal Revenue Bureau; but he threw a Tax-Exempt at it and the dragon vanished. Then the palace door opened and the lovely princess Security came forth to meet him halfway and to be his forever.

Thus the clever youth realized the fulfillment of his fondest dream and lived in happiness and splendor on a height never to be attained by his struggling, less resourceful countrymen in the land of the Fair Deal — which is fair enough to anyone who knows how to circumvent the tax laws, though they appear as inexorable as the law of gravity.

HOW NOT TO FIGHT RUSSIA

By ASHER BRYNES

THE Russians, it has been remarked, are habitual chess players. One of the basic stratagems of that game is the calculated sacrifice of a pawn in order to secure an effective opening for the big contest that is to follow. North Korea was only one of the system of pawns or satellites around Communist perimeter. They have others to move. We can not refuse these gambits, wherever the Russians may choose to open the next offensive. They retain the power of the initiative and the power to cut their initial commitment, as the issue of action may decide. Strategically, the Korean incident is a disaster.

From what we know of Mr. Stalin and the movement he has led for the past twenty-five years it is certain that this maneuver will be repeated. He is a cautious man but he is also the boss of an aggressive political machine whose avowed objective is to substitute political for market control of the factors of production, and by doing so hoist the U.S.S.R. on an economic level with the U. S. The Communists have persisted in that effort for thirty years, with dubious results. Nevertheless, they were able to supply their own needs for arms during the last war (although they had to rely on some 400,000 American trucks and automobiles furnished by Lend-Lease for the transport of Soviet troops and ammunition from the interior of the country to the fighting fronts); and military production has risen sufficiently to supply, over and above Red Army requirements, the North Korean army and probably other satellites with aircraft, armor, artillery, as well as small arms. Mr. Stalin's caution is something to be feared in those circumstances. He has the means of making war — and war is a political act — to offset the economic disparity between the U.S.S.R. and the West. And in this era of absolute warfare he can wage geographically limited offensives, like a monarch of the eighteenth century.

There is a record of strife between Russia and the West running back to that time. The main facts fall into a remarkably consistent pattern; there are no exceptions, reservations, apparently nothing to argue about. In the past century and a half Russia fought six wars with Western or Westernized forces, excluding the action in Korea. She lost three and won three. Those she won were fought inside the country; those she lost, on its border. In tabular form:

when	*outcome*	*how*	*where*
1812	won	interior	Moscow
1856	lost	border	The Crimea
1905	lost	border	Manchuria
1917	lost	border	East Prussia
1919	won	interior	Tsaritsyn, etc.
1945	won	interior	Stalingrad

The moral is that Russian communications and transport have always been relatively weak; and that this weakness worked for them when the country was invaded, against them when they attacked a major opponent elsewhere. If outsiders have been lost in the vast Russian spaces and finally bogged in the Russian mud of spring and summer, or frozen by Russian frosts, the Russians themselves have been lost, bogged or frozen in the effort to march across their own country. Comparison of recent statistics of railway mileage shows that this condition persists. The U. S. and Canada comprise an area comparable to the U.S.S.R., with all its varieties of climate and its forbidding depth; this area (with a fourth less space, a fourth less population) has four and a half times the railway trackage of the U.S.S.R. Reliable road statistics are unavailable. We do know that most of the Russian area is, as scientists say, geologically young and hence lacks firm rock for road building. The common highways of the country are incapable of sustaining heavy traffic unless frozen; and the Russians must depend on their railway network, such as it is, for marshalling any large number of men at other seasons.

These facts have been known for a long time. The wonder is that anyone ever sought to invade and occupy that inchoate area. Napoleon, for instance, who managed to reach Moscow, was well aware of the difficulties before he started on his Russian campaign. In 1807 he said, "Only women and children are capable of supposing that I would go and lose myself in the wastes of Russia." In 1810 he said, "What does Russia want? Is it war? Why these continuous complaints? Why these insulting doubts? Had I wished to restore Poland I would have said so . . . [but] I do not wish to restore Poland. I do not wish to accomplish my destiny in the sands and the desert." Nevertheless, that is exactly what he did two years later.

He had a war on his hands in the West and the equivocal attitude of the Russians hampered his efforts to concentrate upon it and dispose of it. He sought to avoid an interminably expensive war of defense in the East. He went after his objective in the only way possible for a soldier. Through his long career tactical victories had always led to strategic victories. His record as a tactician was still flawless, and it remained so. He did not fail because he outran his supplies; he brushed aside all opposition on the road to Moscow and took that capital as he had taken so many others. He then expected the usual negotiators to arrive for the drafting of a treaty of peace. The only error he made was that of waiting too long.

The U.S.S.R. is not a country that can be conquered by tactical successes because it can not be occupied by the winner. Unless — and this is the only known instance of such a conquest — he happens to be a Mongol whose standard of living is as low or lower than that of the Russians themselves and who possesses a means of locomotion which can refuel itself by cropping the grass under the snow. Nor can the initiative ever be wrested from the Russians by any Western invader, for they can always yield ground, of which they have an inexhaustible supply, until they are ready to do battle on their own terms.

Nevertheless, Russia lost the next war with the West though it was a minor affair compared with the Napoleonic onslaught. It started out as a very cautious war from the Russian point of view, being directed against a decaying power, Turkey, for the sake of an exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Three nations with Mediterranean interests responded to the appeals of the Turks: Great Britain, France and Italy (Sardinia). Their great problem was where to attack Russia. They decided to destroy the naval base of Sebastopol at the tip of the Crimean peninsula and thus neutralize Russia's control of the Black Sea. This involved amphibious operations for the Allies, and for the Russians the defense of a strongly fortified town with all the resources in manpower and material of their vast hinterland to draw upon.

The procedure of the Allies was leisurely. Hostilities were declared in March 1854; the first landings were made the following September. After two ding-dong battles they went into winter quarters while the Russians busied themselves adding string after string of fortifications to the town. In May of the next year the French sealed off the peninsula from the mainland by capturing the town of Kerch. Before this date the Russians had been unable, as a result of transport difficulties on the boggy roads leading down to the Crimea, to marshal their preponderance of manpower and push the Europeans into the sea; now it did not matter how many men they could muster, for there was no room to deploy them. Sebastopol was occupied in the autumn, and by the terms of the treaty which concluded this war her fortifications and naval docks were demolished and Russia was pledged to maintain a Black Sea fleet no larger, ship for ship, than that of the Turks.

The Russo-Japanese War is another illustration of Russia's difficulty in moving hordes of men across the home terrain in order to cope with an opponent on her perimeter. Russia's armies at that time numbered about one million men, and Japan's somewhat less than half that figure; but the Japanese calculated that a missing link in the Trans-Siberian Railway at Lake Baikal shortened the odds, and as the sequel proved, they were right. The fighting ended after a series of Russian reverses in Manchuria although the Russian armies still outnumbered those of Japan, the reason for this abrupt conclusion being that Japan's strategic objective was not the unlimited aim of a Russian conquest, but the acquisition of a free hand in Korea — just over the border.

A new factor contributing to the rapid victory of the Japanese was the outbreak of revolutionary disturbances within Russia during the second year of the war. This was something nobody had calculated upon, yet it was remembered by the Germans in 1917.

These manifold difficulties of the Russian homeland which have been the bane of every invader since Genghis Khan — the poverty of communications, transport, agricultural and subsequently industrial production, compounded by the factors of space and climate — came to a head in the first World War. In the early preparations for it Russia was drawn into an alliance with France, and then Great Britain, against Germany and Austria. The others staked their manpower and industrial resources; Russia came into the combination with her manpower alone, and she poured her troops out of the country as fast as they could be mustered. The inadequacy of her communications network led to administrative chaos and finally to logistic paralysis. Year by year she gathered ever greater quantities of men while her ability to equip and supply them ran down under the stress of war until in the last phase Russian soldiers were borrowing cartridges from each other on the battlefield.

Germany, on the other hand, made no effort to invade Russia proper but contented herself with the occupation of certain border areas after inflicting an unbroken series of tremendous defeats on those unwieldy masses. The first Russian Revolution broke out in the spring of 1917 and the Germans, recollecting what had happened in 1905 and bearing in mind, perhaps, the prophetic dictum of Clausewitz a century before ("Russia can only be subdued by its own weaknesses, and by the effects of internal dissension") made the most of the occasion by shipping a trainload of exiled revolutionaries back into the country. Lenin was among them, and it was under his direction that a treaty of peace was signed, with Germany, early in 1918.

The Bolshevik Revolution had hardly detached the exhausted country from the European war before the so-called "wars of intervention" began. Three well-equipped invasion armies composed of native supporters of the old regime, chiefly professional soldiers, entered Russia from as many directions and penetrated deeply into the interior. Although the authority of the Communist government was limited to the larger towns, these efforts flickered out one by one. The Communists controlled the few railway lines that were still functioning, and this slight advantage in mobility, coupled with their ability to improvise guerrilla forces from among the urban populations, doomed the invaders.

Twenty years later, and about a century and a quarter after the Napoleonic invasion, a new conqueror of Europe repeated the march to Moscow. The comparison between these two failures has been made *ad nauseam* without much mention of the essential fact that Hitler, like Napoleon, was trying to avoid a two-front war after achieving an impressive string of victories elsewhere. Much confidence plus a sense of desperation (Napoleon's talk of "my destiny" is revealing) seem to be required for such a venture. Hitler, however, committed one error which his predecessor avoided. Foiled in the suburbs of Moscow, almost within sight of the Kremlin, he turned southward and committed the deadly military sin of looking for tactical soft spots in the spaces of Russia.

