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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT E. COULSON has been Mayor of Waukegan, Illinois, for three years, and is now a candidate for the office of State Senator. He served as Assistant State's Attorney of Lake County in 1940-41 and 1946-49. During the intervening five years he served with the Counter-Intelligence Corps in this country and the Office of Strategic Services in Burma and China. Mayor Coulson has lectured on juvenile delinquency, and an article of his on this subject appeared in *Harper's* in 1948.

GARET GARRETT is a frequent contributor to the *Freeman*. His article is a chapter from a forthcoming pamphlet, "Rise of Empire," to be published by Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho.

A. A. IMBERMAN, who heads a public relations firm in Chicago, wrote "Free Enterprise: The Worker's View" for the *Freeman* of October 8, 1951. He has contributed to *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

LEWIS NORDYKE, a Texas newspaperman, has reported on all phases of the cattle business for the past fifteen years. His "Cattle Empire" was published in 1949, and he is now at work on another book on historical phases of the cattle industry.

WALTER SULZBACH contributed an article on the European Payments Union to the *Freeman* of June 18, 1951. He is a writer and lecturer on economics and political science, and formerly held professorships in economics at the University of Frankfurt and the Claremont Graduate School in California.

CECIL PALMER, noted British publisher, author and lecturer, was a founder and executive officer of the Society of Individualists. His sudden death on January 18 was a loss to the cause of anti-Statism. Mr. Palmer's most recent book, "The British Socialist Illfare State," is scheduled for spring publication in this country.

MICHAEL J. BERNSTEIN is an attorney who was formerly managing editor of the *Literary World*. He has contributed to *Land and Freedom* and other Single-Tax publications.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1952

THE FORTNIGHT

The Administration and the Europe-firsters had no stomach for reviving the great debate of a year ago, and their strategy in dealing with former President Herbert Hoover's powerful statement of January 27 was to ignore his arguments and facts and to try to dismiss him as a military amateur. But they received a jolt when Mr. Hoover published the messages of approval he had received from a formidable list of generals, admirals and former ambassadors.

Meanwhile there has been no real answer to the facts that Mr. Hoover cited. The French have cut down their promise of fifteen divisions at the end of 1952, made a year ago, to ten. The German contribution is still on paper. The British have announced that their four divisions on the continent will not be a part of the European army, but will only "cooperate." "In sum, the only substantial additions to West Europe ground armies during the two years past have been the American divisions we have sent over."

Aside from American and British divisions, Mr. Hoover continued, "it would be difficult to find ten battle-worthy divisions in the Western European Army today." Even if the dream of a sixty-division army is realized two or three years from now, it would compare with over 200 equipped divisions which these same western European nations placed in the field within sixty days after the outbreak of each of the World Wars. And against our proposed sixty divisions we are told that the Communist armies comprise 300 divisions. General Eisenhower himself now concedes that NATO "is little more than a skeleton."

As Mr. Hoover has summed it up, this is not a calculated risk but a calculated Dunquerque. When we add that the western European nations are contributing less than 10 per cent of the total military expenditures of NATO, is not surprising that Mr. Hoover thinks it time we told our western European friends "certain things in no uncertain terms." Among them are that "ground armies are Europe's own sole problem" on the European continent, and that prior to actual war, certainly, the limit of our aid should be "deterrent air and sea power and munitions."

As for Korea, as Mr. Hoover points out, during the past year "the United Nations vetoed General MacArthur's policies of destroying the Chinese air sanctuary in Manchuria and the employment of Chiang Kai-shek's armies to save American lives. Accordingly, we denied ourselves victory." In our truce negotiations, "we have retreated from the original purpose of unity and independence for Korea to an appeasement idea of a division of Korea about where it was before."

The former President's summary reminds us of a prophetic letter we received on July 20 last, when the truce negotiations had been on for only about ten days. The letter was from a former high official of the State Department. He wrote: "It was blatantly apparent that the Malik speech could mean only one of two things: either the Communists had to have a cease-fire or they were planning a trick. In either event, our position should have been that they were the ones seeking the cease-fire and not we, and that, correspondingly, we would lay down the terms and conditions to be met. In short, we should have taken a tough stand. Instead, we had Ridgway send out more or less hysterical appeals over the radio every other minute begging for a cease-fire, then instructed him to do nothing which would cause the Communists to lose face, with the result that we lost tremendous face and were terribly humiliated." After seven months of negotiations none of this needs to be changed.

People who believe there has been something amiss with the conduct of American foreign policy under the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations have had a tough ten years. They have argued themselves blue in the face, they have marshaled endless displays of excellent logic, yet it has often seemed as though they were speaking

into a soundless void. During the past two weeks, however, it has begun to look as though a decade of pertinacity has not been entirely in vain. For one thing, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously agreed to repudiate the Yalta provision which handed certain Japanese islands to the Russians. For another, 55 Senators have proposed a Constitutional Amendment designed to keep slipshod "international" covenants of the type consistently dreamed up by the UN from overriding the basic law of the land. It may be the counsel of realism to doubt the durability of such evidences of returning sanity, particularly in view of the fact that Senator Taft seems to be making no headway in his efforts to protect the Constitutional right of Congress to limit the use of American troops abroad. However, as congenital optimists we can hardly forebear to let out a joyous squeak. Some day we hope to be able to make it a whoop.

There are, we believe, some 40,000 American women and children in Germany, the families of our occupying forces and officials there. Now either the Administration believes that a Russian attack on Europe is imminent, or it does not. If it does not believe that a Russian attack on Europe is really imminent, what is its excuse for the enormous military expenditures for which it is now asking, for the more than $10,000,000,000 of foreign aid that it now wishes to provide, mainly in Europe, and for its pledges of even greater American land forces in Europe? If the Administration does believe that a Russian attack on Europe is imminent, why does it keep these American women and children in jeopardy?

Those Floridians who have taken to beating and shooting Negroes they don't happen to like or agree with may derive some comfort from the fact that they are behaving in the way that Joe Stalin and Vishinsky think is typically American. They may be sure that every poor *mouzhik* behind the Iron Curtain will hear about their exploits.

Judge Thomas F. Murphy, a competent investigator, was independent enough to comprehend the uses to which his reputation would be put if he agreed to be President Truman's clean-up man. So he asked to be excused. A Democrat of long standing, he did not propose to bail Mr. Truman out with his high personal reputation; nor did he want to be a party to an attack on Congressional prerogatives and duties. Now Mr. Newbold Morris, who has every citizen's inalienable right to call himself a Republican, has come to President Truman's aid. Mr. Morris's special competence as an investigator is an unknown quantity, except that his investigation of various subversive organizations whose activities he has supported in the past was, to put it mildly, a shockingly amateurish job. Senator Mundt was unable to find any evidence that Mr. Morris has ever repented his cavalier endorsement of four groups listed as subversive by the U. S. Attorney General ("American Committee for Yugoslav Relief," "Action Committee to Free Spain Now," "American Youth Conference" and "Lawyers Committee for the American League for Peace and Democracy").

Representative Potter and Senator Mundt, confident that naiveté rather than subversive intent made Mr. Morris participate in such activities, advanced the neat point that the same naiveté surely would disqualify him for a job which, if anything, requires the hardest-boiled worldliness combined with an unerring instinct for right and wrong. We would like to expand that estimate. Even if Mr. Morris had never fallen for the peculiar charms of New York's Communists, a man so patently incapable of perceiving the tie-up between politics and his surprise appointment would seem a poor bet for untieing the much more subtly strung knots between politics and corruption. Merely by accepting such an appointment a few months before election, Mr. Morris, Republican or not, seems to be casting suspicion on his technical fitness for the job. However, we certainly hope we are wrong.

In the fifth of a series of articles on the effect of war mobilization, Benjamin Fine, education editor of the *New York Times,* on January 18, found an unique horror with which to scarify "progressive" educators. A Citizens School Committee in Los Angeles, it seems, has adopted a resolution favoring: 1) Emphasis on the teaching of spelling, English grammar, clear handwriting, elementary arithmetic, geography, history and literature. 2) More discipline in the classroom. 3) The use of grading marks and report cards. 4) Tests for promotion at the close of each term. "If put into practice," says Mr. Fine, "the above suggestions will turn the educational clock back a good half century." We are still shuddering.

Recently, on a trip outside the continental limits of the United States, we heard some grumbling about the treatment of dogs in America. It seems that American dogs have it too good! Some 550 million dollars are lavished on America's 22 million dog population to carry it from cradle to grave. Even the mutts in the back alleys get an occasional fat marrow bone. Of the huge amount of money spent on American dogs, some 200 million dollars go for pasteurized, homogenized and vitaminized multi-flavored dog foods. Oh, to be a dog in America! But just try to tell a Socialist that a dog's life under capitalism is often better than a human being's life under socialism and see what it gets you. The look the Socialist will give you shouldn't happen to a dog.

We can't vouch for it, but an informant tells us that the philosophy of the Pentagon about Korea can be summed up as follows: "It's true it isn't a good war, but it's better than no war at all."

George F. Kennan: Policy-Guesser

MR. GEORGE F. KENNAN, who has been nominated as Ambassador to the USSR, is regarded by official Washington and many newspaper columnists and editors with a respect approaching reverence. He is the author of the "containment" policy (which is costing us billions of dollars, thousands of casualties and a calamitous loss of prestige, and containing Soviet expansion with all the effectiveness of a sieve), and he is said to be the American diplomat who more than any other understands the Soviet mind and the designs of the Kremlin.

With all due respect to Mr. Kennan, we do not find in his statements on foreign policy any sign of greater awareness of the Kremlin's strategy in its war against the West, than in the statements of Dean Acheson or any other State Department official. There is no such sign in his recent book, "American Foreign Policy, 1900-1950." And the misgivings inspired by this book (and the wasteful and ineffectual "containment policy") are only deepened by the appearance of Part V of the McCarran Committee hearings.

This volume contains the official transcript of the secret round table discussion at the State Department in 1949, concerning which Mr. Harold Stassen testified before the Committee. Mr. Kennan, then Director of the Department's Foreign Policy Planning Committee, "briefed" that conference on what, he said, "seems to us to be the relationship between the problem of China . . . and our general foreign policy."

Ignoring the all-important fact that American policy had delivered Chinese nationalism into the hands of the Communists, Mr. Kennan told the conference that the attachment of European countries to national independence and their repugnance to "the sort of thing that was being thrust upon countries by the Russians," had enabled our assistance to Europe to be of "real political value." But, he said,

> there is also the fact that it does seem to us a more serious prospect that the Russians should get hold of Europe from the sheer military standpoint of national security than it does that they should get hold of China and Asia.

Mr. Kennan was also of the opinion that Soviet Russia could do little for China—the logic of its situation, he thought, indicated that such resources as it could spare would go to building up the Soviet Far East. Indeed, he quoted Stalin's answer to the question what Russia was going to give to China when the war was over:

> "What the hell do you think we can give to China? We have a hundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East I think it's you." And I think he was speaking quite sincerely.

Unfortunately for Mr. Kennan's claim to expertness on Soviet designs, the Korean war has taught us what Stalin was prepared to give to China, namely: arms. It has also made a mockery of his appraisal of the Soviet concept of the military role of a Communist China:

> I think militarily they do not look to the Chinese for very much except on a local scale. That is, I would say that if you were probably able to take them apart in the minds of people in the Kremlin on this subject you would find that the role they allotted in their minds to the Chinese Communist military forces was one of assuring the exclusion of ourselves and other imperialist [*sic*] elements from those areas contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union and that they would be relying still basically on the Red Army for their security. I mean they would allot a sort of a role of provincial legionnaires to the Chinese Communist forces in their minds and not a major role. I doubt that they would want them to become, even if they could, a major military power.

Here it may be remarked that the well-known foreign correspondent, Karl von Wiegand, only recently reported on reliable authority that Soviet Russia is planning the complete militarization of Communist China, with the objective of building up an army of twenty million men.

It is the tragedy of the Western world that its official experts on foreign policy seem unable or unwilling to read. Had they read "Mein Kampf," they might have averted the most disastrous war in history. They are now depending on such guesses as Mr. Kennan's concerning Soviet designs, instead of the Soviet blueprint for world conquest which was published in the mid-twenties and has already been in large measure carried out. Had Mr. Kennan only taken the trouble to read the blueprint, he could have told his listeners that it has been the declared Soviet intention for a quarter-century to destroy the West through the conquest of Asia. This strategy was clearly and publicly defined before 1928 in Stalin's book, "Marxism and the National and Colonial Questions" (New York: International Publishers), from which Mrs. Alice Widener has twice quoted in these pages. On page 148 of that book, Stalin said:

> Two things are possible: either we succeed in stirring up and revolutionizing the far imperialist rear—the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East—and thereby hasten the fall of capitalism, or we muff it, and thereby . . . weaken the force of our movement. . . . The road to the victory of the revolution in the West lies through a revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries. . . .

The pamphlet, "China in Revolution," from which Mrs. Widener has also quoted, contains a

speech delivered by Stalin on November 30, 1926, in which he clearly stated the military role allotted to China "in the minds of the people in the Kremlin":

> . . . military questions in China are . . . the most important factor in the Chinese Revolution. The Communists must, with this objective in view, study militarism . . . the future revolutionary power in China will have the advantage that it will be an anti-imperialist power . . . every advance of this power is a blow aimed at world-imperialism [i.e. the West] and is therefore a stroke in favor of the revolutionary world movement.

That same pamphlet contains a speech by Dmitri Manuilsky, now UN delegate of the so-called Ukrainian Republic, who said, among other things:

> . . . The American imperialists . . . are bound to miscalculate because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in Asia and on the Pacific. . . . Liberated China will become the magnet for all the peoples . . . who inhabit the Philippines, Indonesia, and the numerous islands of the Pacific: it will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism. . . . Revolutionary China . . . can become, in alliance with the USSR, the greatest world factor in the Far East. . . .

We leave it to our readers whether history has borne out the declared intentions of the Soviet leaders or the guesses of Mr. Kennan. It is very late—American policy-makers may have miscalculated too long—but we think Mr. Kennan, before he goes to Moscow, ought to brush up on what the Soviet leaders have said, not in conferences with Western "imperialists," but in their published manuals for their own imperialist revolutionary movement.

The Drastic Mr. Morris

THOUGH Mr. Truman had publicly warned of forthcoming drastic developments in his promised clean-up of governmental misfits, the appointment of Mr. Newbold Morris for the job has caught us entirely unprepared. That the operation requires boldness will be readily granted by any one who knows the intricacies of the fur and freezer business. But we wonder if Mr. Truman is not overdoing it.

Once Judge Thomas Murphy had stood him up, Mr. Truman grew understandably desperate about arranging a date with an attractive independent, *any* attractive independent, willing to dance with him the clean-up quadrille. But the longer he waited the clearer it became that the affair would be stiffly formal and anything but fun: The dance steps were rigidly prearranged (the Attorney General, who himself has to be investigated, contributes the choreography), and the timing was atrociously obvious (to install that sort of "investigation" in an election year is tantamount to suppressing an inconvenient campaign issue). So objectionable, in fact, does the strategy behind the Morris appointment look to us that we propose to discuss it here without reference to his personality, with which we deal separately on page 324 of this issue.

