

THE

JUNE 16, 1952

25¢

DERS

556)

esses
esses. The
eas

lay Ed
ork T

questio

as me

that it

where,

ommuni

tence w

HE EDIT

A

in his

Respon

religion

which

must f

ead a

y, relig

an. Sim

tence a

necess

r depen

duty

erence

throu

not son

witho

ecial c

may be

t is m

ecessa

or not

fact

bligati

a man

that

that

his du

HERN

April

think

ght ha

wide

t' . . .

fore

consti

ills, e

come

erson,

Freeman

OF MICHIGAN

JUN 10 1952

BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
LIBRARY

We Have No Air Power

Alexander P. de Seversky

Non-Stop Kefauver


Samuel Shaffer

No God at Yale

John Abbot Clark

How Sick Is Socialized Medicine?

Melchior Palyi



Farmer?

Lawyer?

Merchant?

Chief?

In 1852... 7 out of 10 babies grew up to be farmers. In 1952... it is less than 2 out of 10. Mechanized farming has led the way to this change!

Here's *your* strong and husky young American, 1952 style.

He's a trifle young to worry much about his future. But, when the time for picking a job comes along, he can thank mechanized farming for his greatly broadened freedom of choice.

Fact is, farm machines have given all of us a greater choice in the kind of work we do. Once, nearly all Americans were farmers. Today, less than two out of ten of us are needed to provide our nation's food.

That's where International Harvester comes in. For 120 years our business has been the development of mechanized farm equipment. Three-fourths of all products we manufacture today are used in rural areas. They help farmers produce more, in less time, with less effort. And they make farm life itself more satisfying and rewarding than ever before.

Mechanized farming—using products such as Har-

vester builds—has led the way in making us the best-fed, best-clothed nation in the world. Last year, 29 per cent more food and fiber were produced than in 1941. That's quite a record . . . especially since there were 4 million fewer people on farms in 1951 than ten years ago.

Yes . . . as fewer of us are needed on farms—more of us can choose other vocations essential to our national well-being.

Young Americans today can still be farmers . . . and better farmers than ever before. But they can also be doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs . . . whatever they wish. The choice is theirs.

That's a big and vital contribution of mechanized farming.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER Chicago 1, Illinois

Builders of products that pay for themselves in use . . .
International Trucks • McCormick Farm Equipment and Farmall Tractors
Crawler Tractors and Power Units • Refrigerators and Freezers

bu
th
ac
rg
er
or
rov
n-t
best-
r, 29
an in
there
than

more
r na-

...
y can
what-

nized

AL

ago l,
nola
y
op
er
me

R

you can't lose

the first p
de to the
gists, che
merchandise
own gre
ve its stre
specific
n-use" con

est
28
satisfy Se
in rains, and
ere
le. So, ju

nat

ore

na-

can

nat

ized



**SHOP
RETAIL**

go l.
ois
ay "over th
ore than 4
ndly Sears
America.

SEARS
ROEBUCK AND CO.

SEARS

OUR GUARANTEE SATISFACTION

... or your money back

You can't lose at Sears.

In the first place, all Sears merchandise is first quality. It is made to the rigid specifications of our own engineers, metallurgists, chemists, designers, stylists and long-experienced merchandising specialists. Sears goods are triple-tested . . . in our own great modern Laboratory—where merchandise must prove its strength or confess its weakness—in Factories, where our specifications must be met, and in the Field, under actual "use" conditions.

You would think that all this would be enough—but it doesn't satisfy Sears. Sears merchandise is designed by human brains, and made by human hands. Nothing human is infallible. So, just on the long chance that some time something

might slip through, we say to you in all sincerity and good faith: "If anything you ever get from Sears doesn't make good—SEARS WILL!"

It is this pledge that has won the confidence of America, and held it through 66 years of historic selling. It is this pledge that sends millions of Americans back to Sears again and again every year—they know they are getting FIRST QUALITY, for perhaps no more than they might have to pay for "seconds", and that Sears will cheerfully and promptly refund their money, if they don't get complete satisfaction.

And that's exactly what we mean when we sign our advertising with—

"Satisfaction guaranteed or your money back" **SEARS**

FIVE WAYS TO SHOP AT SEARS AND SAVE



1. SHOP AT SEARS RETAIL STORES

Buy "over the counter" in more than 600 nearby, handy Sears stores all over America.



2. SHOP AT HOME BY MAIL

Take your time . . . relax. Select from over 100,000 items. Your "catalog-store" never closes.



3. SHOP AT HOME BY PHONE

Quick and easy, available in many places. Just phone in your catalog order for prompt service.



4. AT SEARS CATALOG SALES OFFICES

Save letter postage and money order fees. Salespeople will help you shop from all latest catalogs.



5. AT CATALOG SALES DEPARTMENT

Place catalog orders with helpful salespeople at your nearby Sears retail stores . . . by phone or in person.

It is difficult to write a definition of the American way.
But it is easy to find good examples. Here is one:

BY 1970... A TRILLION?



*"Butcher, butcher, kill ox;
Ox won't drink water;
Water won't quench fire;
Fire won't burn stick;
Stick won't beat dog;
Dog won't bite pig;
Piggy won't get over the stile,
And I shan't get home tonight!"*

KEEP this nursery rhyme firmly in mind, and it will be easier to understand a dramatic and similar chain reaction now happening in America.

Like the old lady in the rhyme, Uncle Sam wants action—steel, aluminum, defense production. Two billion pounds or more of aluminum this year, for example.

...But we won't get more aluminum without more plants.

...But plants won't run unless we have more electricity—and lots of it. (For instance, just to make the aluminum planned this year, it will take as much electricity as 125 million homes would use.)

...But there won't be this electricity unless we have more turbines and generators to make it.

...But there won't be more turbines and generators coming into towns on flatcars unless somebody had started making them more than a year ago. It normally takes 64 weeks to build a modern turbine-generator, even after design and engineering have been done.

...But a lot of these extra turbine-generators couldn't have been started over a year ago unless people in the electrical industry had started expanding their plants several years before that.

Now we come to things that kept this chain reaction from fizzling out:

The aluminum industry *did* forecast increasing uses for aluminum, and planned expansion.

People in the electric utility business *did* forecast America's needs for electric power up to five years ahead, and placed orders.

The electrical industry *did* forecast what it would take to build the turbines and generators the utilities would need. Six years ago, in the pessimistic postwar year of 1946, General Electric broke ground for a vast new turbine plant. When this was completed in 1950, General Electric's turbine-manufacturing capacity was upped 60 per cent.

So it looks as if Uncle Sam will get his two billion pounds of aluminum this year. A lot more than we could produce in a hurry unless some people had acted on the right hunch about America's needs—five or six years ago.

We wrote this story about aluminum. We could have written the story about steel, or chemicals. America's electric generating capacity must backstop them all.

That's why electric output is a good measure of a nation's current productive strength.

Here are some figures worth thinking about:

U.S. electric output in kilowatt-hours

1940.....	140 billion
1950.....	330 billion
1960.....	600 billion (est.)
1970.....	one trillion?

A trillion kilowatt-hours of electric power for America by 1970? When business foresight is added to research and engineering under a free economy, things like this can happen.

You can put your confidence in—
GENERAL  ELECTRIC

Free
Editors
M
leave
Conte
itorials
The Fort
Morgenth
Peace, It
The Powe
Lowdown
Justice C
All the N
rticles
We Have
How Sick
Non-Stop
Our Lefti
2. The
No God at
Think! ...
ooks
A Review
Cook and
Betrayal
Creation
French De
rts and Er
Time for
ems
Nothing F
rom Our I
his Is Wha
FREEMAN is
General Offi
es, 1952, by
elitt, Vice Pre
Follette, Assi
ered as second
in the copy; fi
ars a year els
editors can
oned they will
is not to be un
ly represent
ted because, i
ted in U.S.A.,

THE Freeman

A Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Editors JOHN CHAMBERLAIN FORREST DAVIS
HENRY HAZLITT*

Managing Editor SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE

Business Manager KURT M. LASSEN

Contents

VOL. 2, NO. 19 JUNE 16, 1952

Editorials

The Fortnight	595
Morgenthau, Upside Down	597
Peace, It's Wonderful	598
The Power of Hot Air	598
Lowdown on Yalta	599
Justice Clark Finds	600
All the News That Fits	600

Articles

We Have No Air Power.....ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY	601
How Sick Is State Medicine?.....MELCHIOR PALYI	605
Non-Stop Kefauver.....SAMUEL SHAFFER	615
Our Leftist Clergy	
2. The Remedy.....WALTER M. HAUSHALTER	618
No God at Yale.....JOHN ABBOT CLARK	620
Think!.....RALPH DE TOLEDANO	624

Books

A Reviewer's Notebook.....JOHN CHAMBERLAIN	625
Cook and the Pole.....ANDREW FREEMAN	627
Betrayal of China.....FREDERICK GRUIN	628
Creation of Evil.....HUGH STEVENSON TIGNER	630
French Decorative Arts.....RENE HOWELL	630

Arts and Entertainments

Time for Repertory!.....WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM	623
--	-----

Poems

Nothing Remains.....EDWARD DAHLBERG	626
-------------------------------------	-----

From Our Readers.....	594
-----------------------	-----

What Is What They Said.....	622
-----------------------------	-----

THE FREEMAN is published every other week. Publication Office, Orange, Conn. Editorial and General Offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. Copyright in the United States, 1952, by the Freeman Magazine, Inc. John Chamberlain, President; Henry Hazlitt, Vice President; Forrest Davis, Secretary; Alex L. Hillman, Treasurer; Suzanne La Follette, Assistant Treasurer.

Classified as second class matter at the Post Office at Orange, Conn. Rates: Twenty-five cents per copy; five dollars a year in the United States, nine dollars for two years; six dollars a year elsewhere.

The editors can not be responsible for manuscripts submitted but if return postage is enclosed they will endeavor to see that manuscripts rejected are promptly returned.

It is not to be understood that articles signed with a name, pseudonym, or initials necessarily represent the opinion of the editors, either as to substance or style. They are included because, in the editors' judgment, they are intrinsically worth reading.

Printed in U.S.A., by Wilson H. Lee Co., Orange, Connecticut



Our Contributors

The *Freeman* has been seeking a definitive, a clinical, study of socialized medicine. We have it in one brilliant package: DR. MELCHIOR PALYI'S "How Sick Is Socialized Medicine?" Dr. Palyi, a noted Hungarian-born economist who has taught at the University of Chicago, at Northwestern and Wisconsin, went to England at our behest to make this compelling study. . . . MAJOR ALEXANDER P. (Sascha) DE SEVERSKY has been called the Admiral Mahan and the von Clausewitz of the air. His "Air Power: Key to Survival" was the most provocative work of 1951 in the field of strategy. Sharing our view regarding the lamentable state of America's air defenses, he wrote "We Have No Air Power." . . . SAMUEL SHAFFER ("Non-Stop Kefauver"), *Newsweek's* senior Congressional correspondent, fought on Guadalcanal and Tarawa as a Marine. He is co-author of "Betio Beachhead" (Putnam). . . . JOHN ABBOT CLARK ("No God at Yale") teaches English at Michigan State and writes for the high-domed quarterlies.

Forthcoming: James Burnham, author of "The Managerial Revolution" and "The Struggle For the World," approached the McCarran investigation with an open mind. The result, in our next issue, is a piece of contemporary history—the history of IPR—that will amaze you.

Among Ourselves

The editors of the *Freeman*, believing it incumbent upon them to report to their readers from time to time on matters of mutual interest, take pen in hand to initiate a new department.

Whatever doubts we might have had about the impact of the *Freeman* upon the younger generation dissolved the other day when a band of indignant students from a famous New York City high school stormed our office. They had just been bested in one of those oddities of the American educational system known as a mock convention. Their candidate was Taft. Mrs. Roosevelt won. The boys solicited our help in obtaining a speaker for a student forum, announced themselves regular readers of the *Freeman* and departed still seething over the "idiocy" of their "radical" schoolmates. N. B. The principal vetoed their desire for a right-wing speaker.

Freeman readers have the gratifying custom of subscribing for friends whom they wish exposed to arguments for liberty. They subscribe for their brokers, bankers and doctors, they subscribe for their leftist daughters at Radcliffe and for pastors too smitten with Kirkegaard. A distinguished ex-United States Senator from an eastern state recently subscribed for all the public libraries in his state. Alumni subscribe for the faculties of their alma mater (or is matra?). The other day we heard of something new. The beautiful wife of a Washington columnist subscribed for her hairdresser on the commendable theory that ladies awaiting the dryer are receptive to the word.

Henry Hazlitt's colleagues regretfully announce that he has taken a leave of absence from the *Freeman* to work on a book. He plans to resume his editorial duties in October.

What To Do About Socialized Medicine

It's part of the pattern! Yes, socialized medicine is part of the overall pattern of socialization . . . full of promise and short on fulfillment. "Free" medicine has proved to be fantastically expensive even to those whom it promises to help most.

READ

Dr. Melchior Palyi's appraisal on page 605 of this issue. After an extended survey of British state medicine for the Freeman, Dr. Palyi analyzes its results and shows that socialization is the deadly enemy of medical standards and national health.

ACTION

Join with your fellow-Americans in fighting the plot to socialize American medicine. Distribute reprints of Dr. Palyi's masterful analysis to friends, associates, customers and employees.

WRITE, WIRE OR TELEPHONE
YOUR ORDER TODAY!

Single copies 10¢; Twelve copies \$1.00;
100 copies \$7.00; 1,000 copies \$60.00;
Prices for larger quantities on request.

Address your orders to

**The Freeman, Dept. F-16
240 Madison Avenue
New York 16, N. Y.**

FROM OUR READERS

"Bob Taft's Dilemma"

Congratulations to your new editor, Forrest Davis, and a thousand thanks for the article, "Bob Taft's Dilemma" [May 19]. It is absolutely the best thing I have read during this entire pre-convention campaign, and I sincerely wish it were possible for every thinking person to read it, then to demand that Taft bring this issue into the open. There are millions of Americans, Republicans and Democrats, waiting for someone big enough to take a stand and call a traitor or traitors just that.

Los Angeles, Cal. MRS. E.P. MAC HOVE

I have lost all my former enthusiasm, and much of my confidence in the *Freeman*, on reading your issue of May 19. Your editorial and the article by Forrest Davis, attacking General Eisenhower on pure supposition that he *may* have approved the Truman-Marshall-Acheson moves in various parts of the world, are to me most unfair. One wonders whether you have joined the recent smear campaign against the General. I have not as yet canceled my subscription.

CHARLES M. SHEAFE, JR.
New Haven, Conn.

It makes my heart warm to read this analysis ["Bob Taft's Dilemma"]. Great work, much needed. The article is an inspiration.

Chicago, Ill. ROGER FAHERTY

No Compromise with Evil

Your forthright, fighting editorial "In an Age of Mutiny" [May 19] is a classic. Thank God there is a *Freeman* with editors who will not compromise with evil. My hat is off to the person who penned the piece!

The cowardly performance of the officials of the Michigan State Prison seems to be a pattern of the time. Our Federal officials have been doing this for nearly twenty years, especially in the international arena. Do you recall the summer of 1933 when the late Samuel Untermyer made some blistering remarks about the German maniac Hitler? Luther, the German Ambassador, rushed to the State Department to protest to Mr. Cordell Hull. Our amiable Secretary,

instead of throwing the arrogant Ambassador out of his office with the statement that as a free citizen Mr. Untermyer had a right to do whatever he wanted even about Hitler, apologized to Luther. And that compromise with evil, Mr. Untermyer made the prophetic statement: "Mr. Hull will live to regret his regrets."

This bowing to international gangsterism has been going on uninterruptedly, and with disastrous consequences to us and the rest of civilized mankind.

New York City J. ANTHONY MARRAS

Please " "

Please continue to quote "me," you did so frequently in "In an Age of Mutiny" in your issue of May 19 despite the fact that that issue contained Harry Feldman's "Don't Quote Me."

Please continue to quote "me." I am one of those badly abused words which, thanks to its abuse, has all but lost its commonly accepted meaning. I am "liberal," "conservative," "isolationist," "internationalist," and a host of other words that, alas, mean all things to all people—only quotation marks will keep me from falling completely apart.

Or do you turn "me" into "smear" to all people by giving the crutches of " " ? Rather, pay "me" the tribute of admitting that you recognize the all-but-meaninglessness to which abuse has subjected "me"—you keep "me" apart with " " until a less confused, more nicely articulate generation recreates meanings for "me," or begets new words that can stand alone, having fairly chiseled meaning for all.

New York City

W.L. BAKER

An Amendment Needed

I want to commend the editorial "Dictatorship by Default" in your issue of May 5. Particularly I should like to endorse the suggestion that Congress submit a Constitutional amendment permitting Congress to force "either the resignation of the executive in which it had lost confidence, or an immediate new election." That is not a radical idea, but one that has been extensively tried in other self-governing countries and found to work well.

