the

JULY 2, 1951 25 CENTS

FREEMAN

CHINA—LEADERS AND ISSUES:

Portrait of Chiang Kai-shek
ALFRED KOHLBERG

My Former Student, Mao Tse-tung
HU SHIH

What Every Secretary of State Should Know
ALICE WIDENER

Investigate the China Lobby!
AN EDITORIAL

LAX CONTROLS ARE BEST
V. ORVAL WATTS

Editors: John Chamberlain · Henry Hazlitt · Suzanne La Follette

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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ALICE WIDENER has contributed to leading magazines and written radio features. During the war her "Women of the World" won the Radio Institute of America's citation of merit as the outstanding women's program for the promotion of international understanding. The rare Communist books on which she bases her article were tracked down by her husband, William H. Widener, who was with the FBI from 1941 to 1947 as a specialist on communism.

HOFFMAN NICKERSON, authority on military history, wrote "Universal Training: A Fraud" for the *Freeman* of February 26.

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VLADIMIR PETROV, who reviews Elinor Lipper's book on slave labor camps, has first-hand knowledge of them. As a young Moscow engineer in 1935, he was arrested for alleged "anti-Soviet activities" and served six years in the Kolyma gold-mining camp. He has been instructor in Russian at Yale since 1947, and has written two books, "Soviet Gold" and "My Retreat from Russia."

DR. HU SHIH, Chinese Ambassador to the United States from 1938 to 1942, considers it a high honor that he has been put on Mao Tse-tung's list of "war criminals." Largely responsible for what is known as the Chinese literary renaissance, he has published "The Chinese Renaissance" in English and fourteen volumes of selected essays in Chinese, as well as a history of Chinese philosophy.

Forthcoming

In our next issue Col. Lucian B. Moody, cited in the current Senate Hearings as an authority on military aid to China, will tell how that aid was sabotaged by Washington agencies. Among other features will be a criticism of our immigration laws by Blake Clark, and an appreciation of Ridgley Torrence by Padraic Colum.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 2, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

It remained for Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, with his complete candor, to say what no previous witness before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees had had the combined courage and conviction to say — that while President Truman had been right in going into Korea, he should never have committed our ground troops there. And General Wedemeyer drew the logical conclusion that it might still be the lesser of two evils to pull our ground troops out. We are faced, in fact, with a clear alternative. *Either*, as he proposed, we should pull our ground troops out of Korea *or* we should give our commanders there full freedom to take every military step necessary in their judgment to bring victory — to bomb Manchuria, to blockade the Chinese coast and to use Chiang's troops on Formosa against the Communists.

The one indefensible policy is the one we are following — to put our ground troops into Korea, and to tie their hands. The real risks follow inevitably from the Truman-Acheson decision to send our ground troops into Korea, and not from the MacArthur effort to maximize their effectiveness after they were sent in. General Wedemeyer's recommendations confirm the position that the *Freeman* has long taken. As we declared in an editorial, "What Aims in Korea?" in our issue of April 9: "Truman and Acheson will continue to be responsible for the cruel and senseless waste of American lives and treasure until they either permit our land forces there to defend themselves effectively, or admit the ghastly failure of their Asiatic policy by withdrawing our land forces from that theater of war."

During the weeks before he was finally forced to resign as Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson was unmercifully pilloried by Mr. Acheson's journalistic friends as the perpetrator of a "black crime." That "crime" was the reduction of the 1950 military budget to $13 billion. This figure, according to Mr. Johnson's critics, was some $5 to $10 billion short of what was necessary.

With the Korean War coming up, no doubt the $13 billion military budget was ridiculously small. But the budget was not set by Mr. Johnson; it was set by President Truman. Was it limited to $13 billion on the advice of Mr. Johnson, as Mr. Acheson's claque tried to make out? Speaking before the MacArthur Committee the other day, Louis Johnson had something interesting to say on this subject. He was, he said, "sick at heart" when he first learned of the $13 billion limitation. But after two weeks of bitter "soul-searching" he decided that the valiant thing to do was to try to get the most out of the $13 billion rather than resign.

The ironic thing about the whole business is that the $13 billion budget was established on the presumption that the United States would not permit itself to be drawn into land warfare on the Asiatic continent. Mr. Acheson had, in effect, written off both Korea and Formosa by putting them outside the American defense perimeter — and Secretary Johnson's job was to get ahead with a defense program that took off from there. Then, according to Louis Johnson's testimony, Acheson turned around and made the motion to go into Korea. On his own say-so Johnson had nothing to do with this, nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff have anything to do with it. Yet, despite the fact that they had been given neither the money nor the instructions to provide for a war over an Asiatic continental power vacuum that had been originally created by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Johnson together with General MacArthur managed to improvise a defense of Korea. Against the advice of General Collins Mr. Johnson and MacArthur assumed joint responsibility for the Inchon landing. The Inchon coup proved a brilliant success — but it came a week too late to save Mr. Johnson's job. The Achesonian hatchet clique had managed to get his scalp just in the nick of time. If he had lasted a week longer public opinion might have come to his rescue.

Mr. Johnson says he does not know to this day why he was fired. Neither do we. He may have had his shortcomings as Secretary of Defense, but he shines with the brilliance of Sirius, the dog star, on a clear winter's night by comparison with Mr. Acheson, who has been running our military policy for a long time now from his office in the State Department.

Observe, if you wish to get Mr. Acheson's full measure, the Achesonian sequence in military decisions. First, the

United States through Acheson says that Korea is not its baby. Then, through Acheson, it decides to save Korea, thus involving us in the nightmare of continental war against millions. But does the United States simultaneously attempt to get the help of Asiatics on the Asiatic continent? No, for Acheson comes up with a formula for "neutralizing" the island of Formosa with the United States Seventh Fleet. This neutralization order prevents Chiang Kai-shek from raiding the Red Chinese mainland, stymies any possible support and stimulation of Chiang's mainland guerrillas, and leaves the Red Chinese with all the time and opportunity in the world to prepare for the eventual invasion of Formosa. Naturally, the "neutralization" of Formosa precludes the use of any of Chiang's troops in Korea; that would put Formosa, Chiang's headquarters, within the theater of war.

If Mr. Acheson were on Stalin's side his strategy would be not merely remarkable but completely brilliant. From the American point of view it makes about as much sense as General Braddock's decision to draw his British Redcoats up in close order so that the Indians could mow them down from behind the West Pennsylvania trees. The decision to limit our 1950 military budget to $13 billion may have "cut the muscle" out of our defense, and Louis Johnson may have been wrong to go along with any such decision. But Acheson did a much worse thing to America: he is responsible for cutting out not our military muscle but our military brains.

President Truman is trying to stampede Congress into continuing price control by capitalizing on his own mistakes. Ostensibly, his plea for continuance of price control is based on a mistake of the National Association of Manufacturers. That organization in 1946 made the error of saying — as did also Chester Bowles and Mr. Truman himself — that "the answer to inflation is production." On this basis the NAM announced that if price control were removed competition and the increase in production would bring prices down. Mr. Truman thinks he has an easy victory in pointing out that prices did not in fact come down after price control was repealed.

But the explanation is radically different from the one he implied — that the rise in prices since 1946 has been caused by the unrestrained greed of manufacturers and sellers. The real explanation is twofold. The official index numbers under price control were misleading. And the real cause of inflation is the increase in the country's money supply. The government can increase the output of money faster than anybody else can increase the output of goods. Under Mr. Truman's monetary policies, demand bank deposits and currency outside of banks have been increased since the end of June, 1946, by more than $8 billion.

The Office of Price Stabilization wants authority to license all business and industry. Of course it does. In the mechanism of control the license is a cocked trigger. Anyone in business has an absolute right to a license, wherefore you are to believe that you are still a free citizen in a free country. But if you behave as if you were free, your license will be revoked and you will be out of business.

What started this paragraph was not that the OPS wants the power or is asking for it, but its argument. Why, it asks, should there be any difficulty about it? There are already more than twenty Federal laws that confer licensing power upon peacetime government bureaus, and their use of that power, the only reason for it, is to command obedience. So far as we are aware nobody before had counted them up. Had you?

Thus controls extend themselves by a creeping motion and little by little our economic freedoms are eroded away. Resentment at the same time seems to diminish. In the furore over color television no one seemed to think it strange that the Federal Communications Commission decided which of two competitive inventions should have the market; and the Supreme Court upheld it, not on the ground that it was a right decision, but because the decision of an administrative government agency is final. The consumers had nothing to do with it. They will buy what the government thinks will be good for them, or nothing. Imagine that fifty years ago it had been left to a government bureau to say which of three kinds of automobile was best for the public — the electric car, the steam car or the internal-combustion-engine car, all competing for supremacy.

The Office of Price Stabilization says it will let the farmer alone. It has to let him alone. The Department of Agriculture attends to the farmer, with a system of what it calls democratic controls. If two-thirds of the farmers vote to obey the rules, regulations and edicts of the Department of Agriculture, in order to receive its benefits and subsidies, the other third is obliged to go along. One who fails to "cooperate" will suffer ruinous penalties. Free American agriculture has not even a headstone to mark its grave.

For saying so little we shall probably be numbered by Mr. Eric Johnston, the Economic Stabilization Administrator, among those who are dumb, greedy and unpatriotic because they disagree with him. Mr. Johnston has caught what is catching in Washington. We knew him and we think we understand what happened to him. He was on the road to Damascus, upon errands of business, when his vision was dazzled by a shaft of light and he heard a voice saying: "Eric! Eric! What you need to make you great is that Washington look."

President Truman apparently thinks the American highways are more dangerous spots than the battlefield in Korea. The other day he compared the number of traffic accidents (1,035,000 people killed or injured in 1950) with the Korean casualties (80,000). But the answer to President Truman is easy: what GI in Korea wouldn't prefer to take his chances at the wheel of an automobile in America?

Professor Norbert Wiener, "cyberneticist" of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has predicted that in the event of global war robot machines will take over in the factories and release every man and woman for service on the actual battlefield. While the professor is about it, why doesn't he turn his ingenuity the other way around and devise enough fighting robot machines to replace every individual human soldier?

INVESTIGATE THE CHINA LOBBY!

SO THEY are going (maybe) to investigate the "China Lobby"! We can hardly wait.

It will undoubtedly be said by those who are agitating for such an investigation that the *Freeman* is owned by the "China Lobby." For every time an Owen Lattimoreite is pressed to name the supposedly nefarious "Lobby," it turns out to be a rotund, stubborn, courageous, faintly puckish man named Alfred Kohlberg, an importer of Chinese fabrics who serves as the *Freeman's* treasurer, sits on its board of directors, and writes articles that are sometimes accepted by its editors and sometimes turned down. (He has an article, a good one, in this issue on Chiang Kai-shek — see page 619.)

Mr. Kohlberg delights in the allegation that he is the "China Lobby." (He used to share the glorious opprobrium with Clare and Henry Luce; now he seems to own it all by himself.) His only regret is that he hasn't been a more effective lobbyist for his good cause. He grinned a merry Kohlbergian grin the other day when we outlined our theory of what the editors of the *New York Post*, for example, must be thinking of the *Freeman* these days. According to our theory of what the *Post* editors consider the *Freeman* to be, our staff is paid off each week in Chinese dollars. Our contributors, of course, get the same, and most of the work of the staff consists of handling complaints about the rate of exchange. (Hard to eat on Chinese dollars these days.)

Continuing our phantasmagorical projection of what must go on in the *New York Post* mind, the *Freeman* board of directors must of course be packed with Chinamen. These include Chairman Leo (Lum Fong) Wolman, the well-known Sinologue of the Columbia University economics faculty; Ludwig (Hip Sing) von Mises, the Viennese Confucian; Roscoe (Wang the Tiger) Pound, authority on Mongolian tribal law and Dean Emeritus of the Harvard Law School; Leonard (the Old Mandarin) Read, head of the Foundation for Economic Education; the Reverend Stewart (Lao Tse-Tse) Robinson of Elizabeth, N. J., a renowned Buddhist monk; William (Won Long Fang) Peter, attorney for the Chinese Eastern and Rock Island Railroad; Herbert (No Likee Lichee) Cornuelle, a connoisseur of bird's nest soup; and Lawrence (the Comprador) Fertig, an advertising man and breeder of chows. The Board's deliberations would naturally be conducted in pidgin English, which could only be hard on a stenographer who speaks and writes a Hopei dialect. But *Freeman* stenographers are indomitable, and can catch on to anything.

(If *Freeman* board meetings were indeed conducted in pidgin English, a Lattimoreite spy might learn that the controlling thought is "Allee samee need more Amelican monee.")

Now that we have imagined the most idiotic worst that might be said of us, let's talk some sense. Let's talk, specifically, about Alfred Kohlberg, the man who is supposed to be the head and fount of the "China Lobby" in America. Mr. Kohlberg, as we have already indicated, thinks it the right and duty of an American to support an anti-Communist Chinese government, since all *pro*-Communist governments everywhere are dedicated by definition to the overthrow of the United States of America. He pleads guilty of being for Nationalist China on the same basis that the late William Allen White was for the British when he headed the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Or on the same basis that Wendell Willkie, Herbert Agar, Will Clayton, Harold Guinzburg, Katherine Gauss Jackson, George Field and Franklin D. Roosevelt were members of the "British Lobby" when they supported the dispatching of over-age American destroyers to British ports to save the day against Hitler before the United States had officially entered World War II.

As head of his own volunteer "China Lobby," Alfred Kohlberg has been doing his darndest for years to get himself called to a witness stand. He has a story to tell about the infiltration and subversion of China by Communist agents, and about the gullibility and/or treason of certain pro-Red Americans, and he would love nothing better than a Congressional forum in which to tell it. Failing a Congressional forum, he would take any other. For example, he has been trying for a long time to get Owen Lattimore to sue him and bring him into court. Either Lattimore has been "chicken" about it, or else he knows he has no case.

If Alfred Kohlberg were an unregistered "paid agent" of the Kuomintang, as certain pro-Administration journalists have dirtily tried to insinuate, he would have been in jail long ago. For the Department of Internal Revenue has spent hours — nay, weeks — combing over his personal financial accounts and the books of his business. They have also gone over his wife's financial affairs with a fine-tooth comb. The net of their searches was a discovery that Mr. Kohlberg had overpaid his taxes in the amounts of $180 and $108 in 1946 and 1947. According to Irene Kuhn, writing in the *Sign* for June, Kohlberg subsequently addressed a sarcastic note to Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, commenting acidly on the waste of taxpayers' money involved in such politically-motivated tax investigations. Shortly thereafter, says Mrs. Kuhn, the Treasury decided to disallow some items in the Kohlberg tax accounts that it had previously approved as deductible. But the Indian-giver Treasury boys could turn up no evidence of any payment from the Chinese Nationalists into Mr. Kohlberg's coffers.

Alfred Kohlberg is a happy man who loves a good fight. He hails originally from San Francisco, and he has a frontier independence about him that recalls the days of the old Argonauts. He has no hankering to be loved by those whom he considers to be fools. Conversely, he can not love those who try out of foolishness to fool him. He got into his fight with the Communists almost by accident back in 1943. On a trip to Chungking in that year he became perplexed by the fact that certain United States Embassy officials were circulating nasty rumors about Chiang Kai-shek. Since Chiang was our ally, Mr. Kohl-

berg didn't know what to make of this. He talked subsequently with an American general and learned there was no foundation in truth for the rumor that Chiang was hoarding lend-lease tanks and guns for use against the Chinese Communists. The fact was, as the American general pointed out to Mr. Kohlberg, that Chiang couldn't very well be hoarding lend-lease tanks and guns *because he hadn't as yet received any.*

Stirred by the evidence that calculated lies were being circulated about Chiang by American government officials, Mr. Kohlberg thought back over some of the material sent out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. (He had been giving money to the IPR under the impression that it was a good "objective" research body.) He discovered upon investigation that the IPR "line" was the same anti-Chiang line that American Embassy men in Chungking were dishing out. Inasmuch as Mr. Kohlberg is not one who believes that parallel designs can be produced by a series of accidents, he got busy with his own private investigations into Marxist methods of infiltration, subversion and influence. Subsequently he formed his own China Policy Association to combat the Marxist Asiatic conspiracy. This Association sends out its own barrage of material to combat the Communist line on Asia. But the difference between the Kohlberg methods and the Communist and fellow-traveler methods is signal: Kohlberg fights in the open.

In an issue that went to press in mid-April, the *Freeman* dared the Administration to fire General MacArthur. The Administration did — and proceeded to fall flat on its face. We now dare the Administration to put Alfred Kohlberg on the stand. Let there be a full investigation of the "China Lobby." Indeed, let there be a full investigation of all lobbying activities in the United States in behalf of foreign governments. Let us have full details, for example, of the handling of legal business involving foreign loans. Let us know all about the loan to satellite Poland, which was facilitated by a law firm to which a certain high United States policy-making official periodically retires to recoup his fortunes. Let us know what the partisans of France, of Britain, of Yugoslavia, of the Netherlands, are up to in the United States. And let us, above all, know what the innumerable partisans of Communist Russia are up to. That "lobby" has had more success than any other in putting over its point of view.