The most questionable aspect of the stratagem is its axiomatic principle: the contention that appointed special investigators are bound to do a better job than Congress. That this contention is so axiomatically accepted by the public, or rather by the press, speaks for the success of the defamation campaign the same press has for years been aiming at Congress. Our Constitutional system of checks and balances leaves no possible doubt that a meticulous supervision of the executive branch is not so much a Congressional prerogative as an ineluctable Congressional duty. And notwithstanding the editorial insinuations of journalists engaged in the fashionable Congress-baiting, the investigatory achievements of the last two Congresses have been, on the whole, really magnificent.

There exist, of course, a few famous precedents of investigations conducted by special citizens' commissions rather than Congress. But significantly, each of these precedents (and they were immeasurably rarer than the public is made to believe these days) occurred when the investigated Administration was so completely in control of a friendly Congress that a Congressional investigation might have smelled of leniency, if not of whitewash. By the same token, whenever Congress recovered the politely tense relations with the Chief Executive which so peculiarly, and advantageously, fit our political system, it discharged its investigatory duties under its own steam and to the ultimate satisfaction of all.

And no wonder. In Constitutional theory as well as in political practice, the investigatory powers of Congress are of course clearly superior to those of any other body, appointed or otherwise. For, while Congress can always hire competent talent for intricately technical scrutinies, even the most independent technicians will, as a rule, lack the inexorable authority of a Congress which knows and uses its powers. In our form of government no other process of political fact-finding can match the validity of a Congressional investigation—provided, of course, the executive branch does not willfully sabotage it. For, if the President *wants* to prevent Congress from getting the facts, he is the one man in Creation who can do so.

And this is precisely the case of Mr. Truman. Sworn to be the foremost defender of the Constitution, the incumbent President has never missed a chance to undermine the nation's confidence in Congress. For rather transparent reasons of his own, Mr. Truman has always been particularly anxious to obstruct Congressional inquiries into governmental failures—by "classifying" impor-

tant evidence, under the discriminatory powers of his office, in order to withhold it from Congressional scrutiny; by silencing relevant witnesses among Federal employees with the gag of office discipline; and by many another technique available to a willful President. The ruse he relied on most in the area of Federal corruption was, from the start, the scheme of sidetracking the whole investigation by throwing it to appointed special investigators. In this Mr. Truman has been regrettably helped by a myopic press which, in its strange quarrel with Congress, is inclined to find mythical merits in appointed investigatory commissions.

What makes the stratagem additionally suspect is Mr. Truman's obvious intent to blanket the discussion of a most pertinent campaign issue for the crucial months preceding the election. Once those famously judicious "independent" investigators have begun their search, which, for quite a few months, will of necessity remain invisible and inaudible to the public, he apparently figures he can cloak his understandable desire for silence with the seemingly dignified plea that their findings must not be prejudged by public disclosure. And if by a stroke of good luck, helped a bit by Executive finagling, the "independent" investigators were to emerge with their report not before next November, the hottest political issue would have been taken out of politics—no mean achievement even for a politician of Mr. Truman's extraordinary cunning.

Religion and the Schools

THE New York State Board of Regents has proposed a program for daily prayer and for the intensification of religious attitudes in the public schools. The proposal has brought Dr. William Heard Kilpatrick, the eminent philosopher of Progressive education, to a provocative boil. In a letter to the *New York Times* Dr. Kilpatrick objects to the Regents' idea as something that "promises to be hurtfully divisive among religious groups while it destructively threatens the basic American doctrine of the separation of church and state."

The main point of Dr. Kilpatrick's letter is something that calls for both serious discussion and a wary tread. For it is perfectly true that any elaborate religious program imposed on the public schools by a majority of the population might involve a disastrous slur on the rights of the minority. It can be argued with cogency that no Buddhist should be taxed to put a Protestant Christian in charge of the religious "intensification" of a Buddhist child. Pursued to its logical conclusion, of course, the question of separation of church and state rays out into the equally basic question of separation of school and state. Schooling implies learning to discriminate between values, which brings one quickly into the area of philosophy and religion. This, however, is not a point to be argued here. For better or worse, the United States has a long tradition of "free compulsory" public education, and the tradition is not going to be uprooted overnight. Since the American school system is obviously here to stay for a while, the practical problem is how to make the public school student aware of the claims of religion without setting Catholic against Protestant, Baptist against Unitarian, Deist against Fundamentalist, or agnostic against believer.

Our own proposal in this matter is simple: let the public school authorities set ten minutes aside each day for silent meditation. The ten minute period might, of course, be utilized for daydreaming or the plotting of mischief by a certain type of child. To forestall or at least to minimize this possible eventuality, parents of school children should be asked to help determine the use and content of the period of silent meditation by serious preliminary discussion with the child at home.

A second part of our proposed solution of a knotty problem is this: let the study of Biblical literature be made mandatory in the public schools as a practical matter of historical orientation, just as a study of American history is now mandatory. A study of Old and New Testaments can be justified even to agnostics, for no one can understand the origins of Western values in general or the American political system in particular without some knowledge of Biblical scripture. The Western view of man, whether Catholic or Protestant, is a derivative from the gospels, and no child in a Western school should escape exposure to the literature which is at the root of his historical being.

Our ideas about silent meditation and the compulsory teaching of Biblical literature as part of the Western tradition could hardly be objected to by Dr. Kilpatrick on philosophical grounds. After all, we are not insisting on "inculcation"; the agnostic student could utilize the period of meditation to reflect upon the wonders of science or the color of the autumn leaves. And the student of Biblical literature would be free to reject the idea of the divinity of Christ if his parents had so conditioned his mind.

It might be a problem, of course, to win Dr. Kilpatrick to the idea of presenting any course on a compulsory basis. As a student of the learning process, Dr. Kilpatrick has discovered that no one can really learn anything that he is not inwardly prepared to accept. There is a certain shrewdness to this observation. The trouble with the more doctrinaire type of Progressive educator, however, is that he discounts the role of trained repetition in providing students with the *tools*, as distinct from the meaningful *content*, of education. Dr. Kilpatrick argues that mere repetition in school of the daily pledge of allegiance to the flag of the American Republic is not precisely calculated to instil either patriotism or the rever-

ence for the Creator that is mentioned in the literature of the Founding Fathers.

Says Dr. Kilpatrick:

> Instead of "I pledge allegiance" we find the children writing: "I pejur legons," "I plaig alegins," "I pledge a legion," "I pledge the Legen to the flag." Instead of "to the Republic for which it stands" we find: "to the Republicans," "to public for witches stand," "to the republic for Rich can stands." Instead of "one nation indivisible" we find "one country invisable," "one country inavisable," "one nason in a fesible." Instead of "liberty and justice" they write: "with liberty and jesters," "off liberty just for all," "with liberty and jest straws."

And Dr. Kilpatrick goes on to mention the boy who included among the Ten Commandments "I am the Lord thy God in vain."

Dr. Kilpatrick's collection of student malapropisms and boners is most amusing. But the parent who has children of school age might be forgiven if he were to turn the joke against Dr. Kilpatrick. "If Dr. Kilpatrick's samples are representative of student spelling," so the parent might say, "then what in the devil *is* the matter with modern education?" Has a generation of Deweyism and Kilpatrickism resulted in nothing better than a pupil who is willing to "pledge the legion," or to insist on "jest straws" when it is justice that is needed?

Surely something is amiss somewhere. Either we have produced a generation of school teachers who habitually slur the English tongue, or we have turned out a generation of students who need exposure to a simple daily drill in spelling.

It may be true that no pupil will get very much out of an Oath of Allegiance to the flag if he is not "inwardly prepared" to accept it. But it occurs to us that if the pupil were to be drilled in spelling out the pledge of allegiance each morning, as part of the process of mastering some of the basic tools of writing, "inward preparation" for the love of one's country might follow eventually as an uncalculated byproduct of a disciplined approach to one of the Three R's.

MSA—A Second Chance?

MARSHALL Plan Aid, alias ECA, has been officially pronounced dead by a special coroner, Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., on his recent arrival in Paris. Mr. Draper, an administrator of rare integrity and considerable ability, was dispatched to Europe to inspire a new chapter of American interference in European affairs—the activities of the Mutual Security Agency. And this, we should like to think, may give the United States a second chance to inject a modicum of sanity into its relations with the Old World.

The late ECA, wholly apart from its questionable economic results, was an unmitigated political failure. As an attempt at purchasing political friendship Marshall Aid was an unparalleled flop—not because there were any strings attached to it, but because there were none: far from being swept off their feet by such an avalanche of generosity, Europeans never stopped suspecting a gift of fifteen billion dollars offered without any demand for compensation.

The sane course, and the only one understandable to the hardheaded denizens of the cynical Old World, would have been to extend our aid on an honest and strict take-it-or-leave-it basis—available to any one, but *only* to any one, who was willing to embrace, together with the American billions, those fundamental economic principles which had made such a sizeable gift possible in the first place. Instead, ECA (which soon found itself staffed with all those Keynesians, New Dealers and One-Worlders whom the outbreak of peace had rendered unemployable at home) administered its funds as if the American taxpayer, in a fit of lunacy, had decided to finance every last European scheme of "economic and social reform." ECA, more truly than the popular vote of war-exhausted and confused Europeans, was responsible for the survival of crackpot governments which have retarded Europe's organic rehabilitation by several crucial years: they all lived on gratuitously granted ECA billions.

The Mutual Security Act, by which Congress has for the first time defined the purpose of American aid to Europe, could at last stop that fools' merry-go-round. Additional American aid to foreign countries will be given, so states the preamble of the Act, only "to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, and to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interests of the United States." This is clear and cleansing language. If Congress had shaken off Mr. Acheson's reins a few years sooner, and had beaten such excellent sense into the ECA boys while some of the fifteen billions were still around, the free world might have been spared a few precious years of crippling crisis.

These years, of course, are irretrievably lost. But Congress at last has learned the lesson, and by its sage action may have purchased for this country that rare thing—a second chance. From here on, nothing but brazen contempt for the law of the land could make our representatives abroad continue the discredited policies of ECA. From here on, the newly established MSA is under the unmistakable mandate to grant American aid only to friends of the United States, and to deny it unequivocally whenever an applicant rejects the unequivocal conditions of any future American gift. MSA's new European boss can be trusted to abide by the Act's explicit intent. But the quality of his success will depend on the speed with which he can cure his operating staff of the malignant ECA traditions.

Here Comes a Bureau

By ROBERT E. COULSON

Does a costly Federal Bureau, planning for civilian comfort in case of bombing attacks, promise a real civil defense? Mr. Coulson, who is the Mayor of Waukegan, Illinois, thinks not. In this article he tells what civil defense is at present, and what it should be.

WITHIN the last two years a new government activity has purchased its first thousand typewriters and employed the first thousand members of its staff. Almost unnoticed, it has obtained authority to tax and spend several hundred million dollars annually in every city and state and in its national office. Its leaders admit that this is only the beginning.

No one seems to be greatly interested in this activity as a part of the bureaucracy. We complain of the cost and size of government, and in our economy drives we try to whittle away at the bigness which even now threatens to engulf us. Meanwhile the new program has developed without any criticism or evaluation. In another year it will have a vested interest in our tax dollars, and it will be here to stay. The offices are being rented, the employees are being classified, and the mimeograph machines are rolling. The camel has his nose under the tent.

Like all other bureaus, this one began as a small guidance and advisory section. It was formed to serve the people, not to be an evil thing. There was popular demand for the service, and popular clamor for the government to assume leadership.

Now, like all bureaus, this one has discovered that the local efforts are not uniform, and that the smaller governments are not always prompt and neat in the preparation of their progress reports. It has begun its efforts to "coordinate the local activities." Soon it will start prodding the communities which lag behind, urging each city to look enviously at the progress made by its neighbor. Naturally, many sincere people will become convinced that greater Federal control is needed to make the program uniform and efficient. No fair-minded person will be able to resist the arithmetical proof of this. Piece by piece and bit by bit the central bureau will pick up the obligations on which some local governments will default from time to time.

This is our last chance to look at the program cold-bloodedly. Another thousand employees, another set of public appropriations, and it will be too late.

At a recent conference of Illinois mayors I met the regional, state and national coordinators for civil defense. I saw samples of their leaflets, mimeographed releases, catalogues of special equipment and organizational charts. I listened to reports of committees, administrators, field agents and conferences, and heard suggestions for the expansion of each and the multiplication of all. I learned that "the people are angry that so little has been done"; and I learned that the civil defense program is going to be a permanent part of all our planning for as long as there is international tension. Our city plans to levy a new and additional tax of twenty-five cents per person annually for civil defense. So are thousands of other cities and so are the states. Perhaps it is already too late to ask, "What is civil defense?"

Civil Defense de Luxe

Civil defense might mean the use of civilians in the common defense; or it might mean the use of our common resources to protect civilians. Which is it? Which have we asked for, and which are we getting? I suggest that the decision has been made for us, and that we are committed to the latter meaning of the phrase, although we are sometimes encouraged to pretend otherwise.

In the designs and drawings of individual bomb shelters there is a shelf for the portable radio, storage space for beans and bandaids, and a strong door to keep out the noise and the danger. There is no reference to the family shotgun, and no suggestion that an extra box of shells be stored next to the extra supply of orange juice. There are no firing slits in the shelter.

In all the pounds of mobilization literature there is no description of how to make a grenade, how to organize a partisan group at the community level, or how to kill an enemy paratrooper. There is no plan to make revolvers available to the householders hiding in their basements, no signal for procedures in case of a purported surrender, and no design or deadline for counter-revolution in case of partial occupation.

Our civil defense program, then, will consist largely of a plan for individual decontamination plus property salvage. The people of Waukegan will combat the foe with strong soap and hot sudsy water, geiger counters and heavy mittens, sandbags, beans and spare batteries for the portable radio. Ninety per cent of us plan to watch from our basement windows while the military fellows do the defending.

Our bureaus will conduct classes in group hiding on signal, cowering in concert and shutting our eyes in unison. We will practice getting under the bed fast and without bruises. After the need for defense is over and someone else has repelled the

enemy, the bureau will teach us to find lost children faster, test the purity of our drinking water, and direct motor traffic away from the big fires.

This is quite a luxurious program for civilian comfort. Only a society as rich as ours could even contemplate bearing its cost. Other great empires which have tried to substitute comfort for defense learned that if nine citizens run to their burrows the tenth man does not fight very eagerly. The soldier is not inspired to face the foe bravely if he learns that the rest of the folks are busy boiling water for their personal decontamination.

However, let us assume that this fact can be concealed by calling the comfort program a defense program, and that our soldiers will not realize that their taxes are being spent to prepare leaflets illustrating the various methods of getting under a bed. We should, even so, be interested in learning how great a civilian load we can carry, what our competitors are doing and what the estimated return on our investment will be. This program will be costly, it will be nation-wide and it will be permanent. If we identify the program accurately, then we can fit it into its proper place in our economy. Then we shall know how much of our substance we can spend on ear plugs, sirens and flashlights. Let us face the brutal facts of life.

What Civil Defense Should Be

Brutal fact number one is that none of our proposed antagonists are going to handicap themselves, their people or their economies with any plan for personal isolation, safety or comfort. To them, total war means just that, and they will spend no money training people to hide from it.