Falls Church, Va.

D.M. JACKSON

THE Freeman

MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1952

The Fortnight

As we go to press the news comes that the Supreme Court has decided 6-3 in favor of the Constitution in the Steel case. The majority — Frankfurter, Clark, Black, Jackson, Douglas and Burton — deserve special commendation for their heroic work in putting politics aside in an issue that could have scuttled the Republic in a single afternoon. As for the minority of Vinson, Reed and Minton, what can have prevailed upon them to overlook the plain meaning of those words about the illegality of depriving American citizens of their property without due process of law? We understand that plenty of lobbying was done in an effort to get the Court to decide in favor of the Truman pretension to "inherent" Presidential powers of seizure. Lobbying or no lobbying, we are vastly relieved to know that the great traditions of court history can make a majority of judges stand fast on the obvious intent of basic law.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower's return to lead his own campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination occurred amidst an atmosphere of tension both here and abroad. A series of insolent public demonstrations ranging geographically from Kojima Prison to the Place Vendôme furnished the backdrop for General Eisenhower's relinquishment of command. The returning candidate may well have observed on many a French wall chalked insults to his successor, Matt Ridgway, as "*Le Microbe Générale*" in reference to the Soviet imputations of germ warfare in Korea.

The General might well have taken comfort in the hardheaded vigor with which the French *gendarmes*, under the uninspiring but inspired command of M. Antoine Pinay, the President of the Council, put down Communist rioters, housed Jacques Duclos in jail and raided Communist headquarters. The Pinay government, by dealing bluntly with its Reds, has given a prime example to Japanese authorities. Faced with the current street disorders by the Communists, only one legitimate and effectual tactic is open to authorities anywhere, viz., force: "force without stint" in the Wilsonian phrase. Had our own military command followed such tactics in the PW camps in southern

Korea, we would have been spared the national chagrin that found relief in General Mark Clark's action against the two brigadiers.

General Eisenhower's first call was upon his commander-in-chief. If this were merely a courtesy call there would be no cause for concern by the Republicans who meet next month in Chicago. If the European policy approved by the President and executed by his retiring military commander were non-controversial, if it were not so disruptive a matter with the Republicans, the call might pass unnoted. The Republicans, however, must read this visit in the light of the warm personal friendship existing between Truman and Eisenhower which prompted the President to offer the Democratic nomination to Eisenhower only last winter. One may speculate upon what was discussed at the White House talk of Sunday, June first.

Did the President ask and Eisenhower agree not to attack the Administration's foreign policy in the event that Eisenhower wins the GOP nomination? Did Eisenhower renew his pledge of fealty to the Europe First policy?

The tension attending Eisenhower's return arises from such considerations. It can be no secret to him that the party to which he now adheres is deeply divided over the issue of foreign policy. It must be clear to his campaign managers that Ike's White House talk raises questions which the candidate himself must answer. This is the crucial issue as the campaign enters its final month: Just how far is Eisenhower committed to the ruinous foreign policies of this Administration? That issue takes precedence over the acrimonious disputes between the Taft and Eisenhower camps concerning the Texas delegations and the charges that Ike's managers are seeking to "bribe" delegates with offers of free trips to New York, Denver and Abilene. These are the froth of a madly boiling pre-convention struggle.

The riddle of Texas can be resolved into these countercharges: the Eisenhower people claim that the Taft-controlled state convention frustrated the will of the "people" by denying seats to delegations elected in caucuses openly dominated by Democrats;

the Taft people insist that only Republicans shall be on guard at Chicago. Incidentally, Raymond Moley, writing in *Newsweek* for last May 19, afforded a penetrating insight into just how the Eisenhower forces captured the caucuses. Mr. Moley, in Texas while the precinct meetings were under way, found the conservative Democrats engaged in an ambitious project.

Using their manpower advantages and strong discipline they were out to unseat New-Fair Deal Democrats in their own caucuses and elect Eisenhower delegates in Republican caucuses. Mr. Moley called the result "miracle in Texas." In "thousands of neighborhood conventions so many Democratic voters appeared that there were enough to win for the conservative Democrats and to provide an Eisenhower majority on the Republican side as well." Mr. Moley continued to the heart of the matter:

I attended a Democratic precinct convention in Fort Worth. Before the proceedings began, the conservative leader told me rather anxiously that at least 50 of his people had gone to the Republican convention in the next block. And yet when the voters were divided on the crucial roll call, he had 50 and his opponents only 32. Over in the Republican convention, the division was 50 to 23 for Eisenhower. That sort of result prevailed all over Texas.

The Eisenhower managers, charging the Taft people with "stealing" the Texas delegation, have pitched their remonstrance on the high ground of maintaining the two-party system. What becomes of the two-party system if Democrats in Texas swarm into Republican conventions and seek to nominate a Presidential candidate for the Republicans? Who's "stealing" what from whom?

Dr. John Dewey, who died of pneumonia the other day at the grand old age of 92, was a grand old man. We remember him as nobility personified when he stood up against Stalinist hatchet men in the days of the great Moscow purge trials. But though we shall always cherish the memory of his personality, we do not think he will go down in history as a grand old philosopher. As a youth John Dewey picked up the pragmatist ideas of William James, shaping them anew into his own doctrine of "instrumentalism." But, as Randolph Bourne said a generation ago, instruments can never be considered apart from the purposes to which they are put; and Dr. Dewey had only a scant interest in the more purposive side of human affairs. His ideas on "progressive education" were perverted by his followers into a number of desultory and aimless rackets. A partisan of "learning by doing," Dr. Dewey never managed to discover that "doing" in the Teachers College manner had degenerated into a meaningless fetish at least as long ago as 1930.

When a guy undertakes to police the economic life of a great nation it is only reasonable to ask that he know something about that economic life. But reason seems to have nothing to do with Truman appointments in the economic field. Take, for example, the case of Price Stabilizer Ellis G. Arnall, who went into a grocery store the other day and tried to buy a quart of milk for a dime. A dime might have bought a quart of milk a generation ago, but even then dime-a-bottle milk was probably thin Grade D stuff taken from an anemic goat. When Mr. Arnall learned that cow's milk now costs 28 cents a quart he admitted ruefully that he is pretty far "behind the times." We should say that he is still living mentally in the era of the medieval guilds, or at least in the time of the Bourbon kings of France. The boys in those days thought you could improve the efficiency and justice of an economy by controlling prices.

Just two short years ago they were painting the excess of potatoes blue (to keep them out of the market) and dumping them into fields for fertilizer. Now, under the wizardry of the Office of Price Stabilization, you can hardly buy a potato for love or money. There is a South African folk song, beloved of the Boer farmers, that goes: "Pity the poor patat, he can't see with his eye." In America they ought to be singing it: "Pity the poor controller, he can't see with two good eyes."

Last year the government raised the tax on whisky, hoping thereby to augment the Federal income. The public has responded by drinking less whisky and paying less money to Mr. Snyder. It won't be long before some totalitarian will be saying: "Comes the revolution and you'll drink whisky and like it."

That was quite a diatribe that President Truman launched on May 26 against the private power companies who had dared to advertise their opposition to socialized electric power. Mr. Truman appears to think it reprehensible for private citizens to pay for newspaper space in which to present their views to their fellow-citizens. Or does he think it reprehensible of them to air their views at all when their views conflict with his? Certainly he doesn't object to publicity *per se*, or the taxpayers would not be shelling out \$17,134,390 a year to employ an army of press agents whose job is to get favorable publicity for the Administration. If the President really thinks it is sinful to pay for publicity, why doesn't he fire all those press-agenting bureaucrats?

President Truman said the other day that no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court, they still couldn't take away his power to seize the steel mills. The President might be said to be the precise opposite of Old Man River: He don't know nothin', but just keeps talkin' along.

M

German
it loses
speed. I
giving o
would e
thau an
in wart
luck. Fo
chained
would n
ship in
this is p

Howev
of Roos
quences
hasty r
much as
casualtie
necessity
none is
anybody
not even
that Ger
against t

If inst
"uncondi
aged in 1
tive succ
suicides,
settlement
salvaged
wantonly
sive costs
western
occupation
the Germ
postwar
earned an
mendously

Nor wi
of Bonn b
gage. Wes
culated si
armies ar
touched fo
and one c
nation of
extorting
But the w
be paying

Few der
so reprehe
postwar G
York Time
has been r
reawakenin
takable tru

Morgenthau, Upside Down

Germany has an ancient habit of winning the wars it loses, and this time it won with unprecedented speed. But if the Germans were as generous in giving credit as they are anxious to ask for it, Bonn would erect an obelisk of gratitude to Mr. Morgenthau and all those other Americans whose blindness in wartime proved postwar Germany's undeserved luck. For, if this country had not been so stupidly chained to "unconditional surrender" in 1943, we would not be so humbly begging for German friendship in 1952. And let no one overlook the fact that this is precisely what we are doing.

However, given the catastrophic miscalculations of Roosevelt's strategy, and its ruinous consequences for the continental balance of power, the hasty restoration of German military strength, much as it must sadden the mothers of American casualties in Germany, has become an inexorable necessity. Among the advocates of NATO policies none is childish enough to suggest seriously that anybody but Europeans could defend Europe; and not even a professional Germanophobe could deny that Germany, the prize catch of any Soviet thrust against the West, can be protected only by Germans.

If instead of inanely playing Stalin's game of "unconditional surrender," Roosevelt had encouraged in 1943 the emergence of acceptable conservative successors to Hitler's lunatic government of suicides, and had offered them a reasonable peace settlement, all of central Europe could have been salvaged before the eastern dikes broke. Yet having wantonly invited the flood, we must now, at offensive costs to purse and pride, improvise a dam in western Germany. And because Roosevelt's preoccupation with the Morgenthau absurdities denied the Germans an unavoidable junior partnership in postwar Europe, we must now offer them an unearned and, to most other European nations, tremendously vexing senior partnership.

Nor will the wastefully generous peace contract of Bonn be our last payment on the Roosevelt mortgage. Western Europe has been so miserably emasculated since 1943 that Germany, if the NATO armies are to show any strength at all, had to be touched for more than one-third of their numbers; and one can imagine what sort of concessions a nation of Germany's hardheaded egotism will keep extorting in exchange for such a vital contribution. But the worst part of it all is that the West might be paying for a chimera.

Few derelictions of the American press have been so reprehensible as its consistent misreporting of postwar Germany. For all the readers of the *New York Times*, *Herald Tribune* et al., know, Europe has been menaced ever since 1947 by a furiously reawakening German militarism. Yet, in unmistakable truth, postwar Germany's real menace to

the peace and security of Europe consists of its deep-rooted sympathies for "neutralism"—a thoroughly defeated people's absurd indifference to the natural duties of self-preservation. Yes, Germany's "pacifism" is unfortunately genuine, though our metropolitan press has somehow never found time and space for what is easily Europe's most sensational postwar development.

Consequently, even if Soviet Russia patiently and kindly sat out those three years needed for a minimum integration of western Germany's armies into NATO, we might discover in 1954 that this new Germany has none of the Teuton's ancient soldierly virtues. (It has happened before. Sweden, once perhaps Europe's most bellicose power, acquired in no time a similar kind of congenital "pacifism," and for similar reasons: one blood-letting too many turned the ferocious Swedes into veritable lambs.)

Our current Germany policy, in short, might be piling one fallacy on top of another. For the danger of outright Soviet aggression in Europe is either clear and present, or it is not. If the United States Government thinks it is not, we are simply wasting our own substance, and that of our allies, in meaningless armament motions. If, however, the government acts on the assumption that military Soviet aggression remains an immediate possibility, then it must evidently concentrate American assistance on those European nations which are, there and now, beyond any doubt ready and willing to fight the Soviets. Everything else is precious sham.

We might of course be wrong, but it seems to us that only three European nations at present have the guts, and have previously proved their ability, to stand their ground against Soviet aggression—Turkey, Greece and Spain. (Paradoxically, Comrade Tito's government might be the fourth to fill the bill.) These nations should be getting our best support in money, men and weapons. Once they, and we, demonstrated that courage pays in terms of both prosperity and security, other European nations might learn the lesson. France, for instance, might discover that with a militarily potent Spain at her back, she had better grow teeth. And once France recovered her political sanity as well as her specific military weight, the time would have come for an organic solution of the German problem: Europe would then no longer dread a militarily effective Germany, but Germany would no longer be able to overcharge the West for questionable services.

What we are suggesting is, in other words, that the United States start fishing or cut bait—a total reversal of the Acheson policy which keeps fattening the worm and dependably casts the line high into the barren trees.

Peace, It's Wonderful

The other day, browsing through Victor Riesel's "Heard on the Left" column in the *New Leader*, we came across a bald little item that read: "George Kennan is under orders to make a co-existence deal in Moscow as soon as he can without losing face for the U. S."

If we may be allowed to mix our images, this was a fierce stab of light that struck us like a club. Mr. Riesel is a journalist who has unusually good sources; as Frank Hanighen of *Human Events* might put it, the Riesel column is "not merely gossip." Taking Mr. Riesel as soundly informed on the subject of Mr. Kennan's Mission to Moscow, we think we see the whole subject of the Truman Democratic Party policy outlined in terrible clarity. For if Mr. Kennan has indeed been sent to Moscow to engineer a co-existence deal, the project must be designed to cover practically everything. "Co-existence" doesn't just mean a settlement at Panmunjom; it means a settlement everywhere, from Berlin to Iran, and from Vienna to Indo-China. In other words, it means peace.

Can you imagine a more effective campaign slogan for the Democratic Party? Looking into the Truman subconscious via Mr. Riesel, everything falls into a pattern. The Republicans will nominate Eisenhower at Chicago. The Democrats will counter by nominating Adlai Stevenson or Averell Harriman. Then George Kennan will work his magic. A settlement covering North Korea, Indo-China, Iran, Austria, Germany, will be evolved over the course of the summer. Communism will take on a new phase: the Popular Frontism of the fifties. Stevenson (or Harriman) will beat the bushes and assail the ears of the whistle-stop listeners with speeches extolling the foresight of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who never doubted for a moment that Stalin could be had. And poor Ike, as the Republican nominee, will be forced to go along with the Democrats. Could he, as a Roosevelt-Marshall general, be against a peace settlement with Russia? If he dared open his trap to doubt his own hopes of 1945, the Stevenson (or Harriman) cue would be to lambaste him as a warmonger, a deserter to the Taft-MacArthur policy. No matter which way Eisenhower were to turn, the Democrats would have him on the defensive. And a defensive posture, as Dewey discovered in 1944 and 1948, just will not win an election.

All this, of course, is very neat. But if Mr. Riesel's information about Kennan is correct, it is certainly the only sensible reading of the Truman mind.

One obstacle remains, however—and that obstacle is Stalin himself. Mention of his name must inevitably turn the frivolous chatter of the previous paragraphs into serious politics. The inscrutable Georgian might conceivably fall in with Mr.

Truman's purposes for a month or two and make a deal. It would be of some advantage to him to continue the Truman Democrats in office, for the Truman Democrats can always be had with a gesture, a mere hope for a permanent Popular Frontist internationalism. But there are other things that must be nibbling at the edges of Stalin's mind as he grows into the prime of Georgian old age. There is the World Revolution, for example. Russia needs Popular Frontism with the U. S., France and Britain only when it has a strong enemy on its borders. There is no such enemy at present. In brief, there would seem to be no "objective basis" (to use the Marxist cliché) for a Stalin-Kennan rapprochement. Moscow still has more to gain by raising Marxist-Leninist hell than by making a co-existence deal.

So the Democrats will probably never manage to latch on to that most potent of campaign issues, the issue of "peace." On the other hand, if the Republicans are to have a vital issue in a time of continued cold war, they must really be prepared to fight the war. Even if Eisenhower is the candidate, the only way he can carry out a meaningful campaign is to adopt the stand-up-to-Russia policy at present associated with the names of Taft and MacArthur. That would require a rare humility. Has he got it? In the event of his nomination, it must be our prayer that he has.

The Power of Hot Air

Readers who value sound sleep above sound judgment are herewith warned not to read Alexander P. de Seversky's article in this issue ("We Have No Air Power," page 601). It is not just disturbing. It is the most terrifying analysis of our national predicament that we have encountered in many a month of search for realistic information.

Major de Seversky's thesis, documented to the hilt, is that we have no air power because we have no air strategy; and that we have no strategy for the air because we have no strategy, period. To us, who have no credentials to evaluate Major de Seversky's technical information, his general thesis looks irrefutable. And we can not, in fact, recall anyone in our wide and diverse acquaintance who would want to deny the fundamental, the tragic fact of our situation: that the potentially mightiest nation on earth has not the slightest idea where it is going or how to get there.