In the middle of the Hiss-Chambers imbroglio, President Truman made his diversionary remark about red herrings. But the Administration's threat to investigate the "China Lobby" — *a group devoted to championing the cause of our ally in the western Pacific* — is the reddest herring of them all. It is not a mere beet-red, a mere radish-red — it is deep scarlet. And it is the Truman government's own herring. Well, the Hiss-Chambers "red herring" proved what it proved — and Truman has been forced, by the silent drift and pressure of events, to elevate Tom Murphy, the prosecutor of Alger Hiss, to the Federal bench. Some day, after the Administration is through tangling with Alfred Kohlberg (who to our certain knowledge is one part catamount, one part bloodhound and one part high-grade limpet), it may discover the practical sagacity to elevate him to something important in behalf of the cause of good American anti-communism. For example, Kohlberg would make an excellent adviser to the Far Eastern desk of the State Department. He would make an excellent envoy to Formosa.

But we have a better suggestion than any of these. We suggest that he be made the director of the Voice of America. He might even be willing to take the job on at his own expense. Of one thing we are certain: that if Alfred Kohlberg were made the Voice of America our enemies would never know what hit them!

THE TRUTH BURIED ALIVE

IF IT IS a creaking sound you think you hear above the uproar of the world, it is the Voice of America suffering from an acute attack of the virus Achesonitis.

The idea of combating Russian propaganda with the celestial weapon of truth came to a head three and one-half years ago when Congress passed the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act — "to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen their cooperative international relations."

Was this to be propaganda? No, nothing like that. At least, the answer was no if you were thinking of propaganga in the wrong way. This was to be something new on the political earth — a propaganda of truth. To win the struggle for the mind of mankind all that was necessary was to tell the truth. The American truth, of course. Congress was enthusiastic for it. There would be books for world-wide distribution, magazines in foreign languages, libraries in many countries stocked with literature and information, but the main thing would be the Voice of America to cast truth upon the air in all tongues, to everywhere, even beyond the iron curtain.

It was a State Department enterprise. Few Americans have ever heard the Voice. It is for foreign ears. It has cost so far a quarter of a million dollars. This year it asked for $97,500,000 to amplify itself. Then, without notice to anybody, Congress cut it down to less than ten million, and stood fast in that decision against cries of outrage. Would it strangle the Voice of America? Did it want to lose the ideological war? To save the American taxpayer a few million dollars would it betray the mind of mankind?

Now the fact was that Congress still believed in the original idea and stood ready to support it. Its dissatisfaction was not with the idea but with the Voice itself. The House Appropriations Committee, thinking it was time to find out what people were getting for their money, made some investigations. It found bad management, bad planning and waste. All of that it might have been able to take; but it found behind the Voice a fuzzy mind. Representative St. George reported to the House:

> I have spoken on the Voice of America. I do not think it was a very good broadcast and I am sure it was highly inappropriate, because I was asked to speak on an "equal rights" amendment for women, and when I got to the station to make it I was informed that they did not think it was a wise selection, because it might make people behind the iron curtain feel that the women in America did not have equal rights. I said I thought

that had been known for a long time, but apparently it was only discovered at the last moment. For that reason I had to change my broadcast and I am afraid it was rather unsuccessful.

Also, experience and reflection had touched the innocence with which Congress at first embraced the idea. After all, truth-telling was not the simple business the copybooks said it was. What, for example, was the difference between *nothing but the truth* and *the whole truth?* When it came to selective truth, who should make the selection and how? What was political truth, or could there be such a thing?

Behind the Voice of America is an Advisory Commission on Information, with a distinguished membership. Its fourth semi-annual report to Congress, warmly defending the Voice, was spread upon the pages of the *Congressional Record*, and some members of Congress who read it were slightly startled. The Commission made certain recommendations, among them this:

"That the information program must be closely integrated with policy making at all levels. . . . Since most foreign policy is made by the State Department, the closer the information program can be to the State Department the more effective the propaganda will be."

Policy! The nearer the Voice is to policy the more effective its propaganda will be. Truth and policy — are they always compatible? In any case, how could the Voice tell the people the truth about American foreign policy when the Americans themselves do not know what it is from day to day?

Such were some of the misgivings that began to be felt in Congress. Nevertheless, it held fast to the original idea. The position it took was this: The idea of winning the mind of mankind with truth was all right, only somehow it had got off the track. It would have to be reexamined and then reinstated, with much more intelligence to move it and better planning. Thus, what Congress said was, in effect, that whatever was wrong with the Voice was curable, and so it might have been, but for what Mr. Acheson amazingly did to it.

The blood was still wet on the Congressional axe that had chopped 90 per cent out of the State Department's budget for its "truth" campaign when Mr. Acheson appeared before the Senate Committee sitting in the case of MacArthur *et al* against the government's foreign policy — and there, in his imperturbable manner, he explained how the Voice of America was sometimes used to make people believe things that were not so, and why that was necessary.

Follow this. The subject was Formosa. What was the government's policy touching Formosa? Mr. Acheson testified firmly that the government's policy was to keep Formosa from falling into hostile hands because of its strategic importance to the United States. He was asked if this was a new policy. He said no; that had been the government's policy consistently.

The Senate Committee thereupon called for a State Department document, dated Dec. 23, 1949, entitled "Policy Information Paper — Formosa." It had been sent to all the State Department's information personnel, to all of its foreign representatives and to the Voice of America, and it laid down the line they were to take on Formosa. They were to say that the United States had no strategic interest in Formosa whatever, that what happened to it could in no way "damage the interests of either the United States or of any other country opposing communism," that in "areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself," they were to say American aid to Formosa would accomplish no good whatever for the Chinese Nationalists, but, on the contrary, would greatly please Soviet Russia, and they were in every way to discredit "unofficial demands in the United States for action in Formosa." Further, they were to avoid "in output to China any emphasis on [illegible]d conditions in Formosa, *although to other countries reference can be made among reasons why the Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere.*" (Italics supplied.)

This paper was marked top secret and Mr. Acheson protested against making it public. "This is a policy information paper," he said. "*This is not a statement of United States policy toward Formosa.*" (Italics supplied.)

Would the publication of it endanger the national security in any way? No, he said; it wasn't that. Then what was it? He answered: "It is not at all that I think this endangers the security of the United States; it endangers the effectiveness of the Voice of America. It is not that it would surprise the Russians; it is that it gives them an official document which they will use to discredit the Voice of America."

If the paper was untrue and misrepresented the policy of the United States, why was it sent out?

This question caused Mr. Acheson to betray symptoms of impatience. He should have thought anyone could see why it was sent out. The government thought Formosa might fall to the Chinese Reds, and the purpose of the paper was to discount beforehand the bad political effects of that misfortune.

He was asked how often that kind of policy direction went out to the Voice of America. He answered: "It goes out quite often. This is a common attitude in dealing with things that are disadvantageous to us."

In the House the next day Representative Shafer made this devastating summary of the evidence:

> It is now a matter of official record, a matter of sworn testimony, that the executive branch of the United States Government, through the Department of State, formulates a propaganda line as expediency dictates and without regard for truthfulness or accuracy, and that it employs the public information agencies of the government, both foreign and domestic, including the Voice of America, to disseminate that propaganda line — deception intended for dissemination to the potential enemies of the United States to the friends of the United States and to the American people.

Granted that diplomacy is a lying business, still, if it is necessary to lie, why shouldn't the State Department do it directly, since diplomacy is its job? Why should the Voice of American be stultified?

So the record comes to a period, as all records must, but it was the fate of the truth to be buried alive. A Greek said the penalty of lying is that you will not be believed when you tell the truth. The question that never can be answered is this: Did the State Department document entitled "Policy Information Paper — Formosa," dated December 23, 1949, misrepresent American policy? Mr. Acheson blandly says it did. Is he telling the truth now? Could it be that as the government reluctantly

moves to accept MacArthur's military judgment about Formosa, the Secretary of State decides to save the Department's face, and his own, by making a burnt offering of the Voice of America? Nobody will ever know.

WHAT IS FAIR TRADE?

ONE OF the phobias of the New Deal planners who appointed themselves to make America over was competition. Its morals were those of the jungle, it worked only for the rugged individualist, it made people hate capitalism and it was anti-social. Under the laws of the Blue Eagle (NRA) it was abolished. Obedient to an edict of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Department of Justice wrapped up the anti-trust laws and put them away, with the notation, "Suspended," in order that committees representing business and industry, in collaboration with the government, might do an illegal thing.

They came to Washington, sat with the Blue Eagle hierarchy, and wrote codes of fair-trade practice, binding themselves not to compete, not to increase production without the government's permission, to establish fair prices and never, never to cut them. Anyone who cut prices offended the Blue Eagle. He was called a chiseller and was liable to fine and imprisonment. All over the country appeared Blue Eagle shrines, in odd spaces and empty stores, attended by volunteer men and women who passed out pledge cards and asked you to sign. If you signed, you promised to boycott any merchant in whose window you did not see the official Blue Eagle poster, and to buy nothing anywhere at a cut price. The shibboleth was *Recovery*. And all of this was very popular because people believed the great economic depression was owing to competition, price-cutting and overproduction.

The United States Supreme Court killed the Blue Eagle. That was the old conservative Supreme Court, before its mind was liberalized — the court that Mr. Roosevelt said belonged to our horse-and-buggy days. Anyhow, for then, the decision was law. The Blue Eagle emblems disappeared overnight and no more would a pants-presser be sent to jail for charging less than the Blue Eagle price. But the idea of the fair price, which belonged to the Middle Ages, when it was *the just price* — that idea survived. Under its spell Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act, which made it legal for a national producer to fix the price at which his branded goods could be sold to the consumer, *provided* he could get the states to pass agreeable laws. Then all of the states, saving only Texas, Missouri and Vermont, passed what they called fair-trade laws, permitting the producers of trade-mark goods to fix retail prices and forbid the retail merchant to cut them under penalty of prosecution.

The most extraordinary feature of these state laws was called the "non-signer" clause. The meaning of the clause was that if the producer got one merchant in the state to sign an agreement not to cut the price, every other merchant in the state was bound by that single agreement, whether he signed it or not. Therefore, one merchant in the state having agreed not to cut prices, nobody in the whole state could cut them. That began in 1937, and had been working ever since, until last May 21, when the United States Supreme Court declared the "non-signer" clause illegal; and since without that clause the state laws were about as formidable as a scarecrow, the whole fair-trading scheme collapsed at once.

That is what started the recent spectacular trade war in the retail merchandising field, beginning in New York as first-page news, spreading next to the suburbs, and then all over the country. The producers naturally are threatening to withhold goods from the price cutters, which may or may not be legal; they are busy composing laws and amendments designed to restore fair trading and, meanwhile, they are calling frantically upon the little businessman, wherever he may be, to help them — not for love of the producer but to save himself, because competition with its terrible bulldozer is going to roll him under the clods. Well, we shall see what we shall see. The consumer, anyhow, is happy. Happy for the moment. He is the same consumer who only a few years ago clapped his hands for the Blue Eagle and denounced you as an enemy of society if you refused to cheer.

The natural story of merchandising, as any large retailer will tell you, is that from the moment the goods arrive from the factory and are unwrapped and put on the shelf, there is only one thing normally that can happen to the price. It can go down. If at the first price the goods do not move, or move too slowly, the price is cut; and then again and again until the consumer is willing to take them away. If it is necessary to cut the price below cost, still that will be done, for the goods *must* move.

This law is upset by what is called fair-trading, at prices fixed by the producer. From time to time it happens that the merchant gets overstocked with these branded goods, and he can not make them move because he can not touch the price. Advertising will not help, since other merchants are in the same fix, and they would all be advertising the same things at the same prices. Moreover, the cost of these goods in the merchant's books is actually rising as they accumulate dust, because he loses the earning power of the capital tied up in them and their storage eats up money. Many merchants were in that uncomfortable position when suddenly the Supreme Court wrecked the artificial price structure in which branded goods were frozen. At last they could be thawed out. The true law of merchandising could act upon them — and did they move!

You would be optimistic, however, to take this as an omen of a general price debacle. Only branded goods have fallen much. It is true that what the economist calls "inventories" are very high, the highest ever known. Enormous quantities of everything are in storage and stock piles. This is largely due to overbuying last year, by government, by industry and by individual consumers. It was scare buying, and that principally is what caused the great post-Korean bulge in prices. You must remember, however, that consumption goes on steadily at a very high rate, eating up the inventories; that the full weight of the government's demands for the defense program have yet to be felt, and that meanwhile, with the wage ceiling punctured and the economic power of labor ascendant, production costs continue to rise. We shall be lucky if the cost of living can be persuaded to keep its feet flat on this high plateau and not go running for the high hills that are visible on the horizon.

WHAT EVERY SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD KNOW

By ALICE WIDENER

SECRETARY of State Acheson is charged with responsibility for conducting our foreign policy in the most critical period of American history. Mr. Acheson has often admitted that the Soviet Union is the arch-enemy of this country. The American people, therefore, have the right to expect him at the very least to know what the Soviet leaders have said publicly about their own foreign policy. Yet Mr. Acheson appears to be as ignorant of these pronouncements as the western European foreign offices were about "Mein Kampf," which clearly set forth Hitler's blueprint for world conquest. Under questioning by the Joint Senate Committees investigating General MacArthur's dismissal, the Secretary of State testified:

> QUESTION. We have no way, of course, of being sure as to what the intentions of either the Red Chinese or the Russians are with regard to ourselves, have we?
> SECRETARY ACHESON. No, we have to wait . . .
> Q. In 1945 General Marshall tried to work out some arrangements between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists. At that time we did have the feeling that we should try to get them together. . . . when did we decide that the dust had settled and that we had to do something about it?
> SECRETARY ACHESON. If I recall what I was trying to say, at that time, was that I could not see clearly as to what the outcome in China was going to be . . . "until the dust settles," that is, until the situation had become more clear. And it was not a policy which I was advocating, it was a phrase which I used to describe my own inability to see very far in this situation.

Is Secretary Acheson entirely ignorant of the existence of a book by Joseph Stalin entitled "Marxism and the Nationalist and Colonial Questions"? It is a rare item, but its rarity is no excuse for ignorance of it in any Western foreign office. It was printed *in English* in the Soviet Union, bears the imprint of International Publishers, New York Communist publishing firm, and on its flyleaf is the name of A. Fineberg, editor, and the note, "Translated from the Russian Edition Prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute Under the Editorship of I. Tovstukha." In other words, it is strictly official; and belonging, as it does, to the period before 1928, it is unexpurgated. After 1928, "the year of decision," the Communist literature relating to foreign policy was expurgated.

If this book and other unexpurgated Communist pronouncements were required reading, as they should be for Secretaries of State, Mr. Acheson would not have to wait and see what the intentions of Russia and its Chinese satellite are with regard to ourselves or to Asia.

I call his attention to the following passages from Stalin's chapter, "China,"[1] in that book:

> Let us pass to an examination of the fundamental positions of Leninism on which the solution of the problems of revolution in colonial and independent countries is based: . . . There is a strict *differentiation* between the revolution in imperialist countries . . . and revolution in colonial and dependent countries. . . . (p. 232)

I also call his attention to the quotation from Lenin with which Stalin bolstered his argument:

> The Communist International must join in a *temporary alliance* with the bourgeois-democrats of the colonies and backward countries but not merge with them and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement. . . . (p. 234)

Mr. Acheson could have saved himself this costly period of "waiting" had he read the following excerpts from another Communist Party document of that same time, the pamphlet "China in Revolt" (1926). To that pamphlet Comrade Dmitri Manuilsky, who was later to become UN representative of the so-called Ukrainian Republic, contributed an article entitled "China and the Capitalist World," from which Mr. Acheson might have learned that:

> The Chinese revolution . . . will exert a revolutionizing influence on the movement of all Asia, especially India. . . . This is likewise a point in the sharpening of antagonisms in the Pacific. . . ." (p. 32)
>
> . . . China will become the magnet for all the peoples . . . who inhabit the Philippines, Indonesia, and the numerous islands of the Pacific. China will become the major power in the Pacific; it will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American Imperialism . . . (p. 46)
>
> Revolutionary China, which has become an active factor in Far Eastern politics, can become, in alliance with the USSR, the greatest world factor in the Far East. . . . (p. 55)

The Soviet Government has known for at least 25 years just what its intentions were in Asia. What a pity that Mr. Acheson doesn't know yet! Here is another excerpt from that same pamphlet, from a contribution by Nikolai Bukharin, who in 1926 was a famous Bolshevik theoretician, with twelve years still to live before his "liquidation" by Stalin. Its title is "The Prerequisites and Tasks of the Chinese Revolution":

> . . . we must not underestimate the immense importance of the movement in China, for it is one of the most important movements in the history of the world, and will strike a mighty blow at all capitalist stabilization. (p. 64)

And here is an enlightening excerpt from the thesis set forth by Professor Holl of Sydney, Australia, which received official recognition as basic Communist policy:

> This talk of the Pacific taking the place of the Atlantic as the international arena must not be taken lightly. Pre-

[1] Extract from a Speech on "The International Situation and the Defense of the USSR" delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU, August 1, 1927.

cisely on the Pacific, the apparatus for the settlement of international complications is weaker than anywhere. (*Ibid.*, p. 35)

The defeat of Japan and the defeatism of the victorious United States have rendered the above statement more pertinent now than it was 25 years ago.