It may be that this nation is so far superior in productivity that we can carry this mattress on our backs and still outrace the enemy; but if the race is close it is possible that our defeat will be brought about by our excess of precautions to avoid distress to civilians. We should make this gamble if the majority wish to do so, but the program should be identified as an additional burden on the defense effort, a liability rather than an asset.

Brutal fact number two is that this sort of civil defense program is not going to frighten any enemy as much as true civil defense would. The knowledge that we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars annually in the preparation of hiding places may encourage him to growl occasionally just to keep us from our jobs.

Brutal fact number three is that all our money and all our effort will accomplish only a degree of partial salvage. Consider, for example, our civil defense program for an atom bomb attack on our cities. If a billion dollars is spent in Chicago for whistles, sirens, helmets and the other mattresses, and if a bomb strikes Chicago, some buildings will burn, some children will be separated from their parents, some time will elapse before the drinking water is safe, and so forth. If not a single cent is so spent in preparation, and the same bomb is dropped on the city, some buildings will not burn, some children will survive and the water will become potable after some time. A civilian comfort program will not change the picture from black to white, but only from one shade of gray to a lighter shade of gray; and in order to obtain even this benefit we must provide the mattressing for all cities, since we do not know which cities will be bombed.

During the last war, many of us had a chance to see the effects of heavy bombardment on a city which had no program, and compare these with the effects on a city which had good preparation. Take Nanking or Warsaw as examples of the one, and London or Berlin as examples of the other, and observe how the law of diminishing returns applies to civil defense and salvage programs.

Now certainly every city should have a disaster plan. It should have emergency equipment and communications, a source of volunteer manpower, a traffic control program, liaison with the charitable and relief agencies, working agreements with its neighboring cities and a known chain of responsibility and command. The plan should be flexible enough to serve the area in case of floods, train wrecks, fires—and bombing attacks.

But should there be, on top of this, a special atom bomb reassurance bureau with branches everywhere permanently established, and involving another huge fixed item of annual overhead? Admitting that this is good politics, is it healthy for the country to pretend to its citizens that money will insulate them from the horrors of total war? Can we intimidate our enemies by waving our budget at them?

I don't know that I speak for the citizens of Waukegan, since this whole program has developed without discussion or appraisal. I hope that our city will continue to develop a cheap, comprehensive disaster plan, using our local resources and being prepared to share with our neighbors as needed. Then I hope that we shall have the courage to develop a real civil defense program which will use our people for the defense of their homes. I hope that this program will be designed around proper cost figures and damage estimates. I suggest that we go without insurance in all cases where the cost of the insurance is greater than the value of the property insured.

The knowledge that this is our civil defense program, and that all of our people are willing to face up to their responsibilities in a total war, will be a greater deterrent to war than all the strong soaps and gas masks we can buy.

American know-how is unmatched anywhere except in the field of diplomacy.

The State Department moves in mysterious ways, its blunders to perform. EDMUND J. KIEFER

Decline of the American Republic

By GARET GARRETT

Like Rome before us, we are changing internally from Republic to Empire.

WE HAVE crossed the boundary that lies between Republic and Empire. If you ask when, the answer is that you can not make a single stroke between day and night. The precise moment does not matter. There was no painted sign to say, "You now are entering Imperium." Yet it was a very old road and the voice of history was saying: "Whether you know it or not, the act of crossing may be irreversible." And now, not far ahead, is a sign that reads: "No U Turns."

If you say there were no frightening omens, that is true. The political foundations did not quake; the graves of the Fathers did not fly open; the Constitution did not tear itself up. If you say people did not will it, that also is true. But if you say therefore it has not happened, then you have been so long bemused by words that your mind will not believe what the eye can see, even as in the jungle the terrified primitive, on meeting the lion, importunes magic by saying to himself, "He is not there."

That a republic may vanish is an elementary schoolbook fact.

The Roman Republic passed into the Roman Empire, and yet never could a Roman citizen have said, "That was yesterday." Nor is the historian, with all the advantages of perspective, able to place that momentous event at any exact point on the dial of time. The Republic had a long unhappy twilight. It is agreed that the Empire began with Augustus Caesar. Several before him had played emperor and were destroyed. The first who might have been called emperor in fact was Julius Caesar, who pretended not to want the crown and once publicly declined it. Whether he feared more the displeasure of the Roman populace or the daggers of the republicans is unknown. In his dreams he may have been seeing a bloodstained toga. His murder soon afterward was a desperate act of the dying republican tradition, and perfectly futile.

His heir was Octavian, and it was a very bloody business, yet neither did Octavian call himself emperor. On the contrary, he was most careful to observe the old legal forms. He restored the Senate. Later he made believe to restore the Republic, and caused coins to be struck in commemoration of that event. Having acquired by universal consent, as he afterward wrote, "complete dominion over everything, both by land and sea," he made a long and artful speech to the Senate, and ended it by saying: "And now I give back the Republic into your keeping. The laws, the troops, the treasury, the provinces, are all restored to you. May you guard them worthily."

The response of the Senate was to crown him with oak leaves, plant laurel trees at his gate and name him *Augustus*. After that he reigned for more than forty years and when he died the bones of the Republic were buried with him.

"The personality of a monarch," says Stobart, "had been thrust almost surreptitiously into the frame of a republican constitution. . . . The establishment of the Empire was such a delicate and equivocal act that it has been open to various interpretations ever since. Probably in the clever mind of Augustus it was intended to be equivocal from the first."

WHAT Augustus Caesar did was to demonstrate a proposition found in Aristotle's "Politics," one that he must have known by heart, namely this:

> People do not easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one thing takes the place of another; so that the ancient laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have brought about a revolution in the state.

Revolution within the form.

There is no comfort in history for those who put their faith in forms; who think there is safeguard in words inscribed on parchment, preserved in a glass case, reproduced in facsimile and hauled to and fro on a Freedom Train.

Let it be current history. How much does the younger half of this generation reflect upon the fact that in its own time a complete revolution has taken place in the relations between government and people? It may be doubted that one college student in a thousand could even state it clearly.

The first article of our inherited tradition, implicit in American thought from the beginning until a few years ago, was this: *Government is the responsibility of a self-governing people.*

That doctrine has been swept away; only the elders remember it. Now, in the name of democracy, it is accepted as a political fact that *people are the responsibility of government.*

The forms of republican government survive; the character of the state has changed.

Formerly the people supported government and set limits to it and minded their own lives. Now they pay for unlimited government, whether they want it or not, and the government minds their lives—looking to how they are fed and clothed and housed; how they provide for their old age; how the national income, which is the product of their own labor, shall be divided among them; how they shall buy and sell; how long and how hard and

under what conditions they shall work, and how equity shall be maintained between the buyers of food who dwell in the cities and the producers of food who live on the soil. For the last named purpose it resorts to a system of subsidies, penalties and compulsions, and assumes with medieval wisdom to fix the just price.

This is the Welfare State. It rose suddenly within the form. It is legal because the Supreme Court says it is. The Supreme Court once said no and then changed its mind and said yes, because meanwhile the President who was the architect of the Welfare State had appointed to the Supreme Court bench men who believed in it. The founders who wrote the Constitution could no more have imagined a Welfare State rising by sanction of its words than they could have imagined a monarchy; and yet the Constitution did not have to be changed. It had only to be reinterpreted in one clause—the clause that reads: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, imposts and excises to pay its debts and provide for common defense and welfare of the United States."

"We are under a Constitution," said Chief Justice Hughes, "but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."

The President names the members of the Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of the Senate. It follows that if the President and a majority of the Senate happen to want a Welfare State, or any other innovation, and if, happily for their design, death and old age create several vacancies on the bench so that they may pack the Court with like-minded men, the Constitution becomes, indeed, a rubberoid instrument.

THE EXTENT to which the original precepts and intentions of Constitutional, representative, *limited* government, in the republican form, have been eroded away by argument and dialectic is a separate subject, long and ominous, and belongs to a treatise on political science. The one fact now to be emphasized is that when the process of erosion has gone on until there is no saying what the supreme law of the land is at a given time, then the Constitution begins to be flouted by Executive will, with something like impunity. The instances may not be crucial at first and all the more dangerous for that reason. As one is condoned, another follows, and they become progressive.

To outsmart the Constitution and to circumvent its restraints became a popular exercise of the art of government in the Roosevelt regime. In defense of his attempt to pack the Supreme Court with social-minded judges after several of his New Deal laws had been declared unconstitutional, President Roosevelt wrote: "The reactionary members of the Court had apparently determined to remain on the bench for as long as life continued—for the sole purpose of blocking any program of reform."

Among the millions who at the time applauded that statement of contempt there were very few, if there was indeed one, who would not have been frightened by a revelation of the logical sequel. They believed, as everyone else did, that there was one thing a President could never do. There was one sentence of the Constitution that could not fall, so long as the Republic lived.

The Constitution says: "The Congress shall have power to declare war." That, therefore, was the one thing no President could do. By his own will he could not declare war. Only Congress could declare war, and Congress could be trusted never to do it but by will of the people—or so they believed. No man could make it for them.

Even if you think that President Roosevelt got the country into World War II, that was not the same thing. For a declaration of war he went to Congress—after the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. He may have wanted it, he may have planned it; and yet the Constitution forbade him to declare war and he dared not do it.

Nine years later a much weaker President did.

AFTER President Truman, alone and without either the consent or knowledge of Congress, had declared war on the Korean aggressor, 7000 miles away, Congress condoned his usurpation of its exclusive Constitutional power. More than that, his political supporters in Congress argued that in the modern case that sentence in the Constitution conferring upon Congress the sole power to declare war was obsolete.

Mark you, the words had not been erased; they still existed in form. Only they had become obsolete. And why obsolete? Because now war may begin suddenly, with bombs falling out of the sky, and we might perish while waiting for Congress to declare war.

The reasoning is puerile. The Korean war, which made the precedent, did not begin that way; secondly, Congress was in session at the time, so that the delay could not have been more than a few hours, provided Congress had been willing to declare war; and, thirdly, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Republic may in a legal manner act defensively before a declaration of war has been made. It is bound to be made if the nation has been attacked.

Mr. Truman's supporters argued that in the Korean instance his act was defensive and therefore within his powers as Commander-in-Chief. In that case, to make it Constitutional, he was legally obliged to ask Congress for a declaration of war afterward. This he never did. For a week Congress relied upon the papers for news of the country's entry into war; then the President called a few of its leaders to the White House and told them what he had done. A year later Congress was still debating whether or not the country was at war, in a legal, Constitutional sense.

A few months later Mr. Truman sent American troops to Europe to join an international army, and did it not only without a law, without even consulting Congress, but challenged the power of Congress to stop him. Congress made all of the neces-

sary sounds of anger and then poulticed its dignity with a resolution saying the President's action was all right for that one time, since anyhow it had been taken, but that hereafter Congress would expect to be consulted.

At that time the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate asked the State Department to set forth in writing what might be called the position of Executive Government. The State Department obligingly responded with a document entitled, *"Powers of the President to Send Troops Outside of the United States*—Prepared for the use of the joint committee made up of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Armed Forces of the Senate, February 28, 1951."

This document, in the year circa 2950, will be a precious find for any historian who may be trying then to trace the departing footprints of the vanished American Republic. For the information of the United States Senate it said (*Congressional Record*, March 20, 1951, p 2745): "As this discussion of the respective powers of the President and Congress has made clear, Constitutional doctrine has been largely moulded by practical necessities. Use of the Congressional power to declare war, for example, has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer declared in advance."

Caesar might have said it to the Roman Senate. If Constitutional doctrine is moulded by necessity, what is a written Constitution for?

Thus an argument that seemed at first to rest upon puerile reasoning turned out to be deep and cunning. The immediate use of it was to defend the unconstitutional Korean precedent, namely, the resort to war as an act of the President's own will. Yet it was not invented for that purpose alone. It stands as a forecast of executive intentions, a manifestation of the executive mind, mortal challenge to the parliamentary principle.

The simple question is: Whose hand shall control the instrument of war?

It is late to ask. It may be too late, for when the hand of the Republic begins to relax another hand is already putting itself forth.

Corruption as a Campaign Issue

By **A. A. IMBERMAN**

What effect will a campaign centered on corruption in government have upon the "common man" group that makes up 65 per cent of the nation? A public relations counsel answers this question on the basis of studies his firm has made.

THE FEDERAL peccadillos to date indicate some considerable corruption in our Federal machine. The count at this writing is something like this:

Nineteen men have been convicted and sent to jail. These include three members of Congress—former Representative May (D., Ky.), involved in a munitions scandal, and Representatives Brehm (R., O.), and Thomas (R., N. J.), involved in kickback scandals. May and Thomas served prison sentences, and Brehm drew a fine and a suspended jail sentence. Others convicted include nine tax agents, a postal employee, an army officer, a five per center and two pro-Truman Democrats in Mississippi, involved in job selling.

Sixteen persons are under indictment. These include ten internal revenue employees, four persons involved in Reconstruction Finance Corporation scandals, one influence peddler and one Air Force procurement officer.

At least 138 employees have been dismissed. These included 113 employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 17 of the Army Signal Corps, four RFC officials, one draft board chairman, one Department of Agriculture official, one Federal Housing official and one official of the Department of Justice—T. Lamar Caudle.

Twelve persons have resigned. These include the four top officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue—Commissioner George J. Schoeneman, Deputy Commissioner Carroll E. Mealey, Assistant Commissioner Daniel A. Bolich and General Counsel Charles Oliphant. William J. Boyle, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, resigned when he came under fire in the RFC scandal.

Seven White House staff members have been involved in scandals: Major General Harry Vaughan accepted and distributed home freezers, including one to Mrs. Truman and one to Chief Justice Vinson. Wallace Graham, White House physician, was caught dealing in the grain market; White House Secretary Matt Connelly accepted gifts from persons seeking influence; Donald Dawson, White House administrative assistant, accepted board and lodging from an RFC borrower, as did Charles Maylon, a White House counsel. Mrs. Loretta Young, White House stenographer, resigned over the matter of her acceptance of a royal pastel mink coat from an attorney with RFC clients. David K. Niles, White House administrative assistant, resigned just before his name was linked with that of a tax collector under indictment in Boston.

Several Republican soothsayers with whom I have talked recently are confident that "the people" are inflamed against this revealed corruption, and that a strong campaign hacking away at the Democratic graft in Washington would result in a surge

of rage and the election of a Republican President.

I beg to dissent, and suggest that if the GOP centers its eye-rolling around the corruption issue, it will find its candidate dragged to the political morgue the morning after election day.

Results of a Gallup Poll released late in December proclaimed that 45 per cent of the "American public" believes corruption in government would be just as great, whichever party were in power. Is this cynicism accurate? My public relations firm has directed a large number of public opinion studies—some of which cut deeper than the Gallup polls. Our findings would indicate the polls' gross underestimation of the American tolerance for corruption in government. American voters, at least in their commonest incarnation, will sputter and cough behind their hands when political corruption is mentioned. But deep down, few of them really moan over such uncouth behavior in office. As far as the majority of voters are concerned, a campaign against corruption in government would have about as much glow and gusto as an outcry against Euclidian geometry.