With every mile of his advance through the mud and dust of that limitless land he shortened the communications of the Soviet armies until, at Stalingrad, they were able to meet him on better than even terms. And once he was broken, the Soviet pursuit, rolling forward on hundreds of thousands of cross-country vehicles marked "Made in U. S. A.," cleared his forces out of the U.S.S.R., overran the Balkans, entered Berlin and went on to swallow up half of Germany.

The Russians have won every modern war in which they were invaded because it is easier for them to supply their own armies on their own terrain. They have lost every major war in which they tried to march out and fight on other ground.

We can not defend the earth against the Communist

push. There simply are not enough soldiers to man the global Maginot Line that we have been trying to draw around Soviet Russia, supposing that such a line could function as an effective defense. We will have to dare to go over to the offensive where we have been attacked, and now that we are in Korea, lift up our eyes and look across the border to Manchuria and beyond — to the uplands of North China which run along the Russian border in an arc hundreds of miles deep to the province of Sinkiang and just below it, Tibet. These are the wide open spaces of Asia, the lands of the nomadic herdsmen whose religion is Lamaism or Islam and whose historical traditions are those of Genghis Khan, Tughril Beg and Tamerlane. The Communist Chinese are aware of danger in this area. They have invaded Tibet and the Dalai Lama has fled, after the collapse of his miniature army.

There are other straws in the wind. Since the end of World War II the Soviet radio in this border area has been warning everybody against the wiles of American spies. In 1948 a young attaché of the U. S. Embassy in Teheran, Gerald F. P. Dooher, grew tired of listening to this empty palaver and decided to do something about it. Bit by bit he fed the Russians information about an American super-agent, the kingpin of them all, Colonel Robert (sometimes Roger) Throckmorton Lincoln. Now the entire Soviet radio network in the Middle and Far East knows everything. It asserts repeatedly that Colonel Robert (or Roger) Throckmorton Lincoln was born in Slippery Rock, Arkansas (try to find Slippery Rock, Arkansas in an American atlas). He used to be a rum-runner, then he was a swindler, but finally the American police caught him. In order to stay out of jail he volunteered his services as a secret intelligence agent. He is very clever. He has a big organization. Hordes of native spies report to him wherever he goes, and no wonder; he carries a gripsack full of American dollars.

The Soviets have a way of telegraphing what they are afraid somebody else will do to them by claiming that it is being done already. This mythical Colonel Lincoln is a projection of what they would do if they were in our shoes. They would deliberately plan a repetition of the exploits of T. E. Lawrence among the Arabs during World War I. Lawrence traveled from tribe to tribe with a bag of gold, literal gold, the kind of money hard-bitten nomads can appreciate because it has weight and substance. He distributed it by the fistful. He also told the Arabs that in addition to the gold they received today and the booty they would win tomorrow they would be independent and free to run their own affairs at the end of the war.

The peoples who inhabit the Asiatic borderlands of Russia are herdsmen, too, and as nomads there is little difference between their way of life in peace or war, except for the shooting. In the history of Asia the slackening of defensive power North or South of the belt of land through which they wander has been followed by raids which at times snowballed into conquests. A little money in their hands would make them keen to get more; a few weapons which fire like Russian sub-machine guns would give them the means; and if that is not enough they have religious as well as political reasons for quarreling with the Communists. Unfortunately, however, the American T. E. Lawrence, Colonel Robert T. Lincoln, is a myth. We ought to proceed forthwith to make him real.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

Casualties, 65,523; dead, 9848

MRS. ROGERS OF MASSACHUSETTS . . . The hearings to which I refer were on H.R. 6795 [Seventy-ninth Congress], a bill presented by the Secretary of State, which purported to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China, but which, the hearings brought out, was designed also to give military training and equipment to Chinese Communist forces. . . . The hearings were never published, and for that reason I think it is particularly pertinent to bring portions of the testimony to the attention of the House today. . . .

> MRS. ROGERS: Mr. Secretary, the War Department did not write this bill?
> SECRETARY PATTERSON: I believe this bill was prepared in this State Department, is that not right?
> MR. ACHESON: In the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee; by the three Departments. . . .

Mr. Speaker, my Congressional Directory for June 1946, the time these hearings were in progress, fails to list a State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee. It does list a State Department Coordinating Committee with Dean Acheson as Chairman. Among its members were Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent. . . . Mr. Acheson presented a telegram from General George C. Marshall, then in China, dated June 18, 1946, . . . in which General Marshall stated:

> The purpose of the bill presented to the Congress by the Secretary of State is to support the American program of creating a stable and friendly China. . . . Without passage of the bill the President and myself would lack authorization to carry out a phase of American policy toward China which appears vital to the success of our announced policy. . . .

I continue to read from the official transcript of Mr. Acheson's testimony:

> The Communist leaders have asked, and General Marshall has agreed, that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training, and by the supply of minimum quantities of equipment. . . .
> The Communist forces were lacking in the type of organization, training, and equipment which would have made practical their integration into a new nonpolitical national army. . . .
> MRS. ROGERS: Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be trained under the proposed plan?
> MR. ACHESON: I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling. . . .
> MRS. ROGERS: Is there any way we could have an agreement with China — and remember we are talking about training and military equipment for the Chinese Communist forces — Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us? . . .
> MR. ACHESON: Well, I suppose that we have that in the United Nations Charter. . . . Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the technical and legal answer to your questions. I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.
> MRS. ROGERS: I suppose a fight could start before that was decided, could it not?
> MR. ACHESON: Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so. . . . I am sure that we do not need to worry.

Congressional Record, May 15, 1951, pp. 5509–10

ALTERING THE SIGNPOSTS

By ANTONY FISHER

MR. ISADOR LUBIN, the United States representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council sitting in Santiago, Chile, is reported to have said: "There is only one way in which free nations can avoid the cost of war. That is by assuming the burden of rearmament." He is also reported to have said: "We do not assume war is inevitable, nor do we seek to develop a war economy." The report goes on:

> . . . tactfully but with the full weight of United States world leadership lending significance to his words, Mr. Lubin suggested to our allies — both advanced nations such as western Europe and undeveloped areas such as Latin America — that they should take these steps. 1) Impose extensive controls on prices, credits and other sources of inflation. . . .

Other suggestions are made, but it is with this sentence that I wish to join issue. We all agree that rearmament is necessary, but why the "controls"?

What would be said of a group of travelers if, whenever they came to a crossroads or a turning, they decided on which road they wanted to go and then altered the signposts to suit their own wishes? What would be said if a new scientific theory were to be produced which stated that, to prevent high or low temperatures, all that it is necessary to do is to set thermometers permanently at the correct "normal"? What would be said of those who advanced a theory that, in order to make it easier for tightrope walkers to balance, their balancing poles should be fixed rigidly to their bodies? No longer able to make adjustments, the tightrope walker would immediately overbalance one way or the other. The old type of steam engine had an automatic governor in the shape of two weights that rose and fell, actuated by the speed of the engine and the force of gravity. This movement was used to adjust the steam supply so that the engine kept up a steady speed. What would be said of those who wished to fix these weights so that no movement was possible? Inevitably the machine would either gather speed or slow down until it burst or stopped.

The price mechanism measured in terms of money gives us our signposts. It serves as a temperature gauge and as an automatic governor. Perhaps people do not like the look of the road to be traveled. Or they may not like the temperature of the particular chemical process which they are operating. But to disregard the signposts or the thermometer would be considered a lunatic act.

The price mechanism is merely the measure of public supply of and demand for commodities and services of all kinds, and to disregard the prices and to try and fix them at what someone thinks they ought to be is as absurd as it would be to alter the signposts or to fix the thermometer. It is true that prices can rise and fall as the result of supply and demand. But prices can also rise as the result of a drop in the value of the currency. In neither case will tinkering with the effects have any influence on the cause.

The Communist attack in Korea was the signal for the panic return to price control in countries where it had been discontinued, and for the intensification of this control in countries where it had still been retained. It has been a great relief to Communists and Socialists. Is it not strange that as a result of Communist threats of war, the free peoples of the world should immediately be persuaded to turn to a form of Communist economics in order to gain strength to resist Communist aggression? We must certainly rearm, we must be strong, but we can achieve this only by following not Mr. Lubin's advice, but the economics of freedom.

The economic problems that have arisen so suddenly as a result of aggression in Korea are due mainly to an excess of demand over supply which, as always, can be much more temporary than anyone would expect at the present time. The only effective way to deal with this rise in prices is for the market to be left free, and for the governments of the world to keep out of the market, as any interference will aggravate the situation.

But the most pressing problem afflicting the people of almost every country in the world is the fact that national currencies are now measured in terms of paper money which bears only a nominal relation to gold or any other commodity. Because of vast over-expenditure on the part of national governments everywhere these paper currencies are dropping in value, and prices as a whole are therefore rising. This is a wonderful opportunity for hidden Communist forces to do their utmost to get the world to accept the burden of uneconomic legislation which would lead to misery and slavery.