Stalin was even obliging enough in those far-off days to describe the conditions *and purposes* of Communist collaboration with the Kuomintang; a blueprint which could have been extremely useful to Mr. Acheson and his colleagues in the State Department who directed the futile Marshall mission, and indeed might have averted that mission, with all its present catastrophic consequences. I quote from that same chapter, "China":

> Now as to the stages of the Chinese Revolution. . . . In my opinion they should be three: The first stage was the revolution of the general national united front, . . . the second stage is the bourgeois-democratic revolution. . . . The third stage is the Soviet revolution, which has not yet come about but which will come about. Whoever does not understand that there are no revolutions without definite stages of development, whoever does not understand that there are three stages in the development of the Chinese revolution, understands nothing either of Marxism or of the Chinese question. (p. 235)
>
> Was it a correct policy . . . to support the Canton Kuomintang as a government which stood for the struggle for emancipation from imperialism? . . . Yes, we were right . . . becuase the struggle . . . was causing a dispersion of the forces of imperialism, and defeating and undermining imperialism, and was thus facilitating the development of the hearth and home of the world revolution, the USSR. . . . (pp. 236–237)
>
> But how are we to conceive a united front with the national bourgeoisie in the first stage of a colonial revolution? Does that mean that Communists . . . must sacrifice their independence in the slightest degree or for a single moment? No, it does not. A united front can have revolutionary significance only if and when it does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organizational work . . . (p. 237)

In the course of this address Stalin quoted from a speech he had made in November, 1926, in the Chinese Commission of the Communist International, prescribing the infiltration and subversion of the Chinese Army by the Communists. (This was not long before Chiang set the Soviet conquest of China back some twenty years by liquidating the Communists; after which coup there was no attempt to mix the "oil and water" of Nationalist and Communist Chinese until Marshall's abortive mission):

> The work of the Kuomintang and Communist cells in the Army must be intensified; they must be organized wherever they do not now exist and wherever their organization is possible; where the organization of Communist cells is impossible, intense work must be carried on with the help of concealed Communists.
>
> Our course must be steered towards *the arming of the workers and peasants . . . the masses must be mobilized around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.* . . . (pp. 239–40)

After stating that "temporary blocs and agreements with *the bourgeoisie*" in colonial countries were not only permissible but necessary at a certain stage, Stalin proceeded to quote from two Comintern documents relating to May, 1927, which leave no doubt whatever about what would have happened to the Chinese National Army had General Marshall's mission "succeeded":

> The most important thing must be . . . to develop the agrarian revolution systematically. . . . *This is fundamental for the success of the revolution and of the Kuomintang.* This is fundamental for the creation in China of a big and powerful political and military army. . . . The organization must immediately be undertaken . . . with an absolutely reliable command. This will serve as a guard . . . both at the front and in the rear for the disarming of unreliable divisions. . . . Work must be intensified in the rear and within the divisions of Chiang Kai-shek in order to disintegrate them. . . . (pp. 248–249)
>
> The present structure of the Kuomintang must be changed.
>
> . . . *organize your own reliable army before it is too late. Otherwise there can be no guarantee against failures.* . . .
>
> Organize a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists.
>
> *Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek.* . . . (Italics Stalin's, p. 249)

Just in case it may interest Mr. Acheson to know what Communist policy on the question of national relations has been since 1919, I quote from this same book by Stalin these excerpts from the program adopted in that year by the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party:

> 1. The cornerstone is the policy of drawing together the proletarians and the semi-proletarians of the various nationalities for the purpose of waging a joint revolutionary struggle. . . .
>
> 3. . . . the Party proposes . . . a Federation of States of the Soviet type.
>
> 4. . . . The Russian Communist Party adopts the historical class viewpoint and in this takes into consideration conditions of historical development of the given nation: whether it is evolving from mediaevalism to bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy to Soviet or proletarian democracy, etc. (p. 288)

Finally, just to show Mr. Acheson how consistent the intentions of the Soviet dictatorship have been for the past quarter-century, here is Stalin's own statement on foreign policy from that same book on "Marxism and the Nationalist and Colonial Questions":

> . . . when a life and death struggle is being waged, and is spreading, between proletarian Russia and the imperialist Entente, only two alternatives confront the border regions:
>
> Either they join forces with Russia. . . .
>
> Or they join forces with the Entente. . . .
>
> There is no third solution. So-called independence of a so-called independent . . . Poland, Finland, etc. is only an illusion. . . . (p. 79)
>
> Further, history has shown that when individual peoples succeed in emancipating themselves, both from their own national bourgeoisie and from the foreign bourgeoisie . . . they cannot . . . carry on a separate existence and successfully maintain themselves without the economic and military support of Soviet republics. . . . (p. 103)
>
> These, Comrades, are the premises . . . which prove that it is essential for our Party to take definite steps in order to solve the national problem *within the framework of the R.S.F.S.R.* [Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics]. (p. 103)

Yet Mr. Acheson, in 1951, could testify:

> QUESTION. We have no way, of course, of being sure as to what the intentions are of either the Red Chinese or the Russians with regard to ourselves, have we?
>
> SECRETARY ACHESON. No, we have to wait.

How long, Mr. Acheson? It has all been as clear as day since 1919, if only you had wanted to see it.

PORTRAIT OF CHIANG

By ALFRED KOHLBERG

Visit to Chiang

EARLY in July 1949 I was driven, by appointment, from Taipeh, capital of Formosa, some 25 miles into the mountains to Shaoshan Sulphur Springs for an interview with Chiang Kai-shek. He was then in retirement, having turned over the Presidency to Li Tsung-jen the previous January to still the clamor of those who thought that his personality and stubbornness were an obstacle to peace with the Communists. The armies he had left to Li were everywhere in retreat over the vastness of South and West China. The fall of all China to the Communists was only months away, and apparent to all.

The Generalissimo received me in the small living room of a three story Japanese frame house, which, with two others, had originally been built for the Japanese Crown Prince. When the Chinese had taken over after V-J Day it had become government property. It had one curious feature: in a rear room was a small concrete pool into which flowed a hot sulphur spring and a cold clear-water spring.

In thirty-three years of travel through most of China's provinces I had never before met or even seen the Generalissimo, although I had known his wife for several years. But for twenty-three years I had followed his career as closely as the press, and friendship with some of his associates and the Chinese in general, had permitted. I found a man in uniform, without insignia, about five feet, six inches tall, with a close-cropped moustache, looking just like his pictures. As I had expected, he was a man in whom confidence was an inborn characteristic and despair impossible.

At the end of a rather long interview carried on through his interpreter, Shen Chang-kwan (now the government spokesman), he invited me to move up the next day as his guest. While this provided me with a couple of horrible nights of trying to sleep on the floor, Japanese-style, it gave me further opportunity to talk at length with some of his advisers and with him. He asked me to speak frankly, and I did.

Our State Department's infamous White Paper on China was to be issued the following month, but the papers were already full of guesses about it. I asked Chiang what the State Department might put in it of which he would have to be ashamed. His answer was, nothing. He had made many mistakes, he said — some terrible ones — but he had never broken his word to America, or committed any act of bad faith. I did not doubt him, for a year and a half earlier Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer had testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee as follows:

> GENERAL WEDEMEYER. I think the Generalissimo has endeavored to meet our every requirement . . . If I were he, I would be quite impatient with America, but he never appeared so. His parting statement when I left him last August is indicative of his character. He said: "Whether or not your country gives aid or assistance to China, I will continue to use every force at my disposal to combat communism; and I will continue to strive to create a democracy in China, but changes in government are going to take a long number of years. I may not be able to accomplish that in my lifetime. It will be contingent upon outside influences, the influence of your country and of Russia, whether or not I am able to create political and economic stability at home."
>
> He made that statement voluntarily, just before I said good-by to him.

When the White Paper was issued, it confirmed these statements, by omission. Though it charged Chiang Kai-shek with being a reactionary, a Fascist, an incompetent, with being surrounded by corruptionists, and even with not having fought the 1,500,000 Japanese troops in China during the eight years of the Sino-Japanese War, nowhere did it accuse him of broken agreements or acts of bad faith.

I asked Chiang Kai-shek what help China most needed from America. He said arms, ammunition and gasoline; no economic aid beyond the ECA program, but, above all, moral support. He suggested a Presidential statement that America was unalterably opposed to a Communist China and would expend every effort within its resources to aid those fighting communism. Such a statement, he explained, would be of crucial importance because a large number of educated Chinese had been educated in America, or in American institutions in China. They knew, he said, that America had no evil designs on China.

"When the Communists denounce me and my government," he continued, "the Chinese say 'That is just Communist propaganda.' But when your press and even your Voice of America denounce me and my government, they say, 'America has no ulterior motive. It must be true.' And because there is nowhere else to turn, they feel they must accept the Communists. Remember, if the Nationalists win, America will have 450,000,000 friends in China; if the Communists win you will have 450,000,000 enemies."

Little did I think then that in less than two years 75,000 American casualties would attest his wisdom.

"To Govern Is to Foresee"

It was by no means Chiang's first prophetic statement. To quote William C. Bullitt [1] who visited him in 1934:

> . . . in the course of a series of long conversations the Generalissimo made predictions which for foresight and wisdom have rarely been surpassed in the annals of statesmanship. He felt certain that the Japanese . . . would strike again, . . . by 1937 at the latest. The attack came in 1937. He predicted that the attack would be started by a trumped-up incident in the area between Peiping and Tientsin. It was started at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping. He said that he would fight in North China and lose; that he would fight at Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow and lose them all; that he would then place his capital at Chungking in the remote province of Szechwan; that he had just invested $100 million (Chinese) in the

[1] "A Report to the American People on China," *Life*, October 13, 1947.

construction of small-arms factories in the Szechwan cities of Chungking and Chengtu; that the Japanese would never get into Szechwan; that he would never make peace with them so long as he lived, and that in the end they would be defeated. That is the exact history of the events from 1937 to 1945.

He then predicted that after the defeat of Japan, if he were still alive, he would face his greatest difficulties. The country would be ruined, the people exhausted. To lead the Chinese to the peaceful establishment of democratic institutions and modernization of their ancient civilization was an ambition of his life, but it would be a harder task than even the defeat of the Japanese.

In that also he saw clearly. There is no truer saying than the old French one: "To govern is to foresee." Chiang Kai-shek foresees.

During World War II, Chiang made a statement for which he was strongly condemned, but which also proved prophetic: "The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists a disease of the blood-stream."

Party-Line Portraits

American opinion has been presented with conflicting pictures of Chiang Kai-shek. The man himself has not changed, but the picture of him presented to Americans has been altered to fit the shifting Communist Party line on China. I am not suggesting that most American newspapers consciously follow the Communist line. Few of them would do so. But knowledge of China is so limited that a small pro-Communist clique in the press has been almost wholly successful in imposing the Communist picture.

In the early years of the Sino-Japanese War Russia was all for Chiang. The Kremlin hoped he would prove strong enough to keep Japan bogged down in China and thus unable to attack Russia. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939, this enthusiasm waned, and by 1940 the Communist press was accusing him of secret deals with the Fascists.

All that changed again on June 22, 1941 when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Once more Chiang Kai-shek became the white-haired boy of the comrades everywhere. This praiseful period lasted until the summer of 1943, when, after the German defeat at Stalingrad and Japanese defeats in the South Pacific, Russia no longer feared Japan and therefore no longer needed Chiang for her own protection. It was during this 1941–43 period of Communist good will that Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins, one of the most consistent of professional party-liners, wrote: [2]

> Many people talk of the danger of civil war in China at the end of this war, but I think that the danger of civil war in China is probably less than the danger of civil war in many countries in Europe. One reason is that we have in Asia a world statesman, a real genius, in Chiang Kai-shek. What may be called the functional test of the historical importance of Chiang Kai-shek is the fact that throughout an already long political career, he has grown steadily greater and greater.

When the Communist line changed in 1943, the old charges against Chiang Kai-shek were revived, with little or no originality. Corrupt, feudal, a dictator, a Fascist, were some of the charges hurled. Dr. Lattimore even went so far as to use his very name as a reproach when he called President Syngman Rhee of Korea "a little Chiang Kai-shek." The absurdity of it becomes apparent when it is known that Dr. Lattimore has not been in China since he wrote "America and Asia," except for two weeks with Henry Wallace in 1944, and four days with oil-tycoon Ed Pauley late in 1945.

Through American Eyes

Other Americans who have dealt with Chiang Kai-shek since Lattimore praised him are Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer and General George C. Marshall. Though it is public knowledge that Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer disagree on the course we should follow in the Pacific, strangely they agree on Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator Knowland of California brought this out in his questioning of Defense Secretary Marshall before the Senate Committee on May 11, 1951. Senator Knowland read to General Marshall from General Wedemeyer's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, December 17, 1947, as follows:

> The relevant and important facts are that Chiang Kai-shek has opposed communism throughout his history, and he has also stayed on with us as an ally in the war, containing in China 1,500,000 Japanese soldiers who might have been employed against our men in the Pacific. It would have made our task more costly in lives and time in the Pacific. But no, the Generalissimo chose to remain faithful to his allies.

Then Senator Knowland asked General Marshall: "Do you agree, General, with General Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation?" General Marshall replied: "I think that is a correct statement."

Senator Knowland continued: "Then General Wedemeyer went on to say: 'I personally think he is a fine character and that you gentlemen on this Committee would admire and respect him.' " General Marshall replied: "I would like to add to that my own regard for the Generalissimo, who I thought was a very fine character, and I was really fond of him. The question of his handling of the situation and in direct relationship to his own people was another matter."

Against this must be placed the secret diatribes of General Stilwell, made public after his death when portions of his private diary were published under the title of "The Stilwell Papers." Whether Stilwell really meant what he wrote there, or was only getting rid of gripes in good army style, is difficult to judge at this time. For mixed with denunciation of Chiang were almost equally severe castigations of Roosevelt, Lord Mountbatten and General Chennault, and references to General Marshall as a "double-crosser." Maybe he was just blowing off steam.

Chiang to the Chinese

I was in China at the end of the war. The prestige of Chiang Kai-shek and of America with the mass of the Chinese was at an all-time high. There followed a year of the ill-fated attempt of General Marshall to bring about a coalition with the Communists. In a year of truces that prevented Chiang Kai-shek's overwhelming forces from taking over and pacifying most of China, the Communists again and again broke solemn agreements. Meanwhile Russia rushed the recruiting, arming and

[2] "America and Asia," Claremont Press, Claremont, California, 1943.

training of Mao's army, and when General Marshall came home to report failure, the odds against the Communists were no longer overwhelming.

From early 1947 until the autumn of 1948, while we embargoed all arms and ammunition to Chiang, the Communists, with Russian staff command and arms, grew and finally took the offensive. As the tide turned, Chiang's stock with the Chinese went down, as did America's. In Chinese eyes, both Chiang and America had failed to save them from the Communists, to whom they felt forced to submit. They wishfully hoped the Communists would not prove as vicious as the stories they had heard.

In the summer of 1949 I spent a week in a small southern Chinese city where I had many old friends. The Communist armies were only a short distance away, approaching rapidly against crumbling resistance. I got out, but my Chinese friends could not, and had no place to go. Their general opinion was expressed by one who said: "After all, even though they are Communists, they are Chinese like us, and we will get along with them somehow."

More than a year later this man and his family escaped to Hong Kong with the aid of the underground. Many of his friends had been executed merely because they were of the "dangerous" merchant class. His turn was coming. All his opinions and those of friends who had dared to talk to him had changed. They had learned the hard way that the Communists are not "Chinese like us" — just as American Communists are not "Americans like us."

Now, he says, 80 per cent of the Chinese pray for the return of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang is the symbol of resistance to communism, and if his government was far from perfect, it was human and Chinese. With every fiber of their being they live in hope of seeing its return.

THE TWO STRATEGIES

By HOFFMAN NICKERSON

MUCH OF the current American discussion of a possible war against the Soviets is strangely unreal because so many people take for granted that the only worthwhile strategy is one which seeks an immediate decision. In fact, our potential enemies may not try for such a decision, and are most unlikely to succeed if they do attempt it, while we and our Allies can not attempt any such thing for years to come. The struggle between Moscow and those peoples who in one form or another acknowledge traditional morals is practically certain to be decided by a strategy of exhaustion, a long wearing-down process.

The form which the unreal assumption takes is usually as follows: until we or our Allies have armies and tactical air forces which stand a good chance of holding most of non-Communist Europe against the Red Army, the Soviets can win any time they like. By occupying western Germany, France and the Low Countries — which indeed they can easily do — and by putting pressure on Britain they can, so the argument runs, throw us back on a defense of the Western Hemisphere which must fail in the long run for want of resources as compared with those of all Eurasia and Africa. We, on the other hand, are supposed to be preparing and helping our Allies to prepare in order to check a Soviet westward push.

Now the one certainly true statement in the preceding paragraph is that the Red Army could march to the English Channel whenever it might be ordered to do so. No matter how much damage the baby-killers of our Strategic Air Force might do to Russian and other European cities and factories, the idea of that damage being enough to check the Communist armies is too doubtful to be worth discussing here.