I CITE from the immense accumulation of known facts about political corruption. From 1902 to 1924, Charles Francis Murphy—a former saloonkeeper—inhabited the throne of Tammany Hall. When by God's will in 1924 he was removed to the empyrean above, he left a fortune of $2,000,000, which is a sizeable sum of money for a barkeep to accumulate. It took the Seabury investigation to shake public confidence in Tammany, and not the perennial whoops of corruption from the Republicans. Roosevelt's anathema on Tammany and his refusal to grant it any Federal patronage because of its opposition at the 1932 Democratic National Convention, palsied the Tammany statesmen still more. But it was the entrance of Joseph V. ("Holy Joe") McKee into the New York City mayoralty campaign of 1933 which finally split the Democratic vote and led to LaGuardia's defeat of Mayor John P. O'Brien (who had been rushed in to finish Jimmy Walker's term). Senator Kefauver's recent comments on the role played by Frank Costello in New York City politics would indicate that since LaGuardia's demise New York City has continued to dabble in corruption. That this has really enraged New Yorkers is difficult to establish, or at least my agents have been unable to establish it.

Do you find New Jersey sweeter? Consider the case of Boss Frank Hague. For 25 years he preyed upon Hudson County with a diligence rarely equalled anywhere in the country, making Jersey City "the house and sanctuary of the nation's biggest book horse racing betting syndicate," as one report phrased it. The hold of the Hague machine on Jersey City, once undisputed, is now somewhat weakened, but time and other political leaders have been responsible rather than any animosity of the voters.

"Jim" Curley, former governor, three times mayor, ex-alderman, member of Congress and ex-convict, is still performing his prodigies in Boston, albeit behind the scenes. It took another rival to unhorse him—not a native revolt. Even at that, Curley still has one leg up on the horse.

Need I mention the lofty fidelity of the electorate to the Ed Crump machine in Memphis, to the various Long factions in Louisiana, to the late Thomas J. Pendergast's organization in Kansas City and Missouri, or to the powerful Kelly-Nash machine in Chicago (which Jake Arvey now plays like a pianola)? I could pile up more evidences, but they are unnecessary.

Glancing at the history of graft and corruption in the major centers and in the more remote parts of the Republic, I leave it to any fair man to find a clear instance where the electorate was unduly enraged by political shenanigans and turned the election day artillery on the rascals. The electorate in America has never shown any high capacity for being alarmed over political corruption, although it has occasionally shown some restlessness. I do not lay this down as an immutable principle to shake the pious; I merely cite it as a reasonable deduction from our political history.

IN THE many public opinion studies my firm has made—by polls and projective techniques—it has become clearly evident that with the bulk of the population, political corruption is nothing to become inflamed about, even while the boys are in the front lines. By bulk of population I mean proprietors of businesses valued at $500 to $5000, stenographers, bookkeepers, rural mail clerks, railroad ticket agents, sales people in drygoods stores, hardware salesmen, beauty shop operators, telephone operators, factory foremen, electricians, plumbers, carpenters, watchmakers (who may own their own small shops), timekeepers, linesmen, radio repairmen, medium-skill workers, dry cleaners, butchers, sheriffs, railway engineers and conductors, barbers, firemen, practical nurses, policemen, cooks in restaurants, bartenders, taxi and truck drivers, gas station attendants, waitresses, most members of skilled and semi-skilled unions, etc.—and of course, their spouses. These people constitute about 65 per cent of the nation, and (following Warner and Lunt in "The Social Life of a Modern Community") we shall designate them as the Common Man group.

For this tremendous Common Man group, politics plays a curious role. While the typical businessman sees government as an agency primarily for administering public affairs, he also regards it as something foreign to him, as indifferent and perhaps antagonistic to his comfort, safety and happiness, and capable of harassing and looting him. The Common Man, on the other hand, sees government primarily as an instrumentality for getting something for someone. Often he believes the government is run by the "Big Boys" to help themselves—i.e., Big Business. When the Common Man grows lyrical over government, he means that it is making life less complex for him either by providing him with comforts, or by solving some of his

problems, or by giving him a job relieved from the strain of performance demanded by private industry.

Where we have found the Common Man seemingly shedding tears over newspaper disclosures of corruption and graft, we almost always have found conjoined the feeling that if somehow he had known about such finagling in advance and could have profited thereby, he might have had no objection.

I proceed to a crass example. Last year when the (Democratic) *Chicago Sun-Times* suddenly yanked the veil from the new Congress Street highway plan and disclosed that many parcels of property condemned for the route were owned by Jake Arvey, the Democratic boss, my firm was engaged in several consumer-attitude studies in Chicago. We were able to use one questionnaire referring to the propriety of a political boss's profiting by advance knowledge of the route to be taken by the proposed highway, and we were also able to dredge unguarded sentiment on the same situation by use of a simple projective test. While the direct questionnaire elicited gentlemanly horror and a pulling of long faces at the disguised steal, the indirect projective returns overwhelmingly revealed admiration for the feat, and a sort of yearning to be in a similar position.

Above the level of the Common Man group, the responses to the projective tests were mixed, and while there was fairly clear and incessant indignation against the whole deal, the sentiment was not as uniform as one might wish. At least, not as uniform as yours and mine.

Similarly, almost every municipal research league will attest to the Common Man's disinclination to have his stomach turned or his heart broken by evidences of corruption and graft. True, a few hardy souls band together for such protests, but usually they are subsidized by large property owners to shoot the fireworks.

IS THERE, then, no hope for a campaign hitting at national corruption? It is obvious to most people who have ever devoted prayer or laborious thought to governmental problems, that corruption and graft multiply as government complexity increases. As soon as new taxes are levied, as new restraints are legalized, as new holds and grapples are invented by men in control of government, some citizens will offer to buy back their freedom, and some political officeholders will try to use the new restraints to their private advantage. Every time we have a new grist of laws—whether local, state or national—setting up new legal extortions and chicaneries, some officeholders may be depended upon to use them with an eye to self-interest, and no amount of nursing, supervision or policing is apt to hold them within reasonable limits for long. Unless, of course, you believe that men in government are animated by a lofty and impeccable morality—a belief characteristic of professional people and clerics.

While the Common Man in our society has little feeling against political corruption and rarely prays for honest men in government, he does have positive feelings about restraints. As a citizen, he often chafes under the closed shop and the law which forces him into such a situation; he doesn't like the check-off, despite what union business agents cry; he thinks the restraints of wage control are idiotic; he resents high taxes and withholding taxes; he is bewildered by the Administration's give-away program of money and materials particularly when, apparently without reason, Washington withholds materials from his factory and affects his job unhappily; he looks askance at legislation drafting him or his children into the armed services for a conflict whose rationale is not evident to him. These are real restraints for him—they immediately affect his home, his family and his job—and hence take on a vast importance.

The denunciation of graft and corruption will not move him, since the reformer's itch is not contagious on the Common Man level. But denunciation of the hobbles which irk him—and which are responsible for graft and corruption—would find him sympathetic, if laid out before him in language, associations and stereotypes which he accepts. A national campaign promising to ease him of these restraints would find him with his eyes and ears glued to the TV and his heart going pitter-pat.

What Senator Said This?

(The answer is printed upside down at the bottom of the page.)

I am aware, Mr. President, that in pursuance of this campaign of vilification and attempted intimidation, requests from various individuals and certain organizations have been submitted to the Senate for my expulsion from this body, and that such requests have been referred to and considered by one of the committees of the Senate. . . . Neither the clamor of the mob nor the voice of power will ever turn me by the breadth of a hair from the course I mark out for myself, guided by such knowledge as I can obtain and controlled and directed by a solemn conviction of right and duty. . . .

The mandate seems to have gone forth to the sovereign people of this country that they must be silent while those things are being done by their government which most vitally concern their well-being, their happiness, and their lives. . . . It appears to be the purpose of those conducting this campaign to throw the country into a state of terror, to coerce public opinion, to stifle criticism, and suppress discussion of the great issues involved in this war.

These words were said, in criticism of a Democratic Administration, by Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, in a speech delivered on the floor of the Senate, October 6, 1917.

Baloney in Beef Controls

By **LEWIS NORDYKE**

AMARILLO, TEXAS

OUT IN Wyoming, a cattleman rode into a clearing and saw an enraged bull attempting to close the career of a cowboy who had become separated from his horse. Head down and nostrils snorting mad foam, the bull charged. The cowboy dived into a convenient recess in the ground, and the bull plunged across the hole. The cowboy leaped out, and on came the bull, madder than ever, and back into the hole dropped the bow-legged boy.

The cattleman watched this strange thing happen half a dozen times. Then he shouted, "Why don't you just stay in the hole?"

Leaping out again, the cowboy yelled, "There's a bear in that hole!"

In its attempts to control the price and supply of beef, the United States Government has played both bull and bear, with the producer and consumer caught in the unbeautiful position of the in-and-out cowpuncher.

Some high Washington officials have told cattlemen of my acquaintance that beef control is a political football that has to be played; that workers and city-dwellers, who make up large voting blocs, have demanded relief from rising food costs and that a stab at beef price reduction through controls sounds pretty good. Anyone who buys beef at current prices is apt to squirm, but the truth is that controls have never failed to endanger the nation's supply of red meat.

In the days of the OPA of World War II, there were plenty of cattle, but, as housewives will remember, practically bare meat counters. By the end of that era, 86 per cent of our beef was being distributed by black marketeers at illegally high prices. In early 1951 an Office of Price Stabilization order to roll back and fix prices on live animals caused a temporary beef famine at a time when the nation had a record number of beef animals, and only Congressional action headed off a sustained period of shortage.

It would be fine in this time of inflation to buy beef at a bargain, but that can't be. The price of range land has increased from six to ten times since the war years; it costs four times as much to hire a cowboy, and the expense of everything else connected with beef production has shot upward. Yet this is not the main reason controls won't work.

The basic cause is the vast difference between cattle and beef. There are two ways to increase the beef supply. One is to produce more cattle, and the other is to put more weight on the existing beef animals.

Due to the gestation and growing periods, it takes time to increase the cattle population, and the present number of beef animals—91 million on the nation's ranches and six million farms—is just about all the grass will support. If the number is to be increased substantially (it will go up to 95 million by January 1, 1953, according to Department of Agriculture estimates), there must be developed some method of sustaining more cattle per acre. Of course any improvement—in numbers, in more effective use of grass, in quality of beef—will come from competition and the opportunity to earn a profit; that has been the case since the beef business had its first boom in the days of the Texas Republic more than 100 years ago.

IT IS the claim of OPS that control is necessary to fight inflation and to assure an adequate supply of beef. On the other hand, cattlemen contend that controls upset the historic, and complicated, method of producing beef and therefore cause beef shortages. There are other factors in this controversy—the black marketeer, the American appetite for high-quality beef, the seasonal nature of the marketing of grass-fed animals. But let's trail a steak from a ranch in the Texas Panhandle to the kitchen of a boilermaker who lives in Chester, Pennsylvania.

In comparatively recent years the cow country has spread into the pine thickets and cotton patches of eastern Texas and across state lines and the Mississippi into the Old South. Every state raises beef cattle, but the traditional Western range, where the beef business started with the leathery longhorn, is still the main producer, and the Texas Panhandle is typical of that country. Here the ranches range in size from the 800,000 acres of the Matador Ranch down to the lot of the barnyard cowman.

Let's take a modest-sized ranch, which we shall call the Bar Nothing, since the first thing anyone with a cow wants is a brand. The Bar Nothing has good grade Herefords, built up by keeping top heifers and using purebred bulls. Except in the winter, the cattle live on the short grass. During severe weather they are fed high protein concentrates, such as cottonseed or soybean cake or meal, and these are fairly expensive. The calves come in the spring. The calf we have in mind arrived one sunny morning when the hills had a heavy green cast. By the time he was strong enough to stand and nuzzle his first meal, he was worth $75 to $100.

Except for castration, vaccination and branding, our white-faced calf isn't bothered for a long while. In his second fall he is rounded up and shipped out to a feed lot in the Corn Belt. He's what is known as a coming-two, and let's say he weighs 600 pounds—weight gained from the short grass and maybe some sustaining nibbles of cake or meal in

his one winter. He finds himself in the new home, the feed lot, and what a wonderful life it is! The golden grain is stacked before him, and all he has to do is eat. After gaining 300 pounds he is sent to Chicago, where the Belt Line brings him to the end of his trail.

Our calf now weighs 900 pounds and will make choice eating. He goes through the packing house, and from there to the distributor and the supermarket, including one out on the Baltimore Pike, where the boilermaker buys his sirloin for Sunday dinner. In his life, our calf has been owned by the Bar Nothing, the cattle feeder, the packer, the distributor, the supermarket—and a thick piece of him by the boilermaker.

When fresh from the pasture of the Panhandle in the early fall, our calf could have gone to the slaughter instead of the feed lot, but he would have been much lighter—the sort of beef known as grass-fed, and unacceptable in quality to the armed forces or to the average supermarket shopper. Besides, it would have taken a calf and a half to produce as much weight as our one animal obligingly did on feed.

This range-to-feeder-to-processor method is the way nearly all our beef gets to the consumer. But there is this other way. In the fall, just before severe winter weather, there's a run at the big markets, such as Chicago, Kansas City and Omaha. The grass-fed steers are marketed at that time because they have the full weight that grass can give them, and when the range is browned by frost the grass can not sustain that weight.

The bulk of the grass-fat cattle hit the market within a month or two in the fall, and that's the crop for the year. Except for comparatively small herds coming off the winter wheat in Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas in the spring, and some grassers off the pastures of Southern states and California in May and June, there will be no more slaughter cattle from the range until the next fall.

If there were no feeding, practically all our beef supply would hit the market at one time, creating a jam that our stockyards and packers, with their processing and storage plants, simply could not handle. The slaughter-quality range cattle have to go to market in the fall. Therefore, there could be no month-by-month distribution of quality beef without the feeder system. If it takes 90,000,000 beef cattle to supply us through this feeder system, it would certainly require 30,000,000 more with only grass. It is doubtful whether our range and farms, with chance of drought considered, could support so many cattle; and at best the beef would lack quality.

IT WAS the demand for better and better beef that led to the historic feeder development in beef production. The beef business started in Texas in the 1830s, and by the end of the Civil War Texas stockmen were driving cattle over long trails to more populous markets. In 1867 the trails from Texas across Red River and the Indian nations to Abilene, Kansas, were opened, and from that railhead longhorn steaks were shipped all over the nation to test the cutting edge of dinner knives.

Longhorn beef, compared with today's product, was little better than boot leather, but it was the only beef available in quantity. Aggressive stockmen commenced breeding for beef of better flavor and easier to chew. By 1885 there was practically no demand for a grass-fed Texas steer in the main markets, and a rancher couldn't produce on his range and ship to Chicago a three-to-four-year-old animal and sell him at a profit.

In the early 1880s John V. Farwell, a noted Chicago merchant, and his brother, U. S. Senator Charles B. Farwell, came into possession of the nation's largest ranch—a spread 200 miles long and 27 miles wide in the Texas Panhandle. They built the Texas capitol in exchange for the land, an even 3,000,000 acres. With the help of British capital, they started stocking this province-sized ranch in 1885, buying only the best quality range stuff, which still contained some longhorn blood and toughness. They marketed their first beeves off this virgin range in 1888 in Chicago, and lost money on every one. The consumer was demanding, and buying, better beef. Despite the fact that the Farwells had the biggest ranch in the country, the best equipped and the highest quality range animals, they had to lease a vast range in Montana and trail their steers there for two additional years of grazing. Nearly all the major Texas ranchers had to obtain "northern range" for finishing beef.