This is not the first time that inflation has been a problem. History books are full of examples of inflation and price control mechanisms of all kinds that go back as far as history itself. One of the more classic examples which have come down to us is that of the inflation of the Roman currency that took place in the third and fourth centuries A.D., during the decline of the Empire. A succession of bad governments had taken the gold — that is, the value — out of the currency and trade; and industry, left without a measure of value, deteriorated. The most rigorous legislation, with the most ghastly penalties, was quite incapable of restoring value to the currency — that is, in fixing the price of what was no more than a copper coin masquerading as gold.

The Emperor Diocletian tried to resolve the financial crisis by two methods. His first attempt was a most inclusive price-fixing edict. Maximum prices were fixed on all articles and all services, and the huge Roman bureaucratic machine, having once established the prices, set to work to enforce them. The result was failure. The historical passages referring to this failure are similar to those which refer to the failure of the French experiment in price-fixing which took place at the time of the French Revolution.

But Diocletian had a second idea, and that was to reform the currency. We are told that what his price-fixing edict failed to achieve, the monetary reform inevitably achieved by degrees. Prices returned to normal.

History is full of examples such as this one. The tug-of-war is on between those who believe in sound economics based on Christian principles, and those who believe with Karl Marx in the "dictated economy." Let us hope that we have enough men of common sense to insure that wisdom will prevail.

THE HEALTH OF THE STATE

or

Why Can't There Be an American "Economist"?

By JEFFREY CHOWDER

THE VERY stability of the military position in Korea has raised a grave question about the political support of that front. If we are faced with the prospect of a perpetual "accordion war" of shrinking amplitude around the 38th Parallel, one may pretend to foresee also a diminishing popularity for the war; and this the government, against their own better judgment, may already be taking steps to offset. It would be strange indeed if Messrs. Truman and Acheson, in fear of a wave of disillusionment which has not in fact yet occurred, were to adopt secretly and piecemeal the policy of an elderly general whom they have just succeeded in publicly and wholly discrediting. Yet there is disturbing evidence that that is exactly what is taking place.

The government of Formosa is to receive a new U. S. military mission. The blockade of the China coast may be "intensified." The acquiescence of Mr. Morrison has been secured in a policy of retaliatory bombing of Chinese troops behind the Yalu, should such a policy be dictated by military considerations in the field. There is even talk of the use of "atomic artillery" — a phrase which has recently descended from the vocabulary of science fiction to that of State Department background talks. And the *Washington Post*, long a stalwart defender of Mr. Acheson, has called for the Secretary's resignation on the surprising ground that he is in fact a sort of disguised MacArthur, a warmonger in a moustache.

One may well inquire of the Secretary exactly what these portents mean. Can it be that he is really trying to foist on the American people a policy of victory while still wearing the mask of appeasement? Or is he, rather, offering sham appeasement to the more bloodthirsty elements, such as Senator Douglas, of his own party? Even assuming that the latter — and kinder — explanation is the true one, it becomes the unpleasant duty of the Secretary's supporters to ask bluntly whether he is not the victim of a blue funk. While presenting this possibility, they may also help stiffen the Secretary's spine by reviewing certain arguments in favor of the Asian policy he appears to be in danger of forsaking. Some of these arguments have never been fully disclosed in debate; indeed, they may even have escaped the attention of the Secretary himself.

The policy which the United States, with UN backing, has pursued in Asia up to now, is described by the President as a "limited war," by Ambassador Austin as "peace without appeasement," by General MacArthur as "inhibited war," and by the London *Economist* as "fighting for a draw." Whether this policy be right or wrong, it is one that calls for great courage. As the *Economist* itself has put it, "There can be no sterner test either of statesmanship or of military morale." Given this courage and morale, however, the policy has many hidden political and economic advantages which its somewhat adventitious moral opacity should not be allowed to conceal.

Among these advantages is what may be called the equilibrating function of the Korean War as at present conducted. Although the present policy does not entirely avoid war, it does, so to speak, put war in its place. That place is an area of 85,000 square miles and 29,000,000 people between the Yalu River and the Japan and Yellow Seas. It is equivalent to 1.4 per cent of the world's land mass and 1.2 per cent of its population. The more the Korean War is in fact confined to a seesaw around the 38th Parallel, the smaller do these fractions become.

During the latter part of World War II, when postwar peace plans were in fashion, the distinguished political scientist, Mr. Noel Busch, made an interesting proposal. Let, said he, a stretch of the Sahara, such as the one where Rommel and Montgomery had fought, be set aside by international agreement as a perpetual battleground; and let small professional armies fight there forever at an intensity varying with the heat of international political passions, whose safety valve their perpetual war would be. At that time the Busch plan was perhaps rather too summarily dismissed as no more than a bloodier version of the old idealistic "moral substitute" schemes for abolishing war which, flourishing in the days of William James, had helped inspire the revival of the Olympic Games. These, it will be remembered, were designed to sublimate international xenophobia, and in fact seem to have done so until Hitler was their host in 1936. (The fact that Russia has entered a team in the '52 Olympics gives us yet another chance to test their distraining potentialities.)

Meanwhile, however, we have in fact a Korean War which, in all conscience, comes much closer to the Busch scheme than its more sporting but perhaps less realistic prototypes. Korea is surely as remote from all the great political tinderboxes as Busch supposed Libya to be; moreover, it is smaller and almost as poverty-stricken. As a sort of substitute for a substitute for war, it might even save our Olympic athletes of '52 unnecessary toil and sweat. It is of course regrettable that Korea is a real war, with real casualties. But Americans would be very foolish to permit the emotions arising from that fact, however legitimate, to blind them to the very real function this war performs in saving the world from something much worse.

Addicts of the balance of power have tediously warned us that a world divided into only two great powers — e.g. Soviet communism and American capitalism — is an inherently unstable balance, bound to issue either in all-out war or in the emergence of a more complex power

pattern. The facts of our Korean experience may be taken, however, as a rather crushing answer to these gloomy prophets. It can even be argued that the Korean War is a political discovery of no less importance than — and not dissimilar in kind to — the invention of the gyroscopic compass in marine navigation. It has stabilized the tensions of an unstable situation for nearly a year. Why should it not continue to do so for the whole journey?

It will of course be objected that casualties at the rate of nearly 1,000,000 a year (most of them, as it happens, are Chinese casualties) is a high price to pay for the fueling and upkeep of even such an invention as is here described. This will not be a definitive objection to those whose political imaginations encompass the monstrous size of the vessel which the Korean War is stabilizing and steering. That vessel is nothing less than world peace. To shift the figure a bit, the quarrel on the quarterdeck must be judged, not by the norms of standard procedure on a P & O liner, but by the almost certain alternative should the warfare spread between decks — namely, the atomic inundation of mankind.

Once this kind of political imagination is turned on the Korean conflict, it discloses further favorable aspects which it would normally be impolitic to mention. Not the least of these are economic.

Every recent visitor to Japan has been struck by the healthy stimulus the war has given to the economic recovery of those unfortunate islands. This fact could not properly be, and is not here, advanced as in any way a justification of the Korean War.

Given the war's other and more commanding justifications, however, it would be foolish to deny, even from the broadest humanitarian standpoint, that Korea has greatly reduced the price of American face-saving in Japan. The Japanese economy is for many reasons an American responsibility. Is it not better that Japanese labor should be productively employed repairing U. S. naval vessels and servicing U. S. weapons and vehicles, than that the same labor should draw unemployment insurance at the U. S. taxpayer's ultimate expense, or even be drafted into the enlarged national police force which would be required to repress Japanese communism if idleness and poverty were to invite its spread?

It is frequently remarked that the popularity of communism, as distinguished from its power, has lost considerable ground, even in Oriental countries, since the U. S. determined to resist aggression in Korea. This gratifying phenomenon is commonly if cynically attributed to the craven homage which illiterate masses everywhere pay to a military show of spirit; but an economic explanation is simpler and possibly just as true. The Korean war has produced an unexampled prosperity among those very producers of primary materials whose laboring classes have hitherto been considered targets scarcely less rewarding than the industrial proletariat of the West for Communist proselytizing.

To the arguments of such proselytizers, a rise in the price of rubber, jute or copra such as South Asia has recently witnessed constitutes, if not a logical reply, at any rate the cause of a most satisfactory deafness on the part of the masses in question. Trade hath its victories, especially trade at wartime prices; and it would not be difficult to argue that the merchants of Hong Kong, in their recent furnishing of abnormal supplies of rubber to the Chinese mainland, not only have profited themselves and so strengthened the British position in Asia, but also, by making possible the relief of a long-starved Chinese civilian demand for rubber, may have assisted the spread of indifference to communist ideology among the countrymen of Mao Tse-tung himself.

There are also more narrowly American economic benefits that flow from the Korean War, and which should be faced up to without queasiness or misgivings. The Korean War is, of course, the first charge on our military budget. To say so much is to state the obvious; what is less generally recognized is that of all the many demands on that budget, those attributable to Korea make up the only portion with any just claim to stability from year to year. The rest of the rearmament program, however necessary, is the volatile element in our national income and expenditure projections. Its size, its rate of impact on the civilian economy, and its menace of shortages and inflation, all rise and fall with a multiplier effect as the Korean War threatens to expand — or, alternatively, to stop.