All the other assumptions are lies. That we are preparing to defend anything like our present positions in Europe is the most obvious lie of all. Published estimates of what we and our North Atlantic Treaty partners hope to have in that continent by the end of '51 vary between the equivalents of 17 and 25 divisions. The French hope to add another five and the Italians another four by the end of '52, and the French still another five by the end of '53. This last figure would represent a French total of 20, although in General Eisenhower's emotionally moving speech last February he told us that the French hoped to have 25 by the end of '53. In 1940 they had more than a hundred. Meanwhile estimates of the number of "peacetime" Soviet divisions vary between 180 and 220, the latter figure including 60 in European Russia west of Moscow, the European satellites and eastern Germany. The satellite countries themselves are believed to have 60 divisions. Thus a grand total of 240 or 280 divisions is at Moscow's disposal.

Readers can judge these figures for themselves. For at least two years, probably for three or more, the idea of defending western Germany, France and the Low Countries against a serious Soviet attack will be a joke. One can not call it a bluff because a bluff is meant to deceive somebody, and such talk can deceive no thinking person on either side of the iron curtain. Either our leaders are beating the publicity tom-toms for some undisclosed purpose of their own, or if they foresee war they intend that war to begin either with a disaster or with a helter-skelter retreat. Who is the joke supposed to be on? And what is its point?

Meanwhile, the men in the Kremlin have not shown their hand. Although they could have moved westward at any time since the Anglo-American demobilization, they have not done so. As far as we know they are still free to choose. Why they have not advanced we do not know. They may not have been "deterred" — blessed word! — by our bombs to the extent that is often supposed. They may suspect the loyalty of their own and their satellite peoples, although we should not count too much on that, especially in the early stages of a war. They may fear the puncturing of their propaganda about their

own alleged socialist paradise if they allow too many of their soldiers to see the higher living standards of non-Communist Europe. In spite of their expertness in mass executions and deportations of "class enemies" they may doubt success in trying to govern a nation like France in which proletarian wage earners are a small minority, the middle-class far stronger and more numerous than in any country they have yet administered, and the millions of land-owning peasants ferociously independent. Their rigid system has never ruled any large area which did not in normal times produce a surplus of food, and therefore they may fear famines in food-importing western Europe in case they occupied it; famines severe enough to breed pestilent epidemics from which their own troops would suffer. In April a Vienna dispatch to the *New York Times* said that Hungary, once one of the world's granaries, has had to ration bread.

The mere occupation of additional territory does not necessarily strengthen the occupier. On the contrary, it may weaken him.

In any case, guesswork as to Moscow's motives for not as yet moving westward amounts to this: whatever those motives may have been since World War II, they may still hold good.

Further, our possible opponents may think they know a trick worth two of that. Why should they not go on trying to wear us down economically, using the cheap manpower of their puppets to wage little wars which provoke the West to expensive military efforts? Already they have made a brilliant beginning by means of comparatively minor operations in Asia. Why should they not aim at cheaply producing bigger and better Koreas, Indo-Chinas, and Malayas? There are plenty of other areas in which similar attempts might be made. As long as this strategy of theirs succeeds they are like a football team whose first-string men are resting on the bench while their substitutes are contending on even terms against the opposing regulars. Such a competition is reasonably certain to end in only one way.

The chances that Moscow's policy makers may content themselves with minor operations for some time are increased by the known fact that they have carefully studied Clausewitz. That great philosopher of war has a famous passage in the Eighth Book of his "Vom Kriege" in which he envisages victory by throwing an opponent into social disorganization if that opponent is foolish enough to break down his own economy through excessive military efforts. He says in substance: In war and in preparing for war both opponents or prospective opponents try to outdo the other. In theory this might lead to an extremity of effort, but in most cases this attempt at an extremity of effort "would be wrecked by the weight of opposing forces within itself." In other words, if large numbers of people begin to lose heart for further sacrifices they begin to say: "To Hell with it! The enemy can't do much worse to us than our own politicians are already doing." If the government persists, then the masses can sabotage the war effort either actively or passively by falling into despair.

Further, the men in the Kremlin, however much they may misjudge Western societies, know that our economies, although very strong, are at the same time vulnerable. These economies depend upon credit and paper money which can not be freely exchanged for gold or silver. Also the combination of vast loans and fiat money with the factor of freedom — which it is our supreme object to preserve — makes for economic instability.

Certainly the United States has successfully financed its last cost-plus war. Already wages and prices are soaring while the purchasing power of bonds and currency fails. Although there is no limit to the amount of paper money which the government can print, there is indeed a limit to the amount of goods and services which those paper dollars will buy. However necessary it may have been to shut off immigration after World War I, nevertheless that stoppage has produced a labor monopoly under aggressive leaders who show no signs of giving up any of their new power.

Of course, the Communist chiefs know all this. They also know that if we became economically disorganized beyond a certain point we would no longer be able to oppose them effectively in arms.

This brings us to the capital question of what the war plan of the United States should be. There can be very little secrecy about the matter because the answer will depend largely upon the number of divisions we raise and the location of the countries which we help to prepare beforehand as bases of operations. Since the Soviets have the initiative and may or may not invade western Europe, we must take both possibilities into account.

The arguments against our raising too large an army, and especially against putting too many troops and too much military material into France and western Germany, are overwhelmingly strong. Since the elementary mathematics of the situation makes those countries indefensible whatever we do, the only reason for having appreciable forces there is to compel Moscow to make at least a moderate effort in order to occupy them. That effort would compel the Reds to expend some ammunition and supplies which they would rather conserve. Even General Eisenhower, whom no one will accuse of being "isolationist" — a far better word would be "nationalist" — said the other day: "We can not concentrate our force in any one sector, even . . . one . . . as important as western Europe. We must largely sit here with a great, powerful mobile reserve."

Moreover, most of that reserve should be composed chiefly of sea and air power because our troops can move overseas only in ships or planes. Our strategy must aim at exhausting our possible enemy, and to pile too large an Army on top of a great Navy and Air Force would constitute an armed effort too great to be carried indefinitely. At best, prolonged overseas efforts must strain the resources of any country much more than campaigns on the same scale but nearer home. If too great and too prolonged, they are self-destructive.

Without raising a mass army England defeated Napoleon and afterward went on to increased wealth and influence. After twice enforcing universal military service against the Germans she is bankrupt, and may be permanently crippled as a great power. Of course no historical parallel can be made to "walk on all fours"; nevertheless the English example is a warning.

Until the military capabilities of our European allies are far greater than they are today, our only real and possible long-term strategy must be either Pan-American

or one of holding minimum footholds east of the Atlantic. The public has been prepared for neither, still less for the opening disaster or rapid retreat which must follow a westward major offensive by the Red Army.

There is much to be said for a Pan-American strategy. Within an Old World dominated by Moscow all sorts of quarrels would certainly arise. The idea that Russians and West-European Communists could organize Eurasia and Africa into a solid bloc capable of decisive attack on the Americas is fantastic. The Red leaders are not supermen.

But there is no need for us to retire to the Americas. On the contrary, our sea and air power could give our opponents plenty to do in their own Hemisphere. In order to shorten the nightmare of a Soviet occupation of western Europe there would be a good case for remaining in arms east of the Atlantic.

The western peninsula of Eurasia is bounded on the South by the Mediterranean Sea which with its many islands is an ideal theater for naval and air action. The western gateway to that sea is held by Spain, geographically the strongest country in Europe against land attack and politically the most anti-Communist state in the world.

The Pyrennean barrier is peculiarly formidable in these days of landing craft, planes and aircraft-carrying ships, inasmuch as all of its passes are within a few miles of the sea. Its three western crossings — the coast roads by Irun, Roncesvalles and the Somport — are all narrow, as is the Mediterranean coast road. Its only pass of any width, the Cerdagne, is only two or three miles wide and is close to the Mediterranean shore. Over the whole central three-quarters of the range there is no passage for wheeled vehicles; the Bonaigo is only a goat track. With sea and air superiority and a handful of American divisions to reinforce the Spanish Army, and with the Reds so far from their home bases, one could only hope that the Red Command would try to force the range. Even in the unlikely event of the Pyrenees being forced, the successive ranges which cross the Central Plateau are defensively strong, while the Soviet communications would grow steadily longer.

It is hard to see why an accomplished officer like Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, writing in *Human Events* for January 24, said that "the fortunes of war might easily deprive us of the use of Spanish bases."

A glance at the map of Europe shows still another advantage of holding Spain. The two principal West European armies today and two of the most anti-Soviet European peoples are the Swiss and the Swedish. No matter how much those two governments might try to remain neutral, Moscow could never be sure of the political attitude of either. A Soviet army operating in southwestern France would have the Swiss at the rear of its left flank and the Swedes far behind its right flank. The communications of such an army could probably be bedeviled even more effectively by American air-landing operations than by bombing from the air.

With Spain securely held and with American amphibious power and air power ranging the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, no Communist police state could be consolidated in western Europe. Without a mass army we could exhaust and wear down the Soviet power as England wore down what seemed the overwhelming power of Napoleon. We could support the staunch Greeks and Turks, and Tito if he seemed worth supporting. We would be in touch with the whole Near East. If the Soviets advanced toward the Suez Canal or the oil fields on the shores of the Persian Gulf, their peasant soldiers could hardly feel themselves to be defending "Mother Russia," as they did after the German politicians had foolishly destroyed the friendship with which the German armies were welcomed in 1941. Also, in the Middle Eastern theaters of war our sea communications would be so much better than the Soviets' overland communications that each U. S. air group or division could successfully oppose considerably larger forces of theirs. They would have to toil forward over undeveloped countries, while our people would arrive fresh and unwearied.

Meanwhile, the Soviets would be in a pretty pickle with reference to central and western Europe. If they did not occupy those regions they would always have to fear that this or that government, encouraged by some reverse of theirs, might add itself to their enemies. If they occupied territory they would either have to leave large occupying forces there, or else they would have to withdraw after leaving puppet governments of local Communists in power. An army of occupation always becomes increasingly detested, especially if it be large, and most of all if it suffers from the notorious political weaknesses of Russian armies. Communist puppets would soon become equally detested as agents of a foreign and largely primitive people. No massacres or deportations, however vast, would make the agents of Moscow feel secure.

In the long run the swollen Soviet Empire would burst from its own internal weaknesses. Nevertheless, it would be a long run, and the finest athlete that ever lived could not run a Marathon at the pace of a hundred-yard dash.

The essence of the matter is timing, geography and numbers. No prompt knock-out of the Soviet and satellite armies is possible. Accordingly, our strategy should aim at exhausting our possible enemies while not exhausting ourselves. Even if we turned our social order upside down through raising the largest possible U. S. Army in order to defend Allies who are more exposed than ourselves, still nearly all of France would remain indefensible for years. This elementary mathematical truth has nothing to do with our feelings toward the French, the British, or the present Spanish government. If inferior numbers are to resist superior numbers of good troops successfully, then the inferior numbers must do so in a strong position.

If the United States seriously means to oppose Soviet expansion, then active cooperation with Madrid should be the pivot of any stand which we mean to make east of the Atlantic. The monkey chatter about diplomatic obstacles means next to nothing. Nothing except our own folly can prevent our brushing away the dirty cobwebs of the United Nations, and making a firm military alliance with Spain.

Instead, what, oh what, do Truman and Acheson think they are doing?

HYMN FOR TODAY

I hate
The State

DOROTHY THOMPSON

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

By EDNA LONIGAN

Washington

THE REPUBLICANS have failed dismally so far to get the signals General MacArthur gave them in his testimony before the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees. What MacArthur was telling them was simple: that a minimum of force, strategically applied, would topple Red China from the ranks of the Soviet satellites and put the whole program of the Kremlin into profound and irremediable disarray.

The reason Congress missed the signals stems partly from its loss of the art of caucusing, of finding what its opportunities are, and partly from something deeper. The members of Congress, like Americans as a whole, are buffeted about by pragmatic, *ad hoc* "thinking." They have no habit of strategic thinking, and so they are no match for the very dissimilar experts in that art, General MacArthur and the masters of the Communist movement.

Since the Administration group outside of Congress operates with military foresight and precision, under a political general staff as competent as any in the world, it is unlikely that the Republicans will recover the initiative so promptly seized by the Administration.

The Art of Political Confusion

The work assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to blur every clear, sharp point made by MacArthur. They succeeded. Otherwise their testimony was unimportant — except for one point. They are our best military minds. It will not be lost on Europe, Asia or the Soviet Union, that the United States is dangerously weak at the most critical point in national defense — *the intelligence of our top military planners.*

This is the fruit of State Department control of military policy-making, with its need for yes-men. Admiral Sherman was the surprising exception. Americans have been slow to recognize that sabotage of policy, the delicate art which wrecked our postwar foreign policy, has been equally successful in blunting our postwar rearmament effort.

There was much talk in Washington that the Republicans were waiting, sharpening their knives for Acheson. But Acheson does not fight with knives. He presents a smooth, well-oiled surface to his opponents, and when they strike he moves aside, so they will lose their footing and slip.

Acheson's contribution is first to "confuse the vocabulary." He uses soft, formless words, which, like putty, can be pushed into different shapes for different needs. But his major contribution is to confuse the design which is implicit in every policy decision. It is as if the engineers of General Motors prepared two sets of plans, one for top management, in which the parts fitted precisely and added up to make an automobile, and another for the production men in which the parts did not fit, or added up to make a machine-gun.

Acheson submits the design meant for the public in the form of a drama. At the hearings he repeated, with variations, the same play about Chiang Kai-shek which the State Department used originally to cover its true design in Asia. China was not a nation. Chiang was powerless and corrupt. We did the best we could.

Such a performance can not be countered by facts. It rests not on facts but on the keenest psychological knowledge of the arts of persuasion. The details are chosen to give verisimilitude, as Hollywood would choose them. Until the Republicans can state their policy on Asia with the unity and force of a drama, they will be politically negligible. The "peace" in Korea will be identical with Acheson's "peace" in China.

The Peace Offensive

Evidence of a "peace offensive" on Soviet terms has been strong since the beginning of the year. The USSR stated its terms of settlement some time ago. They were the withdrawal of all "foreign troops" from Korea, and the entrusting of the political decision to the Korean people themselves.

These two principles make possible almost any move on the world chessboard. Translated into terms of power they meant that American and Communist Chinese troops would leave Korea, and the Red-trained North Koreans and Korean exiles who had fled to Manchuria under Japan, would remain. While the dust was settling, Communist fifth columns could take over. Then the Korean people would vote themselves into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

With the peace treaty the same thing could be done in Japan, especially if MacArthur could be removed. Soon all Asia would be won and the fall of Europe would be inevitable.

The terms of the UN committee, of the British and of the Administration in Washington have not differed essentially from the Soviet terms. It is unimportant whether the imitation was deliberate or not.

The Administration needed peace, because its war-emergency psychology had failed, and it had plans for filling the spending gap by the financing of Point Four and by garrisoning great numbers of troops and other workers in all parts of the world. The USSR needed peace. Red China needed peace.

The current revival of this peace offensive was signaled in a pipelined article by Stewart Alsop on May 14. He gave the rumored peace terms the Soviet Union would accept. "This," he said, "is the restoration of the status quo ante — a partition of Korea on the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and the staged withdrawal of the Communist and the United Nations forces." He went on, "It can be reliably reported that the American government, rightly or wrongly, will be prepared to accept such a settlement on one major condition," a warning that the next aggression would be met by attack on the Communist centers of

power — after all our forces had been pulled out of Asia.

On May 17 an editorial in the *New York Times* said that of course we could never be party to a move to turn Formosa over to the Communists. Instead, Formosa should be given "the essential right of self-determination." It is easy to see how long Formosa with its eight million people would keep its right of self-determination — after the armed forces of the UN had left. This is obviously the second point of the original Soviet demands. The editorial was put into the *Congressional Record* by Congressman Jacob K. Javits, who is well aware of the propaganda value of whatever he reprints.

Also on May 17 Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado introduced a resolution calling for an armistice in Korea on June 25. He proposed that "all non-Korean persons" except diplomats should depart from North and South Korea (Point 1 again), and in the introduction he said, "Every people should be left free to determine its own form of government and its own way of life, unhindered, unthreatened, and unafraid — the little along with the great and powerful." (Point 2)

Now Secretary Acheson proposes withdrawal of both Chinese and UN troops as the "solution in Asia." We are to withdraw our troops and leave a string of little helpless Asian nations, with the right of "self-determination" — until the USSR takes over.

General MacArthur has already given us the answers to this planned confusion. The choice is not between war and "peace." We have war now, he says, and it is war not with Korea or China but with the Soviet Union. It follows that the only acceptable peace is one which leaves us better, not worse, off for the real struggle, with Russia.

The counter-strategy has been drowned by the Administration in a sea of words. MacArthur's points will have to be dredged up and put before the public again, in their entirety, by the Opposition, if the Machiavellian arts of confusing the people are not to triumph over the more sober methods of representative government.

LAX CONTROLS ARE BEST

By V. ORVAL WATTS

WE WERE lucky in World War II that the administration of price control in the United States was very lax. Many goods and services were never subjected to it, and OPA officials were so hampered by their own red tape and the citizens' resistance that most of their efforts went into issuing and revising orders rather than into enforcement. It may not have been necessary to have inflation. But, since government would not stop inflation at its source by a pay-as-you-go financial policy, it was a good thing that the OPA interference with the economy was so limited.