But new competition soon ended this era. Farmers in the Corn Belt had grain which they wanted to convert into money, and they found a market by feeding it to beef cattle. Eventually a majority of ranchmen had to turn to this feeder system, and there came forth our method of producing good beef on a year-round basis.

AT THIS point, the logical question of any budget-busted consumer is: "Well, why does this feeder system make it impossible for the government to control the price of beef?"

When ceilings on live animals, and rationing, became effective in World War II, the production of good beef almost ceased. Within a little while the feed lots were empty, and poor grade grass animals went to the slaughter. This cut the supply, for the potential beef that feed could have put on our cattle was forever lost. So instead of assuring an adequate supply, control created a shortage.

The feeders were forced out of business. They work on a long-range plan based only on supply and demand. Moreover, the feeder operates on a close margin; he risks the money he pays for cattle, and he risks his feed. If he doesn't get a good gain in the weight of the cattle he feeds and also a higher price per pound than he paid for the cattle, he loses money. The average feeder who has been long in the business can reckon the possible supply and demand—hinged on the supply and price of feed—but he has no idea what bureaucratic whim

the morning paper will report. There may be a sudden change in regulations.

When, in the early part of 1951, the OPS announced an immediate rollback and two future ones, the trade in feeder animals stopped with a jolt. Feeders feared a long period of sudden changes in regulation—a time when they would have to depend on Washington rather than their "cow sense." Overnight, everyone in the business was jittery. No one knew what to do, so nothing was done. Within a few weeks the stockyards were empty, and the supply of stored beef dwindled swiftly. We actually had a beef shortage in 1951, although the nation had a record beef cattle population.

The OPS order included a quota system under which a slaughterer could buy only so much beef daily. The resulting turmoil—a beef shortage and the closing of small packing houses across the country—brought Congressional action. The Butler-Hope Amendment to the Defense Production Act outlawed the quota system. The OPS, thus spanked by Congress, announced that the two future rollbacks would not be made. Gradually the jitters passed, the feed lots filled, and by early winter of 1951 beef production was back on schedule.

When the feeder, with practically no hope of profit, quits business, the nation has to go back to grass-fed beef. This means that at least one-third of the potential beef is lost, and in lush times, when people are able to buy a lot of beef, it also means a shortage.

Then, with the arrogance of a successful thief, out rides the black marketeer. He buys beeves, slaughters them and peddles his meat to individuals and to crooked retail outlets. He may be a "little boy" dealing with only a few steers, or he may be a big-time operator. With the traditional system shot to pieces and the clamor for beef ringing angrily, the ranchman may unwittingly sell to the black-marketeer and the patriotic housewife may unknowingly deal with him, for he is everywhere.

Ray Willoughby of San Angelo, Texas, president of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, in testifying before the U. S. House Committee on Agriculture on May 18, 1951, said:

> Unless memories are extremely short-lived, it can be recalled what happened during the time of the late, unlamented OPA. You will recall the incontrovertible evidence given to you from many sources showing the disruption in the distribution of beef. Surely you will recall that dramatic, never contradicted evidence which showed 86 per cent of the beef of this country was being marketed outside legal channels.

A plentiful supply of beef has always been the best price control, and the only curb to the black-marketeer. The consumer, by his demand and ability to pay, sets the price. The rancher, the feeder and the processor are well aware of that fact.

In Washington, where corn-fed roast beef tastes as good as it does in Chester or anywhere else, bureau officials should take a look at past experiences and stop dishing up political hash.

This Is What They Said

WHEN my husband . . . came home from his first meeting with Mr. Stalin in Tehran, he told us he sensed a great suspicion on the part of the Marshal but formal relations were always polite. He felt no warmth of understanding or of normal intercourse. My husband determined to bend every effort to breaking these suspicions down, and decided that the way to do it was to live up to every promise made by both the United States and Great Britain, which both of us were able to do before the Yalta meeting. At Yalta my husband felt the atmosphere had somewhat cleared, and he did say he was able to get a smile from Stalin.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, *McCall's*, February 1952

I have never been able to understand what a Communist front organization is.

DOROTHY PARKER, quoted in *Hollywood Daily Variety*, June 10, 1949

The Russians can damage their own power to attract people who look to them for sympathy. In 1946 they decided that, all things considered, they had better pull their troops out of Manchuria. They were not sure that America would respond to this gesture . . . so they played safe. Advance agents of the Chinese Communists were already in Manchuria, eager to take over the great industries built up by the Japanese. They were sure they could swing it. The Russians were not so sure. They were afraid that Manchuria, if its industries were left a going concern, might be turned into an American stronghold on the doorstep of Siberia, so they gutted the factories of Manchuria as they withdrew.

OWEN LATTIMORE, "The Situation in Asia," 1949

When Knights Were Bold

If the United States ever again stoops to expedients to avoid the difficult decisions that come with leadership, the heavy burdens that come with defense, we shall once more run the dangers of all half-way measures and waste our strength and conscience as a weathervane rather than a force. If we cringe from the necessity of meeting issues boldly with principle, resolution and strength, then we shall simply hurtle along from crisis to crisis, improvising with expedients, seeking inoffensive solutions, drugging the nation with an illusion of security which under those conditions can not exist.

GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY, address at Longmeadow, Mass. on Memorial Day, 1948

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged. THE EDITORS

Let's Ostracize Communists

By EUGENE LYONS

HE'S A gentle sort, with a sensitive conscience and a fussy concern for the purity of his liberal heritage. Though I didn't relish the role of moral arbiter when he explained his dilemma, the note of distress in his voice cut off my protests. His problem turned out to be trivial in itself, yet it bears recounting for its implications.

My friend, it appeared, had accepted a dinner invitation at the home of "a nice old lady," and now, at the last moment, he discovered that the guest of honor would be a notorious fellow-traveler, an artist active on endless Stalinoid fronts. The prospect of breaking bread with a Muscovite stooge was repugnant to him, but he hated to hurt his politically naive hostess. Besides, he worried whether withdrawal from the engagement might not be "bigoted" and "intolerant" on his part.

"Well," I said, thinking out loud, "suppose you had faced a similar test some years ago, with a notorious Hitler agent as the naive old lady's guest of honor. Suppose you had been asked to help entertain Fritz Kuhn or someone like him—"

"By Jove, you're right!" my friend interrupted. "There would have been no problem if a Nazi were involved, and there shouldn't be in the case of a Communist!"

Unconsciously he had accepted a double standard of social and moral behavior—one for brown totalitarians, another for the red breed. A moment's awareness was enough to show up the illogic of this attitude. The myth that Communists are "somehow" less reprehensible than Nazis and Fascists, nurtured by decades of propaganda and liberal self-delusion, is so thin and dryrotted that it turns to dust under the first finger-prod of logic.

All of us know people who profess abhorrence of communism but continue to associate with its agents and germ-carriers. Some of them, in fact, pride themselves on their broad-mindedness in consorting with fifth columnists whose "views" they despise. Like our self-righteous Secretary of State, they are too noble to turn their backs on friends and acquaintances merely because these happen to be dedicated enemies of freedom and human decency.

Men and women who would have been outraged by the very idea of maintaining amiable social relations with members of the German-American Bund have no scruples about dining and cocktailing and chatting with members of Stalin's assorted Bunds. The pro-Nazi writer or professor or businessman knew—or was soon helped to know—that he must pay for his ugly obsession by exclusion from decent democratic society, but his Communist counterpart still finds open doors to democratic periodicals, discussion forums, social gatherings.

I believe there should be an end to this debasing "tolerance." It seems to me much too late in the day for making excuses for the camp followers of the criminal Kremlin gang, let alone outright Communists. In the earlier years of the Bolshevik "experiment" it made some sense to allow for ignorance, for confusion, for innocent collaboration with horror. But this is 1952, the thirty-fifth year of the squalid, sadistic story. The evil thing has swallowed half of Europe and most of Asia and is making war on free men everywhere in the literal Korean sense. Surely the margins for doubt about the nature of the Communist abomination were erased long ago.

EVEN AT the risk of being "unfair" to a few innocent cretins who still accept Moscow's slogans at face value, the time has come to ostracize Communists of all degrees. They should be cut off as fully, as demonstratively, as uncompromisingly as decent people used to cut off Nazis and still cut off the more obnoxious and identifiable kleagles of race hatred. Those who choose to ride Stalin's bloody wave of the future should be treated conspicuously as moral outlaws and social untouchables. They must be marked with the stigma of shared guilt for every crime, deception and brutality compounded by Bolshevism from 1917 to date.

It used to be smart to be vaguely pro-Soviet. The mink-lined tobacco roads from Park Avenue to Beverly Hills, the penthouse proletariat, the swimming-pool peasantry played at revolution and paid generously into Party coffers for the privilege. It was a species of intellectual social climbing. The Communists found this useful and lucrative for their schemes, and the cumulative mischief has left permanent scars on American life. It has polluted the thinking and crippled the emotions of a generation.

Communism has ceased to be fashionable. For the most part Park Avenue and Hollywood have retreated to more natural and less hideous stupidities. But that is not enough. The giving of aid and comfort to Stalinism in any form must be made positively shameful. Association with the Kremlin's causes and catchwords and obscenities must be identified for what it is: proof of moral depravity and mental driveling.

Let's ostracize Communists and their fellow-travelers. In the context of the current world crisis they can no longer be given the benefit of the doubt but must be clearly labeled as traitors —not merely to their own country but to the human race and to freedom itself.

Creed and Greed

FREE MAN: Peace
COMMUNIST: Piece
after peace
after piece
after peace. . . .

CASMI STEFFIN

How To Defend Free Enterprise

By **WALTER SULZBACH**

An economist asks why the arguments in favor of economic liberty have so far failed to reverse the world trend toward more interventionism.

IN THE United States as elsewhere propaganda in favor of free enterprise has, in general, failed. Its supporters stand for an excellent cause. They have substantial funds at their disposal. But they have been unable to reverse the universal trend toward economic intervention and controls. Even the Republicans in this country and the Conservatives in Britain are not liberals in the sense of Adam Smith, Jefferson, or Cobden. All they promise is that they will achieve the goals of the welfare state more cheaply and efficiently than the parties with which they compete.

If only a small part of the energy and money spent for free enterprise propaganda were devoted to investigating the causes of its failure, many disappointments might be avoided. The following reflections do not pretend to cover the whole problem. Their purpose is to initiate a discussion.

The first mistake of current free-enterprise propaganda is made on the ideological level. We speak too much of the "liberty" lost through controls, forgetting that, although the cry for liberty has been responsible for all revolutions of oppressed *nations* against their oppressors, it has had little significance in the realm of social movements. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out more than a century ago, it is equality, not liberty, that the people in a democracy are most eager to achieve. The principal motive behind the French Revolution, said Napoleon, was vanity and not the lust for liberty. He was referring to the bitter resentment of the French people against the economic and political privileges of the aristocracy and the clergy. It is no coincidence that in many countries the people are quite willing to live under dictatorship and to forego their liberties. Only recently the Brazilians voted their former dictator into the presidency in an honest election. But never and nowhere have the masses voted for an aristocracy of birth or wealth.

Economic equality means in the first place equal access to the chances and pleasures of life. The minimum demand is for social security and full employment. Since well over half of the working population in industrially advanced countries have the status of employees, few people aim at eventually running enterprises of their own. Employees believe that free enterprise is only remotely, if at all, their concern.

To be sure, liberty has not lost all its appeal. But economic interventionism is not felt to be an encroachment on individual liberty. The worker who can find no employer willing to pay him the legal minimum wage does not usually blame the law for his misfortune. He blames the avarice of the employers; and he will not be convinced otherwise.

Not long ago a lively discussion took place on the question whether or not socialism and economic interventionism frustrate the functioning of political democracy. In the opinion of this writer they will do so in the long run, even though the historical experience at this time available can not be used to substantiate the liberal assumption; for the labor parties in Britain, Australia, Norway and other democratic countries have not, when they held office, misused their power in order to stifle freedom of thought and discussion or to prevent elections in which they might be defeated. The connection, if any, between democracy and free enterprise appears more obvious when the question is put the other way round. If we ask whether political democracy undermines the free-enterprise system, the answer is definitely yes. Wherever there has been universal suffrage, organized economic pressure groups have been able to influence legislation; and the idea of the welfare state has proved well-nigh invincible. In the United States no party can win that does not promise privileges to the farmers and organized labor. Big Business and the banks can marshal only very few votes; and the consumers are not organized.

Free enterprise will never make headway as long as its supporters ignore the psychological foundations of democracy.

The second obstacle to be considered is not of an ideological and quasi-permanent but of a transitory political nature. Ours is at present not a peace but an armament economy. In what Herbert Spencer, himself a staunch liberal, called the "industrial type of society," a great measure of laissez faire produces good wages, good profits, and the highest attainable national income. In Spencer's "militant type of society," which covers our present set-up, these achievements are not the foremost purpose of national policy. America's main concern for the time being is security; and in a period of intense rearmament our government is bound to be the biggest buyer of many basic commodities. It can't help drafting potential laborers into the armed forces, and interfering with the location of new industrial plants with the purpose of insuring their immunity from attack. Providing for an ample supply of consumers' goods and the sound investment of private savings is of secondary importance.

The traditional arguments in favor of free enterprise which were valid for Britain around 1900 and for the United States around 1925 have a

somewhat theoretical significance at the present juncture; for it is unlikely that when our ends are changed the means used to achieve them will remain unaffected. Free enterprise propaganda which ignores the present international situation may be compared to a program for the professional education of teen-aged males at a time when practically all of them are liable to be drafted as soldiers.

Thirdly, the liberal school is a hundredfold right when it insists that all attempts to interfere with the distribution of the national product in favor of "labor" or "agriculture" or "small business," are doomed to failure. When the labor unions force the wages of their members up beyond equilibrium level there will be unemployment. When a government guarantees minimum prices to farmers, they will produce more than they can sell and the authorities will have to buy a part of their product. Maximum prices induce the producers to restrict their activities and bring about black markets. Tariffs for the purpose of hampering imports cut down exports as well. And so it goes through the whole economy. The "functional" distribution of income, as provided by the market economy (i.e. distribution as among capital, labor and "risk-taking"), stubbornly resists all attempts by governments to remould it.

But in a democracy the voters demand what they call "economic justice"; and they will not change their minds merely because the textbooks on economics join issue with them. Here is another point where free-enterprise propaganda has been one-sided and unrealistic. For aside from the "functional" there is what the economists call the "personal" distribution among individuals. "Personal" distribution reflects income regardless of its sources. It tells us how much A,B,C, etc. earn in terms of dollars.

Now there can be no doubt whatever that governments may take a hand in personal redistribution without inviting unwelcome secondary results, as long as they don't go too far. When some workers have to be paid more than they are worth to their employers, other workers will find it more difficult to be hired. But if public funds are used to keep starving paupers alive some one else will not have to starve instead. The state *can* organize relief; and no one wants the poor to perish. The question how generous relief should be and how much public money should be spent for social security, education, and so forth does not involve any principle. It is a matter of degree. Liberals need not be told that the tax burden, particularly in the field of progressive income and estate taxes, can reach a measure where it stifles savings, initiative, and new investments and will lead to outright socialism. They should stress that point time and again. But at the same time they should not ignore the basic fact that concessions to the democratic demand for security do not necessarily conflict with the ideas of private property and free competition; and they should not alienate the support of classes which may be won over to the cause, provided that cause is explained in a language to which the people will listen.