Already the program of Mr. Wilson, with its graceful curve bulging in '53 to a "plateau" thereafter, has created the gravest apprehensions among businessmen and economists, not indeed as to our ability to meet the requirements, but as to the depression which they foresee when the "plateau," with its inevitable cutbacks, is reached. Those who do not share this apprehension have a still darker one: that the inflationary pressures inherent in rearmament will get increasingly out of hand as it is realized that competing interest groups, notably labor and the farm bloc, have too unsettled views of the future to accept restraint, or, indeed, to take any position other than that of getting theirs while the getting is good.

Now compare this general and dangerous uncertainty with the actual economic effects of the Korean War to date. To deny that they have been on the whole beneficent would be to take a very churlish view of the statistics. Since last July, investment, employment, consumption and production have all risen at a rate which puts one entirely at ease in contemplating the corresponding vagaries of the price level. As Professor Theodore Schultz pointed out to a recent convocation of economists, "Our economy, as a result of the inventory boom, is in a better state to handle the tasks ahead of it and has given us 'the best of both worlds.' " Both the mood of business and the economic behavior of the people since June 1950, if they have not been in all respects exemplary, have at least yielded something like exemplary results.

If business could be given some confidence that the international stabilizer which has proved its value during the past ten trying months would be allowed to fill the same role in the foreseeable future, several gratifying consequences would ensue. To mention a minor one first: a firmer tone in investment calculations would have the effect of reducing applications for special amortization treatment, thus increasing the yield of present taxes and so reducing in the same degree the case for raising the latter to what might be onerous levels.

Nor would business be the only beneficiary of a more settled international prospect. It is not wholly irrelevant to consider the plight of those selfless bureaucrats who

have accepted the burden of directing the economy for an "emergency" which they can not measure, and whose indefinite outlines have subjected them to much unjust criticism. Given a firm war, they would have at least a point of reference for their programming which would enable them to surmount this criticism. The widespread suspicion of all new controls would be allayed by, or at any rate give way to, the habit of living with that irreducible minimum of allocations, ceilings and limitation orders (manpower controls, except for the draft, might conceivably be avoided altogether) which a limited but permanent war entails. Public servants, like business, labor and other groups, could view the future in the secure knowledge that their contribution to the national welfare would be needed next year as well as this, and economic planning might even become (as it has long deserved to become) a career whose respectability would not fluctuate with electoral whim.

Secretary Acheson once truly remarked that the Soviet threat to America is unlike any of the other problems which, under the significant name of "headaches," we have dealt with in the past. This one, he said, will not vanish with a powder; it is more like the "steadier pain of earning a living."

Now is the time for the Secretary to reflect on the policy implications of those words. When this country learns to accept the Korean War as our mark of Cain, as a part, so to speak, of the normalcy of coexistence, we shall all of us, citizens and soldiers alike, be able to plan our lives with something like calm and certainty.

MacArthur tells us that in war "there is no substitute for victory." That, he should in turn be told, depends on what war one is talking about. And if slogans are to be bandied, the opponents of the MacArthur program might do worse than to revive one of Randolph Bourne's — a slogan more appropriate, indeed, to a limited, stabilizing and glandular war like the Korean conflict than to the one that originally evoked it: "War is the health of the state."

WORTH HEARING AGAIN

THE PERIOD of my career as an economist has been marked by a series of "movements" — I will not say fads — in economic writing and teaching, consisting largely of attacks on traditional views of the nature and function of economics, in which the term "orthodoxy" commonly appears as a cuss-word, an epithet of reproach. The critics, aggressors, have more or less explicitly advocated the abolition of an economics of economic principles and its replacement by almost anything or everything else. . . .

The latest "new economics" and in my opinion rather the worst, for fallacious doctrine and pernicious consequences, is that launched by the late John Maynard (Lord) Keynes, who for a decade succeeded in carrying economic thinking well back to the dark age, but of late this wave of the future has happily been passing.

FRANK N. KNIGHT, *in his Presidential address before the American Economic Association, December 28, 1950*

LIFE IN THE DOG-HOUSE

RESIDENCE in the dog-house is generally taken to be a dog's life. But it is not as bad as people would make it out. Not many misbegotten, unhousebroken curs ever enter the premises; and the flea-bitten and mangy that manage to slink in are promptly purged. Guards selected for keenness of scent lie at all the portals. So that there is an absence of yappers, whiners, cringers and bayers at the moon. There are no lap-dogs, no hang-dogs, no obese poodles, no garbage-rooters. The housemates run to sinewy leanness; for there is no overfeeding. Excluded, along with the portly softies, are the touchy, the snappish, the self-important from coddling, the rib-boned, the luxuriously cushioned, the meticulously vetted, and the indulgently excused (when they make a mess) because of their showy pedigrees or their sheer brazenness.

Within the dog-house is a goodly sprinkling of the bull strain: homely, good-natured, weak of nose but strong of nerve; quiet, not latrant but at most low-rumbling, even when roused to wrath; patiently tenacious of purpose, even to the extent of keeping on trying to chew up hedgehogs after the barbs of prior endeavors have been painfully extracted.

In the dog-house there are many other canine strains, but no weak ones — not, at any rate, for very long — and few tails are to be observed in retirement between hindlegs; many wave at full mast over the back, and curl. In short, the tenants are a pretty tough lot, liberally pied with well-licked scars that detract from pulchritude while conveying a strong impression of experience and efficiency.

That impression has been verified in history. Not seldom has some banished hound been summoned to save the bacon by putting heart into a whole pack of unintelligent, confused, though well-meaning, doggy dubs. Nevertheless, the canine Cincinnatus can not count on prolonged residence outside the quarters from which he has been dragooned. For when the peril is once safely over, and "normalcy" has become the yearned-for desirable, back he goes into the nuisance-pen; for he is too unrestful, never knowing when it is time to let up. Or, if he can hardly yet be spared, his life is made so miserable by the snarling animosity of the very beneficiaries of his leadership that the thought of the sequestered refuge inspires in him a veritable nostalgia. He has no yen after the limelight, nor yet after showers of bouquets or a shiny brass collar; but his élan evaporates in the atmosphere of din and reek generated by the *canes boobientes*, now engaged in ratting on the leader who saved their skins for them. So he returns with disillusioned relief to the abode whence he came.

He has expected no gratitude, for he can not inspire "a lively sense of favors to come," inasmuch as all he can promise to the otiose is a continuance of what has just saved their pachydermatous "rinds" — something they want to forget as soon as possible. Later on, the canine savior and outcast may get a monument, or be stuffed. Taxidermy is not too expensive. But his simulacrum does not grace the wall of the dog-house. The denizens thereof have to make pilgrimage to some cemetery or museum to view his laudatory epitaph or his mummy.

One can readily understand that life in the dog-house has its ups and downs; but the ups really have it, because select company is an incomparable blessing. Dull dogs do not make the entrance grade; and the bore-hound is soon spotted and ejected. There is, moreover, no odor of sewage or disinfectant — just a whiff of DDT to discourage vermin. And at the door hangs the sign: PARK ALL PARASITES OUTSIDE, YE WHO ENTER HERE.

KYON ARGOS

FROM OUR READERS

Proposes a New "Week"

I would like to suggest another week for the great list of special periods already set up, namely: a "be honest with ourselves week." With our tremendous capabilities, what couldn't we do if, instead of expending our energy on words, we would take a little more time in self-analysis and admit a few mistakes, and then work together in meeting the problems that face us?

Again, I would like to say that I appreciate the honesty of the *Freeman*.

New York City — BRUCE CURRY

The Anti-MacArthur Chorus

The whole French press, following the British example, has joined the chorus of your Democratic newspapers in discrediting MacArthur and, like Truman, denouncing him as the instigator of a third world war — which is exactly Stalin's thesis.

Nowhere is it possible to publish anything to the contrary. American money, which makes itself felt everywhere, strengthens the press and the organizations friendly to the Communists. You must admit that it takes strong nerves to resist so much folly.

Paris, France — B. S.

A Letter to Mr. Truman

The following is part of a letter I sent to President Truman on April 12, 1951:

"First Chiang Kai-shek was axed, then James Forrestal, and now MacArthur has been eliminated from the scene. Three of the Kremlin's major aims have thus been achieved, through indirection, through American Democrats who were unwitting tools of pro-Soviet schemers.

"This is a banner day for the Owen D. Lattimores and all the other friends of the Soviet Union, who have been digging the grave of liberty and who have been protected by your government, through spurious politicians' agencies such as the Tydings Committee. Now the sinister policy of your Department of State, which undermined and gagged Nationalist China, and handed the Chinese nation to the Kremlin on a silver platter, may continue to take its course. Now, advised by your superficial, vainglorious, Harvard-pink Secretary of State, you can continue to blunder along in the tradition of George C. Marshall, who in 1946 used American power to browbeat Chiang Kai-shek into a union with the Communists.

"Your government has continued these stupidities down the line. It even had the nerve to falsify history by whitewashing itself and putting the blame on Chiang Kai-shek, through that shameful Jessup-Acheson White Paper, which is a dark spot on America's record.

"Under your inept and fumbling leadership, the friend of Alger Hiss — Dean Acheson — has triumphed once more. Now you can string along with England's weak-kneed Laborites, who are silly enough to imagine that they can save Hong Kong. Now you can negotiate a peace with the Chinese Communists, as if any good could ever come from making any deal whatsoever with the Machiavellian conspirators of world dictatorship. . . .