Now what makes us look at Major de Seversky's article from the editorial page is a thought we find even more disturbing than his material. How is it that this nation of ours—congenitally complacent, to be sure, but talented and characteristically obsessed with adequacy—how is it that this Republic submits to the sort of professional incompetence Major de Seversky puts under his microscope? Can

it be that
to man
guarant

We do
or call it
face of
our nati
of natio
many su
governm
us becau
submit,
first plac
trations
within v
gence ca

If it i
intellige
through
two Ad
price. T
formativ
to the F
through
objective
trations
can life
people h
nature o
premium
thought,
of a pres
disjoints

The t
course, t
concealm
operation
may orig
where th
Snyders,
other aim
everything

To re
country
Administ
strategic
consequen
kept bett
bler's nev
spare him
for his c
sipped an
gon Bure
there has
enough t
concentra
gest a str
ation. An
resources
sinews. B
(called cl

it be that there are not enough brains in this nation to man competently the team which is supposed to guarantee our military security?

We do not think so. Call it our own complacency, or call it a desperate desire to remain serene in the face of catastrophe, we simply refuse to admit that our national predicament can be due to an atrophy of national brainpower. Moreover, we know too many superb technicians, working devotedly for the government, to assume that our military elite fails us because of plain inadequacy. This country, we submit, has no air power, and no strategy in the first place, because the Roosevelt-Truman Administrations have abolished the frame of reference within which alone political and military intelligence can function.

If it is to function at all, political and military intelligence must be encouraged to think things through to the end. This is precisely what the last two Administrations had to discourage at any price. Their political philosophy, indeed their formative creed, was from the New Deal beginning to the Fair Deal end the glorification of muddling through. For what else could it have been? The objective character of everything those Administrations undertook to graft upon the tree of American life was completely alien to it. So the American people had to be prevented from recognizing the nature of the alien growth. How? By putting a premium on incoherence. The faculty for logical thought, for anticipating the ultimate consequences of a present act, had to be made a deficiency; and disjointed improvisation, a good in itself.

The trouble with such Administrations is, of course, that what begins as a clever technique of concealment finally becomes the very substance of operation. The Rex Tugwells, Tom Corcorans, *et al* may originally have known in their heart of hearts where they wanted to go. The McGranerys, the Snyders, the Achesons certainly do no longer. No other aim remains but to remain. In such a climate everything withers—and first of all competence.

To return to Major de Seversky's concern, this country has no strategy whatsoever because this Administration, to tolerate the emergence of a strategic concept, would have to face the inherent consequences of its cumulative failures. But it has kept betting, for twenty years now, on the gambler's never-never luck: that a gracious fate will spare him the terrible need to put up the cash for his chips. In spite of all that is being gossiped around the country about the inane Pentagon Bureaucracy (and some of it might be true), there has been at any hour of the last twenty years enough technical competence and logical acumen concentrated in our military establishment to suggest a strategy commensurate with our global situation. And there was at any hour enough skill and resources in the country to produce the required sinews. But there was never enough moral courage (called character) in this Administration to mo-

bilize both. Worse, there was the overwhelming political need to suffocate the counsel of consistency.

In short, of all the technical prerequisites for establishing an American air power none is more urgently required than a change of Administration. As long as the dead hand of those last twenty years jams the stick, this country simply can not get off the ground.

Lowdown on Yalta

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, from 1928 till 1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt's most intimate assistant and adviser, submits in the recently published memoirs of his momentous labors, "Working With Roosevelt," the ultimate *apologia pro Yalta sua*.

To help the President's report to Congress, the Judge joined F.D.R. on the *S.S. Quincy* right after the fatal conference. When Roosevelt indoctrinated his trusted friend and speech-writer on Yalta so soon after the event, he must have been forthright and spontaneous. Indeed, what Judge Rosenman can remember of the President's state of mind on this unforgettable trip home assumes the weight of monumental evidence—and here it is:

The President made it clear, not only when we were working alone on the speech, but in luncheon and dinner conversation, that he was certain that the Yalta Conference had paved the way for the kind of world that he had been dreaming, planning and talking about. *He felt that he understood Stalin and that Stalin understood him* [our italics]. He believed that Stalin had a sincere desire to build constructively on the foundations that had been laid at Yalta; that Stalin was interested in maintaining peace in the world. . . .

This will have to stand as the most authoritative description we shall ever obtain of the unfathomable ignorance, the arrogant confusion that then had the power to gamble with the fate of the planet. Franklin D. Roosevelt's "certainties," even more than his famous "hunches," were Stalin's decisive weapon in the battle for the world—"certainties" so frivolous and "hunches" so uninformed that they make the clients of bookmaker Harry Gross look like prudent investors.

But the real horror is what Judge Rosenman has to say for himself about Roosevelt's Yalta rationale—seven years after the event. Indubitably speaking for the whole Rooseveltian intelligentsia who still control our foreign policy and indeed the wells of public opinion, the Judge belligerently insists that the fault was not Roosevelt's: his rationale would have proved fully justified—"if Stalin had lived up to his commitments!"

Once upon a time a policeman stood before the court. He had helped a notorious felon, known for innumerable burglaries, to enter a house that had been entrusted to the policeman's special attention. "But Judge," whined the accused, "the man had

told me himself he merely wanted to wax the floors—and how should I have known he was not going to live up to his commitment? He alone is guilty. I am innocent." "You are guilty as all hell," thundered the Judge, "and twice guilty for this impudent excuse!" But the Judge's name was of course not Rosenman.

Justice Clark Finds

The Supreme Court, not unlike other agencies of arrogated ultimate wisdom, adds to the sum total of human ignorance each time it seemingly resolves a quandary. For instance, the nine Justices have recently agreed that the New York State Court of Appeals, when it banned an imported film as sacrilegious, was violating our constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech. The term "sacrilegious," or so argued the nine sworn custodians of our libertarian purity, is too vague and indefinite to serve as a standard for governmental censorship.

Not that it matters much, but we are always happy to concur with the Supreme Court. Whenever appointees of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman strike out against insolent governmental intrusion in human affairs, there should be rejoicing in the beleaguered camp of liberty. Yet this time our joy is marred. As if to make sure that the opponents of regimentation do not get too uppity, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to base its finding on the one clear and pertinent issue—the inadmissibility of Statist meddling with man's spirit. Rather, the decision (written by Justice Tom C. Clark) took great pains to emphasize that the Justices were solely concerned with what they called "religious views . . . provided by the most powerful orthodoxies." In short, what bothered them was not so much statism as "clericalism."

"A state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is 'sacrilegious,'" pronounced the Justices—and hastened to add: "It is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films." But that is precisely where the nine venerable Justices slipped. For if they think the term "obscene" one whit less ambiguous than the term "sacrilegious," they ought to hurry to the nearest college course in semantics.

"Sacrilegious," according to the "American College Dictionary," is something that "violates or profanes anything sacred or held sacred" [our italics].

"Obscene," according to the same semantical authority, means "offensive to modesty or decency; . . . disgusting; repulsive."

Now both terms, clearly, are not statements of measurable fact but rather value judgments based on socially accepted mores. Yet the statement "sac-

rilegious" has much more measurable content than the statement "obscene": what a community, or any of its significant segments, holds sacred can be found, specifically codified, in Holy Scriptures; but what makes an image or a phrase repulsively suggestive is a matter of vaguest subjectivity. While both terms merely express opinions held by significant groups, *spiritual* sensibilities are indubitably of a higher order than *esthetic* ones; and if the government has any business at all to outlaw violations of sensibilities, it ought to protect that which is held *sacred* over and beyond what is deemed merely *decent*.

In other words, the Supreme Court should have left semantics alone. They are much too tricky a subject, even for such a distinguished scholar as Mr. Justice Clark. The Court's sole business is to safeguard the American citizen against governmental infringements of his Constitutional rights. One of them is his right to be free of censorship—no matter on what grounds it is to be exercised. The Supreme Court should have said so, without the kind of ambiguity it deplored, rather foolishly, in the extremely precise term "sacrilegious." We, at any rate, would have liked to be reassured by the Supreme Court that the same Constitution which guarantees a film merchant's right to offend the religious feelings of millions of good people, on the other hand forbids the government to manipulate news from, say, the State Department.

All The News That Fits

The *New York Times* is still the best daily compendium of spot news in the whole field of American journalism. But its judgment in playing the news as we suggested in our last issue, seems to have become chronically defective. The emotions of its editorial governing board are constantly interposing roadblocks against a proper assessment of stories on a variety of subjects. The editors have frequently misjudged the news from Germany, they have allowed their education reporter to commit logical howlers of serious dimension (more of this later), they have exalted what William S. Schlamme, our valued contributor, calls "McLiberalism" in their zeal to combat "McCarthyism," and they have permitted their headline writers to go absolutely haywire in the Taft-Eisenhower struggle.

The latest instance of Alice-in-Wonderland headline lining occurred on May 21, when a report of Republican primary activity in Washington, D. C., was presented as "Taft Loses to Eisenhower in Capital 'Home' District." True enough, Taft lost the Thirtieth Precinct, which takes in the Taft home at Thirty-first and R Streets, N.W., in Georgetown. But on May 20, the day that report was filed from Washington, Taft had thirty-three District of Columbia delegates as against four for Eisenhower.

We Have No Air Power

By ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY

The "stormy petrel" of American strategy, Major Seversky, sees no hope for survival in war with the USSR unless and until we plan to assume global command of the air.

The essential optimism of the American people has been put under severe strain by the lessons of Korea. It grows apparent that our air striking power is steadily deteriorating in that theater in relation to the enemy's. Because we never have lost a foreign war, the general assumption is that we will not lose the next one; that we can defeat any nation, i.e., the Soviet Union, or any combination of nations that the Kremlin can bring against us. Our self-assurance is in general justified, yet we can not win a war against the Soviet world empire without global command of the air. Given the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in manpower and its favored position in the great Eurasian heartland, command of the air is the *sine qua non* of our warmaking potential.

Such command we do not have, and, as we study the dismaying reports from Korea, we may well doubt whether it is attainable without a drastic revision of our whole military philosophy, our strategy and concept of weapons.

What have we learned in Korea? We have learned that, although we have the greatest industrial potential in the world, we have allowed ourselves to be outnumbered in the air by the Soviet enemy, who is taking an ominous lead over us both in quantity and quality of his fighting tactical aircraft. Our command of the air over Korea is threatened. So far in Korea the Communists have not chosen to attack our ground forces from the air; they have not bombarded our targets with determination. In my view this is because the Soviet overlords do not wish to unmask their true power until they are ready for a decisive showdown, in order to exploit to the maximum the element of surprise.

The only advantage we now have in the Korean air grows out of the superiority of our pilots. This advantage, however, will dwindle as more Communist pilots gain combat experience. We may gather from reports of enemy action that the air over the Yalu River is being used as a proving ground for testing equipment and tactics and schooling pilots under combat conditions. Should the enemy bring his numerical superiority to bear against us in the skies, our air forces will be so busy with air combat for mere survival as to be of little use to the riflemen on the ground. Even if their forces remain qualitatively inferior, the sheer weight of numbers

may absorb our air potential so completely that it will be unable to give close support to the ground forces. In such event we shall, if hostilities are resumed, risk a military disaster in Korea.

We have at the moment an edge over the Soviet forces plane for plane. I have already noted that our pilots are better trained. We have better sighting devices and a small advantage in firepower. Our jets are primarily equipped with 50-caliber machine guns firing non-explosive, solid slugs which do very little damage to the enemy MIGs but, because of their high rate of fire, do score frequent and occasionally vital hits. In most cases we inflict only superficial damage and the MIG is able to streak home at 700 miles per hour to fight again.

The Soviet aircraft, by contrast, are equipped with 20 mm. and 37 mm. cannon firing explosive shells. A direct hit by such a projectile is enough to destroy an airplane. But because their rate of fire and muzzle velocity are low, their sighting devices inferior, the MIGs score relatively few hits. That is why we shoot down more aircraft than the enemy does.

We should assume that this situation will be rectified in time, but not necessarily to our advantage. The American sighting devices will no doubt soon appear on Russian planes, perhaps with improvements, as in the case of their adaptation of the British jet engine. They have had ample opportunity to copy our sights from shot-down planes.

What we see in Korea today on both sides is obsolescent aircraft. We know that we have better engines and airframes, improved technical equipment on test. We must take it for granted that the Russians likewise have superior fighting craft on the way. I think it obvious that the Kremlin is not giving the Chinese its latest types, keeping those for itself in case of major hostilities.

If we were outnumbered only in Korea we might view the situation with more equanimity. But the Soviet Union outnumbers us in fighter planes generally. According to such authorities as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary Thomas Finletter and General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Soviet Union has something like 20,000 airplanes available for combat. True, the Russians at present concentrate production on interceptors, whereas

we divide our production among a number of types. The Russians primarily outnumber us tactically. They have no alternative. Their first job is to secure their base of operation—to take possession of vital areas on their own continent—and that can be done only by ground forces. To provide close air support of their mass land army, their strategy demands great masses of tactical aircraft for command of the air over battlefields.

American air power deficiency is far more serious than generally acknowledged. Indeed, I feel compelled to make the assertion, based on a life-long study of military aviation, that the United States for all practical purposes today *has no air power*. Worse, unless radical changes are made in our strategic judgments, it will never have real air power. If we persevere along the present lines, we shall have a large number of miscellaneous aircraft, but this amorphous mass will not constitute air power in the strategic sense—to achieve command of the air.

The Nature of Air Power

General Omar Bradley, speaking recently in Pasadena, California, stated:

Americans will have to fight on the ground 3000 miles from home if we are to provide an ultimate protection to New York, St. Louis and Pasadena. Some prefer the dramatic vision of American power sitting securely in the Gibraltar-nest of the North American continent, with our eagles flying out to defend the nest, and to attack the enemy if war should occur. This Gibraltar concept is a selfish and a defensive one.

In a subsequent magazine article he enlarged on this theme:

Because we Americans prefer quick and easy solutions to difficult problems, we are vulnerable to a theory of defense which catches our imagination. A military concept, popularly known as the "Gibraltar Theory," places reliance mainly on air power and sea power and contemplates the withdrawal of our ground forces from the continent of Europe to our own North American "Gibraltar." The adoption of this policy by us would leave our friends in Europe to face aggression by themselves, while we bombed the enemy from afar, and we would soon find ourselves without allies, and going it alone.

Either General Bradley does not grasp the basic principles of aerial warfare, or he distorts them against his own better judgment in his zeal to please those who dominate our foreign policy.

What, after all, is command of the air? It is the ability of a nation to navigate through the air at will anywhere over the face of the globe, and the ability to deny this freedom of air navigation to any enemy. To illustrate: thousands of tactical aircraft built to support ground forces, to be fired like so many shells to clear a path for an advancing army, do not by themselves constitute air power. Such a tactical air force can not give strategic command of the air. It is part and parcel of the ground forces—another weapon added to the

array of ground weapons such as tanks and cannon.

True strategic air power can be expressed only by air forces designed and built specifically to achieve command of the air, that is to say with the capacity to win the air battle by destroying the enemy's air forces in being as well as his sources of air power on the ground. This is the kind of air power that can deliver atomic bombs and other explosives at the right time and place to destroy the enemy's capacity to wage war; the kind that can deny our air to the enemy so that the American industrial heart will maintain its healthy beat; the kind that can shield European rearmament through its power as a deterrent; the kind that can assure us friendly skies over the seven seas so that our overseas supply lines may be maintained; the kind that can protect the vital sources of strategic materials from destruction by the enemy's long-range aviation, so our own war machine can be sustained.

It is a military truism that air power is only as good as its base. If we plan air power based on the soil of Europe or its environs, within easy reach of overwhelming Soviet ground forces and tactical air force, it could readily be neutralized through destruction of its bases. Thus it stands to reason that the air power to give us global command of the air ought to be located primarily here on our own soil, on a secure base inaccessible to the Russian Army and its tactical air force.

General Bradley told us last November that "in the Strategic Air Command, we have the finest fleets of aircraft in the world." This is simply not so. Outside of some one hundred obsolescent B-36s, we have no equipment to implement a true strategic air force. What is coming from production lines for that purpose, such as the B-47, hasn't the necessary range to do the job. Refueling in the air to extend range is, in my opinion, highly dubious under combat conditions for sustained offensive. Moreover, through some unexplained and fantastic blunder these new jet bombers are virtually unarmed, having only two 50-caliber machine guns in the tail firing backwards. We are having difficulty shooting down MIGs with our Saberjets equipped with six 50-caliber machine guns. It is absurd to imagine that a big bomber can defend itself with only two such guns. Should these bombers attempt to invade hostile air defended by the latest Soviet fighter planes, they will prove clay pigeons for the enemy's defenses. The tragic probability is that Russia is no longer deterred by our great stockpile of atomic bombs, because we lack effective means of delivering them on a decisive scale.