The radical rejection of even a small measure of personal redistribution is particularly dangerous in times when the most simple-minded are aware that the thing can be done. If we can spend $60 billion on armaments it stands to reason that in more normal times we can spend at least a part of that sum for the poor, or the aged, or the young, or any other group we are willing to support.

SINCE the ideological arguments of the supporters of free enterprise have had little effect in the past and will presumably fare no better in the foreseeable future, and since periods of rearmament and war are anyhow not propitious for an extension of laissez faire, what can be salvaged and restored of free enterprise at this juncture should be supported not by attempting to *convince all* the people but by *organizing some* people, namely those whose immediate interests are involved. This should be done first for the purpose of abolishing those governmental subsidies and investments which go back to the New Deal and have long lost their usefulness, if they ever had any; and, secondly, for the purpose of halting inflation.

The principle of price "parity" benefits the farmers, formerly bankrupt but by now highly prosperous. At the same time it is a heavy burden on everyone else. It should be abandoned as soon as possible. The same applies to our silver-purchase policy. The liquidation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is overdue.

Our "parity" farm policy is a drain on the Treasury and on every consumer. The housewives in the cities, if they ever read a paper, are aware of the fact that it is they who pay for the prosperity of the farmers. They and their husbands know everything the economists are able to tell them. But they don't mind. They do nothing about it. For the farmers are organized, and consequently get what they want. The consumers, though they are by far the majority, are not organized and therefore can be exploited.

The same holds true for inflation, next to war the greatest enemy of free enterprise. The results of both, war and inflation, are obscured by the short-run prosperity which they produce. But aside from the misery it inflicts on those who have trusted the stability of the national currency, inflation is so dangerous because it deprives all prices, wages, and investment figures of their true meaning and significance. It protects enterprises which should not be entitled to expand or even to exist; and it permits governments to spend vast sums without adequate budget controls.

Yet inflation is never an economic necessity. It is a political expedient; for if governments can appropriate purchasing power by taking it away from the people who have cash and checking accounts or hold claims defined in terms of the national money unit, they might as well levy taxes

in a regular way on the earners of incomes, the buyers of commodities, the owners of real estate, etc. A sound system of taxation is at least an attempt to let social justice prevail; whereas inflation is a method of irresponsible expropriation which, more than anything else, undermines the meaning and justification of the principle of private property. Governments are well aware that the victims of inflation are wont to suffer silently. History records many revolutions of the debtor classes. The creditors, who have been far more frequently dispossessed, have never revolted.

Only a handful of individuals and corporations in this country have a stake in silver mining; but this small minority has organized its interests. It has promoted the silver lobby and has become an important factor in our monetary policy. It is almost unbelievable that the people whose interests are tied to cheap food prices or the preservation of the purchasing power of the dollar are not organized as political pressure groups, and therefore wield no influence. Everyone is a consumer; and millions of Americans hold life insurance policies, bonds, mortgages, or saving accounts and are thus on the losing side as long as inflation goes on and prices continue to rise. It should be easy to organize the consumers, particularly those who live in towns and cities, as well as the past and present victims of inflation.

The pressure of these two classes, consumers and creditors, might well prove irresistible. The victims of interventionism should be able to achieve for free enterprise by political action what arguments and statistics have failed to accomplish.

From Our Readers

More About Our Function

The editorial in your issue of December 31, "The Function of the Freeman," was in my opinion conciliatory beyond the call of duty.

The majority of the American people support neither the domestic policy of the New and Fair Deals nor the foreign policy that led us to Yalta and Teheran and into the land war in Korea. At the last Presidential election only a fourth of the qualified electorate gave positive support to these policies.

Yet our country is still ruled by a comparatively small group of self-styled progressive intellectuals. This clique controls almost all the important media of communication and education. It controls the tremendous Federal apparatus of political propaganda, costing hundreds of millions of the taxpayers' money. It sets the dominant tone in the editorial offices of our newspapers and magazines, in the legitimate theater, in the movie industry, in radio and in television. Its partisans misuse our schools, especially the universities, to indoctrinate the rising generation with the ideas of government omnipotence, all-around planning, socialism and communism.

It is true that some minor results have already been attained in the fight against this leftist bigotry. The overt coddling of Communists and fellow-travelers by Federal authorities has been discontinued. It is unlikely that the official machine will again dare to shield traitors as it did persistently until a few years ago.

This initial success is certainly hopeful, but it is only a first step. The Administration continues its inflationary policies and its endeavors to use the people's dissatisfaction with the inevitable consequences of inflation as a pretext for increasing controls. If the present financial policy is not abandoned very soon, an economic catastrophe of unprecedented gravity may result. Then the spokesmen for "progressivism" will put the blame on capitalism, whose operation they have sabotaged by every means available. They will try to interpret the failure of their own absurd schemes as the collapse of the market economy which has provided the average American with the highest standard of living in history. And they will try to persuade people that only the adoption of full regimentation of every aspect of the citizen's life and work can bring salvation.

What is needed to frustrate this combination of folly and deceit is an enlightened public opinion. It is necessary to counteract the incessant propaganda of the "liberal" intellectuals; to explode the fallacies of their tenets; and to give the youth of America, whose minds have been misguided by teachers and textbooks, an opportunity to recognize fully the benefits which they derive from the American system of economic freedom, representative government and civil rights.

This is the function of a journal of opinion like the *Freeman*. It must combat the superstitious belief that the coming of socialism is inevitable. It must restore confidence in the future of freedom. It must encourage those who have refused to let themselves be deluded by the harbingers of bondage. It must win back to the cause of freedom those who have fallen victim to the collectivist slogans. It must raise its voice in favor of the philosophy of true liberalism, and expose the counterfeit "liberalism" of those who try to sell dictatorship and oppression under the specious label of democracy.

New York City M. L.

"A Notable Service"

In the short time since our subscription started I have been very much impressed by the high and stimulating quality of the writing and thinking that goes into your publication. You are doing a notable service, and those of us who admire independence and forthright opinion hope that you will continue to find the means to keep going.

CLAYTON HOAGLAND, Editorial Director, Institute of Economic Affairs. New York University

New York City

Manners, Arts and Morals

Notes on the Entertainment Industries

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

NEXT TO "Point of No Return," Mr. John van Druten's "I Am A Camera" has been generally welcomed as this season's greatest dramatic hit on Broadway. It is the story of a British girl who, under the pretext of being a whore, is one. An anemic subject, one would think, yet even such meager dramatic material the playwright (just as the author of "Point of No Return") had to rent from a novelist's warehouse. There is, it seems, considerably more inventiveness in the frigidaire business than in our theater. All Mr. van Druten has contributed to an old novelette by Christopher Isherwood, aside from a routine fitting job for stage dummies, are a few clever lines of dialogue and loans from other authors—Molnar, for instance. (The structural joke of the "new play"—the professional problems of a writer discussed on the stage, and used for driving the plot's motor—is from "The Play's The Thing.")

Christopher Isherwood's melancholy sketches of British youngsters who, vaguely bothered by weird signs in the sky, are killing time in Berlin while the Nazis are getting ready for quite another kind of killing, remain memorable notes of a sensitive reporter. Written in the early thirties, these "Berlin Stories" reflected, honestly and authentically, the moral fatigue of a generation which did not want to hear the first rumbles of the hellquake and, for that reason, made sophisticated noises of dissipation. Oh yes, there was also among them that silly British girl, Sally Bowles, who, with her rather touching Anglo-Saxon lack of talent for the distinctly Gallic vocation, dabbled a bit in sexual wickedness.

And so it came about that Mr. van Druten, apparently in a desperate search for material fit to tickle a frivolous audience, recalled those "Berlin Stories." Off went the complexities of Mr. Isherwood's distressed prose, his trembling premonitions of unthinkable horror, his remorse over a generation's lazy heart. On came a few of Mr. van Druten's famously elegant *single-entendres*—and there it was, that veritable triumph of the trade: a bedroom farce for debutantes.

What made things even worse was Mr. van Druten's appallingly bad taste in retaining, of all things, Isherwood's compassionate recollection of two bewildered Jewish lambs, about to be slaughtered. In the "Berlin Stories," written almost twenty years ago, this anticipation of the gas chamber was a credit to Isherwood's moral sensitivity. Used on Broadway, in 1951, as a sort of tragic relief in a dirty story, Mr. van Druten's counterpoint reference to six million future corpses is the most offensive gimmick in his altogether offensive off-color play.

I shall not deny that I enjoyed watching Miss Julie Harris, who plays Sally Bowles with all the wickedness a Smith undergraduate could muster. Even the limitations of her register add, in this particular case, to Miss Harris's success: as she is simulating anyway, her single-pitched mannerism, sustained for an entire evening, is this time in style. But my enjoyment of the act would have been greater if it had been shown at a stag party.

For, shock as it may my fellow intellectuals, I admit that filthy language embarrasses me in the presence of ladies. But what embarrassed me even more was that hundreds of well-attired and visibly nice women in the audience, many a girl freshman among them, seemed to find the joke utterly, utterly delightful. Why ladies, when gathered in hundreds, should enjoy the sort of language any three of them would resent in the relative privacy of a drawing room, has been often discussed by mass-psychologists, who contend that the individual's moral and esthetic standards get lost in the herd. This, if true, is sad, particularly when it comes to ladies who, if they were smart, would keep out of herds.

THERE ARE, of course, exceptions to that widely neglected rule. For instance, mixed company did not bother me at all when I saw "Top Banana," a musical which stars Phil Silvers and his expert team of funnymen. Served à la burlesque, smut, it seems, becomes aseptic. The secret of old-fashioned burlesque is its unconscious tact in presenting the off-color gag without the slightest literary pretension, without intellectual rationale or psychological motivation. It is *pure* smut. When performed not for a kick but for a laugh, strip-tease strikes me as unobjectionable. There are, it seems, only two tasteful ways of discussing sex (a notoriously private affair) in public: either to contemplate the superiority of an inexorable force (i.e. to immerse oneself in tragedy); or to show the stupid self-importance of crude appetites for what it is—excruciatingly ludicrous. Mr. van Druten could do much worse than engage in a study of the two hilarious and completely disarming knockouts in "Top Banana": one, a kind of Koechel-listing of all the classical burlesque gags, presented by the show's funnymen with terrific speed in front of the curtain; and two, the elopement scene towards the end which, I want to report in the jargon of the trade, made me roll in the aisle.

But gratitude for a few greatly appreciated laughs must not sidetrack a critic from assessing

the Broadway disaster as a whole. In the following account of all productions currently to be seen on Broadway (except for the straight musicals and Sir Lawrence Olivier's British guest company), I have attempted to separate the quintessence of each play's dramatic material:

"Affairs of State": a statesman's education through and for sex.

"Anna Christie": a prostitute, sent downhill by rape, has difficulties in recapturing pure love.

"Come of Age": a reincarnated unkissed boy-poet receives an exasperating sex education from a woman twice his age.

"Desire Under the Elms": spiced by murder, adultery and other family contacts, sex relations can be tough in New England.

"Gigi": two old cocottes have unexpected trouble in training a girl for the oldest profession.

"I Am A Camera": as said above, the story of a British girl who, under the pretext of being a whore, is one.

"Point of No Return": a suburbanite has doubts about the meaning of his career but, egged on by his wife, keeps going.

"Remains To Be Seen": even an illiterate girl, set against a comical background of mystery, can exude gamy sex appeal.

"Stalag 17": coarseness, comedy and tensions in a corral of sex-starved prisoners of war.

"The Constant Wife": a cool woman coolly defends her unfaithful husband and then goes coolly off on an extramarital binge.

"The Fourposter": snapshots of a marriage taken around the title-bed.

"The Moon Is Blue": a civilized lecher can get to first base—but not beyond—with a dangerously inquisitive girl.

"The Shrike": to escape a mental institution, an unbalanced man has to accept a life term with his vampire of a wife.

IN OTHER words, of the thirteen "legitimate" Broadway dramas, ten are entirely focused on the tribulations of sex, while the remaining three ("Point of No Return," "Stalag 17" and "The Shrike") handle sex quite thoroughly, and not at all tangentially, but at least in some context with other motivations of human behavior.

The nine Broadway musicals, of course, are as frankly disrobed as musicals have every right to be (though some of them use that ancient license to the naked hilt, and might have embarrassed the Minsky brothers). As to Olivier's productions, they are impeccably tasteful exhibits of mature British theater art, including the choice of playwrights. But in the context of this critical essay I can not help noticing Olivier's (subconscious, I am sure) flair for Broadway's present obsession: he picked the indubitably sexiest play of each, Shakespeare and Shaw, a double feature which an unscrupulous advance man might easily have billed under the combined title "Up In Cleopatra's Room."

Lest I be misunderstood, I want to go on record that I count the female form, and the desires it frequently arouses, among the least disputable successes of Creation. Furthermore, having received my early education in the proximity of Sigmund Freud, I have always been willing to grant that sex is here to stay. But not necessarily on Broadway! And certainly not to such total exclusion of everything else! I am, to clarify my position beyond any possible mistake, so unreservedly in favor of sex that I rally to its defense against the catastrophic consequences of literary inflation. A few more seasons such as this, and the sensitive segment of the audience, sex-satiated beyond endurance, will patronize bootlegged showings of "Uncle Tom's Cabin"—a distinct calamity, not only because that play is rather poor, but mainly because sex, if inhaled in reasonably spaced dosages, has exquisite stage possibilities.

For the most serious quarrel I have, retrospectively, with the Minsky brothers is precisely over their underdeveloped sense of quantitative discrimination: nudity, in the singular quite often attractive, evokes in the plural a cumulative disgust. This brings me, in a context I would have deemed unthinkable only a few years ago, to the Sunday edition of the *New York Times*, in whose columns, the other Sunday, I counted 73 pictures of what *corsetières* and Hollywood censors so modestly call "cleavage." I must report that, characteristically, I enjoyed that bit of statistical research much less than I first thought I would. This may merely prove that I am neither young enough nor old enough for peeking; but Mr. Sulzberger, I trust, does not really want to discount the large group of potential readers between the age of puberty and that of senility. Nor can he, surely, be happy with the fact that his paper could so readily be mistaken, by some who can not understand English, for a trade organ of the American corset industry.

There may have been a time—say, thirty years ago—when public contemplation of anatomical facts and physical tensions required courage and deserved patronage. But what courage does it take, and what patronage does it deserve today, when chastity is considered a character defect, monogamy moronic, and a lady is expected to blush only over her deplorable allergy to dirty jokes? In such an era, one can be sure, Professor Freud, were he still around, would most earnestly prescribe a healthy dosage of repression, on medical as well as on esthetic grounds.

As a doctor, he would advise against a total surrender to constantly provoked drives—a surrender which necessarily ends in idiocy. And being the civilized child of a civilized century, the Professor, who thought he had located the roots of civilization in the repression of elementary physical urges, left also never a doubt that he considered the game, all in all, well worth the candle. A perusal of the current 22 Broadway offerings, I am afraid, would send him off in a fit of remorseful contrition for a flood of cultural debauchery he had decidedly not willed, to a medieval monastery.