"Have the British and the French contributed enough to the Korean war effort to warrant your listening to their advice? When, under their pressure, you at last appease the Chinese Communists and help them to a seat in the United Nations, how will you justify the deaths of our American boys in Korea? I guess you won't feel badly about that. Your ignorance and the flattery of the Achesons surround your conscience with a shockproof wall. In the meantime, time is running out on the future of the land of liberty."

Montclair, New Jersey — FELIX WITTMER
Associate Professor of the Social Studies
New Jersey State Teachers College

Unsung Government Economy

On January 29, the Comptroller General of the U. S. sent to each member of Congress a two-page letter giving "certain facts" about the General Accounting Office.

Two examples:

1. Between April 1946 and January 1, 1951 the number of employees was reduced more than 50 per cent (from 14,904 to 7063).

2. Just recently a reorganization in one branch has reduced personnel from 325 to 61 at an annual saving of almost one million dollars.

With the Congress and the President throwing taxpayers' money around like wheat chaff, it would seem that these accomplishments by the GAO would rate headlines in daily and weekly papers. I have seen no reference to this letter in the Sunday *New York Times*, the daily *Portland Press Herald*, or in *Newsweek* or *Time*. Could it be that the GAO doesn't employ enough "public relations" experts to work up press releases for the overstaffed and overrated Washington Fourth Estate?

Don't you think your subscribers would be interested in this letter? It shows what an honest and courageous public official with administrative ability can do.

Thomaston, Maine — HARRY P. SWEENY

Letter from a GI

I received your issue of February 6 with Geraldine Fitch's fine article on the untapped manpower available on Formosa, and because I am in Korea where that manpower could possibly prove a decisive factor in *a war we can not win through arms*, I was perhaps more interested in the piece than many in the States. . . .

The MacArthur affair was tragic. While I feel Truman was right . . . constitutionally, I am wholeheartedly on the side of MacArthur on the issues involved. My opinion is that the dismissal was executed in a spiteful, shoddy manner. . . . My prayers, and those of the majority out here in Korea, are that it will not prove irremediable and catastrophic.

Korea — GI

MEN WHO SCUTTLED CHINA

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Freda Utley's "The China Story" (Regnery, $3.50) is a great piece of history and a fine model of crusading journalism. My first impulse is to say that it ought to be stuffed down the throats of George Marshall, Dean Acheson and Harry Truman. But aside from the vengeful satisfaction such action might give some long-suffering people, that would hardly help get the United States off the hook in its foreign policy. To save this nation from disaster, some means should be found of trepanning the skulls of Marshall, Acheson and Truman and getting Freda Utley's words inside their heads.

Whittaker Chambers, who knows the Communist conspiracy from the inside out, once remarked that there is only one instance in history in which a nation has succeeded in using the State Department of its Number One Enemy to kill off its Number Two Enemy. He was obviously speaking of Soviet Russia, the United States and Nationalist China. The truth of Mr. Chambers's epigrammatic flash is underscored by Freda Utley's patient display of statistics and textual analysis in ten pointed chapters. Her book begins with Yalta, but soon Mrs. Utley is dipping back into the thirties, when the attitudes that gave birth to Yalta first found a habitation in the minds and emotions of scores of young Americans who thought that communism, unlike fascism, had a "progressive" destination.

The story as it affects China began in Hankow, in 1938. The United States military attaché in Hankow in those early days of the Sino-Japanese War was Colonel (later General) Joseph Stilwell. A soft-hearted and sentimental man despite his "Vinegar Joe" nickname and his gruff exterior, Colonel Stilwell was easily captivated by Agnes Smedley, a gallant and basically idealistic soul who had the blindest sort of admiration for the Chinese Communists. Agnes Smedley not only captivated Joe Stilwell, she also won over practically everybody else around her in the Hankow, or "Wuhan cities," region. Among her conquests were Captain Evans Carlson of the United States Marine Corps, and John Paton Davies, the elegant and sophisticated American Consul in Hankow. Together with Davies, Carlson, Smedley and Stilwell in Hankow was journalist Edgar Snow, whose books did such an effective job in presenting the Chinese Communists to book-reading Americans as romantic Jeffersonian agrarians. Later on Snow was to become a favored writer for the *Saturday Evening Post;* he has continued his sophistical dissertations in that medium over the years, although his name has been dropped from the *Post* masthead.

The "Hankow last-ditchers," as Mrs. Utley calls them, were scattered to the ends of the earth by 1942. But Joe Stilwell, by then a General, was appointed American military representative in China in that year. The appointment brought most of "Joe's Boys" (Victor Lasky's phrase) back into effective action. John Davies became Stilwell's political adviser — and with him Davies brought his protégés, John Stewart Service, Raymond Paul Ludden and John Emmerson. Since Stilwell was Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek as well as American military representative in China, Joe's Boys had the opportunity of seeing all, knowing all — and influencing all. Their lines of infiltration and persuasion went deep into the State Department in Washington; and, by playing on Stilwell himself, they were able subtly to make their point of view on China prevail with General George Marshall, who was Stilwell's friend, patron and boss. They worked hand in glove with John Carter Vincent, who succeeded Joe Grew as head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department in 1945; and they formed a united ideological front with Lauchlin Currie of the Foreign Economic Administration and with Owen Lattimore, Deputy Director of OWI in 1942–44.

Mrs. Utley does not contend that Stilwell, Davies, Service, Ludden, Emmerson, Vincent, Currie and Lattimore were Communists; what she does say is that they followed a plan of agitation and action that was eminently satisfactory to Joe Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in their efforts to communize China. It may be important to note that John Davies is today a key member of the Policy Planning Committee of the State Department, in which position he is still able to influence policy affecting all the sensitive agencies of government.

Mrs. Utley not only tells how Joe's Boys and their journalistic counterparts managed to capture the diplomats and the Secretary of State (first Byrnes, then Marshall, then Acheson); she also shows how they made a virtual corner of the book market through taking over practically all the white space devoted to Far Eastern affairs in the important review media of New York City. There was a time in New York's literary history when a General Chennault, a George Creel or a Freda Utley could no more get an unbiased, let alone a favorable, notice in a big New York paper than a zombie could win high place on an Olympic athletic team.

Most of Mrs. Utley's book is devoted to the fellow-traveler crusade for the American mind as it looked westward to the Pacific and beyond. But she also does magnificent work in exploding certain stereotypes that the fellow-traveler writers and speakers have falsely established as axiomatic with practically everyone from college presidents to golf caddies. There is the stereotype, for example, that Chiang Kai-shek's "corrupt" entourage somehow frittered away from two to four billion dollars

worth of American military and economic aid after V-J Day. Dean Acheson and Senator Tom Connally have both repeated this old chestnut (using the two billion figure); and it crops up in editorials, articles, speeches and conversation almost everywhere. (The most recent place I read it was in an article by Ralph McGill, the Atlanta editor and journalist.)

What actually happened was that our State Department by one ruse or another kept the military aid to Chiang from arriving until it was 'way too late. As for the two billion figure, Mrs. Utley breaks it down in a way to show that Nationalist China got very little of value, no matter what dollar price is attached to the sum total. Acheson's figure of two billion includes a total of $799 million of "economic" aid and $797 million of "military" aid. That comes to something over $1.5 billion. (The balance is not itemized, but presumably it includes $474 million of UNRRA aid.) But of what did the "military" aid consist? Some $335 million of it consisted of "services and expenses" connected with repatriating the million or more Japanese soldiers in China and transporting Chinese Nationalist soldiers to accept the surrender of Japanese armies. Even President Truman has said that these "services" can not properly be regarded as "postwar" Lend-Lease; they should come under the heading of World War II expenses. If the United States had not transferred the Chinese to take surrender of the Japanese, American troops would have had to be used, at considerably greater expense.

Deducting the $335 million represented by the cost of repatriating the Japanese and accepting their surrender, we have a total of some $460 million of postwar military aid to China. But this figure must be trimmed further by disallowing most of the non-military "surplus war stocks" sold to China in 1946, which Acheson misleadingly includes in his total of "military aid." The truth is that out of a total of $100 million worth of so-called "surplus war stocks," 40 per cent consisted of quartermaster supplies; only a paltry $3 million of the $100 million represented the small arms and ammunition needed to fight the Chinese Red armies in the field. Subtracting all the "surplus war stocks" that were useless for fighting, we get a figure of some $363 million of postwar military aid to China.

At least $125 million of this was never brought to bear in time against the Chinese Red Armies for the simple reason that the executive department of the government in Washington persistently dragged its feet. The United States Congress allocated $125 million of munitions under the China Aid Act of April 1948. But where the British had received arms from American arsenals within a few weeks after the evacuation of Dunquerque, the China Aid Act munitions were not delivered until nine months or a year after Congress had spoken. Meanwhile the Communists had overrun most of China. During the long, wearisome interval between the passage of the Aid Act and the actual delivery of the arms, the Truman government diddled and fiddled. At one point, after President Truman had written to Secretary of State Marshall advising him of the procedures to be followed in permitting China to make use of the sums appropriated, Marshall waited more than three weeks before communicating the relevant information to the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador. The Chinese fumed as the State Department sat on its hands, getting nowhere with their pleas for the right to begin purchasing what Joe Stilwell had called "bullets, damn it, just bullets."