As matters stand, I doubt that outside of the B-60, of which we have only two, our new jet bombers are proper weapons with which to win command of the air over Soviet Russia. In spite of spectacular speeds, they will be intercepted by enemy fighters, and not having adequate or proper

defensi
they w
is bein
Force
high a
As a
bomber
the wa
win co

Our
manne
Should
this pr
withou
riously

Why V

Why
Soviet
air pow
be gro
nologic
technol

At th
at least
opment
ics. Th
We ha
ficed re
our sci
to surv
secured
fied th
German
bring v
their k
experie
manufa
cluded
which t

This
pride.
technol
vice fr
know-h
been in
of man
took us
steps,
selves
engine
of pro
parentl
Pratt &
Royce f
after th
Wright
lions or
cured a
which v

defensive power or electronic counter-measures, they will be easy prey. The error of the last war is being repeated. At that time our Chief of Air Force stated: "My bombers are going to fly so high and so fast that nothing can intercept them." As a result, armament was neglected and his bombers were shot down in droves. Only toward the war's end did they carry sufficient firepower to win command of the air over Germany.

Our strategic air force is well conceived, well manned, superbly led, but it is only a token force. Should it be called upon to carry out its mission, this precious nucleus of gallant men will be lost, without inflicting decisive damage or even seriously impairing the Soviet capacity to make war.

Why We Are Outclassed

Why are we so decisively outclassed by the Soviet Union in the air? Why have we no genuine air power in being or in sight? The answers may be grouped under two general headings: technological and political. Let me deal first with our technological shortcomings.

At the end of World War II the Germans were at least a decade ahead of the world in the development of jet engines and supersonic aerodynamics. The British were ahead of us by many years. We had to win an air war and therefore sacrificed research to mass production. After V-E Day our scientists and engineers had the opportunity to survey German technological progress. Having secured the necessary data, they came home satisfied that they would be able to start where the Germans left off. Only on rare occasions did they bring with them German scientists to profit by their know-how. On the whole we ignored the experience of German engineers, designers and manufacturers. In some cases we deliberately excluded German scientists from the very work in which they excelled.

This was due to false psychology and false pride. We considered ourselves leaders in the technological field and were loath to accept advice from yesterday's enemies. Yet the German know-how on production of jet engines could have been invaluable. Such experience is the product of many years of effort. Starting on our own, it took us five years to retrace German scientific steps, so that it was 1950 before we found ourselves at the German level of 1945. Besides, our engine industry, having tremendous inventories of production of reciprocal engines, was apparently reluctant to make a change-over. Thus Pratt & Whitney secured a license from Rolls Royce for its Nene engine as late as 1948, a year after the same engine was sold to the Russians. Wright Aeronautical, after spending scores of millions on developing its own jet engine, finally secured a license for the British Sapphire engine, which will not roll from the production line in any

substantial quantity before 1954. In short, we lost five years of precious time.

The Russians, on the other hand, frankly admitted that they were ignorant on the subject. Having no high quality aircraft engine industry to speak of, they invited (or kidnapped) the German scientists, gave them all the necessary facilities and left them free to continue their work; provided them with comforts and took good care of their families in Germany to allay anxieties and boost incentives. As a result, the Germans in Russia have made extraordinary progress in the techniques of design and production of jet engines. They managed to improve the British Nene engine, both in performance and simplification of production through metallurgical and other innovations. Why the United States did not avail itself of the Nene engine before it was sold to the Russians defies explanation.

As for the British, their policy was somewhere between the American and the Russian. They did not turn the German scientists completely loose but succeeded in welding them into an effective team with their own. That policy also proved helpful, and today there is no question that the British are ahead of us in the quality of their jet engines. Barring some remarkable discoveries, it will be very difficult for us to regain the lost time, unless a tremendous concentration of wealth and effort is made with an A-1 priority of funds for research and development facilities, plus national recognition of a state of emergency in this field.

Now as to the political obstacles to the fullest development of a vast air program. Since World War II there have been changes in the industrial life of the nation that have impaired our productive efficiency. A large part of this impairment may be laid to what may be termed the marriage of capitalist and socialist industrial policies. Our mass-production lines are not as efficient as in the past. They are plagued by all kinds of new regulations and new attitudes on the part of both labor and management. We have lost the accelerating effect of full incentive. Production today is being handled primarily on a cost-plus basis through continuous renegotiations, with the government carrying the burden of additional expenses. Therefore, there is no incentive for anybody to produce more units in a given time. Everybody is more interested in the gross business transacted than in how many units are produced. These factors—lack of competition, lack of profit incentive and lack of efficiency, together with the much greater complexity of the aircraft themselves—result in fewer units produced per dollar and per diem. For example, one factory that during World War II was producing ten fighters per day is today producing only half a fighter a day. In my judgment, we may never again produce, as in the last war, 100,000 aircraft a year.

But at bottom we have no air power because

we have no over-all strategy. In line with the political policy of "containment," we are building all kinds of forces and weapons to meet the enemy's initiative at any possible point of his own choice. This makes for profligacy. In aircraft, we are designing and building everything conceivable for strategic and tactical use—from small puddle-jumpers for artillery observation to artificial rocket-driven satellites to be hung in the sky. Our air force today begins to look like Noah's ark—a pair of everything and no concentration of numbers to implement any definite mission. To quote General Bradley again, "Our strategy must meet the various capabilities of our potential enemy, and any method of attack which he might choose; and must meet the attack at the time and place of his choosing."

Mail-Order Strategy

We have set ourselves an impossible task. It is a mail-order approach to strategy: an attempt to build in advance ready-made packages of weapons and forces for every contingency the enemy may force upon us. A mail-order house at least has a fairly good idea of what its customers want, whereas by General Bradley's admission we haven't the slightest idea what the Communists will "order" from our military department store. (I want to make clear that I am not impugning the good intentions or patriotism of General Bradley but simply citing him as spokesman for our military leadership.)

That is why we are attempting today to build the biggest army, the biggest navy, the biggest air force, the biggest marine corps simultaneously—and for good measure trying to rearm not only the free world but some nations whose loyalty to freedom is dubious, while feeding the whole world and giving industrial aid to backward nations. One hundred and fifty million Americans can not hope to support such a program without weakening themselves to the danger point. Insofar as this confusion amounts to a strategy, only one thing seems clear. It is grooming us for a climactic ground-bayonet struggle, where the advantages are overwhelmingly on the enemy's side.

The outworn concept of the last war apparently still prevails, namely: to have a small strategic air force designed only to soften the enemy in order to enable our army to win a land battle. But a small strategic air force will not suffice to achieve command of the air over Russia to do the necessary "softening." Only a genuine and preponderant strategic air force can do the job. And that can not be created unless we drastically cut down our land and sea forces, and especially their tactical air components, so that the released facilities may be assigned for production of strategic aircraft. More than ever it becomes obvious that we must take inventory, reshape our strategy, de-

termine which force is decisive, which is within our manpower and our industrial capacity, and concentrate on this force as our A priority. Air power is, in my opinion, that essential force.

Global command of the air is an absolutely indispensable precondition to victory. Once we have such global command, we can take our time in creating the other forces. As it is, we are putting the cart before the horse—and starving the horse to death. It is generally admitted that our surface forces can not win a battle without air command. So, if the worst comes to the worst, it is better to win the battle of the air, and then consider possible exploitation of that victory, than to build great surface forces and lose them because we lack the air power to give them friendly skies. But I fear that such a new strategy can never be put into being by men whose whole experience is that of past wars. Military men can never implement a new approach that is beyond their technological knowledge, experience, philosophy and professional environment.

If we are to implement a genuine air strategy, we must have entirely new leadership. At the top we require military men who have been nurtured in this new type of technological air warfare, so that their insights and philosophy may permeate our entire military establishment. We have plenty of such men in our armed forces. We need only the pressure of an enlightened public opinion on this issue to put them in command.

America can win a war against a nation or combination of nations—but it can not win "in any old way." There are those who assert that in our military preparations we have passed the point of no return. I disagree. We still have a choice between the current strategy of so-called balanced forces and strategy resting on air power.

The balanced-forces strategy is bound to deteriorate into a surface struggle with the aim of destroying the Communist armies. Since we ourselves lack the numbers to generate a victorious force for that kind of struggle, we are laboring to create a kind of international army to do the necessary. In such a plan, our survival depends on the ability of an array of other nations to defend themselves and, in a sense, to defend us. If any of them falters, the whole scheme collapses. In effect our fate is tied to the internal political vicissitudes of those foreign countries.

The alternative strategy is to make America strong in its own right. That can be achieved only through air power which can guarantee us global command of the air. Only in the air can we bring to bear against the Soviets not only better quality but overwhelming numbers. If America is strong in its own right, we shall not have to buy the loyalty of allies with dollars. Strength attracts allies. They will climb on the bandwagon of freedom not only because our side is right, but because our side has might.

H

On Ju
came
hensiv
all-for
its au
Aneur
of obt

Less
of He
553,57
the wa
beds—
were c
have t
measur

Since
are ab
filling
attitud
have n
health
don) In
the men
without
For exa
1951, L
teen [k
people v
of horro
tals is t
they can
adminis
(Sheffie
non-med
actually

The o
almost t
cent of
counting
cover ca
authorit
non-exis
negligib
was one
scheme.

As to
industri
ment an

How Sick Is State Medicine?

By MELCHIOR PALYI

After surveying Britain's national health scheme for the Freeman, the author of "Medical Care and the Welfare State" finds that its results are the depressing opposite of its glowing promises.

On July 5, 1948, a National Health program became the law of Britain. It is the most comprehensive attempt in history to provide free-for-all, all-for-nothing medical care. "Money," declaimed its author, the left-wing Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, "ought not to stand in the way of obtaining an efficient health service."

Less than three years later, the British Ministry of Health announced (December 1, 1950) that 553,577 people (100,000 in London alone) were on the waiting list for hospital beds. Some 40,000 beds—almost 10 per cent of the total number—were closed due to shortage of nurses. More may have to be closed in consequence of economy measures.

Since the new scheme came into force, families are abandoning the old and the defective, who are filling the hospitals. "The public is adopting the attitude that because of the Welfare State they have no responsibilities for their aged parents," health administrators recently informed the (London) Institute of Public Administration. Many of the mentally deficient and the helpless aged are left without institutional care to shift for themselves. For example, in six months previous to April 18, 1951, Lord Saltoun told the House of Lords, "seventeen [known] cases had been reported . . . of old people who were found dead in varying conditions of horror." The problem of the overcrowded hospitals is to keep out the old and chronically ill whom they can not discharge. Meanwhile the clerical and administrative staff of a typical set of hospitals (Sheffield) has increased by 63 per cent, and the non-medical staff of a major London hospital has actually trebled.

The costs of governmentalized medicine have almost trebled in four years to more than 19 per cent of the overinflated national budget—not counting the payroll levy of some \$120 million to cover cash benefits, or the contributions of local authorities. Yet new hospitals are conspicuously non-existent, and the enlargement of old ones is negligible, though the lack of adequate facilities was one of the major arguments for the new scheme.

As to the quality of medical performance in industrial centers, the doctor has primitive equipment and little help, but is burdened with 3000 to

4000 and even more registered patients. This means three minutes or less for a consultation during which he should diagnose and advise, make out an ever-increasing number of prescriptions, write letters to specialists and hospitals and fill out many kinds of official forms (all without recompense). Besides, he has to keep extensive files, squabble with authorities, participate in endless committee meetings, etc.

Within three years, more than every second Britisher has received "free" dental treatment. But the dentists, rushed madly from one chair to another, are forced to sacrifice the dental care of school children whose teeth are decaying.

The people pay, of course, for what they get "free." How much is indicated not only by a 12 per cent addition to their extremely heavy tax bills—the main burden falling on the workingmen and the impoverished middle classes—but also by the fact that, according to the painstaking Collings Report (1950)¹, "the over-all state of general [medical] practice is bad and still deteriorating," and "has reached the point where, despite the efforts of the most conscientious individual doctors, it is at the best a very unsatisfactory medical service and at the worst a positive source of public danger."

The nation's health is actually jeopardized because the exorbitant cost of overextended curative medicine forces the shelving of urgently needed outlays to prevent the occurrence and spread of disease.

This Something-for-Nothing Utopia, advertised world-wide, is now in slow retreat: the Labor government itself set a ceiling of £400 million (about \$1100 million) on direct medical expenditures; and the Conservative government is attempting to enforce it by making the patient pay roughly one-half the cost of dentures and eyeglasses, a small fee for each prescription, etc. More constrictions, and more bureaucratic controls, are bound to follow. The enthusiasm begins to cool off, but the vested interests and high-pitched expectations once set in motion keep the scheme alive—forever, presumably.

Campaign oratory is one thing; practical reali-

¹ "General Practice in England Today: A Reconnaissance," by Joseph S. Collings (M.B., B.Sc.—Sydney, Australia), printed in the *Lancet* (London) of March 25, 1950.

ties are another, as I discovered during a recent on-the-spot survey of the retreating British medical Utopia. On the basis of that survey, I propose to analyze briefly the discrepancy between the promise of socialized medicine and its fulfillment, and to outline its far-reaching consequences.

EGALITARIAN MEDICINE

There is no opposition in Great Britain to the principle that the cost of medical care should be shared amongst the community. The plain fact is that medicine has advanced so far and so fast in the last fifty years that the cost of an illness is more than the average person can afford.

This statement does not come from Communists or Socialists or ignorant crackpots. It is a recent announcement of the august British Medical Association. The spokesman of the doctors went on elaborating their position, which is the popular one in Britain (and beyond):

When medical care becomes too costly for the average citizen two alternatives lie before us. Either the full range of modern diagnosis and treatment can be provided only for those who are able to pay for them, and the remainder must accept a second-class medical service; or some system of *sharing the cost of medical care throughout the community must be devised*. The former alternative is practiced in a number of countries, but the latter is preferred in Britain . . . *This has brought great mental relief to very many homes, and much sickness and disability, which otherwise would have been endured in silence, have been treated and corrected* [Italics added].

By paying lip-service to the egalitarian philosophy, the doctors incurred a large share of responsibility. No medical scheme could work if they refused to cooperate. Yet the medical profession has always "betrayed" its own cause by welcoming the introduction and subsequent expansion of socialized schemes or by taking a defeatist attitude of non-resistance. Such was the case when Bismarck put over the first compulsory health insurance plan (the cornerstone of his authoritarian Welfare State), and at almost every step in the enlargement of its scope; also when Lloyd George (1911) and Laval (1930) installed second-hand copies of it; and again under Bevan. Physicians are humanitarians, and attracted by professional and emotional interest to the unlimited medical horizons depicted by Socialist schemers. When the inevitable disappointment comes, they try to correct the system only to be frustrated by inherent troubles which can never be corrected.

The official line—used especially to win the support of the middle classes—is that the high cost of illness necessitates free medical services to bring "mental relief" to the home. Yet Colin Clark, an Australian economist with a great deal of Welfare State experience has said:

Nobody should be provided with any money or service for which he could have made adequate provision for himself with a reasonable exercise of responsibility and forethought. One of the first responsibilities of man is to maintain his own health and that of his family . . .

Just how many people are unable to pay for illness or to carry a low-cost sickness (hospitalization) insurance policy? The price of medical care in general, and of medical insurance in particular, automatically adjusts itself to the general price and income levels; group practice at low fees is an example. In other words, the law of supply and demand is effective here as elsewhere—but modified in favor of the consumer by force of tradition and human factors in the doctor-patient relationship, and especially by the custom of charging according to the patient's ability to pay. Besides, facilities for the poor are, and have been, furnished through public, private and institutional charity.

But charity is taboo with the Socialists; it is "degrading." The emotional appeal of communistic medicine is based on two assumptions: that there should be no charity; and (tacitly) that if an average person falls ill, the family is trapped with no savings left and no income to be spared. We are assumed to live on the verge of utter poverty, with the medical professions standing by to extract ruthlessly their pounds of flesh.

If we accept the principle of providing "mental relief" from the doctors' bills, why not apply the same principle to other mental headaches? To most families, the rent is a far more serious expense than the "high cost of illness"; why, then, not give everybody a home at the expense of everybody else? (That is what stringent rent controls and generous housing subsidies are supposed to approximate in Britain; they do not even improve the housing mess.) In any case the argument that before 1948 the English middle and working classes lacked basic medieval facilities (while the death-rate was declining in spectacular fashion) merely adds the adjective "mal-doctored" to the "mal-fed, mal-clothed and mal-housed third" of statistical demagoguery.

The true motive behind the drive for socialized medicine is to *equalize* medical care. The idea that all men have equal rights to equal shares of doctors, nurses, hospital beds, etc., runs like a red thread throughout the propaganda literature.