True enough, the official price indexes registered little change in the price level during the reign of the OPA. But few persons except the officials themselves believed or claimed that their indexes represented the actual facts. Producers and buyers found innumerable ways to avoid and evade almost all the controls — fortunately for the war effort. I say fortunately because, if the OPA had been able really to freeze all prices and wage rates, it would have frozen all enterprise, with a consequent collapse of industry.

I know this is contrary to a popular theory that price control failed only because it was not applied soon enough or broadly enough, because violations were not punished severely enough, or because OPA officials were inexperienced and incompetent. In other words, price control would have worked if we only had taken enough of it. Now again, as a new venture in price freezing gets under way, we hear this same old alibi for the new OPA, or OPS. And we'll hear much more of it in the months or years ahead.

The trouble with this plausible notion is that prices must rise in order to keep an economy going whenever there is currency inflation. Inflation means that the supply of money outruns the supply of goods. When this happens, prices must rise in order to induce producers to continue working for money and economizing in the use of it.

Because of governments' unsound financial policies, wars and armament programs ordinarily bring about inflation. That is, they give people more money and reduce the supply of goods they can spend it on. Consequently, money loses some of its purchasing power per unit whether prices are frozen or not. Either buyers will bid prices up, or else some of their money must go unspent. If prices are held down, so that buyers can't spend their money on goods, some of them won't work so hard to get it. This means that money loses its purchasing power over both goods and labor. This is another way of saying that inflation causes a rise in costs regardless of price control. In other words, costs do not depend merely on prices and wage rates. They depend also on quantities and efficiencies. Freezing prices does not freeze costs or values any more than stopping a clock stops time.

During World War II, for example, in view of the government's inflationary policies, labor costs were bound to rise, no matter what controls were put on labor and wage rates, if only because of the great increase in rate of labor turnover. Employers had to break in many more new hands, take persons who were less competent (and sometimes less willing), and do their best with what they could get.

The same was true of materials. Producers had to use substitute materials as they used substitute labor, with a consequent increase in costs and often a decline in quality of products.

Similarly, they had to deal with new customers, and new customers usually mean increased selling costs. This was true especially in the case of the government, which became the biggest customer of all.

As a customer, government is one of the poorest. It is slow to pay, hard to please, and generally untrustworthy.

To begin with, you can't do business with the government without a written contract, one that is airtight and puncture-proof, able to stand up in court no matter how many government lawyers kick it around for one reason or another. And getting such a contract is not merely a matter of hiring a lawyer, paying a five-per-center in Washington, or making a contribution to a political campaign fund. It takes time and a lot of work not only to get a contract, but to protect it and collect on it.

That is only a part of the story of the way costs increase in wartime, apart from increases in the prices of materials or labor. New taxes, for example, add to costs, and they add far more than the amount government collects. Taxes on profits have now reached the point of actually encouraging waste. This waste not only retards the progress of the company that is thus seduced from sound policy, but it raises costs for other companies which are thus deprived of needed labor, materials and machinery. For this reason, if we think of taxes only in terms of the effects on the more profitable concerns, we fail to realize the full extent of the burden and where it falls.

Then there are war bond drives, Red Cross drives, defense activities, more visits from government inspectors and tax collectors, Congressional investigations and hearings, flocks of questionnaires, greatly increased trade association activities — *and price controls*. Few persons outside the management level realize how much the necessary red tape of price control itself contributes to rising costs and diminished output. In World War II it often increased labor costs by from 10 to 20 per cent when the merchant had to deal with ration books and coupons.

Of course, if price ceilings are put high enough, they add little to the cost of living except for the added expense of filling out the forms and posting price lists. Some of the price ceilings imposed by Mr. DiSalle during the past year have been of this nature. That is the reason we have had as yet only a minimum of the shortages, decline in quality, tie-in sales, favoritism, bribery, short-weighting, and so on that the OPA gave us in World War II.

Actually, OPA price ceilings added considerably to the cost of living. In order to stay in business, producers had to spend a large part of their time meeting OPA requirements, getting special rulings for their particular cases, or working out more or less legal ways of getting around the controls and ceilings. Even to increase the output of goods on which the price ceilings were relatively high at the expense of goods on which the ceilings were low, added noticeably to the rise in costs and decline in the value of money.

Most producers also had to resort to illegal evasions at times, if only because of conflicting orders. This added to costs because of the legal risks involved. In the case of those commodities which were sold partly at the legal prices and partly at so-called black-market prices, like meat, the average price was higher than it would have been had all of it been sold at free-market prices. This was due partly to the premium for the risk of prosecution and partly to the fact that the sky is the limit for some goods, such as foods, when supplies are low.

I realize, of course, that the price fixers themselves claimed that their controls were a great success. "Look at the Department of Labor's cost-of-living index!" they said. That index showed little rise in prices during the troubled life of the OPA from 1942 to 1946, but this was a triumph for government statisticians, not for price control.

The prices recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for its cost-of-living index were not the prices which consumers were paying. The official price for a man's dress shirt might remain unchanged at $2.00, but this fact was not important for the consumer who could find only a "sport" shirt priced at $4.00. The official price of wooden clothespins might remain unchanged at 10 cents per dozen, but the only thing available might be plastic clothespins at 5 cents each. If you wanted meat, whether or not you had ration coupons, you probably asked no questions about prices and you stood well away from the scales while the meat was being weighed.

In other cases you went from one store to another, hunting for milk or eggs, while you used up gasoline that you felt was worth a dollar a gallon (whether or not you had paid that for it) and while you wore out tires that were worth five times the official price. Then, when you found what you wanted, you stocked up on a lot of other things you didn't want (such as "seed beans" at five times the price of unavailable "food beans") so that the dealer would sell you the one thing you wanted.

Who wants to go through that degrading, soul-sickening experience again? It seems that many people do, judging by the popular clamor for price ceilings and rollbacks.

Much of this clamor comes from persons who are more concerned with destroying or harassing private enterprise than with keeping down the costs of living. Many housewives and some businessmen, however, are asking for more price control because they never did understand how OPA price ceilings caused the shortages, frustrations, deceits, discourtesies and waste of time from which they suffered. Some blamed the degeneration on the greed of merchants who were supposedly taking unfair advantage of wartime shortages and wartime needs. Others blamed the weakness or incompetence of government officials in not making the controls more universal — in not applying them as strictly to wages and farm prices, for example, as to the finished products.

Only in the later days of the OPA, after a few business organizations had belatedly put the facts before the people — and after the 1946 meat shortage — did any considerable number of housewives and wage earners begin to suspect that price ceilings were not after all a help in keeping down real living costs.

Now today we hear again the cry that price control might work if only it were enforced and if it were impartially applied to everything, including wages and farm prices.

This idea springs from a false line of reasoning. If it prevails, it will do more to sabotage the armaments program than all the Communists and fellow-travelers put together can ever hope to achieve. The fact is that, to the extent price controls are *not* universally applied or enforced, producers can work more efficiently and without subterfuge. To that extent customers can get more for their money and the cost of living will be kept

down. If administrators are slow and inefficient, if they are too few or are located too far away to attend to their job, or if they fail to control wages or raw materials, we should all count ourselves fortunate. It will be that much easier for producers to avoid, evade, or adjust to whatever controls exist.

Let us suppose, for example, that government tries to freeze commodity prices but not wage rates. Suppose further that price ceilings are put below cost on many items. Then producers and consumers must turn to substitutes — substitute goods and substitute methods of production. If wage rates remain flexible, the more resourceful producers — those more successful in finding satisfactory alternatives — can offer whatever wages are necessary to get labor and expand output. They can adjust more quickly to the price controls and thereby reduce the hardship if they don't have to bother with the work permits and bureaucratic red tape necessary for enforcing wage ceilings.

The real trouble in the labor market now does not come from lack of wage ceilings, but from the legal and illegal coercion that is being used to push wages up regardless of economic conditions. The remedy for this evil is not more controls to prevent employers from paying higher wages, but the removal of controls which now *force* them to raise wages. We need not more controls over the labor market, but more freedom from the coercionists, public and private, so that buyers may pay what labor is worth rather than what government and union officials think they can extort.

The same is true of the markets for commodities. The fewer controls, the better. It is bad enough to have price ceilings on retail prices for foods, for example, but it is still worse to have them on all farm commodities. Suppose that retail prices of beef are frozen while feed and cattle prices are not. The rise in feed prices may reduce profit margins for producing and selling cattle and beef. But, if so, the rise in feed prices takes place because other producers are finding more profitable uses for the feed or for the labor, land and machinery used to produce it. The poultry raisers may be bidding for the feed as against the producers of beef. This means that consumers believe they get more protein for their money in the form of eggs and poultry than in beef. In any case, the free movement of feed prices enables producers to adjust their methods so as to produce more value for consumers.

The present evil in the markets for farm commodities, as in the labor market, is not too much freedom, but too much control. Instead of adding new government controls to keep prices down, we should abolish those controls that government is using to force prices up.

So with industrial materials. Even though the finished products are controlled, producers and consumers will fare less badly if the prices of raw materials are left free. The price fluctuations will induce increased production of the things that yield more utility per dollar of expenditure; and they will encourage buyers to use more economically the goods that are relatively scarce. In both ways, the value of money is kept from falling as much as it would if price controls were applied to the raw materials as well as to the finished products.

Let us stop saying, then, that "a mixed economy lacks the advantages of both the free economy and the fully controlled economy." The fully controlled economy has no advantages whatever. It is a theoretical monstrosity that has never existed in fact, and never can exist because there can be no economy except as there is freedom of enterprise. A little freedom is always better than none at all. A mixed economy is bad in proportion as the controls are extended or are more rigorously enforced. It is less restrictive and less inefficient in proportion as the controls are reduced or laxly administered.

We can see the truth of this in the experience of the Soviet government. After several attempts at all-out socialism, that government has found it had to leave some opportunity for individual initiative and enterprise in order to avoid complete economic stagnation and collapse. It has had to tolerate some private property, private trade and private profit. It has found it could not maintain price ceilings in the face of currency inflation. It could not nationalize all industry or all agriculture. It had to institute piece-work methods of payment for labor, even in agriculture. It had to give its industrial managers a share in the profits, and it had to give local bankers some discretion in control of credit.

Americans like to repeat Lincoln's saying that a nation can not exist "half slave and half free." The only truth in this statement — the truth that Lincoln had in mind — is that a half-free society is unstable. Certainly no sensible person would contend that slavery for all could ever be better than slavery for some. Enslavement, whether by private persons or by government agents, causes degeneracy of both master and slave. The source of this degeneracy must be found and excised or it will eventually destroy the body politic, even though "eventually" may mean generations or centuries hence.

Thus far, all societies have had forms of enslavement and sources of degeneracy from their very inception. Therefore, all have been unstable and eventually have been overcome by peoples who had a better understanding of man and his need for freedom. But those societies lasted longest and progressed most which were most successful in resisting restrictions on individual liberty.

Can we now and then cut out some of the cancers of restrictionism, and can we slow down the growth of others? If so, we can to that extent increase the strength and lengthen the life of our nation.

Inflation is an evil, but price control adds to the evil. If government will not stop inflation at its source by sound financial policy, then the less it tries to impose price and wage ceilings the better off we shall be.

OFFICIAL PROGRAM

"Dismissal of General MacArthur"

By HARRY S. TRUMAN

All-Star Command Performance

Cast of Characters

Gen. George C. Marshall — Gen. Omar Bradley
Gen. J. Lawton Collins — Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman

Director: Dean Acheson

CASMI STEFFIN

FALLACIES ABOUT COMMUNISM

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

BY THIS TIME most Americans are aware that a hostile aggressive force called communism is making their lives steadily more cramped, regimented and dangerous. There is still, however, a good deal of confusion and uncertainty about the precise nature of the communist threat.

To some the menace seems moral and ideological, to others military and political. Some incurable twilight sleepers and innocents refuse to admit that there is any threat at all. The fellow-traveler attitude of finding glib excuses for every aspect of Kremlin policy, from slave labor camps to annexations of foreign territory, so fashionable a few years ago, is wilting in the present climate of American public opinion.

But the fellow-traveler has been succeeded by a type wittily designated by Arthur Koestler as the anti-anti-Communist. It is still considered a sign of liberal and advanced views in the United States, and even more in Great Britain and France, to use up five or ten per cent of one's moral and mental ammunition in repudiating sympathy with communism and 90 or 95 per cent in criticizing and denouncing any positive plan for opposing its advance at home and abroad.

The anti-anti-Communist is recognizable by his addiction to a number of fallacious clichés, of which the following are perhaps the most familiar:

1. *Communism is an idea, and you can't stop an idea by force.*

Now nothing could be more satisfactory than an international situation in which there would be fair competition in the market place of ideas between communism and free institutions. But it is the first instinct of communist regimes to destroy any possibility of such competition by isolating their subjects from any knowledge of the outside world apart from what is given them through the mendacious propaganda of official newspapers.

Nor does communism rely on peaceful persuasion as a means of extending and consolidating its power. Armies marching across frontiers, hard-faced secret police agents rounding up hosts of people for deportation, the permanent regime of unlimited terror plus unlimited propaganda which follows every victory of communism — these things are not disembodied ideas.

2. *One can combat communism only by creating a better social and economic order.*

The implication in this fallacy is that the burden of proof is on the free societies, that communism has achieved a running headstart and is conquering by its superior appeal to the masses of the people and its proved ability to provide for their needs.

It is hard to imagine a more demonstrably ridiculous assumption. Immigration, it has been said, is the sincerest form of flattery. And the movement of population has been away from, not toward communist areas. More than a year after the end of the late war there were about 800,000 DPs in refugee camps, who refused to return to their native countries. In all probability as many more were hiding out under false names and with false papers, afraid that they might be forcibly repatriated.

All these fugitives were from countries under communist rule. How little movement there has been in the other direction is obvious from one simple fact. The few individuals who leave free countries and take up residence behind the iron curtain are such rarities that they rate individual newspaper stories, like the traditional man who bites a dog.

Despite the lack of housing and lack of jobs in West Germany there has been a stream of migration, at the rate of about one thousand a day, from Sovietized East Germany. The trickle of movement in the opposite direction is very thin. And it is significant that in Korea it is the regions held by UN troops, not the districts occupied by the Communists, that are flooded with refugees.

3. *If people don't like communism they will quickly get rid of it.*

This cliché is one of the surest marks of an individual who has neither traveled, nor read, nor thought to much advantage. It reveals an almost breathtaking ignorance of the pulverized helplessness to which the individual is quickly reduced under a system which almost literally forces everyone to spy on everyone else.

4. *Communism is positive and we must be "for," not "against."*

This overlooks the point that by far the greatest and most stable contributions to human happiness and freedom have been made by those political thinkers who insisted on strict limitations of arbitrary power, whether this power might be in the hands of an executive official or of a mob. One need only read over the American Constitution, which has served the American people pretty well, and note how many of its clauses are expressed in negative terms:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .
>
> The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall *not* be violated.
>
> Excessive bail shall *not* be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

On the basis of these and many other firm, uncompromising negatives, a very positive structure of human liberty and achievement was built. And the revolution that the world most needs today would sweep away many of the bureaucratic restrictions which governments impose upon their citizens, and impose more restrictions on what governments may do. Imagine what a weight of

fear and misery would be lifted from the peoples of the Soviet Union if they enjoyed a firm, respected constitutional guaranty worded as follows:

"No one shall be arrested without a specific charge or held in prison without access to legal aid, or sentenced to imprisonment and exile without an open trial, or required to perform slave labor under inhuman conditions."

If we clear our minds of these and similar fallacies, communism may be recognized for what it is, a triple threat, which must be met on three separate levels.

First, it is a disintegrating idea, the armed doctrine of a regime which openly sets as its goal world conquest through a combination of military power and internal subversion.

Second, it is a blueprint for espionage, sabotage and treason.

Third, it is a snowballing empire, already larger in area and population than any conqueror created in the past and using an adroit strategy of terror and confusion to paralyze the will and ability to resist further expansion.

More than 150 years ago a militant revolutionary France confronted Great Britain with a challenge not unlike that which the United States faces today. At that time there was a great debate, great if only because of the stature of the participants, on what, if anything, should be done to meet this challenge.

Prime Minister William Pitt, in a speech in the House of Commons of February 1, 1793, gave a description of the designs and methods of the revolutionary rulers of France which would apply to the Soviet Politburo without the change of a syllable.

> They will not accept, under the name of liberty, any model of government, but that which is conformable to their own opinions and ideas; and all men must learn from the mouth of their cannon the propagation of their system in every part of the world. . . . They have stated that they would organize every country by a disorganizing principle; and afterwards they tell you, all this is done by the will of the people. Wherever our [the French] arms come, revolutions must take place, dictated by the will of the people. And then comes this plain question: What is this will of the people? It is the power of the French.

And Edmund Burke, writing to a friend in August of the same year, unconsciously anticipated the ideas which one finds in the writings of ardent anti-Communists of our own time:

> We are at war with a principle, and with an example which there is no shutting out by fortresses, or excluding by territorial limits. No lines of demarcation can bound the Jacobin empire. It must be extirpated in the place of its origin, or it will not be confined to that place.