Long before the Executive sabotage of the China Aid Act, people in the Truman government were busy cutting off military aid to Chiang Kai-shek. During 1946 and part of 1947 General Marshall embargoed the shipment of arms or ammunition to China. The embargo was lifted in July of 1947, when the State Department allowed Chiang's government to purchase 130 million rounds of ammunition — or *enough for three weeks of fighting.* In December of 1947 the Chinese Nationalist troops had enough 7.92 mm. ammunition for only 22 days. Dean Acheson has said that Chiang lost no battles because of lack of bullets. Well, you can't lose battles when you haven't enough ammunition to start them in the first place. But you can lose wars, very definitely.

If Joe Stilwell's Boys had not "planned it that way," the Chinese Nationalists might have received a large consignment of war materials right after V-J Day at no additional cost to the American taxpayer. But someone in Washington had put through the order for "Operation Destruction." By the terms of this order (and who, pray tell, issued it?) large quantities of munitions and equipment intended for China were destroyed or thrown into the sea. Smaller caliber ammunition was blown up; 120,000 tons of larger caliber were dumped into the Indian Ocean. A consignment of 20,000 captured German rifles had actually left a German port for China when Lauchlin Currie, writing on White House stationery, signed an order forbidding the sale of German arms and ammunition to Chiang. Weapons that might have gone to Chiang actually ended up in Russian hands in East Germany.

"Too Little, Too Late" is the burden of Freda Utley's story of the Aid to China that was provably impeded by the American State Department. Because of the facts, Mrs. Utley can not find it in her heart to join the strident clamor of the "liberals" against "McCarthyism." She willingly admits that Senator Joe McCarthy may have stretched things a bit when he referred to Owen Lattimore as a spy and the "chief architect of our China policy." But her own careful comparison of Lattimore's writings with the twistings of the Communist Party line establishes one fact for certain: Lattimore has always tried to make it easy for Mao Tse-tung's Reds in China.

The sum of the whole "China Story" is that General Marshall, John Davies, John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent and many another pro-Mao man and "Hankow last-ditcher" lost the United States some 400 million Oriental allies. Yet this gang remains almost wholly in the employ of the United States Government. It has even been whispered that one of Joe Stilwell's Boys, John Emmerson, may step into MacArthur's shoes in Japan! Moreover, President Truman has served notice that the Stilwell gang will continue to run our foreign policy, at least until 1953. May Heaven help us until we can get to the polls in November 1952!

GREAT QUAKER

Rufus Jones: Master Quaker, by David Hinshaw. *New York: Putnam's. $4.00*

It is now nearly three years since, on June 16, 1948, Rufus Jones died at his home in Haverford, aged 85. The lapse of time has not been sufficient for a final assessment of this great Quaker spokesman and his role in a period when all the values for which he stood were increasingly challenged or denied.

David Hinshaw, knowing that his work is premature as a complete biography, has nevertheless laid foundations on which all future students of the life of Rufus Jones will build. There is little doubt that these will be numerous, and not confined to members of the Society of Friends. As the philosophy of this spiritual leader transcended the particularism of his sect, so we may anticipate that some objective historian will eventually give complete definition to Rufus Jones, against the background of his times, as George Macaulay Trevelyan did for another great Quaker in the "Life of John Bright."

That classic biography of a Quaker statesman was published 24 years after Bright's death. Mr. Hinshaw reveals that he was — fortunately, we must say — "gathering material for this book" with Rufus Jones ten months before the latter died. It is this intimacy with the personality of the subject that makes Mr. Hinshaw's study delightful reading. But it is too early yet to underwrite the bold assertion that Rufus Jones "occupies a place" with George Fox and William Penn "to form Quakerism's great triumvirate." There have been many others, John Woolman, John Greenleaf Whittier, John Bright not least among them.

Because hierarchical definition is dangerous, especially in the spiritual democracy of Quakerism, a caution as to the title of Mr. Hinshaw's biography is advisable. By "Rufus Jones: Master Quaker" the author does not mean that Rufus — as two of his old friends may call him — ever ruled this highly individualistic sect. The suggestion, rather, is that Dr. Jones mastered not other Quakers, but the philosophy of Quakerism itself, just as a "master craftsman" was not, in guild parlance, a ruler of men, but of the materials with which he worked.

For members of the Society of Friends, as well as for the general reader with a mild interest in Quakerism, the Hinshaw biography does a great service in explaining how Rufus Jones, like all great spiritual leaders, rose above dogma and faction in order to unify through substance. As Harry Emerson Fosdick shrewdly observed of Rufus:

> He has gone to the root of the matter in religion, and emphasizing, as he has, the profundities, he has therefore emphasized the universals, and so, to an amazing degree, has been not sectarian at all, but the interpreter of Christianity to the deepest need of multitudes of people of all the denominations.

This spiritual insight is the more interesting because Rufus Jones was never an ascetic. All real Quakers, which does not mean all who call themselves such, base their faith on belief in a spark of the Divine in each individual, whether it be called "conscience" or "inner light." In some persons this sense of personal communion with God leads to an extreme of mysticism, but always it is as different from pantheism on the one hand as it is from positivism on the other.

Belief in the fundamental of "inner light" was the wellspring of the power that vested in this Quaker farm boy from the backwoods of Maine. The effect of that power was not merely to give Quakerism everywhere a new vitality, but also to make it a living, influential creed for tens of thousands, all over the world, to whom this sect had previously either been wholly unknown, or known only as a name.

It was not altogether easy, as Mr. Hinshaw shows, for Rufus Jones to reanimate Quakerism from within. And it is doubtful that Rufus Jones would have achieved so much if world upheaval and the friendship of worldly men had not made his task as a reformer easier. Certainly Rufus was not a nationally known figure prior to the organization of the American Friends Service Committee in 1917. This Committee is now famous because of many missions of mercy which have commanded world respect. The first of its great undertakings was the administration of regenerative feeding of several million debilitated German children in 1919 after the World War I Armistice, at the request of Mr. Hoover and largely financed by the Hoover organization. Dr. Jones in 1917 was 54 years old, an age at which both George Fox and William Penn had accomplished most of their active work. For Rufus, however, the middle fifties marked the beginning of thirty years of intense activity. Prior to that climacteric, he had been a remarkable teacher in a fine small college. The coming of world war somewhat paradoxically made this American pacifist a great international force.

Under present circumstances it is still too early to estimate the lasting influence of Rufus Jones, or of Quakerism as reinforced by his wise leadership, upon a world obsessed by fear and hate. David Hinshaw wisely does not attempt to do this, except inferentially. For instance, he relegates to an appendix the account, as told in an article by Rufus Jones himself, of an historic visit to Gestapo headquarters in Berlin in December 1938. The purpose of the visit, made by Rufus and two other prominent Friends, was to obtain permission for the extension of relief to Jewish victims of Nazi persecution.

As can be imagined, that was no easy task. Yet the trio of devoted Quakers won through to the inner citadel of Nazidom, delivered their message and were given "full permission to investigate the sufferings of Jews and to bring such relief as they see necessary." This could have been an action of great political moment except that a few months later war intervened.

The unfailing humor which always made Rufus Jones a very human character breaks forth in this story, as told in his own words. After their interview, while waiting for a decision from "Hangman" Heydrich, the three Friends were left entirely alone. Instinctively they bowed their heads in prayer — "the only Quaker Meeting ever held in the Gestapo." When the Nazi chiefs returned, one said casually that every word spoken in the room had been recorded. "We were glad then," wrote Rufus, "that we had kept the period of quiet!"

Many other illustrations of this great man's whimsical side are recorded by David Hinshaw. They help to show why he was, and still is, so widely loved. And his dry wit had all the pith and pungency one would expect from a real "Down-Easter." One of these reviewers well remembers an incident that David overlooks. Rufus was speak-

ing in Meeting, to college students, on the importance of individual effort. "Take the case of Methuselah," he said. "We have it on good authority that he lived 969 years. Yet, so far as we know, longevity was his only accomplishment worth recording."

The more modest 85 years vouchsafed to Rufus Jones were packed with subtle achievement of a nature that has lately been all too rare. David Hinshaw has not merely appreciated its significance, but has deftly and sympathetically made this clear for all to understand. His book will be as permanent as the subject with which it is deeply and reverently concerned.

HERBERT HOOVER and FELIX MORLEY

ROOSEVELT'S LETTERS

F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, edited by Elliott Roosevelt, assisted by Joseph P. Lash. *New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. $10.00*

In these two stout volumes, containing Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal letters for the period 1928–1945, one finds no such sensation as would accompany the publication of the unexpurgated personal letters of his successor. (Would not "The Anti-Chesterfield" be a promising title for the epistles of Harry S. Truman?)

The multiple ghosts who hovered over the preparation of Roosevelt's state papers were not pressed into service for the preparation of these informal communications. Stripped of ectoplasm, there is nothing very arresting or remarkable in the content or style of these letters. Moreover, as Elliott Roosevelt explains in his introduction, this is by no means a full collection of Roosevelt's letters. Material prejudicial to friendly relations with foreign countries; material relating to patronage and to applications and recommendations for government posts; documents containing derogatory remarks concerning the loyalty, character and integrity of individuals have been omitted.

Still the correspondence, even in this bowdlerized form, possesses considerable historical interest. One finds a memorandum for Mrs. Roosevelt regarding the shutting off of oil shipments to Japan, dated November 13, 1940, and reading as follows:

> The real answer which you *can not* use is that if we forbid oil shipments to Japan, Japan will increase her purchases of Mexican oil and furthermore may be driven by actual necessity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East.