But does socialization equalize the benefits of medical science? Private practice survives to some extent even in Russia. In Britain, 5 per cent of the population did not sign up for the manna. Some people, though registered with a scheme-doctor, prefer to pay for "commercial" services when seriously ill. In a magazine article devoted to high praise of socialized medicine, an outstanding "liberal" writer told why she had decided to

pay a h
speciali
as a sc
Social
ment is
pay. In
among
even so
beds) w
offer to
free of
folk are
the cor
Social
jority o
inequal
ties can
classes
When m
enjoy th
the poc
in real
tuated,
Socialis
the com
A str
the lim
ality in
tarian i
by the
in the d
ical serv
der soc
ism, v
farm po
can not
politan
out of t
financial
are invo
Most
medical
upper cl
congeste
That dif
governm
up the
power to

MEDICINE

There
does eq
degree.
In the
industrial
working
The gen
it functi
strumen

pay a huge fee as the private patient of a famous specialist rather than wait for an appointment as a scheme-patient. Time was of the essence.

Socialism or no socialism, "first class" treatment is open primarily to those who can afford to pay. In the British scheme, they may choose among first-class commercial nursing homes, and even some 5000 first-class private rooms (pay-beds) which the nationalized hospitals themselves offer to the upper class at very high rates — but free of charge to the influential — while common folk are packed into the wards, spilling over into the corridors.

Socialized medicine encompassing the vast majority of the population actually emphasizes the inequality in distribution of income. The authorities can not apportion "health care" among social classes if all groups are equally entitled to it. When millionaires (and wealthy foreign visitors) enjoy the same subsidy as the poor, the inequality in real incomes is accentuated, notwithstanding Socialist propaganda to the contrary.

A striking example of the limitations which reality imposes upon egalitarian idealism is offered by the geographic pattern in the distribution of medical services. Whether under socialism or capitalism, widely dispersed

farm populations or isolated mining communities can not be provided with the facilities of a metropolitan area. Geographic equalization would be out of the question even if Britain were not in a financial plight. Yet precisely such inequalities are invoked as an excuse for socialization.

Most revealing is the difference between the medical standards affecting the urban middle and upper classes on the one hand, and the people in congested working-class districts on the other. That difference persists — unless and until the government "redistributes" the doctors or divides up the patients among them. In Britain, it has power to do so, in effect.

MEDICINE AS MASS PRODUCTION

There is one way in which socialized medicine does equalize medical services to a very large degree. It levels them down.

In the first place, there is no progress at all in *industrial medicine*—the mass-treatment of the working population in the manufacturing centers. The general dissatisfaction with that system as it functioned, or stagnated, before 1948 was instrumental in creating sentiment for the Bevanite

reform. But the almost unanimous criticism of pre-1948 practices is silent about an essential feature: It was already a socialized system, the "morally" bankrupt Lloyd George panel scheme. The description of its obsolete and unhealthy operation in the painstaking Collings Report, based on the analysis—in 1949-50!—of a large assortment of cases, constitutes a first-rate text for the teaching of medical socialism. It focuses attention on the impediments to proper medical care when the general practitioner, overwhelmed by a flood of free patients, resorts to "snap" diagnosis.

That Report also showed that British industrial medicine had not improved *since* 1948. How could it when the *number of patients was doubled* in one stroke by the inclusion of the workers' families and of the "middle classes"? In addition, the number and kinds of free benefits have multiplied; and consequently the *per patient* volume of con-

sultations, domestic visits, prescriptions, and requests for one benefit or another has increased by 50 to 100 per cent, or more.

The stampede for "bargains" engulfs the dentists, specialists, and makers of surgical appliances. The demand for and misuse of dentures, eyeglasses and proprietary medicines grows into "racket" dimensions. All

of this is generally known, supported by voluminous evidence, and reluctantly conceded in official publications.

The supply of medical materials, even if with great delays and rising costs, responds to the demand. Appliances are being turned out by the millions of units; drugs by the billion. In England and Wales alone, according to the Ministry of Health, 609 million prescriptions, 19,500,000 pairs of glasses, 7 million dentures, 706,602 appliances of "main types" and 130,000 hearing aids were dispensed in less than three years. The Ministry does not mention the notoriously huge volume of misapplications and duplications, or the number of wigs dispensed. Or that for each and every item, materials and skilled labor in short supply have to be drained from other occupations such as production for export and for armament.

The pressure on the labor market — under full employment — is increased in many more ways; for example, extra labor had to be called in to cope with the virtual run on the dental laboratories. Incidentally, the dental profession is to be diluted (on the German pattern) by "technicians" without academic training.

While many individuals profit, partly by malingering and cheating, some of the medically

relevant effect consists in weeks and months of waiting for appointments, hospital accommodations, appliances (up to 12 months for more complicated lenses, the Ministry of Health conceded in 1950); in reduced time for and interest in the patient on the part of the overworked personnel; and in bringing the middle class type of medical practice nearer to the level of an obsolete and "dehumanized" industrial medicine, and a deteriorating one at that.

The very crux of the problem is egalitarianism. The majority of British doctors and medico-politicians who accepted and still accept the principle, have had to learn the validity of the elementary economic law that the demand for the good things of life tends to increase with lower prices. As the spokesman of the British Medical Association, after having endorsed the free-for-all idea, wailed:

Our legislators planned the National Health Service on too high a plane. They forgot the imperfections of human nature, and they devised a scheme which requires a high degree of responsibility and self-restraint, and a higher sense of public duty in both doctors and patients, than the British people possess.

The assumption that the pursuit of self-interest is an imperfection of human nature and that human nature can be remade or manipulated, is part of every "planning" philosophy, of communism in particular. In reality, the elimination of the "pay" motive fosters the very force which it is supposed to overcome. Misjudging not only the economic, but also the moral nature of man, it breaches the psychological dams which hold back individual greed.

Throwing valuable goods and services free-of-charge on the market not only encourages unrestrained demand; it demoralizes the consumer. What was formerly expensive and therefore appreciated and carefully husbanded becomes a *right* that can be fully exercised only through prompt and rapid consumption. If the law permits throwing to the four winds all concern over the economic use of important productive factors; if the individual is freed from responsibility for their conservation (beyond verbal admonitions and ineffectual police controls); if scarce resources have become a hunting ground for all comers; where is the line to be drawn between ethical and unethical behavior in taking advantage of the scheme?

Apologists of socialized medicine argue that free medicine is no different in principle from free education; why should the one be controversial when the other long ago ceased to be so? But the public school system has a limited objective: elementary education for every child. Moreover, children are not crashing the school gates in their urge for education; nor do they insist on staying there. The misuse of school

funds can be easily controlled, and the control need not affect the quality of teaching.

The exact opposite holds true of the demand for medical services. The "need" is as undefinable a quantity as illness itself. Where is the line to be drawn between real and imaginary, somatic and psychological, visible and hidden, minor and major, self-inflicted and unavoidable ailments, convalescence and restored health, if no financial consideration inhibits the individual in calling on the doctor, and if the doctor has no right to turn him away, no opportunity for a thorough check, and every incentive to keep him on his "list"? When the restraint and responsibility imposed on the individual by his own pocketbook is lifted, who is to decide who gets what?

DOCTORS ON TRIAL

It is easy enough to skyrocket the demand for medical care; but medical services do not grow in proportion. While the population increases by an annual one per cent or so, and the unpaid calls on the doctors' services multiply, the number of doctors can increase but slowly. Raising their incomes would not help; they can not work more than full time. Indeed, higher incomes might be an inducement to "go easy." And they must work for the scheme (unless a majority of them defeats it by resorting to the strike weapon) or go out of business. Their bargaining power is accordingly low; and so is the political influence of so small a minority. The similarity with the position of landlords under rent control should be instructive.

Bismarck's scheme of compulsory medical care, the world's first, started with the doctors as full-time employees, like the army doctors. This was unsatisfactory, and the profusely inventive German bureaucrats fell upon the technique of quarterly capitation fees. General practitioners on the panel receive the equivalent of about \$1 per patient every three months. The patient fetches a ticket which he delivers to his choice among accredited practitioners and specialists. Or he may utilize special services in an accessory fashion at fixed and very modest rates—the equivalent of 25 cents for a tooth-extraction is an illustration.

In Britain, the capitation fee is \$2.52 a year for each registered client, whether or not he turns up as a patient. (The clients do turn up at least five times a year on the average.) The fee is fixed without regard to the patient's ability to pay, the nature of his ailment, the number of consultations, home visits, etc., involved, and without regard to the professional ability and experience of the physician.

Evidently, unless he is something of a saint, his incentives are destroyed—or rather, canalized in a direction detrimental to his own efficiency and the scheme's finances. (In the German system, there

remain
the d
prohib
titione
the nu
them
holds
and eff
tients'
to shi
special
ed and
by shi
pital b
Trac
adhere
tem le
English

...
medic
little
main
their
forms

In E
tioners
more t
tioner
2250
care; b
of that
district
hood b
In the
patients
among
they ar
to the o
have re
tioner
tions an
for med
fits, etc.
and rela
take to
of the s

The e
icine. T
faction
action i
tient's
sistence.
deterior
time to
Associat
nations,
necessar
sional ti
is absol
must not
each cas

remains the incentive of cajoling the patient into the doctor's private practice, but this is strictly prohibited in the British set-up.) The average practitioner's only chance to make a living is to increase the number of his registered clients and to keep them on his list. Pitiful as this inducement is, it holds a three-fold temptation: to minimize the time and effort devoted to each patient; to satisfy the patients' whims so as to retain their good will; and to shift his burden as much as possible to the specialists. They in turn find themselves overcrowded and relieve the burden (and their consciences) by shifting the patients onto the overcrowded hospital beds.

Traditional standards of medical service are still adhered to, more or less. But where will this system lead? "There will be," complains an unhappy English doctor,

... an entirely different type of man going in for medicine—our future doctors will be small-minded little men with civil service mentalities, and their main concern will be keeping on the right side of their administrative superiors, the correct filling of forms, watching the clock and passing the buck.

In Britain, fewer than 20,000 general practitioners carry the main burden of medical care for more than 45,000,000 people. The average practitioner should have some 2250 persons under his care; but he has a fraction of that number in rural districts where his livelihood becomes precarious. In the metropolitan areas patients have their choice among doctors, except that they are bound for a year to the one with whom they have registered. The practitioner is forced to give all his time to consultations and catering to the public's insatiable longing for medicaments, appliances, sick-leaves, cash benefits, etc. A collusion develops, for doctors can earn and relax the more, the more readily they undertake to cooperate with the patient taking advantage of the scheme.

The end result must be a decay of curative medicine. There is little scientific or emotional satisfaction in standardized procedure in which quick action is what matters, and submission to the patient's greed is all that brings even a bare subsistence. Professional standards must inevitably deteriorate. "The general practitioner must have time to do his work properly," the British Medical Association points out, "to make thorough examinations, to see his patients as often as he deems necessary, to consult specialists. . . . His professional time must not be encroached on more than is absolutely essential by non-medical work." He must not be forced "to abbreviate his treatment of each case to a routine, to abandon clear thought

and accurate observation." And he "must have . . . free time for professional reading, attendance at postgraduate courses and other professional meetings, and for investigation and research in his own practice." All of which gets lost when the doctor is obliged to turn, in effect, into an overworked and underpaid sorting clerk.

HOSPITALS IN DECLINE

The backbone of the medical care is the hospital, originated and developed through private and public charity. Only in Britain has Lenin's pattern of wholesale nationalization of hospitals been imitated outside the Soviet sphere. Bevan took over about 2800 "voluntary" and municipal institutions. Another 600-odd "teaching" hospitals retained a degree of nominal independence. There is one significant difference in the treatment of the two types: the clinics have been permitted to retain their endowments and to apply them in accordance with the benefactors' wishes, while those accumulated by voluntary hospitals were confiscated (largely to pay the debts of others), often to the detriment of research activities.

Nationalization was expected to relieve the hospitals of the "humiliating" necessity of appealing to charity. Centralization, eliminating "competition," would presumably result in a more economical use of the hospitals' resources. Freed of financial worries by government backing, the hospitals would be enabled to enlarge their facilities and to fulfill their humani-

tarian purpose. Thus argued the collectivists.

None of these promises has been or could be realized. The hospitals still look forward to private donations, which they badly need but receive in trickles. Citizens have become indifferent to institutions in which they used to take an active interest—a fact that has more than financial significance. "Local sentiment is by far the most powerful agency preventing the Hospital Service from degenerating into an arid bureaucracy," warned the Parliamentary Select Committee on Estimates in 1951. But what should attract "local sentiment" to institutions owned by a central authority and run by remote bureaucratic control?

Monolithic centralization has brought no economies. Per bed costs have risen faster than the price level, and are often higher than in the remaining private nursing homes. (The same situation obtains in Paris where the municipally owned hospitals are overloaded under a socialistic medical scheme.) Before nationalization, there was one bed available per 100 population, just as in the United States, and

no one ever heard of a hospital advising expectant mothers (as has happened since) to apply for a bed 12 months ahead. The overload creates a need for more space and equipment, which increases the financial worries of the institutions and seriously impairs the medical and human value of the whole set-up.

On the other hand, a shortage of nurses accounts for a large number of beds out of use and for half-empty sanatoria. There are enough women in Britain to fill the gap, but it takes time to train them. As it is, two out of every five nurses are *not* trained (registered); a fact that bodes ill for efficiency. In any case, the hospitals have to compete with other openings for their favors, under conditions of full employment! To attract them, the Minister raised their pay checks appreciably while refusing any raise to the underpaid general practitioners and cutting the income of dentists and ophthalmologists. As to the specialists, who have become full or part-time employees of the nationalized hospitals, the Auditor General has stated that

... of the total hospital expenditures, 9.9 per cent goes in doctors' [specialists'] salaries, 23.8 per cent for nurses, and 26.5 per cent represents salaries and wages of "other officers and employees" including administrative staffs.

From the administrative angle, nationalization raises weighty problems. Bulk-buying was expected to lower the cost of hospital supplies. But governments are poor marketers and the advantage of their buyer's monopoly is canceled by the clumsiness of their maneuvering. British hospitals complain that the poor quality of the "cheap" supplies increases costs, and also that they have to take what a central bureau thinks is good, rather than what is suited to their individual needs.

Under socialism the life of a hospital manager is not easy. There used to be a sort of nationwide competition in economy of management. Now, economy is of no avail; the savings disappear into the general trough. Economy is actually discouraged; the more money a management requests, the more it is likely to get, provided it keeps in step with the others. But they all try to get the most—which keeps them in step.

Excessive red tape is the universal complaint. Hospital managers are literally swamped by Ministerial decrees and their legalistic interpretations. Down to the smallest details of administration, the question is not to decide what is best, but to check on the voluminous files to see what the High Authority has prescribed, and how to avoid procedural errors. Every professional recommendation has to travel back and forth among overlapping medical committees, the local Hospital Management Com-

"Such is the curse of nationalization: In the attempt to avoid waste and to equalize standards, the government robs the individual management of all freedom—necessitating astonishing and avoidable increases of administrative staffs—and stymies all initiative, thereby increasing waste."

mittee, and the Supervisory Regional Hospital Board, "so that a debate on a particular point may extend over many months." The "mountainous addition in work" results in a great increase in the clerical staff and declining efficiency of administration.

In the British scheme more than in any other the hospitals are the dumping ground for medical cases, with devastating financial consequences, to say nothing of the serious medical hazards and the dangers to human values which are involved. "In terms of expenditure, the cheapest form of medicine is preventive medicine; the next cheapest is efficient care of patients in their homes; and the most expensive is hospital treatment." In the budgetary estimate for 1951-52, the expenditures for the hospitals and auxiliary services account for some 60 per cent of the total of £469 million (\$1313 million). Theirs is the most steadily increasing single item of operating expense.

Where so much of the taxpayer's money is at stake, thorough checks and controls must be applied—and red tape. It is bad enough that each hospital has to submit its detailed budget six months in advance of the year's beginning, and abide by its provisions to the end of the year, eighteen months later. What is worse, in the words of the Committee on Estimates:

... the strict limitations of expenditure to the sub-heads of estimates ... is a deterrent to economy [in the hospitals]. A saving made under one sub-head may not now be transferred to another ... and since at the end of every financial year the authority to spend any unspent money lapses, the hospital authorities are tempted to make their estimates for every sub-head as large as possible and then to spend all the money allocated to them on what they can within that sub-head.

The managements would of course prefer block grants with the "powers of transfer and carry over" which they had under private management. But the Ministry, which has the sole power to decide, is adamant—and rightly so from its point of view. Such blanket grants would give a free hand to the local chiefs, who might dissipate the funds. The more conscientious (and ambitious) a central bureaucracy, the less it can take such chances with the taxpayers' money.