A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

In his "Eisenhower: The Man and the Symbol" (Harper, $2.50) John Gunther conclusively proves that Ike is to be liked. We learn a great deal about the particularities of Ike's likeable exterior personality from the Gunther method of reporting, which establishes Dwight David Eisenhower as an excellent bridge player, a good amateur cook, a golfer of parts, a painter who ranks a little below Winston Churchill, and a reader whose tastes run to violently gaudy pulp Westerns. We also learn a good deal about Ike's Abilene, Kansas, childhood, though this comes second-hand, by way of other books about Ike. The high points of Ike's own "Crusade in Europe" are also well presented by Mr. Gunther. But as to Ike's *ideas*, which might make him less likeable to certain people if they were known, Mr. Gunther proves a very unsatisfactory cicerone. John Gunther may have no difficulty getting inside whole continents, but he has not managed really to get "inside Ike" at all.

Since Mr. Gunther has the equipment to be a first-rate reporter, should one ascribe his failure to a period which does not reward journalists for digging behind official facades? (I know the only time I ever got a real news beat—which was on the contents of the 1944 Marshall letter to Tom Dewey warning him to keep the truth about Pearl Harbor out of the political campaign—I was looked upon as a sort of moral leper for some months thereafter.) Whatever the answer to this question of the lack of reward for digging, it remains true that Mr. Gunther just hasn't dug hard enough, or talked with enough people, or probed his subject for revealing attitudes on specific matters. Maybe Mr. Gunther couldn't have done any better under the peculiar circumstances of the looming political campaign: Eisenhower hasn't wanted to talk in advance of a sure sign from the firmament (or maybe Mr. Gallup), and his friends and even his enemies may wish to remain under wraps until after the New Hampshire primaries. But the fact that Mr. Gunther may have been hampered by circumstances does not help answer the questions that still must be asked of Eisenhower before the Republican convention next June.

Mr. Gunther does indeed tell us something about Ike's views on both foreign and domestic matters. But the views on foreign policy, as outlined here, are rudimentary and far from profound. As for Ike's domestic philosophy (it is generally "conservative" in its drift), the statements quoted by Gunther lack the sort of amplitude and seasoning that would enable a reader to know how the man might behave in certain situations. Mr. Gunther refers to speeches in which Eisenhower has attacked the idea of Federal aid to education, or decried the search for an "illusory" security at the expense of initiative and self-reliance, or warned against the "danger" that may arise from "too great a concentration of finance." It is good to know where Eisenhower stands on some of these things, even good to know that he may be a sort of Kansas Populist in finance, but, as Mr. Gunther himself says, "probably his chief defect, both in general and as a Presidential candidate, is lack of definition."

Mr. Gunther quotes Eisenhower as exclaiming: "If only a man can have courage enough to take the leadership of the middle." But the "middle," in our time, is anywhere the collectivists and Welfare Statists choose by their words and activity to place it. The technique of controlling the whereabouts of the "middle" is as easy as it is infallible. If a leftist wants, let us say, *two* billion dollars for a given project, he can establish his figure as the "middle" figure by the simple expedient of asking for *four* billion. The sort of thinking that Eisenhower has presumably done about "leadership of the middle" merely provokes the left to double its demands in quest of a "compromise" that will give it precisely what it wants.

Mr. Gunther notes, in Eisenhower, the seeming "lack" of a "fixed body of coherent philosophical belief." But if he truly feels that "lack of definition," and "lack of depth," are Eisenhower's chief defects as a Presidential candidate, why didn't he press his subject into efforts at definition? A truly first-rate reporter of the old school—an Alva Johnston, for example—would have hacked away at this until he had either elicited something or proved to his own satisfaction that there was little to be had. In the latter event it would not necessarily be established that no "definition" to Eisenhower exists. A man can hold detailed beliefs and still keep mum for his own reasons. But the reporter who can't get answers to searching and, yes, impertinent questions from a public figure at least should know that he must get out the gumshoes and go to work collecting and cross-checking the statements of friends and enemies of that figure. The trouble with Mr. Gunther is that he hasn't given the gumshoes a try. He has evidently dis-

dained talking with Ike's presumed enemies, probably on the theory that it would contaminate him to be seen in company of anyone who might conceivably turn up in a "MacArthur-McCormick-McCarthy Axis." (Incidentally, the almost universal assumption that a journalist should mingle only with a Socially Approved Set is a measure of what has happened to journalism in our shallow and benighted era.)

A victim of "liberal" preconceptions, which make it impossible for him to think about the "interior" facing-east-facing-west position of Russia on the globe with the cold precision of an F. A. Voigt or a Sir Halford Mackinder, Mr. Gunther is certainly not the man to discover for us whether Eisenhower really believes the world is round. Stalin's own writings on Asia and the colonial question are pretty good reason for thinking that the Bolsheviks are "Asia Firsters." This does not mean that Europe should not be defended against the possibility that the Russians will become "Europe Firsters" overnight, or that Eisenhower is wrong about the urgency of creating a European Army. But it does mean that Eisenhower should be questioned—and questioned relentlessly—about his feelings relative to the Marshall-Acheson policy in the Far East. To their credit both Dewey and Stassen have shown their awareness that Russia can fight at will on any front she chooses, and that undue concentration on Europe might lose us Asia, or vice versa. But as to Eisenhower's world perspective we are still in the dark. Perhaps even less is known about the broader aspects of his foreign policy than about his domestic ideas.

Mr. Gunther's failure to tackle the most important questions about his subject is all the more glaring when one considers his pages about Eisenhower as President of Columbia University. Mr. Gunther shows a fine awareness of what various factions thought of Eisenhower on Morningside Heights. He shows no comparable awareness of what larger factions in the outer world think of Eisenhower as a soldier and statesman-to-be. He tells us that Eisenhower has his doubts about the wisdom of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions. But whether Eisenhower thinks the pressure of fifth column infiltration played any part in softening us up for Yalta is a subject which Mr. Gunther does not explore. No doubt he would consider it "McCarthyism" even to mention the matter.

OUR ENEMY, THE STATE: A RE-REVIEW

By CECIL PALMER

Our Enemy, the State, by Albert Jay Nock. *Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers. $2.50*

For many more years than I now care to revive in my memory, I have publicly and privately proclaimed that there are at least three outstanding books in the English language which, if they had been read as widely and thoughtfully as they deserve to be, might have spared the world much of its present misfortunes. The books I have in mind are Milton's "Areopagitica," Mill's "On Liberty," and Spencer's "Man versus the State."

The lamps of liberty are going out, one by one, throughout the whole world. Indeed, this widening darkness is the supreme human tragedy of the age in which we live. In our desire to flirt with knowledge, we have jilted wisdom. There is only one end to this illicit kissing of the ephemeral—a stubborn, stupid unwillingness to embrace the eternal. Moral rot is eating away the very roots of individualism, and thereby destroying the soul of man at the fearful price of granting secular exaltation to a soulless State.

From now onwards I, for one, intend to add a fourth book to the jeweled necklace of libertarian literature. "Our Enemy, the State," by the late Albert Jay Nock, is given this high precedence in my humble estimation because it has, in common with the classics I have mentioned, all those qualities of clear thinking, objective presentation and lucid exposition which distinguish the wise philosopher from the merely intellectual pamphleteer. The one writes for all eternity: the other for the moving moment that must inevitably pass away.

Superficially, one of the grimmest paradoxes of the twentieth century is the emergence of the atom bomb at a time when it is painfully evident that the overwhelming majority of mankind is afflicted with delayed adolescence. Substantially, however, it is perhaps not a paradox at all. May it not be that the universality of the adolescence and the splitting of the atom are patterned in the natural law of cause and effect? Is it unlikely that we have been inflicted with the super-scientific bomb because we have refused to grow up and because we have failed to cherish and honor the spiritual bounty of our inheritance?

Albert Jay Nock obviously absorbed every word of Herbert Spencer's masterpiece and, having done so, his own mighty pen began where Spencer left off. Nock's prescience is uncanny. Reading his book in this Year of Grace, 1952, it is difficult to realize that it was written in 1935. It reads like contemporary journalism, but with this tremendous difference: it is written in prose of such majesty and simple beauty that it will rank, for all time, as im-

perishable literature. Furthermore, it states a case against Statism that is as fearless and provocative as it is profound and unchallengeable.

The State, as Nock implies over and over again, is merely the politicians' dreams come true. It is political conjuring, whereby "all the people all the time" are invited to believe that the State and Government are one and the same thing. The truth is, of course, that whereas Government has its roots in society, the State is a parasitical, malignant growth that seeks to destroy society by bribery, corruption and *compulsion.*

"Our Enemy, the State," as the very title emphasizes, warns every thinking man and woman to remember that the price of human liberty is eternal vigilance. It stresses, also, that liberty, unlike justice, is *not* a right. *It is an attitude of mind, and a beatitude of the soul.* This very great book reminds us that the State is at once a myth and a terrible reality. It is a myth in the sense that it has no validity outside the twisted, crooked mentalities of totalitarians. It is also a reality in the sense that, whenever it is allowed to usurp the throne of Government, it not only commandeers the power that corrupts but, in order to give finality to its ascendancy, it must acquire for itself, and for itself alone, the absolute power that corrupts absolutely.

Albert Jay Nock made the point that history divorced from political economy is a story without background. The present writer ventures the assertion that political economy divorced from history is about as utilitarian as a teapot without a spout.

The great value of Nock's diagnosis of Statism, and all its implications, is that it establishes a pregnant matrimonial alliance between philosophical history and political science. We are able, therefore, to see the evolutions and revolutions of human understanding, and misunderstanding, in perspective. In other words, the author enables us to contemplate objectively the State's progressive efforts to subjugate society. Statism is political ideology, seeking outlets in the body politic whereby it can subtly transmute social power into State power. Communism, socialism, fascism, and all the other left-wing ideological variations, are the outward and visible signs of this inward and secular infiltration.

Herbert Spencer invited his generation to recognize the natural antagonisms that must exist between man, as man, and the State, as master. Nock was able to extend and widen the invitation for his own day and generation. Much that Spencer conceived in creative and prophetic intuition, Nock saw with his own eyes as contemporary phenomena. But, like Spencer, he too reinforced his fine scholarship with intuitive "second sight" into the future.

It is impossible to read this burning, passionate essay on the State as tyrant without realizing that man himself is all too frequently his own worst enemy.

It would be bad enough if we merely admitted that man is in danger of selling his soul for a mess of political pottage, in terms of the so-called Welfare State. Unhappily, truth demands the unequivocal admission that man is, today, showing too many signs of his guilty willingness to give his soul away, in blind obedience to a State masquerading as Father Christmas.

I could wish that a thousand millionaires would pool their petty cash in support of a literary crusade dynamically inspired with the will and purpose to make this dead man's masterpiece a living monument in the land of his birth, and beyond.

"Our Enemy, the State" should be in the hands, and in the minds, of the new and rising generation which is being so cleverly and so wickedly seduced by power-drunk State idolators. It is a book which offers inspired guidance to those who have ventured off the known way, only to find themselves in a jungle of frustration and perplexity. Above all, it is a sincere, honest, courageous and finely documented libertarian approach to the urgent spiritual, social and economic problems which beset us, and which mankind *must* resolve if declining civilization is to escape total eclipse.

POPULAR FRONTISM

The Yenan Way, by Eudocio Ravines. *New York: Scribner. $3.00*

What is most valuable about this better-than-average ex-Communist autobiography is its informed tracing of the evolution of the Popular Front formula that Lattimore & Co. sold to General Marshall, as a result of which the latter tried to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into a coalition government with the Chinese Communists. Mao Tse-tung's cynical adaptation of the formula became known as the Yenan Way.

In 1934, at the urgency of Stalin, Ravines says that he interviewed Mao, Li Li Shan and other Chinese Comintern agents in Moscow, although there appears to be some doubt that Mao was in Moscow in 1934. Mao, who according to Ravines exuded adulation of Stalin, had this to say about the Popular Front technique:

> The greatest talent in this work, comrade, is never to be associated with failure. Never to defend the weak even when he is right. Never to attack the pillager of the treasury, if he is the owner of a great fortress. He might crush you and there is no use being a martyr. . . . Let them get rich today. Very soon we can expropriate everything. The more help they get from us in their pillage, the more positions they will let us take and occupy. . . . These are not the ideas of Mao. These are weak echoes of the clairvoyance of our distinguished and meritorious comrade Stalin. . . .

Ravines says that he found the Yenan Way *trago amargo*—a bitter draught. But he swallowed it and soon was applying the formula with notable success in Chile. His Communist faith had been shaken but not broken by what he saw of the Great

Purge that followed the Kirov assassination, and by the abysmal poverty of the Russian masses. He was further disillusioned by his experience of the Spanish Civil War, where he saw Comintern agents living high while soldiers and peasants starved and died; where Soviet armaments were tried out—and snatched away if they proved successful; where the vain and sadistic General Lister shot a dozen brave men merely to cover up his own blunders and defeats.

But Ravines did not break finally with the Party until the Stalin-Hitler pact.

A professional journalist with fictional leanings, Ravines frequently achieves eloquent and incisive passages like this picture of the Communist millenium:

> And afterwards, Pierre? Subjugation of the peoples by Stalin's methods, NKVD brigades in every country, every party, every little ghost-government. Inventions of deviations to right and to left as an excuse for the assassination of leaders, officials and any man who has a mind of his own. The transformation of the world into a concentration camp like Russia . . . the policeman the highest human type . . . the spy an example to the world's youth . . . the cultivated men of Europe and America down to the level of the Russian, stupefied with terror.

A Peruvian, Ravines writes now from his third exile, in Mexico. He describes the Peruvian radical, Haya de la Torre, as a vain and ruthless adventurer, and de la Torre's APRA as a terroristic conspiracy which has frequently allied itself with communism.

JAMES RORTY

THE EPIC FALTERS

Closing the Ring, by Winston S. Churchill. *Boston: Houghton Mifflin. $6.00*

The fifth volume of Prime Minister Churchill's extensive personal history of "The Second World War" requires little general introduction for those who have read the first four volumes. The vividness, lucidity, stage-minded pauses and dramatic presentation so characteristic of the Churchill style are still apparent. But the point of diminishing returns has been reached, even for these admirable qualities. Mr. Churchill strives mightily to continue the epic mood, with the heroes duly enumerated and eulogized. But the only logical literary outcome of this mood would be the triumph of the forces of good over evil. In spite of Mr. Churchill's efforts to explain everything satisfactorily, we know that this was not the result. The war's real end was tragedy, inconsistency and failure in its major purpose: the extinction of despotism and the establishment of peace on earth.

The incongruity of the situation forces the reader to examine more critically the actions of our heroes —the three Caesars—with the result that, in the documents presented, their reputations come off more and more tarnished.

There is something deeply disturbing to one's confidence in the insight of the Western leaders when one reads about the mediaeval ceremony of presenting a specially designed Crusader's sword to Stalin at Teheran (pp. 363-4). Should the defense of Stalingrad, gallant as it may have been, be sufficient to drown out the pagan strains of the "Internationale"—and the atheism and slavery practiced in its name? There is something equally disturbing in the lack of discussion between the two Western heroes (Roosevelt and Churchill) on the possible bad faith of their comrade-in-arms, and in the Churchillian epigram "gaily" ending the formal conference at Teheran: "Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies" (p. 383).