This seems to be an adequate characterization of the significance and purpose of the American Government's order of July 25, 1941, suspending all financial and commercial dealings with Japan.

Roosevelt's attitude, apparently shaken only in the last weeks of his life, of staking the peace on trust in the good intentions of the Soviet Government is reflected in a letter to Thomas W. Lamont, of November 12, 1942. Lamont had delivered a speech denouncing any Americans so churlish and suspicious as to doubt the enduring character of Soviet-American cooperation, before a meeting of the Council of American-Soviet Friendship, one of the leading candidates for the Attorney-General's subversive list in later years.

Roosevelt congratulated Lamont on his "excellent speech" and related an unpublished incident of the period when Litvinov was in the United States negotiating American recognition of the Soviet Government. Trying to console Roosevelt for some difficult hurdles in the discussions, Litvinov suggested that in 1920 America was one hundred per cent capitalistic, while Russia was at the other extreme, zero.

In the subsequent thirteen years, the Soviet Union, according to Litvinov, had risen to twenty, while the United States under the early New Deal had gone to a position of eighty. Litvinov professed his "real belief" that in the next twenty years the two countries would come still closer, the Soviet Union to forty and America to sixty, thereby making understanding much more possible. Roosevelt ended his letter to Lamont:

"Perhaps Litvinov's thoughts of nine years ago are coming true."

In the light of 1951 neither Litvinov nor Roosevelt seems to deserve any laurels as a prophet.

There are two cordial letters to the late Harold J. Laski, left-wing British Labor Party theoretician whose outspoken admiration for many aspects of Soviet communism was only mildly tempered by an occasional yearning wish that the Soviet regime would be just a little more tolerant of critics and dissenters. In one of these letters, dated January 16, 1945, Roosevelt writes to Laski: "Our goal is, as you say, identical for the long-range objectives."

The collection contains many letters addressed to members of European royal families, including one to the young King of Yugoslavia with a rather amusing tincture of condescension:

> My dear Peter:
>
> It is good to have your note and I can assure you that I am thinking much of the day when you and your wife will be going back to Belgrade. I think things are shaping up well and I am glad indeed that you see Mr. Churchill and can partake of his great wisdom.

This letter was dated November 2, 1944. Despite the assurance that "things are shaping up well," Peter never did make the return trip to Belgrade. Indeed, one of the strongest impressions which one derives from these letters is the author's almost amazing lack of anticipation of the perils involved in the tremendous postwar power of Soviet communism. This subject is never even referred to.

Roosevelt displayed a persistence worthy of a better cause in refusing to modify his "unconditional surrender" slogan, a slogan that seems to have grown out of his garbled recollection of an episode in Civil War history. He associated unconditional surrender with Appomatox, whereas the phrase was actually used by Grant in connection with the reduction of Fort Donelson.

A memorandum to Cordell Hull of January 24, 1944, expresses concern over the plight of the people of Indo-China and favors replacement of French rule by a trusteeship system. But nowhere is there any expression of concern for the fate of the peoples of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Roosevelt assures a Polish-American Congressman that "there were no secret commitments made by me at Teheran and I am quite sure that other members of my party made none either."

But this is not what Molotov told the Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in Moscow in 1944 without eliciting

contradiction from Churchill and Averell Harriman, who had also been present at Teheran.

Perhaps the best illustration of the haze of profound self-delusion through which Roosevelt viewed the post-war world is to be found in the memorandum of a luncheon conversation of November 13, 1942, in which he developed his ideas on this subject.

There were to be four "policemen," the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, charged with keeping peace. All other countries would be disarmed and the "policemen" would keep close watch to see that they did not arm secretly. "Russia would be charged with keeping peace in the Western [*sic*] Hemisphere, and the United States and China would be charged with keeping the peace in the Far East."

The question what would happen if two of the "policemen" started to shoot up the other two never seems to have occurred to the President. Indeed, an appropriate subtitle for this collection of letters would be the saying of the Swedish statesman Oxenstierna: ". . . with how little wisdom the world is governed."

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

TOO MUCH READING?

The Public School Scandal, by Earl Conrad. *New York: John Day. $3.50*

If there is a public school "scandal" thousands of American parents and observers of the school system would say that it consists in an increasing failure to transmit to pupils what Pestalozzi called "the disciplines of word, number and form." This is not the scandal Mr. Conrad has in mind — quite the contrary; according to him the schools are producing delinquents, truants, and candidates for mental institutions because children are made to go to school at too early an age, forced to read too soon, and suffer from "school fatigue" brought on by stern discipline and an exhaustive load of homework. He is especially incensed — his white heat never lessens throughout the book — by forced early reading, a matter first brought to his attention through the reading difficulties of his own small son in a New York City school. (Although the book pretends to deal with a national situation, Mr. Conrad's experiences seem to be centered almost entirely in New York.)

Unfortunately for his argument, most modern educators agree with him that it is damaging to force children to read until they are ready; indeed, his own quotations from schoolmen show that pupils are not expected or even encouraged to read in the first two grades. His dramatic indictment of the national "crime" of producing maladjustments among seven-, eight-, and nine-year-olds by excessive homework doesn't, to my mind, make much sense unless he can show where, in what schools, this age group is given homework. I think it would be unusual to find any public school in this country where regular home-study assignments are given before the 5th or 6th grade, that is, at about the age of eleven or twelve. Throughout the book the author is busy bringing up heavy artillery which goes off with the reverberation of a cap-pistol.

Mr. Conrad has some hardy prejudices, including one against the Catholic Church. He is not content with pointing out the undoubted fact that the parochial schools often dump their more difficult pupils on the public school, or that the Church is a great believer in censorship; he must go on to suggest that Catholics who serve on school boards rarely believe in public education but are only trying to advance the Church's viewpoint and that the Church is willing, in its desire for power, to sacrifice the schooling and well-being of its own children.

He doesn't seem to care much for free enterprise and hints vaguely that Business, that old ogre, is behind the nasty plot to teach the young to read; he suggests that the motto of business is "teach 'em to read — and they'll buy." He is adept at finding bias in textbooks. He quotes from a book which described the freed slaves after the Civil War as being "like carefree children" who thought that freedom "meant one long vacation," and finds that this accurate statement constitutes "prejudice against Negroes." Because New York's Superintendent of Schools, William Jansen, once wrote in a textbook that the natives of Africa are "backward" he is charged with holding "in contempt" the peoples of colonial countries. (This last item is "documented" with quotations from the Teachers Union and the New York *Daily Compass.*)

No, this sort of thing obviously won't do. For all its air of presenting an exposé, despite the author's breathless tone of sensation, the book is irrelevant to the great problems confronting current public school education. Occasionally he puts his finger on a real weakness — the blind faith in tests and measurements, the inadequate program of mental hygiene, the ineptitude of Parent-Teacher Associations — but the great weakness of the book is that he seems uninterested in essential education. The immediate task of the public schools is to develop the radical new techniques and methods whereby all pupils — bright and dull, rapid learners and slow — may be reached with genuine education, not some watery substitute labeled "Life Adjustment" or "Training in Skills." Mr. Conrad seems unaware that the real scandal of the public schools is that educators have ceased to believe in the efficacy of education.

MORTIMER SMITH

GLAMOR GIRL OF WAR

War In Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent, by Marguerite Higgins. *New York: Doubleday. $2.75*

This is a mean little war, an ugly war, that we're fighting in Korea; and the late Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker didn't think it was any kind of war for a woman. And the fact is that Marguerite Higgins, a slip of a girl (and a pretty girl, at that) with blond hair and a pert, turned-up nose, does look as though she'd be more at home in a cocktail lounge, making polite beebly-babbly, than in a foxhole. There's a further fact about Maggie Higgins that Walker didn't reckon with, however. Although she looks (and frequently acts) like a sweet, simpering thing, she has more stamina, more determination, and more drive than most men. And more guts, too.

Walker expelled Maggie from Korea in the first month of the war, and she raised such unladylike hell around the Dai Ichi Building, then General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, that MacArthur was forced to reverse his Eighth Army Commander's order. So, with only an

occasional time out for a quick drink and a shower in Tokyo — and a furlough of maybe two weeks in the States — Maggie covered the war for the *New York Herald Tribune*, and covered it as very, very few men, until the historic Marine retreat to Hungnam. She wasn't with the Marines when the Chinese broke through and surrounded them near the Changjin Reservoir, but she managed to wheedle an airplane ride to join them. And she stayed with them from Hagaru to Koto, where Marine Maj. Gen. O. P. Smith, in a burst of chivalry much like Walker's, ordered her out.

When she did come out, she was the most famous woman war correspondent in the world, a kind of glamor girl of war. To a good many soldiers and Marines, and to many of her male colleagues, she was also a kind of monster. One of the easiest ways to hot up a conversation in Korea was to ask: What makes Maggie run?

There were just as many men in Korea who liked Maggie, but even they were baffled by her. For she stopped at nothing to get a story. There was no danger, no hardship too great. Under fire she was obviously frightened; in a country where heat prostration and frostbite took more casualties than enemy fire, where sometimes even breathing the dust made men so sick they ran high fevers, she often was obviously ill. And she constantly had to fight the brass back in Tokyo, who kept insisting that Korea was no place for a woman. Yet she got some of the best stories of the war.