Such is the curse of nationalization: In the attempt to avoid waste and to equalize standards, the government robs the individual management of all freedom—necessitating astonishing and avoidable increases of administrative staffs—and stymies all initiative, thereby increasing waste.

As Britain's belt continues to be tightened, the modest capital allocation for new building and equipment is being reduced (by 20 per cent in the

single y
tients a
tenance
sharply
homes f
nursing
ruin ne
specialis
pressure
which m
patients,
methylat
the paper
reaurac
salvage
of the
cause gr
agement

CURAT

While
ism, med
ly in co
private
of social
pansion
ventive
This is
on the p
cialist m
inhibition
permit
stages. I
reduces
toms ren
general
in the bu
the situa
exclusion
pitals.

Enligh
perience
scheme,
at least
nally an
one-half
payrolls,
istered i
its West
decentral
from a s
scheme o
sured." A
as in Bri

To ma
become
patients
highly re
to be a

single year 1950); heat is rationed; menus for patients as well as staff become more austere; maintenance personnel is cut; the use of X-ray films is sharply curtailed; sanatoria for the insane and homes for the aged are closed down or left without nursing staffs. It was even proposed to dismiss and ruin nearly 1100 hospital "registrars" (junior specialists), an economy move postponed under the pressure of public opinion. "At Middlesex Hospital, which maintains 712 beds and handles 33,000 outpatients, nurses have been warned against wasting methylated spirits and cocaine for local anesthetics," the papers reported. The petty attempts of the bureaucracy in delving into irrelevancies, trying to salvage the airy promises and ingenious reckonings of the demagogues, bring no cost reduction but cause great hardship to patients, doctors and managements alike.

CURATIVE VS. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

While medical practice degenerates under socialism, medical science continues to progress (especially in countries where medical care is a matter of private initiative). The people benefit not because of socialization but in spite of it. For an overexpansion of curative care results in too little preventive care—and in the need to do more curing.

This is so, in the first place, because of the strain on the personnel. It is a fundamental tenet of Socialist medicine that patients relieved of financial inhibitions will go to their physicians in time to permit the discovery of ailments in their early stages. In practice, the overuse of medical services reduces the doctors' time and interest. Early symptoms remain unnoticed. The primary function of the general practitioner—to prevent illness or to nip it in the bud—tends to become obliterated. In Britain, the situation is further aggravated by the virtual exclusion of the general practitioner from the hospitals.

Enlightening in this respect is Germany's experience with her 80-year-old compulsory care scheme, which has been gradually expanded to cover at least 75 per cent of the population. It is still nominally an insurance set-up, with one-third (originally one-half) of the total cost deducted from employee payrolls, and no government subsidies. It is administered in a far more self-restrained fashion than its Western counterparts, and on a comparatively decentralized pattern. Moreover, the country suffers from a surplus of physicians, not a deficiency. The scheme contracts for one panel doctor per 600 "insured." And yet the medical result is much the same as in Britain under Bevan's system.

To make a living, the German panel doctor must become a "panel lion," attending as many as 100 patients a day. What was once the world's most highly reputed medical set-up has sunk so low as to be a recurrent topic of vitriolic public debate.

The most insistent charges center around the fact that the underpaid practitioner tends to give his patients what they want instead of diagnosing their ailments; consequently the doctor's chief function—to check illness at the outset—gets lost in a maze of bureaucratic red tape and medical malpractices in which he often participates. It is generally understood that, for example, "deals" between drug producers and panel doctors are a widespread practice.

Far from having improved national health, the German system is now faced with the need of radical revision in order to alleviate some of its own evil consequences. Out of this unsatisfactory situation came the German doctors' recent proposal to stop the "irreparable damage" to the nation's health and to reduce the "unbearable burden" of a growing army of invalids, by supplementing socialized medical care with a systematic and regularized family-doctoring scheme.

The same story comes from France: the rising costs of medical care actually consume most of the funds earmarked for preventive medicine in the budget of the *Securité Sociale*.

In Britain, indiscriminate mass-medication threatens the same consequences. For example overcrowding and the closing of 4000 reserved hospital beds keep thousands of acute tuberculosis cases out of the hospitals; and lack of means prohibits sending advanced cases abroad to escape the rigors of the British climate. Accordingly, "primary notifications" of respiratory tuberculosis cases increased in 1950 to 98.8 per 1000 of the population, as against 84.2 in 1939.

Again, Britain has no money to enforce obligatory immunization against smallpox, or to teach the public how to combat the spread of diseases, or to subsidize the unique and successful (low cost) health center experiment of Doctors Williamson and Pearse in preventive medicine. But "money does not stand in the way" of unrestrained spending on medical trivia.

"An astronomical sum" is being spent on the health services, but a mere 7 per cent of the money goes for prevention of disease, grumbles the Dean of the London School of Hygiene. The government provides things which serve to popularize it with the mass of voters; but homes for the aged are closed or left without nurses.

It is one thing to promise, as Bevan did, to reorganize mass-doctoring in and around super-duper health centers (copied from Lenin's blueprint of "prophylactoriums") of little or no prophylactic value. It is quite another to procure the necessary manpower and materials to build the centers. It has been estimated that the material absorbed by one of the two or three health centers under construction would suffice to build 140 family dwellings—at a time when housing shortage is a main impediment to healthy living in Britain and a contributing factor in the overcrowding of hospitals.

UTOPIA IN A STRAITJACKET

It takes time for the deterioration of medical standards and of the doctor's social and professional status to become a political issue. But the immediately visible result in mounting costs becomes a major political issue whenever the Welfare State is confronted with a financial crisis. During the Great Depression the compulsory medical schemes had to retreat, led by the Weimar Republic under Chancellor Brüning. Even the moderately subsidized and completely decentralized Swiss system had to trim its sails. Today the dollar crisis is forcing both France and Britain to attempt deflation of their giveaway programs. The underlying problem is the same: the inherently communistic and bureaucratic nature of Medical Security raises its operational costs even in a depression, and well ahead of prices in an inflation. Unless it is stripped of its Utopian glamour and put in a straitjacket, a critical stage threatens when budgetary deficits must be stopped and taxes can not be raised further.

There are six ways to halt the trend toward bankruptcy: 1) by camouflaging part of the cost, that is, shifting it to other organizations and groups; 2) by making the patients pay for part of the "gratuitous" services; 3) by providing less and less service; 4) by subjecting services and supplies to price ceilings well below their market values; 5) by direct, "physical" checks and controls over the use of medical resources; and 6) by their all-around nationalization.

Medical socialism has its own cycles of expansion and contraction. The upward phases may be of the explosive type—anything on the Bolshevik pattern is bound to be revolutionary—or of the slowly "progressing" kind of which the German scheme is the classic illustration. That scheme² started with compulsory membership of factory workers and with cash benefits only. Step by step, it grew vertically as well as horizontally. Compulsion was extended to salaried employees up to an income limit, which in turn was raised; next, "voluntary" membership was admitted; benefits in kind were instituted and gradually stretched to include everything the patient might need; pretty soon the client's family was covered, too. At present the upward cycle is on again: Socialists and welfarists are fighting to have the door opened wider by raising the beneficiaries' income ceiling from an annual 4500 to 6000 marks (\$1500), which would take in all but a residual 10 per cent of the population.

Yet, instead of running into financial difficulties, the German panels are again accumulating moder-

"To make a living, the German panel doctor must become a 'panel lion,' attending as many as 100 patients a day. What was once the world's most highly reputed medical set-up has sunk so low as to be a recurrent topic of vitriolic public debate."

ate reserves (which a governmental authority "invests"). The secret of this apparent solvency is simple: they save at the patients' expense in order to stay within the financial limitations of a 6 per cent to 7 per cent payroll levy; they carry only part of the total cost incurred and they keep the doctors on "starvation" wages as does perhaps no other system of socialized medicine except those of Holland and Great Britain.

They limit expenditures for pharmaceutical products to a "regular" amount—no more than 4 marks (\$1) worth per patient for each three months' period. If one patient gets more, others have to do with less (such is the unethical di-

regard for medical results forced upon the profession). Exceptions are allowed within narrow confines, but pressure is being exerted on doctors and pharmacies to substitute cheap medicaments for more expensive.

They save a great deal on the biggest single item, hospitalization, the cost of which is carried in part by public and private charity. There are no free dentures, eyeglasses or physiotherapy. Approximately half the charge for appliances is paid by the patient in the form of "deductibles." The indigent are not "insured" (except old-age pensioners), but have to fall back on charity—another appreciable saving.

On top of all this penny-pinching and cost-shifting, the German system is subjected to sharp controls. Pharmaceutical products are under price regulations (the French abolished theirs recently), cutting profit margins to the bone. Doctors are checked in all "dubious" cases by physicians permanently or occasionally retained, and called on the carpet for "undue" spending. Except in obviously urgent cases, patients may not be hospitalized without the consent of the lay bureaucrats. They are policed, too, if the panel suspects misuse of the facilities.

With all this, the German system works less wastefully than the British and French because it is relatively less bureaucratic. Each panel is an independent unit run by its permanent civil servants, under a board elected by representatives of labor and business. In contrast, administrative autonomy and responsibility are absent in Britain where a central bureaucracy, three or four steps removed from local problems, runs the show.

In France, the panels' arbitrary rule is modified by Ministerial edicts. Even so, they are in a monopolistic position for their respective areas and overwhelmingly under Socialist-Communist direction. Small wonder that of the three, the German system operates at the lowest average administrative costs (6 to 10 per cent of total expenditures), the French at the highest (up to 20 per cent), with

²Bismarck's brainchild, borrowed from that cheap autocrat, Napoleon III!

the Br
The
head a
derserv
under
ical s
for em
per cer
wages,
billion
world's
medica

The
by the
other il
costs th
tic is i
paradox
plan wi

By n
entitled
over thr
tion as
the pati
cent fro
be restr
therefor
pays hi
compara
ference.
doctor c
capacity
at the p
On the
Though
since the
—Fren

Why
of payro
tem to
on which
commo
though
be the li
war sch
is that
and the
creasing
ments i
volume.
cost con
story. B
eral wen
up 50-fo
74-fold
and as m
hospitali

³Note
are but
services;
spite of
difficult

the British running the French a close second.

The point is that the German system keeps its head above water by underpaying the services, underservicing the patients, and putting all groups under controls. Yet even this "classic" type of Medical Security furnishes a modest amount of care for employees alone at the staggering cost of 6.5 per cent of payrolls—which, at 1951 salaries and wages, would mean in the United States some \$17 billion annually—almost 100 per cent more than the world's most health-conscious population spends on medical care of all sorts.

The new French experiment (introduced in 1946 by the Communist Minister Croizat) provides another illustration of the law that socialized medicine costs the more, the more centralized and monopolistic is its set-up. It is especially interesting as a paradoxical attempt to combine a share-the-wealth plan with a free market for health services.

By now, four out of every five Frenchmen are entitled to free services in case of long illness—over three months. In less serious cases, hospitalization as a rule is the only free service. For others the patient usually pays, but recovers 70 to 80 per cent from the panel. The "insured" is supposed to be restrained by his share in the costs which should therefore be well under control. He chooses and pays his own doctor, who in turn treats him with comparative freedom from authoritarian interference. The fee is supposedly fixed; actually the doctor charges more or less according to the client's capacity to pay, and the client finds that he recovers at the panel only one-half or two-thirds of the fee. On the other hand, the doctor is not overrun. Though the number of consultations has trebled since the war, his income and professional standards—French standards—are reasonably maintained.

Why then, did the cost boom from 2.63 per cent of payrolls under the (German-type) prewar system to 8.6 per cent in 1951, even though payrolls, on which the revenues are based, move in step with commodity prices and though 7 per cent was to be the limit under the post-war scheme? The trouble is that patients demand, and the doctors concede, increasingly expensive treatments in ever-increasing volume. A glance at the cost components tells the story. Between 1939 and 1951, while prices in general went up only 22-fold, the panels' expenses shot up 50-fold for doctors' services other than surgery, 74-fold for pharmaceuticals, 78-fold for surgery and as much as 110-fold each for dentistry and hospitalization.³

³Note that these figures do not include maternity bills, which are but slightly ahead of the price index for medical goods and services: 57-fold for the one against 50-fold for the other; this in spite of a substantial increase in the birth rate. Evidently it is difficult to chisel on childbirths.

The worst of it is that there is no end in sight. The deficit had reached 45 billion francs in 1951. Unless there are drastic curtailments, it will be around 70 billion this year. But what can be done? The Sickness Security "borrowing" from Old Age Security is a legerdemain that can not continue. And payroll taxes can not be raised when "fringe benefits" of all sorts already total from 46 to 90 per cent (!) of every wage bill, all but 6 per cent charged to the employers. To make the patient pay a larger share would be totally "unpolitical." Even the limited deductibles arouse the public. Having contributed to the costs, it considers itself cheated of its rights and is further exasperated by the fact that it has to carry more than the "legal" 20 per cent of the doctors' fees. Deductibles not only cause appreciable administrative expenses, but actually vitiate the meaning of Medical Security. What kind of Social Justice is this under which the poor have to pay for a goodly slice of their medical care, and at the same rate as the rich? To be effective, the charge on the patient must be high enough to be prohibitive for the lowest income group while easy on the higher brackets. This is *egalitarianism reversed*, the shame-faced admission that scarce things have to be "rationed," and that the price mechanism is the one and only efficient procedure to enforce the rationing.

Moderate charges suffice to restrain more or less the demand for expensive appliances, though not for drugs. But the insured recoup on what they have to pitch in by "suffering" more illness and needing more and more medicines, hospitalization, and even surgery; which goes to show that French ailments under socialism have something to do with psychology. The doctors have to oblige—the patients' freedom to choose among them takes care of that—if only by extending the cards which entitle the holders to sick-pay, in order to attract more patients more often. Who could check on a doctor-patient "deal" raising the number of alleged consultations and dividing the loot? Everywhere, deductibles turn out to be a very expensive device to the panels and the taxpayers.

The one means of averting collusion is that of physical controls on the German pattern—review of individual cases by bureaucrats, official doctors and independent medical authorities; the use of plain-clothes detectives to check on the patients' behavior, etc.; all of which means more administrative costs and irritations with little effect beyond reducing outright fraud. It does not touch the core of the problem, which is the perversion of the doctor-patient relationship into a silent conspiracy to provide both partners with mutual advantages at the expense of the scheme. Demoralization spreads as the public learns

the tricks. Pharmacies substitute toilet articles for prescriptions. Hospitals, in order to reduce their own deficits, "forget" the clients of the well-paying Medical Security in their beds. The panels are winning the battle against brief illness (up to two weeks) by genuine weapons in the bureaucratic armory—red tape, delays and chicanery—until the patient, his patience exhausted, forgets his claim and becomes "seriously" ill.

The only way to maintain a socialized scheme "successfully" is to cleanse it of all vestiges of freedom and competition. The French panel bureaucracy hopes to take over the hospitals and sanatoria. It wants more control over the pharmacies. Above all it strives to make effective its regulation of medical fees. If it succeeds, which is unlikely short of a new leftward orientation of the country, it will have accomplished only the creation of new conflicts, a poorer quality of service, and a premium on bigger and better cheating.

This brings us back to the crisis in the British scheme. There, too, the recent introduction of partial payment for eyeglasses, hearing aids, dentures and prescriptions will mean some saving. But numerous exceptions are permitted, and besides, the additional administrative jobs translate themselves into pounds and shillings. If experience can serve as a guide, the "silent conspiracy" to compensate the public through the back door for what it pays at the front may be expected to spread.

Police controls are the last refuge of all self-bankrupting, socialist planning. We have seen what happens to the British hospitals. The druggists are under scrutiny. Significantly, the Bevan system relies on stripping the doctors of their "power." With the clarity of collectivist logic, Bevan recognized—as did Stalin—that Utopia, to work economically, must be thoroughly regimented. The medical profession in particular must be nationalized so as to make it dependent on and responsible to the Minister, not the patient. That this is a complete perversion of its role is immaterial. What matters is that the voters are convinced of the politicians' magnanimity and the costs kept to manageable size—with the doctors and hospitals taking the blame for the unsatisfactory results.

The specialists have been engaged from the outset as employees at the hospitals, while the general practitioners retain a liberty more nominal than real. They must keep extensive files and open them at the request of the authorities. (No medical secrecy under socialism!) For any infraction of the rather vague rules they are disciplined. "Any of their more paranoiac" patients—who may be forced on them—can start proceedings against them. They can be fined and actually dismissed from the service with no right of appeal to the courts and little chance left to open a new practice outside the scheme. And even if they do manage outside, they lose their modest pensions, while the sale of their practices is strictly prohibited (an outright viola-

tion of private property rights). They are not supposed to prescribe advertised drugs or more than the absolutely necessary amounts.