Finally, Charles James Fox, replying to Pitt, struck the note, so familiar in our own time, that "you can not fight an idea." To quote briefly from his speech:

> If there was any danger from French principles, to go to war without necessity was to fight for their propagation . . . How was a war to operate in keeping opinions supposed dangerous out of this country? It was not surely meant to beat the French out of their own opinions; and opinions were not like commodities, the importation of which from France war would prevent.

This discussion is all the more significant today because the Soviet Communist leaders have discovered a secret which the French Jacobins never learned: the perpetuation of their regime through the method of unlimited propaganda plus unlimited terror. Whereas the Jacobin apparatus of dictatorship was broken up, the Communist apparatus held together. Many attitudes and emphases have changed in Russia during the 34 years that have passed since the Bolshevik Revolution. But the two fundamental principles of Communist rule, political dictatorship and all-out economic collectivism, have only been strengthened. Both these principles, one may note, enhance tremendously the power of the ruling group.

Because there never was a healthy abatement of revolutionary power in Russia, followed by a period of moderation and "settling down," the Soviet threat to the independence and security of the non-communist world remains real and sharp. Its nature as a triple threat may be analyzed as follows:

1. The threat as Idea. The dangerous, explosive element in the Soviet communist idea is its universal, Messianic character. "It is inconceivable," wrote Lenin in one of his and Stalin's many formulations of the same theory, "that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Meanwhile a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states are inevitable."

One of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, prepared under Stalin's closest supervision, reads as follows:

> With elemental force imperialism exposes and accentuates all the contradictions of capitalist society. It carries class oppression to the utmost limits, intensifies the struggle between capitalist governments, *inevitably* gives rise to worldwide imperialist words and *inexorably* leads to the world proletarian revolution." [Italics supplied.]

Along with this dynamics of supposedly infallible dogma there is a dynamics of fear. This point was put to me very vividly by Tomasz Arciszewski, last Prime Minister of the free Polish government-in-exile when I talked with him in London in 1946. Arciszewski, a veteran Socialist, had met Lenin and other Communists at international conferences and was familiar with their psychology and viewpoint.

"Remember," he said as we parted, "as long as there is one free country left, anywhere, the rulers of the Kremlin will never feel safe. They will call it warmongering and imperialistic and do everything in their power to destroy it."

Five years have passed since that talk; and Arciszewski has been proved right by what has happened in many parts of the world — in his own Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Greece, in China, in Korea.

The appeal of communism as an idea to left-wing groups outside of the Soviet Union has been based almost entirely upon false pretenses. The very word is deceptive. It suggests the early Christians voluntarily sharing their goods in communal living, or the Brook Farm idealists practicing plain living and high thinking.

There is probably less voluntary sharing in the Soviet Union than in any country in the world. Inequality is enforced with the utmost rigor, and in far more glaring forms than one would find in a "capitalist" country. The gulf in living standard between a member of the Soviet

governing elite and a starved slave laborer is far wider than the gulf between a wealthy and a poor man in the United States. Red Army soldiers were amazed on finding that privates in the American Army could smoke the same brands of cigarettes as officers. Rank in the Red Army is measured by the quality of tobacco available.

Unfortunately Communists, who are masters of the Big Lie, found in Western countries audiences passionately eager for a Big Myth. Too many Western intellectuals were willing to sell their birthright of a free, civilized culture for a mess of synthetic Messianic pottage.

There were pastors prepared to exalt the "Christianity" of a system which not only denied and persecuted all forms of religion, but practiced systematically acts of mass barbarism and genocide comparable only with the crimes of the Nazis. There were intellectuals who went into ecstasy over the "progressive" character of a regime which has already put into practice many of the grim fantasies of George Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty-Four." There were scientists prepared to admire a dictatorship as intolerant of independent scientific thought as the Inquisition was of Galileo. There were self-styled champions of human liberty prone to overlook the annihilation in Russia of the most elementary rights of man. There were pacifists eager to believe the best of a tyranny that was armed to the teeth.

It is true, of course, that communism, in so far as it is an idea, a system of political and economic thought, is most effectively met by other ideas. But ideas are weapons and ideas have consequences.

And this leads to the second aspect of the communist threat: the worldwide fifth column, of which the strings are pulled from Moscow. There has never been anything quite like this in history. For there has never been a parallel instance when millions of people were enrolled in parties of which the first and indeed the only consistent principle was blind obedience to authority lodged in a foreign capital.

That there should be a Canadian spy case, a Klaus Fuchs case, an Alger Hiss case and many other detected and undetected episodes of treason, sabotage and espionage follows from the nature of communism. If the best answer to communism as a theory is relentless analysis and exposure of its fallacies and false promises, of the contrast between Soviet realities and the absurd mirages which are the stock-in-trade of communist propaganda abroad, the best and the only possible answer to communist subversion is intensified vigilance.

It is preposterous to claim the privileges of dissenting free thought for the man who steals confidential information about secret weapons or who acts as a source of information to Soviet spy rings. As every Communist is a potential traitor and as there is a considerable fringe of fellow-travelers who match the outright party members in fanaticism, the need for intelligent, rigorously enforced loyalty programs is clear and obvious. Equally necessary is continual "redbaiting," in the sense of exposing individuals and organizations which function as volunteer voices of Moscow. If there are excesses in those necessary attempts to combat foreign infiltration, these excesses must be laid to the account of the evil force in Moscow that from the beginning has set as its goal the kindling of civil class war all over the globe.

Finally, there is the third aspect of the communist threat; the growth of a tremendous empire, stretching from Stettin to Canton, inhabited by some 800 million people, in control of almost all the "heartland" of which the British geo-politician Mackinder once wrote:

> Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.
> Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island.
> Who rules the World Island commands the World.

This empire, which now rests with one flank on the subjugated countries behind the iron curtain in Europe, with the other on a communist-dominated China, would never have come into existence if every cardinal principle of maintaining the balance of power had not been recklessly disregarded in the waging of the war and the making of the peace. Even during the period of the cold war, when Marshall and Acheson recognized, in theory at least, that the Kremlin's intentions toward this country were not benevolent, we fell sadly behind in the race for armed auxiliaries.

If one reckons the armies of China, North Korea, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany, the Kremlin can dispose of some five or six million armed men, outside the Red Army. The score on our side is dangerously close to zero, and not for lack of opportunities.

We failed before last June to give the Koreans on our side a fighting chance to defend themselves and help us. We still stubbornly refuse to give the Chinese on our side a fighting chance to get back to the mainland, incidentally reducing the pressure on our own forces in Korea. We are making no serious effort to rearm the Japanese. We have talked about rearming West Germany and accomplished nothing. The Russians have talked not at all, and accomplished a good deal in putting arms in the hands of Germans on whom they rely. We have done nothing to take advantage of the existence of a large pool of reliable anti-Communists, many of them men with military experience, the exiles of communism from Poland, the Baltic states, Yugoslavia, from Russia itself.

Had half the money spent on the Marshall Plan been appropriated for a truly martial plan for a united anti-Communist Europe it would not be necessary to shiver whenever there is a new rumor of a Soviet march to the Atlantic.

The communist triple threat must meet a triple response. The ideological challenge can best be met by a campaign of truth about conditions in the Soviet Union and a ringing affirmation of the pragmatic value of liberty. And it should certainly be as easy to kindle fires behind the iron curtain as it is for Communist incendiaries to touch off blazes in the non-communist part of the world.

Communist subversion and military power are not disembodied ideas. They can only be met effectively on their own ground, by vigorous, intelligent police action and exposure, in one case, by smart balance-of-power politics in the other. We shall be well on the way to countering the communist threat when we recognize its nature and cease confusing freedom to criticize with freedom to conspire and the strategy of terror of a ruthless empire with the persuasive movement of an idea.

FROM OUR READERS

Mr. Acheson's Colors

My Harvard class was 1911, back in the days when scarcely a thought needed to be seriously given as to whether Harvard's sturdy and honored Crimson was in danger of fading to pink.

I know that many older Harvard men are seriously disturbed at the present trend which grants academic freedom of speech to many who appear to support the Communist cause but which would promptly and effectually deny similar academic freedom of speech to any "Fascist," and it hurts to realize that there is so much justification for a great part of the criticism that Harvard's current attitude has brought upon her honored name.

However, it is just "one too many" for me to swallow to have Felix Wittmer, in his letter to President Truman, dated April 12 and published in your issue of June 4, add Secretary Acheson's name to the Harvard pink coterie. Just as Acheson, rowing on a *Yale* crew, let down his crewmates by collapsing in a race against *Harvard*, so is Acheson now, seemingly jittery with fear of the "Big Red" color again, letting down the country.

How Acheson can sleep at night, after losing for his college and now for his country, is a mystery.

Won't you please see that Mr. Wittmer proceeds to give Acheson back to Yale and not add his name to the Mathers, Shapleys and others who have earned for Harvard enough disgust already?

Belmont, Mass. WAYLAND M. MINOT

Nostra Culpa

It is true, as I well know, that a title can not be copyrighted. But don't you think that your editorial entitled "Generals Die in Committee" (June 18) is carrying things too far?

New York City CHARLES YALE HARRISON

[*Our apologies to the author of "Generals Die in Bed." But we beg to point out that Mr. Harrison was dealing with a more glorious breed.*]

"Liberals" Are Privileged People

For some years I've been a fairly successful magazine writer — with about 100 articles and 20 short stories in top magazines. I'm represented by one of the top agents in the business. I've never had any trouble selling anything I've written — until I wrote a story in which the "villain" is one of those hypocritical leftward liberals so characteristic of the 1930s and 1940s. Almost every editor who has read it — and it has been submitted to every magazine from the major slicks to the literary monthlies — liked it, but found some excuse not to buy it. I wondered why, until my agent told me one day that perhaps if I'd made the villain a crooked Congressman I might have a chance with the story!

You can see why I quietly and bitterly laugh to myself when I read in an editorial in one or another liberal journal that liberal writers have a tough time expressing themselves via the radio or magazines or the films.

There's a moral in all this somewhere, but I'm damned if I know it. The whole experience with this story has been so depressing that I haven't written a piece of short fiction since. There seems to be a sort of quiet universal taboo against satirizing the radical. Sinclair Lewis would have starved to death if he'd lampooned the Lattimores instead of the Gantrys and the Babbitts.

New York City MAGAZINE WRITER

MUSICALS WITH PLOTS

By RICHARD McLAUGHLIN

THE OTHER night in the theater a woman within earshot exclaimed: "Why must they make these musicals so earthy!" Justifiable as her indignation was, she might have been more to the point if she had asked why they were so *plotty*. For it is "plottiness" that ails three-quarters of Broadway's musicals today. Where once our musicals did not have enough "book," now they have too much. Patrons of the theater who look to musicals for relief from earthbound cares have hardly had a feeling of being airborne for lo! these many years.

In the old days there used to be a distinction between a musical show and a straight play. But song and dance routines, gag lines, belly laughs and prat falls, all of which used to be backed by an appealing score and bright lyrics, are today fast becoming things of the past. Producers may lay more stress on librettos than before, but the rate of musicals with burdensome stories does not slacken. The plots grow more complicated every season. Even Cole Porter's "Out of This World," which had lavish sets, bright costumes and great acting talent, collapsed under the weight of a clumsily written book. Every succeeding week in the theater takes us further and further from the lighthearted spirit of fun and frolic that once enlivened the American musical comedy stage. It's no substitute for the old type of enjoyment to get an Agnes de Mille or Jerome Robbins ballet sandwiched in between a renunciation and a death scene. Yet that is what nine-tenths of the musical productions offer us today.

"Oklahoma!," adapted from Lynn Riggs's "Green Grow the Lilacs," and "Carousel," based on Molnar's "Liliom," were the first of the streamlined American operas to convince theatrical managements that the public wanted plottiness. "Oklahoma!," revived at the Broadway Theater, has its virtues; but ever since its success originality has had to take a back seat. Depending upon adaptations, the musical show writers have lost all sense of invention. Two glaring illustrations of how unrefreshing, how downright dreary, the musical has become are "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" (Alvin Theater) and "Flahooley," now closed, but to reopen in the fall.

Adapted by Betty Smith and George Abbott from Miss Smith's own best-selling novel, the theater version of "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" requires all its dancers and chorus to make us believe that it is a musical. Even so,

I found its tear-jerkiness far too cloying for my taste. Though Shirley Booth, a warm, vibrant and riotously funny comedienne, gives one of the finest performances of her career as Aunt Cissy, she is not on stage long enough to save the show. Arthur Schwartz and Dorothy Fields have furnished Miss Booth with three numbers ideally suited to her inimitable Broadwayese gusto.

But nothing can stop "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" from lagging toward the end. Songs like "Look Who's Dancing" and "Mine 'Til Monday" introduce a gaiety and heartiness in the first act that is lost in the second. Nor does the production ever come up to the bawdy hilarity of Miss Booth's unforgettable scene where she pretends to her gullible mate that she is giving birth to a baby while a neighbor's infant is being smuggled into her bed. Johnny Johnston as Francie Nolan's lovable ne'er-do-well father, and Marcia Van Dyke as his uncomplaining drudge of a wife, Katie, look and act their parts most convincingly, but they have small voices and their singing verges on the colorless. No doubt they play "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" the way it should be played, as straight heart-throb drama. But why, in that case, should the book ever have been made into a musical in the first place?

Unlike "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn," "Flahooley" has an original book. But this does not make it a better show. Where the one bogs down under its maudlin plot, the other never gets off the ground. Messrs. E. Y. Harburg and Fred Saidy have loaded their "magical musical" with so many plots that it is like a tour through a graveyard. We get all the old heavy-handed satire on American big business, the old political witch hunts and martyred "liberalism" dished up to us again by the socially conscious creators of "Finian's Rainbow." But this time the score can not distract us from the social commentary, as it did in the authors' fantasy about leprechauns in the Solid South.

"Flahooley" is not for the kiddies. Even though Cheryl Crawford has called on David Ffolkes and Howard Bay to provide a glamorous tinselled toyland, with the Bil Baird Marionettes thrown in, no self-respecting parent would want to take his children to see a lot of dolls with their heads bashed in. That is exactly what happens to the Flahooleys, or laughing dolls, in this humorless extravaganza. Invented by an employee in the great toy firm of B. G. Bigelow, Inc., the laughing doll, or Flahooley, is declared to be a menace to our capitalistic economy. Witch hunts are organized against this laughing symbol of "liberalism." In the course of the confusion on the stage, a genie out of Aladdin's lamp, who wishes only to spread happiness and cheer in our frightened world, is driven to a mental hospital.

Ernest Truex plays the wooable toy tycoon with stoic patience and is miraculously well aided, considering the pot of propagandistic shish-kebab he has fallen into, by a company of earnest, talented singers, dancers and actors. But the whole thing falls dead because it is weighted down with inane stereotypes that were old hat even before the pre-1914 muckrake period had passed into oblivion. For Heaven's sake, let's have some musicals that are musical — the theater is bad enough when it gives us straight plays made out of ideas that were second-hand even in the days of Dreiser and of Shaw.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

It [the House Committee on Un-American Activities] is closer to the People's Court of Hitler Germany than anything we have seen in our time. That is what is cold and frightening and evil about it all.

New Republic, November 3, 1947

Let us look forward to a future when American scientists in large numbers are lecturing and working in Soviet laboratories, American students are studying in Soviet universities, and Soviet scientists and students are in America in equal numbers, carrying the most important inspired teachings of each country to the other.

LINUS PAULING, California Institute of Technology, message to the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, November 7, 1943

It is not expected that the [Chinese] Communists will institute or propagandize for an actual Soviet, Communist system. They have not done so where they have had power in the past. Their program, at least thus far, has been one of agrarian reform . . . with the aim of betterment of the life of the masses at the expense of the minority if necessary.

NATHANIEL PEFFER, the *New York Times Magazine*, May 14, 1944

As far as I know it was very largely a group of young men, perhaps assisted by a few women, who cleaned up the Kansas City, Missouri, situation and finally proved that the political boss system under Mr. Pendergast — or anybody else for that matter — rarely brought about an honestly run government. The same thing might be said about the Hines case in New York City. . . . Probably Mr. Hines and Mr. Pendergast are kind and good in many ways according to their lights. They happened to fall on times which were evil for them because the public conscience had changed as to what is right and wrong in positions of public responsibility. These men may feel that they were unjustly singled out.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "Women in Politics," *Good Housekeeping*, March 1940

We must become better acquainted with our new friends, the Russians. We can live peacefully in the same world with the Russians if we demonstrate to ourselves and the world after the war that we have gone in for all-out peace production and total consumer use of our products to bring about the maximum of human welfare.

HENRY A. WALLACE, *Free World*, August, 1943

The Freeman *invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.* THE EDITORS



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

American criticism, within my lifetime, has been a series of fads. In the middle twenties the imitators of Mencken rode high; in the late twenties the New Humanists took up most of the space in the literary magazines. Then came the proletarian cult, the Marxists, the pluggers for social significance. And these, in turn, were followed by the logic choppers, the "grammar boys" (Edward Dahlberg's phrase), and the *partisan reviewer* specialists in Kafka and Henry James.

Because the fads have bloomed and died with extreme rapidity, the literary landscape is littered with critics out of jobs, with comparatively young men without vocation. Only a pertinacious few have lived through the fads; these go on writing criticism because they never made the mistake of trying to merge themselves with the fashions of the moment. An Edmund Wilson, for example, has persisted because he could never give his heart wholly to the demands of any cult; he has always remained Edmund Wilson, a master of expository clarification, even in the midst of his dalliance with estheticism and Marxism. But the Edmund Wilsons among us are few.