She was with KMAG (the Korean Military Advisory Group) in the first, panicky retreat from Seoul, and was trapped with Col. Sterling Wright on the banks of the Han when the South Korean Army blew the only bridge to safety. She was with the 24th Division when Pvt. Kenneth Shadrick was killed, the first American to die in the war. She was with Lt. Col. (now Brig. Gen.) John M. Michaelis of the famous 27th Infantry Regiment when his command post was attacked. Despite every effort by the Tokyo brass to prevent it, she was one of the very few correspondents who hit the beach at Inchon with the 5th Marines. And, of course, she was at Hagaru.

Now Maggie has written a book about it, but evidently for no reason except that war correspondents are expected to write books, which they can autograph for their lecture audiences. "War in Korea" is little more than a rehash of Maggie's *Herald Tribune* dispatches, with some of the stories told in more — and some in less — detail. The first time she told them they were news, and therefore, didn't suffer much from the fact that she writes about as vividly as a wooden Indian. They lack that excitement of immediacy now.

There are a couple of chapters in which Maggie does attempt to give a fuller picture of the war than normally can be given in news dispatches. She has a chapter on "Our South Korean Allies," for example, and one on "The Enemy." These attempts are fairly sketchy, however, and frequently sound like little more than a smattering of bromides.

The fact is that Marguerite Higgins is a first-class reporter — but an extremely limited one. For she's essentially a police reporter. If war were a good sex story or a four-alarm fire, she'd probably be one of the best reporters around. Unfortunately, war is a bit bigger than either.

HAROLD LAVINE

EARTHLY PARADISE

A Breath of Air, by Rumer Godden. *New York: Viking. $3.00*

When Hollywood made a movie out of "Take Three Tenses," the title which they gave it was "Enchantment." This, I feel, was a very happy choice: enchantment is exactly the quality which one associates with Miss Godden. From "Black Narcissus" onward, all of her books have cast a kind of golden spell. Even the less good among them — such as "A Candle for St. Jude" — have been impregnated with a special magic which has become Miss Godden's trademark, so distinctive is it and so uniquely her own. Not a major novelist, and definitely a romantic one, Miss Godden writes, nevertheless, with reticence and wit, and her limpid, delicate prose is a delight. One can not expect profound substance from her, nor does one ever get it, but within her limitations she is at her best nearly flawless, and she has real creative power as well as surface charm.

"A Breath of Air," Miss Godden's latest, borrows its plot boldly and frankly from Shakespeare's play, "The Tempest," albeit with modern improvements and divergences. The scene is an island, Terraqueous, and the Prospero of the story is a certain Mr. van Loomis, who is actually a Scottish nobleman. For twenty years — ever since he bought the island and came there with his baby daughter, Charis — Mr. van Loomis has ruled Terraqueous as a kind of benevolent despot. He has built up its agriculture; he has developed native industries; he has made an isolated life for himself, in this unspoiled earthly paradise, that satisfies him richly and completely. Less satisfied, however, is Charis, a latter-day Miranda, who has begun to feel the stirrings of desirous young womanhood, but who has no means of gratifying them on the island.

It is at this juncture that a plane, blown off course, is forced to land near the island, bringing with it two strangers from the outer world. One of them is Valentine Doubleday, a successful young playwright, and immediately Mr. van Loomis sees in him a solution to his problems and an admirable prospective husband for Charis. Ruthlessly, accordingly, the wily old man contrives to hide Valentine's plane, being determined to keep him on the island until nature takes its course, as nature inevitably does. In the meantime, however, complications occur, for neither the charms of Charis nor the beauties of Terraqueous can quite beguile Valentine into settling down in lotusland and forswearing the profession which he loves. Still more restive is his companion — a literal-minded type — who succeeds, with the help of the local Caliban, in re-establishing contact with the world.

This is as much of the plot of "A Breath of Air" as I think it right to divulge, for Miss Godden has by no means clung literally to the story of "The Tempest," and there are legitimate surprises in her novel. It is a story, moreover, full of subtleties which reveal themselves gradually, for Miss Godden is of course not merely interested in telling a pretty fairy tale, but in offering a perceptive and witty commentary on life and human character. The clashes in viewpoint between the natives and the handful of Europeans offer her endless opportunities for the most sharp-edged kind of satire, and she has much

that is shrewd and pungent to say about two ways of life, each of which has its serious drawbacks. Light as it is, too, the novel has a theme — namely, that despotism, however benevolent, simply will not do, as Mr. van Loomis, in the end, painfully learns.

Such profundity, however, as "A Breath of Air" has is so far outweighed by artistry and charm that it is hardly worth dwelling on at length. Who cares, really, about the implied moral, when Miss Godden has once again produced a delectable light novel, informed with intelligence and wit? What one will remember about "A Breath of Air" is its lovely, sensuous descriptions of Terraqueous and its people; the comic interplay which occurs between its main characters; its ingenious and subtle echoes of "The Tempest." One will remember too, or at least I shall, Miss Godden's Ariel, the enchanting Filipino who in his lust for civilized pleasures has eaten the fatal apple, and is foredoomed to destroy his own paradise. "A Breath of Air" is not the type of book which one can afford to take too ponderously. To some it may seem irrelevant in a world such as ours — but is minor perfection ever irrelevant?

EDITH H. WALTON

HOMESTEADING WITHOUT MEN

Wilderness Homesteaders, by Ethel Kavanaugh. *Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton. $5.00*

As a child Ethel Kavanaugh dreamed of homesteading and felt cheated for not having been born in an earlier period till she read that Alaska still had a frontier for settlers. She was widowed in 1922, when only 21 years old, and left with two daughters to rear by teaching and office and newspaper work. Not till 1942, after a second marriage had failed, was she free to realize her dream. She planned to go alone. When all efforts to dissuade her failed, her younger daughter, Dorothy, insisted on going along.

Except for the smallness of her stake (she does not give the sum), Miss Kavanaugh was well prepared for frontier life. She had been brought up on a farm and had learned to use axe and gun. By nature she was less afraid of loneliness and Alaskan bears than she was of crowds and city "wolves." Also, while saving for the adventure, she had worked in offices in Alaska, thereby gaining the opportunity to question many persons who knew the country. From them and from studying weather, soil and farming data, she chose the Homer area. There was no road down the Kenai Peninsula from Anchorage to Homer, so she and her daughter flew in. A small boat took them to the head of Kachemak Bay, from where they struck out on foot with heavy packs.

They hadn't gone far before they met a bear. It fled. Thirty-five miles from Homer they came upon a beautiful natural meadow in Fox Valley, which is rimmed by mountains. A herd of moose was wading through the deep wild grass. To mother and daughter it was a scene of enchanting beauty. They decided to go no further. For the site of her cabin Miss Kavanaugh selected a sheltered clump of spruce and staked out a homestead on the unsurveyed land. A year or so later, when Dorothy became of age, she took over the abandoned claim of a settler who came after them, a man without the hardihood of these two very feminine women.

The most difficult and dangerous problem of the women homesteaders was that of freighting their equipment into the valley. A few days of this discouraged several prospective settlers who came after the Kavanaughs. It was several years before mother and daughter were able to buy horses and make a road from the edge of the bay. They built their own cabins, broke the tough virgin sod for a garden, harvested wild hay, shot bear and moose for meat and took their pleasures as amateur naturalists do by observing the wild life.

In the early years they had to support the homestead by leaving it to work in fish canneries. Perhaps each now has a homestead that is self-supporting. Miss Kavanaugh doesn't say, but she does say "homesteading is no road to wealth."

Homesteading in Alaska poses many special problems. If there is another woman who contemplates settling there without benefit of men folk, this book should prove invaluable to her. Miss Kavanaugh and her daughter are more resourceful, more courageous and better fitted for frontier life than many men who have tried it.

So much misinformation has been published about Alaska that anybody considering farming there should first read "Report on Exploratory Investigations of the Agricultural Problems of Alaska," miscellaneous publication No. 700, U. S. Department of Agriculture, published in December 1949. C. C. Georgeson, who was in charge of the Alaskan Agricultural Experiment Stations from their establishment till 1928, estimated that 41,600,000 acres in the Territory were suitable for cultivation and 22,400,000 for pasture. This statement went unchallenged for many years because of Georgeson's vast experience. No one ever will know how much heartbreak Georgeson's optimism caused. Actually the land that is suitable for farming in the Territory has not yet been determined, but the 1949 report estimates it at "not more than about 1,000,000 acres."

Farming in Alaska is done a few inches above permanently frozen soil or at best above soil that never warms in the short growing season. If it were profitable, the farmers there would be raising more than the 15 per cent of the Territory's needs that they now supply. Farming opportunities in Alaska hardly can be called good.

Still, homesteading, with little or no profit, is appealing to many. Miss Kavanaugh's book makes one wonder if the airplane has not made it feasible for frontier life to take a new form. If the homesteader fails at farming, she or he now can fly to fish cannery, mine or office, as Miss Kavanaugh did, and harvest enough cash to enjoy the freedom of the wilderness for part of the year.

ROBERT SIMPSON

PIPSISSEWA

Seeking what made fragrant the cool spaces
Beneath the high nave of the hemlock, I found
You, small by the chanting brook,
  in bright processional
Lifting your pale censers.

JAMES RORTY

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