The dentists, too, are subjected to arbitrary rules. They must submit cost estimates for every appliance and must provide the patient with the cheapest and yet the best service. Though nominally independent, they are under the thumb of the bureaucracy which can force them to serve the interests of the State *against* the patient, whose freedom to choose among them is already being restricted.

The ultimate objective is complete nationalization. Indeed, the inherent conflict between communism and economy can be resolved only if the scheme is taken over by the barracks-doctor whose job is to keep down absenteeism and medical expense at the price of destroying the ethical as well as the medical value of the doctor-patient relationship. From the socialist theory of the patient as beneficiary of the scheme to the communist practice of the patient as its object—in order to keep him working—is an inevitable step. That is what happened to Lenin's pipe-dream at Stalin's hand.

Such is the inescapable logic of medical communism. The abolition of the free market and its companion, charity, ends in the dictatorship of the bureaucracy over both doctor and patient, with little or no charity or humanity involved.

Just Horsing Around

Why is it a political campaign can not be conducted without so many references to the horse? Almost everything one reads or hears these days makes mention of that animal. The party in office cautions that it is no time to change horses in midstream. A candidate may be accused of trying to return to the horse-and-buggy age. Or he may be called a stalking horse for another candidate. If we agree with a candidate we say he shows good old American horse-sense. If we don't agree with him, we say "horse feathers."

The claims of one party give the other party the horse laugh. The *New York Times* has said of Eisenhower that "he is no man on horseback—if he were, this newspaper would not be supporting him" (although why being able to stay on the back of a horse is a term of opprobrium it is difficult to say). One is asked to give a horseback opinion. We are afraid of the Trojan horse. If a fact comes to one direct it is straight from the horse's mouth. It is too late to shut the stable door after the horse has been stolen. The candidate chosen at a deadlocked convention is known as the dark horse. There is even a popular ladies' coiffure today known as the horse-tail.

If we claim to have left the horse-and-buggy age so far behind, why the preoccupation with the horse?

ELIZABETH MANNING

N

Recent
Washin
the Pro
aspiran
Coonsk

Whe
commen
league
out hi
stopped

The
tional
Party.

Northe
rank-an
ative,
passwor
ent, but
fauver
publicit

Yet
tionally
satisfyi

Democr
the desi
the pro

Fair De
The par
brace h

ruption
disguste
hopes. A

come hi
Mason-I
coming

The r
and Sou
afraid
ignore t
big city
relations

Southern
traying
the min
compulse

The r
Presiden
and the
stems fr

Non-Stop Kefauver

By SAMUEL SHAFER

A Washington newsman weighs the chances of Estes Kefauver in the race for the Democratic nomination and finds that although he is a loyal Fair Dealer no one in the party is for him—except the voters.

Recently, in a confidential aside to a friend at a Washington cocktail party, W. Averell Harriman, the President's confidant and himself a Presidential aspirant, asserted: "My intention is to stop the Coonskin."

When Senator George of Georgia offered his first comment on the Florida primary in which his colleague and close friend, Richard Russell, had nosed out his opponent, he said: "At least we have stopped Estes Kefauver."

The stop-Kefauver complex has become an emotional fixation in all segments of the Democratic Party. In the arena of passionate denunciation, the Northern liberal, the big city machine boss, the rank-and-file party hack, and the Southern conservative, all have a common meeting ground. The passwords for entry into this arena may be different, but the emotional overtones are the same. Kefauver is "fuzzy," "ambitious," "a lightweight," "a publicity hound," or a "phony."

Yet were Estes Kefauver considered unemotionally, he could be seen to possess qualifications satisfying each of the disparate groups in the Democratic Party whose common denominator is the desire to remain in power. He should appeal to the professional liberal because of a New Deal and Fair Deal voting record almost without blemish. The party hacks and machine bosses should embrace him because he has tilted lances at the corruption that has overwhelmed the Administration, disgusted the people, and brightened Republican hopes. And the Southern conservatives should welcome him as the only candidate from south of the Mason-Dixon line with a reasonable chance of becoming the next President of the United States.

The resistance of the party hacks, machine bosses and Southern leaders makes sense. The hacks are afraid that if Kefauver were elected, he would ignore them in the distribution of patronage. The big city bosses fear a disturbance of their symbiotic relationship with the underworld. And the Southerners tremble at the possibility of his betraying the South by making common cause with the minority blocs in the North which advocate a compulsory fair employment law.

The marked antipathy to Kefauver nursed by President Truman, the White House palace guard, and the Administration cohorts on Capitol Hill, stems from a motive embedded far deeper in the

political consciousness. Estes Kefauver committed the unforgivable sin. As Chairman of the Senate Crime Committee, he exposed the connection between organized gangsterism and the Democratic Party in an election year. As a result, he contributed to the national revulsion that swept five Senators and 28 Representatives out of office.

Standing at the entrance of the Senate Chamber during the special session that followed the 1950 elections, Majority Leader Scott Lucas pointed at Kefauver and, in a voice dripping with hate, told a newsman: "There's the S.O.B. that defeated me." To this day, Lucas has never blamed himself for failing to repudiate in advance of the election the ineffable "Tubbo" Gilbert who ran for sheriff on the same ticket. Instead, he blames Kefauver for exposing Gilbert as "the world's richest cop" and stampeding Cook County against the Democratic slate.

This same curious myopia is shared by the White House and the Democratic National Committee. The evil lies not in corruption, but in its exposure. There is no sin like the betrayal and defeat of a fellow Democrat.

He Doesn't Look "Liberal"

It is the resistance to Kefauver by the "professional liberal" that defies analysis and beggars description. Searching for an explanation, columnist Marquis Childs recently asked a young Kefauver backer for the answer. The reply is worth quoting:

"Don't you understand? The reason is that he doesn't look like an intellectual. You can't see him on the cocktail circuit with a martini in his hand. He looks just like what he is—a big, shambling fellow from Tennessee who happens to have brains and convictions and ability."

Once Kefauver is separated from the emotional storms he stirs up, the hatred he begets, and the fears he engenders within the Democratic Party, the picture of the essential man and politician is not difficult to limn. Estes Kefauver shuns the label, "New Dealer," but his voting record in his nine years in the House and four years in the Senate speaks for him. Here will be found the evidence that, as President, he would continue to follow the Roosevelt-Truman policies at home and abroad.

The public knows him almost solely as a kindly,

gentle crimebuster. He prefers to refer to himself as "just a plain Democrat." But the significant fact about Kefauver is his consistent promotion of those policies which carry out the Roosevelt-Truman program for a "liberal democracy" at home and the attainment of world peace through heavy financial and military commitments abroad. Though unloved by Truman and rejected by the Party kingmakers, he continues to be among the most loyal supporters of the policies and programs that have kept the Democratic Party in power for nearly two decades.

It is interesting to note that when Kefauver talks policy to the voters, he never calls for any rejiggering of the existing Democratic program. Publicly, at least, he has never evinced resentment of Truman's failure to appreciate his loyal support of the Fair Deal. The only change he asks for is new faces and younger blood in administering the program. "I am not running my program on the basis of opposing President Truman," he stated revealingly in an interview in the *U.S. News and World Report*. "I am appealing for and getting support on my own program, and of course, most of my supporters are the ones who have supported President Truman."

Fair-Deal and Fuzzy

A *Congressional Quarterly* analysis of the voting records of the Senate's three leading Democratic contenders for the Presidential nomination shows that out of 44 major issues before Congress in the past three years, Kefauver stood solidly with Truman on 38, against him only on four, and was not recorded on two. Senator Kerr of Oklahoma supported the President on 32, and Russell on only twenty.

In the field of foreign policy, Kefauver has supported Truman unstintingly on mutual aid and Point Four. He not only voted for every measure to initiate or support these programs, but has voted against all efforts to cut funds to maintain them. Last year he even co-sponsored with Brian McMahon a signally unsuccessful effort to restore the full amount recommended by the President, against the dominant mood of Congress to slash these funds considerably.

On domestic issues, he has been found far to the left in that dwindling band of the Fair Deal acolytes. His votes on appropriations for the government establishment show time and again how he has thrown his weight against efforts to economize by blanket fund cuts. Many of these economy amendments, incidentally, were sponsored by his colleague and present supporter, Paul Douglas of Illinois.

Here are additional illustrations of Kefauver's identity with Truman on key issues in the last three years: In the so-called "great debate" he voted against a resolution passed by the Senate which opposed additional ground troops in Europe without Congressional consent. He favored: Alaskan

Statehood; a 75-cent-an-hour minimum wage; elimination of anti-strike injunctions; reorganization of the Internal Revenue Bureau; 90 per cent parity on basic farm crops; increase in Commodity Credit Corporation borrowing power; Federal aid to education; slum clearance and low cost housing; and universal military training. He opposed: efforts to tie wage and price controls together; a ban on livestock slaughtering quotas; cuts in public housing; and limitations on Federal jurisdiction over natural gas.

On two vital subjects, civil rights and the fight against domestic communism, Kefauver's record is vulnerable, confused and contradictory. On March 11, 1949 he sided with the Northern liberals in upholding Vice President Barkley's ruling that cloture could be applied to a motion to take up a bill. This ruling, which a majority of the Senators successfully challenged, would have spiked one of the most effective filibustering weapons in the Southern armor. Yet only six days later he switched sides and voted for adoption of the Wherry-Hayden rules change which, in the opinion of the Northern liberals, gave filibusterers the most potent weapon in Congressional history. And just one year later he voted against invoking cloture on a motion to take up the FEPC.

Perhaps no single issue more effectively divides the Democratic Party than a compulsory fair employment practices law. Kefauver, desiring to woo both wings, finds himself on both sides of an irreconcilable ideological conflict.

In 1948, in a Senate speech, he said:

The FEPC is, in my opinion, a dangerous step toward regimentation. It is of doubtful constitutionality and it certainly violates the rights of the employers of our nation. It simply would not work, especially in the South. Any effort to put such a law in operation would cause widespread difficulty which would be very detrimental to the nation.

On April 6, 1952, a few weeks after he announced his candidacy, he told newsmen:

I believe in fair employment practices, but I am not convinced that a national compulsory commission is the best approach to a difficult problem which varies from State to State. . . . If the Democratic convention which nominates me adopts a platform including a compulsory FEPC plank, I shall wholeheartedly support that platform in its entirety.

The question naturally arises: how can Kefauver "wholeheartedly support" anything which "would be very detrimental to the nation"?

Not so long ago, when Kefauver was a member of the House, his stand on civil rights was far less equivocal. Then he said:

This is the time when we need harmony and good will in our country. Disruptions such as the civil rights issue will hurt our position of world leadership in the cause of peace. Most of the matters embraced in the President's civil rights program cannot be dealt with by legislation. I have always opposed and will continue to vigorously oppose the

FEPC
provi
The
on th
mand
Negro
of leg
their
unity

An An

On th
swers i
are rev

Q. W
A. I
worke
tunity
Q. Bu
A. I v
certain
econon
would
difficu
Q. W
govern
A. I
govern

In th
naive b
social a
to power
Hiss, H
pear to

In 19
a perma
In 1946
against
munists
committe
consider
removal a
tive bra
or perso
vored th
he voted
vision o

In Se
break o
ternal S
which t
Ten day
the Sen
fauber,
pated in
The Pre
and Kef

But E
afire (w
ousy) b
equivoca
commun
showed

FEPC, the anti-lynch bill, and any non-segregation provisions. . . .

The anti-lynch law is an unjustified encroachment on the rights of the states. . . . There is no real demand for anti-segregation laws in the South. The Negroes of the South are not interested in this kind of legislation. . . . It would not be in the interest of their own welfare to fan the fires of passion and disunity by espousal of Federal non-segregation laws.

An Anti-Anti-Communist?

On the subject of communism, the following answers in the *U.S. News and World Report* interview are revealing:

Q. Would you continue the Truman loyalty program?

A. I think so. However, procedures ought to be worked out to give the person accused every opportunity to clear his name.

Q. But would you deal firmly with Communists?

A. I would deal very firmly with Communists and I certainly would try very hard to have conditions, economic and social, in the country so that people wouldn't be grasping at communism. But it is very difficult to control what a man thinks.

Q. Would you try to keep Communists out of the government?

A. I would certainly keep Communists out of the government—by all means they must be ferreted out.

In these answers Kefauver reveals an apparently naive belief that communism is nurtured largely by social and economic inequality rather than by a will to power. The forces that shaped such men as Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Lee Pressman appear to be beyond his ken.

In 1945, Kefauver voted against the creation of a permanent Committee on Un-American Activities. In 1946, he was the only Southerner who voted against a resolution to cite for contempt 18 Communists who had refused to give information to the committee. In 1947, he voted against a resolution to consider the Loyalty Bill, providing for the removal and prevention of appointment in the executive branch of the government of all Communists or persons who belonged to organizations that favored the overthrow of our government. In 1948, he voted against the anti-Communist affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Bill.

In September 1950, two months after the outbreak of war in Korea, he voted against the Internal Security Act, the so-called McCarran Bill, which the Senate passed by a vote of 70 to seven. Ten days later, when it was brought up again in the Senate for passage over Truman's veto, Kefauver, who doesn't believe in filibusters, participated in an all-night filibuster to prevent a vote. The President was overridden by a vote of 69 to 10, and Kefauver was one of the ten.

But Estes Kefauver is not setting the grass roots afire (while his rivals burn with professional jealousy) because of his Fair Deal convictions or his equivocal positions on civil rights and domestic communism. His spectacular crime hearings, which showed up the ugly partnership between the gang-

ster and the politician, not only made him a household word, but have identified him in the public mind as "Mr. Honesty" himself. This, combined with an effective display of humility and modesty on the hustings, a forthright handshake, and a mnemonic gift for names, has propelled him to the head of the race for the Democratic nomination.

A big question remains: Were the crime hearings a success? If considered as a show, they were; if viewed as a means to the proper end of obtaining remedial legislation, they failed. For a brief period, while millions suspended normal activities to watch television screens, organized crime was forced out into the open. When the spectacle had passed, the public attention turned to other matters; the criminals crawled back into the woodwork and again teamed up with their politician playmates. Congress has pigeonholed every recommendation of the crime committee, such as a proposed Federal Crime Commission, changes in internal revenue statutes to compel disclosures of net worth, and the banning of interstate dissemination of racing results. The one positive act taken by Congress, the imposition of the gamblers' tax, was opposed by Kefauver as unconstitutional. It may be, but in the meantime it has hurt the gambling fraternity more than any single Federal law ever enacted.

The role of the TV industry in bringing the legislative processes home to the people has been set back, too. Congress has become sensitive to the obvious harassment of witnesses forced to appear before television cameras. Speaker Sam Rayburn has banned them from every House committee, and most Senate committees now refuse to admit them.

Estes Kefauver will come to Chicago on July 21 with a maximum potential of 350 delegate votes. Though leading all the other candidates, he will still be only one-fourth of the way toward the goal. A deadlock is certain to ensue. The kingmakers will move from the convention floor to the smoke-filled rooms of a Loop hotel three miles away. And there they must make the most difficult decision of their lives. For if they pick Kefauver, they may be signing their own death warrants as party bosses. And if they reject the best vote-getter in the party, they may lose the election.

Bedtime Reading for HST

At the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries, the Cortes, or parliament, of Aragon swore fealty to the King of Aragon thus: "We, who are as good as you, swear to you, who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our liberties and laws; but if not, not."

Of course the King of Aragon, poor benighted medieval soul, had never heard of the divine right of Presidents.

BEN RAY REDMAN

Our Leftist Clergy

2. The Remedy

By WALTER M. HAUSHALTER

In this concluding article on our clergymen who mistake Marxism for liberalism, the author calls for a rededication to historic Christian ideals.

In the fateful year 1867 appeared two books heavily loaded with revolution and trouble for the Christian religion—Darwin's "Origin of the Species" and Karl Marx's "*Das Kapital*." Darwin's materialistic interpretation of man in the setting of organic evolution produced shocks and tremors through all Christendom. Marx's work, though fraught with more trouble for Christianity, went unnoticed by the Church for a long time.

Marx, exiled from country after country on the Continent, was then barely existing as a hack writer in the squalor of Soho, London. His writings were a jumble of strange jargons that few took the trouble to read. However, he had one Big Idea, as old as Cain—to take the other fellow's property and administer it for his good. For the success of this Big Idea Marx had to clear the ground of Christianity. Marx and Marxian communism had to brand religion "the opium of the people" for the same reason that Cain talked back to God. This is the whole fabric of Marxism; its technique of violence and bloodshed is no mere excrescence.