One of the handful of critics who have saved their souls by ignoring the claims of the cultists is J. Donald Adams, whose column, "Speaking of Books," appears every Sunday in the *New York Times Book Review*. Since most of his life Mr. Adams has functioned as an editor, his critical output is comparatively slim. But he is a man of learning and of taste, and his deeply abiding convictions go back a long way. His "Literary Frontiers" (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, $2.75), while it lacks the heft and body it might have had if the author were not so immersed in the demands of weekly journalism, gives one the measure of a full man who is well worth the knowing.

I worked for Mr. Adams on the staff of the *New York Times Book Review* some twenty years ago. I remember him complaining then that American novelists seemed bent upon evading the manifold challenges of American life. A great Emersonian, Mr. Adams has always believed, with Emerson, that "all life remains unwritten still." In "Literary Frontiers" this modern Emersonian documents his case against the American novelist. Where, for example, is our big novel about Washington politics? Or about American industry? How many of the women in our fiction are true women? Where is the good novel about the westward movement? Where is our good war novel? Where is our good comprehensive novel about New York City?

To ask these questions is almost to answer them, but Mr. Adams spells out in detail the lacks in our most important writers. He is willing to grant that Howells, Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis have hit off certain aspects of certain types of businessmen in their novels, but their portraits of the movers and shakers of our industrial culture are extremely limited. Worst of all, these portraits have been taken as stereotypes for imitation by a hundred lesser novelists. A couple of generations ago, back in the muckrake days, there was a spate of political novels. Since that day only Elliot Paul (see his "The Governor of Massachusetts") and John Dos Passos have seriously concerned themselves with public figures. As for the novel of New York City, Mr. Adams notes that many writers have concerned themselves with the magazine and publishing worlds. We have had our "Big Wheels," our "Hucksters." But only an occasional Thomas Wolfe or Dos Passos has tried to get around the town, from the quiet back streets of Brooklyn to what Mr. Adams refers to as the crush and loneliness of the subway at Times Square.

Without ever quite saying it in so many words, Mr. Adams puts his finger on the weakness of the American novelist. The weakness stems from a preoccupation with autobiography. If the novelist is in the Hemingway tradition, he tends to be the personal lyricist, not the dramatic observer. Hemingway is magnificent when he is creating from personal mood. But his women, for example, are mainly projections of a very masculine desire. In "A Farewell to Arms" the Hemingway dream girl is called Catherine Barclay. The same dream girl turns up in "For Whom the Bell Tolls" with a Spanish accent and cropped hair. In "Across the River and Into the Trees" she is a young *contessa*. In each case she is docile, passionate — and completely imaginary. As Mr. Adams points out, Hemingway's most successful women characters are Lady Brett Ashley, the bitch-type female of "The Sun Also Rises," and Pilar, the earthy old Wife of Bath of "For Whom the Bell Tolls." But for the rest, Hemingway has specialized in making his women "a mirror for narcissism."

Curiously, the inability to create convincing women characters goes back a long way with the American male writer. Mr. Adams points out that Melville did not write of women, that Hawthorne's Hester Prynne was a wraith, that Mark Twain's universe was one of boys and of boys grown older, that Dreiser's women were "little more than objects of male desire," that Dos Passos's are two-dimensional, that Sinclair Lewis has succeeded only with Fran Dodsworth, that Fitzgerald's girls are "iridescent bubbles." Our women novelists — Willa Cather, Ellen Glasgow, Edith Wharton, Elizabeth Madox Roberts — have done better by their own sex — and by the masculine-feminine relationship in general.

Occasionally I would quarrel with the detail which Mr. Adams uses to support his generalizations. For example, Dos Passos has been very successful with one type of feminine character, that of the dedicated social-worker gal who has enlisted for the duration in the "class struggle." (He doesn't make the breed very appetizing, but that is something else again.) As for Fitzgerald, he once spoke of his girls as being "warm and promising" — and they are all of that. But they are also on occasion considerably more. Nicole Diver, in "Tender is the Night," is a very modern psychotic — and fully as much of a symbol as Hester Prynne. But if Mr. Adams tends to miss the importance of "Tender is the Night," it is one of his very rare errors. In general, his choice of illustrative detail is wholly relevant to the point he is endeavoring to make.

The most rewarding sections of "Literary Frontiers" are devoted to the American novel. But there are good things in the closely linked essays on "The Wonder of the World" and "Words." Mr. Adams has a predilection for the short and lovely words of English speech, words such as "dawn" and "dusk." He doesn't like Latinity; "how few indeed," he says, "are the Latin words woven into the texture of English which have fiber and life." (How about "fortitude," "imperious," or "suave," Mr. Adams?) As for certain words that have lost their luster in recent years — words like "liberty," "honor," "freedom," "faith" and "glory" — Mr. Adams aptly marks that the fault is not in the words themselves. They have lost their luster because we have betrayed them and can not look them in the face.

Edward Dahlberg, as is patent from his "The Flea of Sodom" (New Directions, $1.50), is a very different type of critic from Mr. Adams. But the two share one thing, and that is a fierce integrity. For years Mr. Dahlberg has been an embattled man, fighting a glorious one-man fight for qualities that have all but disappeared out of contemporary literature. As readers of his *Freeman* reviews have had occasion to note, Mr. Dahlberg loves the flashing metaphor, the parable, the Orphic saying, the ritual, the myth, the barbed epigram. Deeply critical of modern life, Mr. Dahlberg is preoccupied with something that lies beyond politics. He is neither for nor against any political *form* as such; what he dislikes about the contemporary world is its *texture*, which he finds appalling under both capitalism and socialism. As Herbert Read points out in an introduction to "The Flea of Sodom," Mr. Dahlberg hates the "garage proletariat," which is universal. He hates it in America — but he also knows that Stalin's tanks stand ready to invade Tibet.

Much of "The Flea of Sodom" is oblique — and some of it is opaque. But it yields its remarkable wisdom to the reader who is willing to savor a few concentrated pages at a time. One can stand a good deal of teasing parable and heavily charged fable if the reward is to be an occasional Dahlbergism such as: "History has been and always will be the jibe of the multitude." Or: "Nations without stable forms and deities are brutish. A populace, mad for novel raiment and bizarre amusements, breaks antique idols and proverbs, and canonizes trash." Or: "Culture is conversation; a noble people are remarkable talkers. Underneath the wholesome tongue is the Tree of Life." Or: "The greatest profligacy comes from tedium. The garage proletariat will blow up the earth to make his existence less monotonous." Or: "No one is on guard enough against his nature, for each man is dear to himself, and thoroughly unprepared for his vices."

Mr. Dahlberg may be wrong-headed at times, and I personally doubt his view that a machine civilization must be a brutish civilization. But he is a gadfly to the comfortable, the well-ensconced, the respectable and those who are, in Peggy Bacon's phrase, "glitteringly unoriginal." We need more like him; one is not enough to overturn the false gods of a sterile moment.

THIS COULD HAPPEN TO EVERYBODY

Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps, by Elinor Lipper. *Chicago: Regnery. $3.50*

Except for Communists and their fellow-travelers, everybody takes it for granted that the Soviet regime in Russia is evil, that it has one of the lowest standards of life in the world, and that the Russians are deprived of democratic freedom. However, there are plenty of people outside the Soviet sphere who think that Soviet rule is all right as far as the Russians are concerned, that, after all, they are accustomed to such conditions as a result of centuries of life under dictatorship, and that the only thing we want is that the Communists leave us alone and do as they like in their Empire.

In order to see how wrong is the conception of a possible peaceful coexistence of democracy and totalitarianism, one should take a look inside the Soviet Union and make his own judgment as to what the real power of the communist system consists of, and how bad life is under it. One should know that it offers no security either to the man in the street or to the Communists themselves; no one, no matter how high his position in the communist hierarchy might be, is safe from physical destruction in dungeons and concentration camps in the Soviet Union.

Life in the Soviet Union ceased to be an academic subject for the West when in 1939 the Communists began step by step to seize a number of countries in Europe and in Asia and to threaten what was left of the free world. There are still many people who think that the world is big enough to live half free and half slave, but these people exist most certainly only outside of the Kremlin. There is no doubt now that Stalin and his associates want to have all the world live in communist slavery.

Those who serve now in the American armed forces, their relatives and friends, should know what the conditions are in Soviet concentration camps, since our soldiers most likely will get there if they are captured by the Communists in Korea or elsewhere. It is an old practice that the prisoners of all Communist-dominated countries serve their terms — or die — in the Soviet Union.

"Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps" is written by Elinor Lipper, who at the age of 25 went voluntarily to the Soviet Union in 1937 in order to see how her conception of socialism had been put into practice in that country. Two months later she found herself in one of the five

Moscow prisons, among other women ranging from peasants to ministers' wives and high-ranking officials of the Communist Party. There were young girls, nursing mothers torn away from their children, and sick and old women among 95 inmates of Miss Lipper's cell, which had been originally designed for 24 prisoners.

Later Miss Lipper was sentenced by a commission of invisible judges to five years' imprisonment for unspecified "counter-revolutionary activity" and sent to one of the remotest slave labor camps of northeastern Siberia.

The book is not so much the personal story of Miss Lipper, which is very dramatic in itself, as it is a broad picture of the life of prisoners. What makes the book especially valuable is that Miss Lipper is the first woman to have written a full account of the life of women under Soviet slavery. These women are tortured by officials of the dreaded NKVD-MVD just as the men are; they are subject to the same hard labor; they are raped with impunity by prison guards and common criminals, and they are punished if they get venereal diseases or get pregnant. Miss Lipper tells about children born in slavery who become the property of the state, about honest girls who become prostitutes after years in "corrective" camps, about the terrifying mortality rate among prisoners from overwork and undernourishment.

Being a Swiss citizen, Miss Lipper had a good chance of release not only from the camp, but also from the Great Prison, usually known under the nickname of the Soviet Union. Instead of the five years she was originally sentenced to, however, she had to stay in prison camps for eleven years, because the Soviet Government found it expedient not to release any political prisoners during the war and for a long time after it. She managed to survive because of her knowledge of medicine, a knowledge which enabled her to hold a job as nurse in prison hospitals.

Unlike the book by the Marquis de Custine, a three-months' visitor to Russia in 1839, Miss Lipper's book is a real document, the most up-to-date report on what is going on in the Soviet Slave Empire. This is an honest and truthful report. I spent six years in the same camp and can confirm every fact presented by Miss Lipper, if not her every general statement.

Unlike the French aristocrat de Custine, who never learned a word of Russian and who had nothing but contempt for the Russians, Miss Lipper recalls many of her fellow-inmates, and the Russian people in general, with great pity and sympathy. She tells the story of a prisoner who presented a petition to a camp commander asking to be transferred to the status of a horse working in the gold mines. The petition said:

> If I were a horse, I would have at least one day off in every ten. Now I have no days off. If I were a horse I could rest now and then while at work. As a prisoner I can not. If I were a horse I would be assigned to work equal to my strength. As a prisoner I am always hungry, and when I don't meet my labor quota I get less bread, so that I do still less work, and in the end I get so little bread that I can hardly stand on my feet. A horse has his stable and his blanket — I haven't had a new jacket for two years. A horse doesn't have to work more than 14 hours a day. But I am kept in mines 16 hours. If drivers beat a horse too hard, they are punished, for a horse is precious here. But who punishes the guards and brigadiers who beat and kick me because I've become too weak to do my work well? What is a prisoner in Kolyma? Nothing. But a horse — a horse is something!

It's not hard to guess that the prisoner was not granted the status of a horse; he was put in the lockup.

Such are the conditions under which some 15 million people are living in the Soviet Union. They include not only the Russians but people from all Communist-controlled territories; there are also Germans, Japanese and other foreigners who had the bad luck to fall into the Soviet web; and there are American boys there, too.

It is everybody's duty to know the facts and to think about what should be done in order to liquidate such a system once and for all, so that human dignity can be preserved all over the world. VLADIMIR PETROV

GRANDPA ELEPHANT

The Twilight of the Elephant, by Elio Vittorini. Translated by Cinina Brescia. *New York: New Directions. $1.50*

The jacket speaks of this "novella" as having "affinities with abstract painting." This is a fair description of the work, though it is not always clear just what is being abstracted. Compassion primarily, perhaps, but hunger, too, as well as a kind of simple stoicism. The concrete symbols are the Elephant, the Stranger, the Mother (a not too distant relative of the mother sketched for us in the author's earlier and more pretentious story, "In Sicily") and, not to be overlooked, Bread.

The Elephant is the name applied to the grandfather of a large and poverty-stricken family. There is something magnificent about an elephant, with his enormous strength and suggestion of Olympian wisdom, his brooding taciturnity and the impression he gives of having lived long years and seen heroic things we can not hope to know. But there is also a suggestion of the ridiculous in his ungainliness and monstrosity. And it must be conceded that he eats a great deal. So his nickname, revealing all these aspects of grandfather, reveals as well the mixture of irritation and admiration which has caused his daughter to bestow it on him. How can she fail to revere the remnants of the strength she knew him to have in his youth? Yet she is a mother, too, and with grandfather consuming an elephantine ration, what chance have her children to savor the good things of life? The allegory here is clear enough and may well have a purely national as well as universal significance.

The situation admits of no satisfactory resolution and none is achieved. There is, in fact, very little action but a great deal of conversation. It is easy to see the techniques with which Hemingway has made American readers familiar — small wonder it is that he thinks highly of Vittorini. There is the same garrulity of the supposedly inarticulate, the same suggestion of drama behind the veil of talk which is often banal in its superficial impression, indeed the same kind of sentimentality which is at the core of the temperaments of both writers. Vittorini's artistic personality is, for all that, traditionally Italian and even Sicilian; the social preoccupations of Verga and the "cerebralismo" of Pirandello are his heritage. I think in this particular story the effect is not as forceful as the author intended it to be; for one thing the canvas is too small for his subject. It is, however, a work of depth and deals with no trivial matters. The translation by Cinina Brescia is well done. THOMAS G BERGIN

MY FORMER STUDENT, MAO TSE-TUNG

By HU SHIH

THERE is a real dearth of biographical information about my former student Mao Tse-tung, the present ruler and dictator of Communist China. For many years the only available material on his life story has been the six chapers entitled "Genesis of a Communist" which form Part Four of Edgar Snow's "Red Star Over China." For the last eight years a Chinese translation by Fang Lin of Snow's report of Mao's "Autobiography" has been in circulation in Communist China and in Hong Kong. This Chinese version seems to have had the benefit of some slight correction and revision either by the Chinese Communist Party or by some one who had semi-official authorization to make the revision. For instance, Mr. Snow named only eight members of the First Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party founded in 1921. The Chinese translation has added four more, including T'an P'ing-shan. Of Snow's original eight, one name was transcribed as "Sun Yuan-lu," which is almost unidentifiable: the Chinese version has the correct name, Shen Hsuan-lu.

In August 1949 there was published in Shanghai a small book by Hsiao San on "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Childhood and Youth," which tells of Mao's early life, in particular his student days at Changsha (1911–1918), with more detail than Snow's account, but which ends the story in 1920 — a year before the founding of the Party — when Mao was only 27 years old. In 1945, Hsiao San had published a magazine article on "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's First Period of Revolutionary Activity," which covered Mao's life in the years 1920–1923. That article has had many unauthorized reprints in many parts of Communist China. But that "first draft" is said to require so much revision that it has never been allowed to appear in book form.

The above list practically exhausts all the available biographical data concerning Mao Tse-tung. "Comrade Mao," says Hsiao San in his preface, "ever since he once yielded to the persistent persuasion of the American journalist, Snow, has never indulged in talking about his own life, nor does he want other people to write his biography." Hsiao San admits that his informants were mostly Mao Tse-tung's old comrades in the Party and in the revolutionary wars, and that his writings about Mao's life had never been read or authorized by Mao himself prior to their publication. Apart from some interesting details of the local geography of Hsiangt'an and Ch'angsha, Hsiao's new book adds little new material to the autobiography as told to Snow and as corrected in Chinese translation.

All this points to the undeniable fact that it is very difficult today to attempt a full-size biography of Mao Tse-tung. The scarcity of narrative biographical material might be partly overcome by some linguistically competent researchers if they would only study systematically Mao's numerous published speeches and writings, and chronologically arrange and present the important ideas and policies contained therein.

Any writer who tries to produce a full-length biography of Mao, but has not the patience or the training to study Mao's numerous speeches and articles, is doomed to miserable failure. He will be forced to appropriate Mr. Snow's record with its numerous small errors. He will be forced to supplement Snow by Hsiao San — and add to the composite, not the results of patient research, but often the labored inventions of an audacious imagination.

Payne's Meager Resources

That seems to be what Mr. Robert Payne has done in his biography, "Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China."[1] The core of his book is of necessity taken from Mr. Snow's account of Mao's autobiography. But Mr. Payne has not made use of the Chinese version which could have corrected many of his mistakes. Although Mr. Payne acknowledges in the introduction that he has been "helped by long talks with Hsiao San in Kalgan," the latter's book and article on Comrade Mao Tse-tung are not listed in Payne's bibliography.