For those who recall the great and noble principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms (the self-determination of peoples, the sovereign rights and self-government, and the pledge of no territorial changes without freely expressed consent by the peoples concerned), it is indeed disappointing to find less than fifty words out of some 180,000 devoted to the principles which took America into the war. The sole reference by Mr. Churchill occurs in a letter of instructions to Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in October 1943:

> We reaffirm the principles of the Atlantic Charter, *noting that Russia's accession thereto is based upon the frontiers of June 22, 1941.* We also take note of the historic frontier of Russia before the two wars of aggression waged by Germany in 1914 and 1939 (p. 283).

Within this very paragraph is contained the Allied assent to the annexation and enslavement of the people of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, East Finland, East Poland, Bessarabia and Bukovina in violation of the principles in the Charter. This paragraph marked the death of the Charter—even though the corpse was paraded, for propaganda purposes, for some time before it was interred. The clanking chains of its ghost are audible as one turns these pages, despite the obvious attempts to lay it to rest.

There are many points which Churchill fails to clarify adequately—at least for the historian. One of these relates to his strategy of the "soft underbelly of Europe." Its high purpose was to place American and British forces in the heart of eastern Europe, thus forestalling formation of Communist puppet states. Although the contemporaneous material quoted by Churchill would indicate that he argued strenuously for a drive into the Danube Valley and an attack in the Aegean and the Adriatic, he denies it:

> The reader . . . must not be misled by a chance phrase here and there into thinking . . . that I contemplated a campaign by armies operating in the Balkan peninsula. These are legends. Never had such a wish entered my mind (p. 254).

This denial of any desire for "mass invasion of the Balkans, or a large-scale campaign in the eastern Mediterranean" is repeated at page 344. Chur-

chill also urged and even attempted, with British troops, to occupy the islands of the Aegean. What purpose this could have had except for further action in the Balkans is hard to see. And Churchill's contemporary memoranda are rife with such sentences as:

> . . . The utmost efforts should be put forth to organize the attack upon the Germans throughout the Balkan peninsula . . . (p. 136).
>
> I believe . . . that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are militarily and politically united, and that it is really one theatre with which we have to deal (p. 210).
>
> [To Eden in Moscow] You should find out what the Russians really feel about the Balkans. . . . It may be that for political reasons the Russians would not want us to develop large scale Balkan strategy (p. 286).
>
> [To General Alexander] . . . If we can get hold of the mouth of the Adriatic so as to be able to run even a few ships into Dalmatian or Greek ports, the whole of the Western Balkans might flare up (p. 464).

Not only are there many other similar quotations within Churchill's own writings, but his advocacy of the eastern Mediterranean strategy has been described by Admiral Leahy ("I Was There," p. 162), by Sherwood ("Roosevelt and Hopkins," p. 747), by Hull ("Memoirs of Cordell Hull," pp. 1368-9), by General John R. Deane ("The Strange Alliance," p. 41ff), and by Elliott Roosevelt—to mention only a few.

It may be that Elliott Roosevelt's "As He Saw It" is responsible for Churchill's denial seven years after. The President's son showed little or no respect for Churchill who, he said,

> was of the opinion that we should contrive our entry into Europe in such a way as to meet the Red Army in central Europe, so that Britain's sphere of influence might be maintained as far east as possible. ["As He Saw It," p. 93].

Whatever esteem Churchill may have had for Franklin Roosevelt obviously did not extend to his son. The account of the dinner given by Stalin at Teheran makes it clear to the reader that Churchill considered Elliott a boor and a nuisance (pp. 373-4). The opinion, of course, is expressed in more polite language, but the meaning is clear.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to see the reason for Churchill's denial of his eastern Mediterranean strategy. In this strategy he held the vital concept that war was for political consequence, not alone mere military victory. The narrower concept, unfortunately, typifies the limited purpose of his American allies. In "Closing The Ring," and even more so in succeeding volumes, Churchill will be sadly in need of evidence to establish his greater foresight toward building a new world from the wreckage of the war.

In other places problems with the Soviets are touched upon and the reader's interest stimulated —only to be left hanging. On May 4, 1944, for example, Churchill wrote Eden asking for a one-page paper setting forth "the brute issues between us and the Soviet Government which are developing in Italy, in Rumania, in Bulgaria, and above all in Greece" (p. 708). He even questioned whether the British Ambassador should be recalled for consultation, and asked Eden to consult with Harriman. But there is nothing to tell the reader what, if anything, came forth from the Foreign Secretary. Certainly these ideas were not pursued at Teheran and Yalta.

To the historian, too, the Churchill history appears lopsided. The student is frustrated by the fact that he must accept what Roosevelt said and wrote only from Churchill's account of it. The correspondence between the two has never been published although, by Churchill's own statement, Roosevelt sent him over 1500 communications. It is strange, indeed, that an Englishman alone has access to this material which is denied to Americans. The American historian must rely on such scraps of information about Roosevelt's communications as Mr. Churchill cares to give. He may be grateful for the scraps, but he is scarcely convinced that they embrace the whole story.

There is much, however, for which the historian must give credit to Churchill. The vital, secret understandings took place at Teheran and are now confirmed. In "Closing The Ring," the British Prime Minister is honest in their statement. Among them were Russia's promise to join the war in the Far East after the defeat of Germany, a promise to give the Soviets "warm water ports" in Europe and the Far East (meaning Manchuria), a promise to support Communist Tito instead of Mihailovich in Yugoslavia, a tacit understanding to support the Russian annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, the partition of Finland and Poland with Russian annexation of the eastern segments (shades of "no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise"!), an understanding to support a periphery of governments "friendly to Russia" on her boundaries, and an understanding that Germany would be dismembered and fragmented after the war ended.

Those who remember Mr. Roosevelt's speech to Congress after his return will recall his denial that there were any "secret political agreements" at Teheran. Churchill's ample and illuminating account of the "unconditional surrender" of Italy certainly carries the conviction that there were undertones of grants for surrender, despite Roosevelt's prior pronouncement at Casablanca. For instance, recognizing the position of the Royal family in the Italian Government and accepting the government headed by Marshal Badoglio do not exemplify "unconditional" in the same sense as it was applied to Germany.

Mr. Churchill has provided some vivid accounts of battles and campaigns. He has confirmed the surmised processes of top-level diplomacy during the period. But these echo in hollow mockery against the current background of world events.

ARTHUR KEMP

BRAZILIAN PANORAMA

Time and The Wind, by Erico Verissimo. Translated by L. L. Barrett. *New York: Macmillan. $4.95*

This latest panoramic epic from the pen of Brazil's best known novelist could almost be advertised as the historical novel to end historical novels. It is the full jumbo size, guaranteed to outlast all competitors by a month at least. Brazil is a big country and judging by Verissimo's efforts, intends to yield nothing to her Yankee sister, no matter what Anthony may be adverse and regardless of how many competitors may have gone with the wind. We have here some 620 pages, covering a period from 1745 to 1895 and presenting a rich gallery of characters, ranging from the primitive cowboy to the sickly and decadent provincial lady of leisure.

The work has many virtues, not the least of which is precisely this procession of sharply drawn flesh and blood characters. Unforgettable is the swashbuckling Captain Rodrigo, always ready for love and combat, uneasy and unhappy when neither is available; picturesque is old Fandango, a stock figure of the cowboy that, with very slight changes of costume, would be recognizable in Texas of fifty years ago; but best of all are the women, particularly the inarticulate, long-suffering, passionate Ana Terra and the durable Bibiana, arresting as a young girl, almost terrifying as she grows into old age. The action, too, is lively; it could hardly fail to be since it must cover a hundred and fifty years of history in a period when history in the Western Hemisphere was moving on with rapid and violent intensity.

We see the frontier town of Santa Fe in the province of Rio Grande do Sul grow from a handful of huts to a thriving provincial city, gathering momentum in spite of civil and foreign wars, misgovernment and natural calamities, following a pattern which Europeans may marvel at but which we in North America will find familiar enough. Indeed, one of the fascinating aspects of the novel for the American reader is the revelation of a cultural pattern strikingly similar to our own. Any North American with the slightest interest in his own country's history must read this novel with a growing sense of kinship, for the Latin settlers of South America, though they brought from Europe a tradition different from ours (and the difference is not to be minimized), yet by force of circumstances, by the nature of things, have had the same readjustments to make, the same problems to face. Without intending to prove it (nor indeed to prove anything, for the only "thesis" of the novel is its implicit patriotism) Verissimo demonstrates clearly that there is such a thing as "the American" as distinquished from the European, and that hemispheric solidarity is culturally a greater truth than many of us realize.

A novel of this extent, one might almost say expanse, is a story of a people more than of people, and it speaks well for Verissimo's skill that he can make his characters stand up against the background of time and events that he portrays. Even so, from a purely artistic point of view, the personalities might have more impact if the novel had been broken into a trilogy and published with a year's interval between the parts. The author has himself felt the need of some synthesizing machinery, and hence has told his tale in a series of flashbacks, a device he has used in earlier novels. It does serve in a way to keep time within bounds, but many readers will find it distracting rather than helpful. But this, if it be a fault, is a relatively small one compared to so many virtues. Verissimo writes with enthusiasm, professional mastery and a sense of the poetry of his subject, all of which comes through in L. L. Barrett's fine translation. A pity there's no map; this is the kind of novel that needs one.

THOMAS G. BERGIN

MARRIED TO CHICAGO

Chicago: City on the Make, by Nelson Algren. *New York: Doubleday. $1.50*

If Mr. Algren could have managed to be a bit dispassionate about his Chicago, this would have been a better and a less arresting book. But to ask Mr. Algren to be dispassionate about Chicago would be tantamount to asking a man to be indifferent to a wife who has got under his skin.

Mr. Algren is married to Chicago, and it is one of those "until death do us part" affairs. Both his mind and heart are involved and it keeps him permanently stirred up. Her blowsy charm, her gaudy vitality, her brash gallantry, have set him running a gamut which not only never stops but which gathers speed. Here it all is: passion, irritation, lyricism, anger, admiration plus an occasional *degringolade* into something bordering on sentimentality. Right off he states his case: "Once you've come to be a part of this particular patch, you'll never love another. Like loving a woman with a broken nose, you may well find lovelier lovelies. But never a lovely so real."

A sense of humor would help, but Mr. Algren, I'm afraid, isn't blessed with one. If he had been, he would either have settled down before this or got a divorce. And he further complicates things by not only hanging on to his illusion but adding new facets to it. He says:

> If you've tried New York for size and put in a stint of Paris, lived long enough in New Orleans to get the feel of the docks and belonged to old Marseilles awhile, if the streets of Naples have warmed you and those of London chilled you, if you've seen the terrible green-grey African light moving low over the Sahara or even passed through Cincinnati, then Chicago is yours and you can say it and make it stick.

He is proud of her. She can tell a policeman where to go and at the same time cradle a renaissance in her lap. A fighter's girl and a writer's girl. "An October sort of city even in the spring.

With somebody's washing always whipping in smoky October colors off the third floor rear."

A city that is all things to all men. She embraces them all with debonair impartiality—the Indian-skinning traders, Dwight L. Moody, Robert J. Ingersoll, Dreiser, Bill Thompson, Sandburg, Capone and the White Sox. She has everything except a sense of proportion. This is why Nelson Algren is so well endowed to be her biographer. Within his limitations of temperament he has done a good job.

ALIX DU POY

THE GREAT ADVERSARY

The Origins of Totalitarianism, by Hannah Arendt. *New York: Harcourt, Brace. $6.75*

Limitations of space make impossible the detailed treatment which Hannah Arendt's profoundly penetrating study deserves. Her brilliant attempt to discover the roots of totalitarianism in certain aspects of nineteenth-century imperialism and anti-Semitism may be open to serious question, but her insight into the nature of totalitarian rule is nothing short of revelation. With that revelation this review will be exclusively concerned.

The normal world of common sense and historic experience provides no guides for an understanding of totalitarianism. Most resemblances are superficial, those which are genuine are without significance, and all are misleading. The Kremlin has no ideology in the sense in which that term is commonly understood. It is in fact neither socialist, Marxist, Leninist, communist nor collectivist. A lifetime devoted to the study of these sociological theories does not equip either the student or the devoted Party member to predict the course of Soviet strategy or action a day in advance. These are determined solely by Stalin and the Politburo, and are directed, undeviatingly, toward a single objective—complete control of the human race.

This goal is not merely one deliberate choice among several possible alternatives. It is a congenital necessity because it is an inescapable consequence of the basic assumption upon which the totalitarian regime is built. That assumption, or rather heresy, is the conviction that man has *unlimited* powers, that through the machinery of organization nothing is impossible and everything can be achieved, and that man can create a social order from which unpredictability has been wholly banished. All Soviet activity is a manifestation of this fundamental belief.

Soviet expansionism is unmotivated by the traditional goals of empire. The prewar Russian domain is sufficiently rich and diversified in material resources to absorb, in their exploitation and development, all the energies of the Russians for at least a century. But as long as there exist communities uncontrolled by the Kremlin, elements of unpredictability—and hence of danger to the totalitarian regime—remain. Complete domination of the globe offers the only assurance of being able always to direct the "course of human events."

Similarly, economic considerations, despite a professed thoroughgoing materialism, are entirely subordinate; where they are emphasized, it is solely as instruments for the extension of control. Thus, the enforced collectivization of the early thirties was not primarily the result of any genuine belief in the *economic* superiority of collective farming. Under the New Economic Policy, immediately prior thereto, the peasants had begun to develop interests and social relations and structures which threatened to acquire an independent and autonomous life of their own. These had to be crushed, and were, at a cost of 5,000,000 lives. Even more striking is the complete physical neglect of concentration camp prisoners. This immense reservoir of potential slave labor could be used to produce more than it would cost to maintain it in good working condition. What is known of these camps indicates that no attempt is made to utilize this labor-power economically, as any rationally profit-minded slave owner would do.

The attempt to eliminate the unpredictability which underlies human existence becomes, as it must, an attempt to destroy man's capacity for spontaneity which is the essence of his nature. It is precisely because of this spontaneity that man, as we have known him through history, is never wholly predictable, is always potentially capable of creating novelty. This potentiality is a constant threat to the permanence of totalitarian rule. The areas behind the Iron Curtain are an immense prison in which the Kremlin performs its experiments in destroying spontaneity and creating a new species—the wholly predictable human animal. The concentration camps are the specialized laboratories, their inmates the selected guinea pigs, and their MVD jailers the fantastic experimenters hitherto known solely through the novels of H. G. Wells and his successors, or in the science fiction of the pulp magazines.

Only by a minutely detailed paraphrase would it be possible to indicate the really miraculous achievement of this book. Hannah Arendt has unerringly gathered all the truly significant evidence to sustain her thesis that unbelievable fantasy has become the incredible reality of a large segment of the world. By means of a series of intuitive and imaginative insights which are the fruit of an almost fanatical intellectual passion (what T. S. Eliot has called thinking with the senses) she has illuminated a phenomenon of our age which is unique in history and as dangerous to the survival of civilized humanity as the machinations of the Devil are to the salvation of the sinner. Everybody should read this book, particularly our leaders, for it is their incomprehension, their blind ineptitude, yes, their partial acceptance of the fundamental heresy, which renders us so helpless before the onslaught of the great Adversary.

MICHAEL J. BERNSTEIN

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