The remainder of the book is Mr. Payne's laborious padding. It is really painful to watch the young author straining his pitifully meager store of knowledge of things Chinese merely to fill the pages of an impossible book.

For instance, Mr. Snow (p. 152) quoted Mao as saying that en route from Tientsin to Nanking, "I stopped at Ch'u Fou and visited Confucius' grave. . . . I also stopped by the river where Yen Hui, one of Confucius' famous disciples, had once lived. . . . On this trip I climbed T'ai Shan, the sacred mountain of Shantung." These sentences are expanded by the imaginative Mr. Payne into two pages of elementary geographical and historical discourse (pp. 61–62) to prove that Mao Tse-tung "had never wholly departed from Confucianism." And what ridiculous information he gives us in those pages! He identifies the river where Yen Hui lived as the Huai River, which is absurd. And he says that Liu Pang, founder of the Han dynasty, raised the standard of revolt "when he was still a shepherd" and created his capital in Sian, "a few miles south of Yenan," all of which is crazy.

Mao Tse-tung had told Snow that when he was in the Hunan Normal School, he was obliged to study the writings of Han Yu and master the old classical phraseology (p. 143). This one sentence of one line and a half is expanded into a sophomoric dissertation on Han Yu, cover-

[1] Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China, by Robert Payne. New York: Schuman. $3.50.

ing fully fifty-nine lines (pp. 31–33) and placing Mao's study of Han Yu in his village school days even before he went to the Senior Primary School in Hsianghsiang.

In recalling the winter scenery of the North Lake in Peking, Mao quoted to Snow (p. 151) one line of verse by the T'ang dynasty poet Ts'en Ts'an (Chen Chang in Snow's transcription) which most school children of Mao's generation used to read and memorize from the popular anthology, "Three Hundred Poems of the T'ang Dynasty." That casual reference to Ts'en Ts'an leads Mr. Payne to write another sophomoric dissertation of two pages and a half (pp. 223–225) on that poet, who, Mr. Payne tells us, has "deeply influenced" Mao Tse-tung's poetry. But all Mr. Payne's diligent searches for Mao's poetry have netted him only three short poems totaling twenty-eight lines in free translation; and one of these, "The Snow," is a *tz'u* (written originally to the tune of a popular melody, but in recent centuries written slavishly to the strict metric pattern of a long forgotten tune) which is a form of Chinese versification unknown to the age of Tu Fu and Ts'en Ts'an. (Had Mr. Payne seen Hsiao San's "Comrade Mao's Childhood and Youth," he could have found a fourth poem of Mao's, also a *tz'u* written to the same forgotten tune.) It is beyond my comprehension that any critic in his senses should be able to judge from three mediocre poems that their author had been "deeply influenced" by a certain poet of the eighth century A.D.

Indeed, Mr. Payne's whole dissertation, thirty-odd pages long, on Mao Tse-tung as a great poet and art critic (pp. 208–240) is the best illustration of the author's great art of filling space with nothingness. From these pages I select this most delicious specimen of sheer nonsense:

> Even his [Mao's] signature dances, the characters having a wild, curving ebullience, and perhaps it is no accident that part of his signature closely resembles the serpentine curve shown in the map of the Third Annihilation Campaign. His signature, based on T'ang dynasty models, flows like water; Chiang Kai-shek's signature, based on the classic Han dynasty script, is squat and square like a toad. A Chinese, comparing their signatures, would know which would conquer the other. (p. 236)

Such instances of empty padding, though highly insulting to the intelligence of the reader, are relatively harmless compared with the hundreds of items of fabricated or falsified history with which this supposed "biography" is filled. One group of glaring examples of falsified history is found in Mr. Payne's account of the May Fourth Incident (pp. 64–71). Mao Tse-tung was not in Peking at the time of the Peking students' demonstration on May 4, 1919; so there was only one passing reference to it in his autobiography (p. 153). Mr. Payne has undertaken to supply an account of this historic event. And a wonderfully imaginative account it is, for it contains at least forty instances of false history! Out of this large number, I offer these five major examples of absolutely untruthful reporting:

> 1. Ch'en Tu-hsiu had for some time been awaiting an explosion of this kind. His plans were prepared, and he carried them out with a masterly sense of order.
> 2. He [Ch'en Tu-hsiu] addressed the 5000 students of Peking University, told them to elect committees to tour the neighboring colleges, and urged them to elect by ballot a supreme committee to be devoted to direct action.
> 3. There was to be a student cabinet and a council of wardens to carry out the decisions of the supreme committee.
> 4. There was to be nothing casual: everything must be done quietly and systematically. The purpose of the new political movement was to overthrow the government . . .
> 5. They [the students] were more than 10,000 strong, and they were armed with wooden clubs, iron bars, and cans of gasoline removed from the laboratories.

All five of these statements (taken from the brief space of twenty lines on pp. 64–5) are without the slightest basis in fact. My friend and colleague, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, having already resigned from the Peking University early in 1919, never addressed the students either on that day or before or after. May 4 (Sunday) being his editorial day, he spent the whole day at his home writing editorials for his six-month-old *Weekly Review*. And he actually knew nothing of the student demonstrations until late in the evening. If there was conscious effort involved in that historic incident, it came from some patriotic elder statesmen who served as members of President Hsu Shih-ch'ang's Special Commission on Foreign Affairs, and who had deliberately passed on to the educational circles the then still secret news that the Paris Peace Conference had decided to yield to Japan all the former German concessions and interests in Shantung.

The spread of this alarming news led to the hasty calling of the students' mass meeting. The purpose of the meeting was not "to overthrow the government," but to discuss the ways and means of voicing the students' protest against the decision of the Paris Conference. It is a matter of public record that the students were not armed in any manner. And it is a well-known fact that at that time the Peking students had no inter-school organization, and it was not until the month of June that there was some semblance of a national student organization. The whole May Fourth affair was spontaneous and unorganized; and it was the crowd psychology of the moment that led a part of the parade to the house of Ts'ao Ju-lin, then Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Some Whopping Mistakes

Of the hundreds of instances of false history in Payne's volume, I shall select only the more outrageous:

> In all he [Yen Fu] translated more than 112 books from five languages, even from languages of which he was entirely ignorant. . . . He was not a good translator. He was often inaccurate. (p. 17)

This is criminal calumny against the good reputation of a most conscientious scholar and translator. So conscientious was he as a translator that he will always be remembered for his famous remark, "The final decision on the translation of a single new term often cost me ten days or even a month of careful consideration." In a lifetime he translated only eight works, seven from English, one from French. Here is another example (p. 17):

> Yen Fu returned from the Naval College at Greenwich with a rough draft of a translation of Darwin's "Origin of Species" in his pocket, completed the translation in Peking, and had it published. The Empress Dowager read the book, admired the classical perfection of his prose, and shook her head uncomprehendingly.

This makes a good story but it is absolutely untrue. Yen Fu never translated any work of Darwin. "Origin of Species" was translated by my teacher and friend, Mr. Ma Chun-wu.

In Mr. Payne's account of the "Long March," there occurs this jewel of truly marvelous literary inventiveness:

> The strain of the Long March was beginning to tell. Mao was very lean, with dark hollows under his eyes, and often ill. . . . He wore a faded blue uniform, carried no caps, and there were usually books in his pocket — a copy of the monkey tale, "Journey to the West," and the old dog-eared copy of "All Men Are Brothers." The book, "Journey to the West," described a pilgrimage of a learned monkey through China, Tibet and India, and *what was surprising was the accuracy of a medieval fairy tale when it came to describing the borderlands of China and Tibet.* [p. 154, italics mine]

Is it possible that Mr. Payne has never read Mr. Arthur Waley's delightful translation of "Monkey," which has both English and American editions! Where did he get such absurd information about this Chinese fairy tale which has absolutely nothing in the way of "accurate" geographical information about "the borderlands between China and Tibet"?

Absurd Fabrication

All this elaborate padding and absurd fabrication is unnecessary when there are so many published speeches and pamphlets by Mao Tse-tung which are accessible to anyone who reads Chinese. Not a few of Mao's writings are available in English translations. Almost every one of his speeches and articles is clearly dated. All these dated writings constitute a large collection of important and truly biographical data for the writing of any life story of Mao Tse-tung.

Unfortunately, Mr. Payne has neither the linguistic training nor the research technique to make full use of this mass of useful material. He does have a chapter entitled "Five Books," which attempts to summarize five of Mao's "books" or pamphlets. But that chapter is most disappointing in many ways. In the first place, the five works are not presented in their chronological order. Secondly, Mr. Payne fails to give us a comprehensive and intelligible summary of any of these five works. A possible exception is "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China," from which Mr. Payne has quoted fairly full passages of some importance. But the reader will not be able to understand the content of any of the other writings from Mr. Payne's scanty quotations and unmethodical discussions. Mao's booklet on "Coalition Government" has 50,000 words in Chinese, and Mr. Payne quotes only twenty-five lines: the reader is never told what kind of "coalition government" was demanded by Mao for the period of the War against Japan and for the postwar period. Mr. Payne, in another chapter entitled "Five Battles," makes use of Mao's summary of the five Annihilation campaigns of the Nationalist forces, which Mao had used as illustrations in his five lectures on "The Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary Wars." But neither in that chapter, nor in the chapter on "Five Books," has Mr. Payne shown any understanding of the importance of this work, in which Mao Tse-tung, without ever mentioning the names of Clausewitz, Lenin and Stalin, devotes forty-eight of his seventy pages to a detailed and eloquent exposition of the Clausewitz-Lenin-Stalin strategy of the "counter-offensive" and of the great value of the "strategy of retreat." Nowhere else is Mao better shown as a master strategist and as (in the words of the Communist Ch'en Pai-ta) "the gifted disciple of Stalin."

In the third place, Mr. Payne has left out a number of Mao's important writings which must be included in any biographical study of this ruler and dictator of Communist China. Of these, I may mention the following:

1. His speech on "The Three Purges" (February 1942), demanding "purification" in thought, in the party leadership, and in the literature produced by the Party.

2. His speech on "Oppose All Party-line pa'ku" [the eight-legged essay] of February 8, 1942, which represents Mao Tse-tung at his best in both destructive and constructive criticism of Communist literature, and in particular of the prose style.

3. His speeches at the opening and conclusion of the Round Table Meeting of Writers and Artists at Yenan, May 2 and 23, 1942, which Payne barely touches in his book. (pp. 238–9)

4. The "Present Situation and Our Duties" (December 25, 1947) which contains his famous ten principles of the Communist strategy and tactics. The English translation of this bears the title, "Turning Point in China."

5. "The People's Democratic Dictatorship" (June 30, 1949) which best describes the dictatorial and despotic nature of the present regime in China, and which has been made required reading for all teachers and students in all grades of schools from primary school to university.

This last mentioned article, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," has been translated in full, and the whole English text was included in the Department of State's "United States Relations With China" (popularly known as the "White Paper on China," pp. 720–729). From this version Mr. Payne apparently took one sentence about Hung Hsu-chuan (please note where Payne derived this wrong spelling of the name of the leader of the Taiping Rebellion), Yen Fu, Kang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen as "the four men who sought the truth from the West." On the strength of this casual sentence, Mr. Payne wrote his first chapter of twenty-one pages on "the Forerunners." But he has completely ignored the main body of this very important document. Why is he so unwilling to present to his readers this most eloquent and most outspoken exposition of the despotic nature of the state and government under which four hundred million human beings are now living and suffering?

How can the world understand the real Mao Tse-tung if his biographer deliberately, or unwittingly, leaves out such interesting revelations as this passage from his speech on the sixtieth birthday of Stalin (1939):

> Stalin is the leader of world revolution. Stalin's emergence in the history of mankind was a momentous event; thanks to Stalin, the cause of the revolution has progressed successfully. You know that Marx is dead, that Engels is dead, and Lenin is dead, and who could have given orders and issued commands if it had not been for Stalin? The fact that Stalin has come into the world is . . . fortunate. Today, when we have the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and Stalin — all's right with the world.

In short, Mr. Payne's "Mao Tse-tung" is an ignorant and irresponsible book. Mr. Payne's ignorance of the Chinese language and Chinese history is truly appalling; but his pretense to knowledge is even worse than his ignorance. To praise Mao's poems, for example, is ignorance; but to say that "from that moment [of the publication of Mao's airplane poem, 'The Snow'] hundreds of Chinese, particularly in the Universities, came to feel

a real respect for Mao as a poet," and to describe that poem as one "which would embrace the whole of Chinese legend and Chinese history in a moment of time," is unpardonable pretense of knowledge of things of which he is deplorably ignorant. Mr. Payne does not know that Chinese critics have publicly pointed out that it was sheer ignorance for Mao Tse-tung to say that Wu Ti of Han or T'ai Tsung of T'ang was "hardly lettered" and that Genghis Khan "knew only how to bend his bow at the eagles." Any Chinese can tell Mr. Payne that Mao mentioned the eagles in describing Genghis Khan merely because the word *tiao* (eagle) happened to rhyme with the other lines which all have the end-rhyme of *-ao* or *-iao*.

And very often Mr. Payne's ignorance of Chinese language and history furnishes ample evidence to prove the doubtful character of some of his sources of information. One such source of information was supposed to be Mao Tse-tung himself, whom Mr. Payne claims to have interviewed in Yenan and whose conversation fills pages (215–221) of his book. Here is a part of that conversation:

> I asked when there would be peace. . . . "When the people rule," he [Mao] answered. He had a way of saying *ming-sheng*, the people's rule, which was like the sudden, startling pealing of a bell. (p. 218)

Mathews's *Chinese-English Dictionary* (1950) lists fourteen Chinese words pronounced *ming*, but none meaning "the people"; and eighteen words pronounced *sheng*, but none meaning "to rule" or "government." What could possibly be the language or dialect that Mr. Payne has put into the mouth of Mao Tse-tung? Or was it some "foreign devil" posing as the future "Ruler of Red China?"

What is most offensive in Mr. Payne's book is his complete unawareness of a sense of intellectual and historical responsibility in undertaking to write a work of biography, which should be a part of authentic history.

MIRRORWISE

Selected Prose and Poetry of Edgar Allan Poe. Edited with an Introduction by W. H. Auden. *New York: Rinehart. $.95*

Even rooftops that wear a television antenna usually have a Poe of some sort tucked away below (say, behind the equally disused radio set); therefore another edition, and a selection at that, may hardly seem notable. On the other hand, few of us have probably read much Poe since we were thirteen (and loved "he accosted me with trepidation" for its ten-dollar words), so that sooner or later, in these days of nervous inventory, the man our high school teacher said invented the detective story will be due for "revaluation." When he is, this bargain selection, which comes wrapped in an introduction by W. H. Auden, will be as serviceable a basis for beginning speculation as any.

Mr. Auden is athletic and witty, and if he exposes here and there (intentionally, I don't doubt) the exasperation of a major recognized artist who must still give over his mornings to editing and introducing in order to make a living, this is not inappropriate in connection with one of the most journalistically overworked poets in literature. On Poe's verse and criticism, since he comes at their problems from the inside, Mr. Auden has wise remarks to make. On the fiction, lacking a practitioner's insight, he resorts to a familiar Auden strategy — the overly-tidy categorization. A line down the middle of the blackboard: "Poe's minor fiction also falls into two groups" etc. — and over the Gothic spread of black cats, telltale hearts, sullen tarns, swirling maelstroms, purloined letters and descending blades, is pressed a sharp, Augustan cookie-cutter. As so often with Auden's patterns, one suspects that, as James said of American trains, "the country exists for the cars." But the result is always lively, and Mr. Auden has set a unique example of adaptability. Only an ingrate would cavil.

Reading through the Poe (incidentally, since Mr. A. himself points out that much of Poe's "best criticism will never be read widely because it lies buried in reviews of totally uninteresting authors," I wish he'd have found room for a selection), I found myself interested not so much in "Eureka" or the "Narrative of A. Gordon Pym," which Auden emphasizes, as in the famous description, in "The Philosophy of Composition," of the writing of "The Raven."

Isn't this an example — the earliest in American literature — of the artist arrived at that crucial stage of self-consciousness in which, in addition to making the image in his poem or novel, he feels compelled to make a corollary image of himself creating that first image? (James's prefaces, Gide's journal to "The Counterfeiters," Allen Tate's "Portrait of Narcissus as Narcissus" are some of its successors.) And may not Baudelaire's "shock of recognition" have been prompted — as much as by his sympathy with Poe's "diabolism" — by the appearance of this new species of artist (Coleridge, Poe's master, was the first full-blown example in English) — the man who finds himself fallen in two, and unexpeditiously aware of himself in the very act of creating; and who can therefore only completely express himself with a double exposure, by writing, like Henry Miller in "The Tropic of Cancer," in front of a mirror?

ROBERT PHELPS

SURFEIT

These years of ours are swollen
Stuffed-to-the-gullet years,
Craw-crammed and nauseous
With poisoned days, sick hours,
And minutes soured by hate.

The world's spent ducts
Run dry of tears.
Grave-diggers shovel late.

Is it unreason, then,
To dream of a hollow season?
Of vegetable decades, free of bile,
Mounting uncounted into empty spans,
While great historical events
Are measured out like misers' pence,
And there is time, full time,
For life's more private mystery?

Dear God above! we vomit history.

BEN RAY REDMAN