Lenin and Trotsky, in quiet retreat under Christian and capitalistic shelter in Switzerland and America, saw their chance. Seizing on purely accidental features, such as Rasputin's devilism over Czar Nicholas, and the contemporary existence of the Church and feudal oppression, the revolutionists soon made the Big Idea credible to the Russian masses. "Religion is . . . the sense-deadener, the conditioner for abject subjugation of the workers to capitalistic oppressors." In order to live, Marxism has to eliminate Christianity because Christianity opposes class hatred, violence and theft.

For the first time in history a vast economic movement has flouted Christianity as Public Enemy Number One, and the enmity is openly avowed and openly delivered. The leaders of Soviet communism boasted that they would destroy the Church, then proceeded to do so. Their anti-God order is openly called for in Marx's "Manifesto" and in the Soviet newspapers, and is delivered in daily criminal deeds behind the Iron Curtain. How any churchman East or West of the Rhine can miss the fact and the intent of Marxian Soviet communism is the mystery.

Whatever act of deception is involved in the present widespread addiction to Marxian communism in certain areas of the American churches must be self-deception. There can be no other sensible explanation of the trumpeting of American church-

men for an anti-Christ communism that wills their destruction. They have stuck their own heads into the sand.

"Communism in America will be different," declares one of the liberal American churchmen. "Americans will naturally make of Russian communism something better." This churchman is probably under the spell of Plato's idealistic "Republic," which seems so rapturous when read by the fireside, or he has beheld in the far-away the God-controlled communism of the Medieval orders.

Then, too, American churchmen have seldom witnessed any but benevolent communism with religious motivations. From 1776 to the present America has given shelter to more than three score communistic colonies, including Brook Farm of the New England idealists, the Shaker colonies, the Fourier communities, the Owen, Oneida, Perfectionist, Harmony and Zion experiments. Not one of these radical experiments ever breathed the slightest word of social violence. Nearly all of them, as witness Zion City on Lake Michigan today, were deeply spiritual. But many of them, though dedicated to God, made such extraordinary demands on man that they soon broke up. Add to this the romance of the Communist episode of the Acts of the Apostles, and light breaks on the enigma why the American churchman with inclinations toward communism deceives himself about Marxian communism.

The Humanist Fallacy

The trumpeters for Russian Marxian communism in American pulpits and pews are of all shades and degrees. Many are just "little dogs in high oats" who have lost their way in this difficult world of screaming ideologies. Many belong to the benevolent order who "hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil." Still more who would be horrified by any straight connection with Moscow are caught in the net of the Communist fronts outlined on that vast map in a hall of Congress. Very few are out-and-out holders of party cards or deliberate voices for the party line.

The most fertile field for the planting of Marxian seed is in that area of the American Church given to liberal Humanism. In many Humanistic quarters a pseudo-Christianity is presented that is little different from successism, scientific progressism, social experimentation, do-goodism or directionless

idealism
elemen
out the
liberal
and th
with th
The
noble c
ing to
dom of
the de
Reform
crescen
tional
goddess
utteran
evoluti
individ
Their r
ning a
hundre
That
is a car
Saxon
penalty
chaos.
ence to
no exc
bedlam
We
tion of
being t
What v
of God
is most
is leas
Christi
Author
front a
Church
Soviet
division
against
That
mine ex
trap," i
tians w
for this
known
did, re
Americ
straight
the swe
Histo
theme:
There V
ican aid
Bolshev
The
superior
a hard

idealism. The enterprise holds many counterfeit elements that menace genuine Christianity. Trace out the areas in the American churches where this liberal Humanistic persuasion has been strongest, and there you find the strongest ties of sympathy with the Marxian experiment in Russia.

The Humanists have wanted a short-cut to their noble dream of social salvation. While not consenting to the Marxian technique of taking the Kingdom of God by violence, they have been eaten by the desire to take it soon. Since the Protestant Reformation the liberal Humanists, with mounting crescendo, have cried out bitterly against institutional restraints and have glorified Liberty as a goddess to be worshipped. From some of their utterances you gather the impression that the long evolution of the human race was to the end that the individual could do and think as he alone pleased. Their revolt against authority has sent them spinning away from one another into more than one hundred self-regarding, self-determining sects.

That Liberty is a good, nobody disputes. That it is a cardinal virtue of the Christian and the Anglo-Saxon conception of life nobody doubts. But the penalty for its over-emphasis is self-determining chaos. No orderly society is possible without obedience to a duly constituted authority. Christianity is no exception to this axiom. The alternative is a bedlam of contradictory egos.

We are not here contending for one manifestation of the American Church, as against others, being the true and proper repository of authority. What we do indicate is that where the authority of God in Christ, as vested in an Authorized Church, is most revered, there the Communist infiltration is least menacing. Where the eternal ethics of Christianity is most stringently enforced by an Authoritative Church, there you find the stiffest front against Marxian collectivism. Examine the Church leaders most sanguine about the glories of Soviet communism, and you will find them in those divisions of the Church which feature the revolt against authority.

That American churchmen are, as a friend of mine expresses it, "walking into the Russian bear-trap," is of deep concern to that majority of Christians who have kept their balance. The explanation for this pathetic delusion goes deeper than the well-known tendency of idealists to turn away from sordid, realistic facts. The complete explanation for American churchmen's walking with eyes wide open straight up to the Marxian block will be found in the sweet philosophy of sirenism.

History and literature are packed with the siren theme: Samson, the Prodigal Son, Kipling's "A Fool There Was," down to the recent case of the American aide in our Embassy in Moscow beguiled by a Bolshevik siren.

The little wife at home, no matter what her superior endowment of beauty and brains, enters a hard competition with the siren because the wife

is nearby and obvious. Here is a cue to the understanding of the lure of Russian Marxian communism for the liberal Humanists. Russia is the land of romance, of the great idealistic adventure; the Utopia of man's dreams. So they have been told by the Muscovite sirens; so the liberals have told themselves, and so they are told by a group of churchmen returned from behind the Iron Curtain where they saw a painted and perfumed section potemkinized for their inspection.

The Fickle Majority

Another domain of American Church life that falls easy victim to the fraudulent claims of Marxism is that invaded by political liberalism of the brand that identifies Americanism and majority rule. "The voice of the people is the voice of God," is its easygoing assumption. At its rawest this means that when a majority in the nation want slavery or emancipation, prohibition or liquor licensing, war or peace, foreign alliances or isolation, free enterprise or statism, then and there you have the Will of the Divine. It means little to these political liberals that public opinion is a shrewish creature of little moral stability and that for vacillation it can outdo the winds. For their kind of democracy the voice of the people is the sure interpreter of God.

Authentic Christianity never had confidence in majority rule. It has seen a majority giving Jesus an ovation on Palm Sunday and the same majority five days later voting His Crucifixion. It has vast concern for the masses but it frankly looks on them with compassion and as sheep without a shepherd. Christianity knew long before Cooley, Le Bon and the social psychologists proclaimed it that the multitude, at a football game, a lynching, a public assembly or an ovation to a popular hero, is capable of turning an emotional somersault and reversing itself within the same hour. The founders of the American government did not go the length of Ibsen in saying, "the compact liberal majority is always wrong." But they made this government something more than the servant of blind, vacillating public opinion and majority rule. They created a representative Republic where majorities could be saved from their confusions and led to their ideals by their best minds. This shallow political liberalism, alien to true republican constitutional government, has deeply penetrated American churches in the same areas given over to the Communist-fronters.

The remedy for sirenism must be strong. It is too much to hope for the Marxian dupes that if we leave them alone "they'll come home dragging their tails behind them." The risk of such a solution is too great for the issues Christianity has at stake. Nor can much be expected from lectures and charting of courses. A cure might come from a real residence, not a tourist's visit, behind the Iron Curtain,

a real sight of the labor camps, a real taste of the food and comfort of the "Paradise of the Workers," and a daily reading of *Pravda*.

The surer and more permanent cure for the Marxian siren lure for American churchmen will come through an intensification of the faith of historic Christianity. In their zeal for comprehensive brotherhood many liberal American churchmen have become Humanists, salvationists-by-science, devotees of all ideologies. Christianity they have reduced to an easy-going philosophy with little urge or vitality. If American churchmen can rally around authentic Christianity and effect a spiritual regeneration of vast dimension, Christendom may be saved from Asiatic Bolshevism.

The right to private property, its attainment through labor and frugality, its protection by society, and its stewardship under God, is an age-old creed of Christendom. It has been affirmed for 1900 years by Councils of the Church, Popes, Westminster Confession, The Thirty-nine Articles of the Episcopal Church, and similar Christian pronouncements. When such American clergymen as Bishop

Bromley Oxnam, Harry F. Ward, J. Meyers and J. H. Carpenter strike out against "capitalism and the sordid profit motive," they lend aid to the false idea that Communist industry operates on a higher ethical level than American industry. In any department of American industry, rubber, textiles, dental supplies or whatever, the business man must meet drastic competition and deliver a service before he can get any profit. If these leftist clergymen will quit vilifying the profit motive and praise the service motive which is the true basis of American industry, they can help the world to see the vast ethical superiority of American industry over slave-camp Russian communism.

A mighty anti-God movement of international dimensions is out to destroy the Christian religion. We stand before the wrecked and ruined remains of cathedrals and churches. Some devilism has led Christian nations to help in the destruction of their own Christian institutions and values. The situation may yet be saved by Christians returning to the genuine historic Faith under the banner of a united Church. But the hour is late.

No God at Yale

By JOHN ABBOT CLARK

A commentary on "God and Man at Yale" which might conceivably be written by an atheistic totalitarian liberal after a rough night with Buckley and Swift.

In his well-known "Argument" for the retention of merely nominal, window-dressing Christianity, Jonathan Swift admitted that to retain, or more accurately, to restore primitive Christianity, the reality

... would be to dig up Foundations; to destroy at one Blow all the Wit, and half the Learning of the Kingdom; to break the entire Frame and Constitution of Things; to ruin Trade, extinguish Arts and Sciences, with the Professors of them.

Now, 250 years after the publication of Swift's "Argument" and the chartering of Yale College, there appears out of nowhere a harmless-looking little squib of a book, "God and Man at Yale," by William F. Buckley, Jr., Yale, '50. It is Mr. Buckley's unmistakably sincere, if misguided and anachronistic, intention to "break the entire frame and constitution of things" at Yale, and extinguish most of her "arts and sciences, with the professors of them." In short, he is fanatically bent on turning Yale into a Christian American university.

Mr. Buckley is no doubt giving us the facts about Yale. Our quarrel is solely with his unrealistically Christian reaction to these facts. No good Modern, no tolerant, broadminded Liberal (and aren't we

all today?) is going to be surprised or alarmed to learn that God is not being taken very seriously these days at Yale; that most Yale sociologists treat Christianity just like any other tribal superstition; that its Economics Department is dominated by Keynesians and collectivists; and that a great many of its philosophy instructors are thorough-paced relativists, empiricists, and Logical Positivists.

What would indeed shock us Moderns would be the intelligence that Yale had decided to fall behind the academic procession, and again require the assent of its faculty to something on the order of the Saybrook Platform of 1708, giving satisfaction "of the soundness of their faith in opposition to Arminian and prelatical corruption."

In the very same year, coincidentally, of the Saybrook Platform, Swift observed in his "Argument" that he realized it was

... neither safe or prudent to argue against the abolishing of Christianity, at a juncture when all parties seem so unanimously determined upon the Point, as we can not but allow from their Actions their Discourses, and their Writings.

All a
All
Swift
to ke
purel
the o
—not
perso
He b
Yale
lihood
"Yale
whole
and r
found
Thi
his tr
no ma
tempt
a dan
erns p
is sur
To
which
ly, Ya
and a
cation

Su
for
to d
sider
ened
belie
sider
ment
divid
natio
ernm
ism
on to
and
ly fo
the U
of th
pose
again
judg

Of c
out ag
of trad
cists a
being
author
tions e
of time
agnost
spoken
by the
effacin
Yale
publica
fronte
tory. Y
1) she

All appearances, he conceded, were against him.

All appearances are against Mr. Buckley, too. Swift (if we are reading him straight) was content to keep only the name, the shell of Christianity, purely for reasons of expediency. Mr. Buckley, on the other hand, demands—250 years later, mind you—nothing less than primitive Christianity, a real, personal belief, apparently, in a real, personal God. He believes, in the words of the chairman of the Yale Alumni Fund (another young man, in all likelihood, whose education didn't take, either) that "Yale alumni are looking for—and will respond wholeheartedly to—a re-emphasis of the spiritual and moral values that 250 years ago led to the founding of this University."

This young Shelley in reverse might have called his tract "The Necessity of Theism at Yale." And no matter how well-bred and open-minded our contempt for it may be, there is no denying that it is a dangerous book. But what ought to give us Moderns pause at the moment is the realization that it is surely rocking Yale to its Saybrook foundations.

To come at once to the crux of the dilemma, which the author insists should be faced immediately, Yale must choose between Academic Freedom and a dogmatic, clear-cut, wholly unambiguous educational credo.

Suppose [said Mr. Buckley in an address prepared for Yale Alumni Day which he was not permitted to deliver] this credo were to assert that Yale considers active Christianity the first basis of enlightened thought and action. Suppose it reasserted its belief in democracy. Suppose it asserted that it considered communism, socialism, collectivism, government paternalism inimical to the dignity of the individual and to the strength and prosperity of the nation, save where the government and only the government could act in the interests of humanitarianism and national security. Suppose Yale were to go on to say that whereas every student must recognize and explore conflicting views and of course ultimately formulate for himself his own credo, nevertheless the University would not *sustain* prominent members of the faculty who sought to violate the explicit purpose of this University by *preaching* doctrines against which officials of the University had cast judgment.

Of course, "a hundred organizations would lash out against Yale." Of course "they would accuse her of traducing education, of violating freedom." Fascists and Communists, we understand, are already being discriminated against at Yale. If the Yale authorities were to take Mr. Buckley's recommendations even half-seriously, it would only be a matter of time until the humble atheists and soul-searching agnostics would be given notice. The shy, soft-spoken Freudians would probably be next, followed by the Keynesians, the Kinseyites and the self-effacing Logical Positivists.

Yale has had its trials in the past; but with the publication of "God and Man at Yale" it is confronted with the most fateful crisis in its long history. Yale, as we see it, can do one of three things: 1) she can try to forget the book (temporarily pla-

cating the obscurantist elements by importing a few Thomists now and then); 2) she can restore God to His old Saybrook status; or 3) she can give Him His notice.

If she does the first, she'll only be putting off the evil day of decision. If she does the second, she'll soon sink to the level of a small denominational college, a Great Books shelter house like little St. John's, or a "damned seminary." But if she does the third she'll continue to keep pace with our mammoth state-supported institutions of higher learning (where religion has long been relegated to a hole in the curriculum), and retain her honored place alongside Harvard, Chicago and other privately endowed universities (where there is an ever-increasing awareness of the fact that splitting the atom is infinitely more important than triangulating the Godhead).

Obviously, Yale must embrace the third option. Under the circumstances it is the only sane, tactful, forward-looking, logical, positive, enlightened, progressive, rational, scientific, sociological, liberal, pragmatic, modern, instrumental and existential thing to do. In the next Yale Catalogue, as a footnote to the University Calendar or at the end of the list of faculty members currently on leave or lately deceased, would appear a brief, dignified statement to this effect: "Beginning next semester, God will no longer have any official connection with this University."

Up With the Id

With God free to go His way, and Yale hers, there will remain absolutely nothing (except maybe Harvard) standing between her and the spiritual, anthropo-cultural leadership of the country. She will feel free after all these years to begin putting the study of a man on a truly realistic, animal basis, giving far more attention to the terebratula and the werewolves, far less to Homer and the ancient Hebrews. And with the consignment of the Soul to the boneyard of fictions that have outlived their usefulness (see Russell, "Unpopular Essays," p.133), the id and the cyclotron will triumphantly come into their own at Yale.

We are not going to enumerate here all the advantages which will necessarily follow from the New Haven Footnote of 1952 (or, if you like, the Emancipation Act, the Yale Codicil, the Fullbreak Resolution, etc., etc.). We do, however, feel constrained to mention a few of the resulting benefits.

To start with, there will no longer be that confusing sense of divided loyalty on the part of the administration. No longer will President Griswold be heard muttering to himself, "Is my first duty to God or to Yale?" No longer will he be torn between his responsibility to the statically Christian alumni and the dynamically atheistic members of his faculty. No longer will he feel the faintest compulsion to become another Timothy Dwight, lashing

out at Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre with the same dialectical ferocity that characterized the earlier president's bigoted assaults on Voltaire, Diderot and Holbach.

It is hardly fair of Yale to prolong that feeling of inferiority which President Griswold must experience in the company of Conant, Oppenheimer, or one of the Comptons when the talk suddenly veers to such topics as the feasibility of tapping solar energy, or the attainment of world-wide birth-control through diet, "with religious groups approving." He should be absolved, too, from paying sheepish lip-service to the Founding Fathers of the great American fortunes—many of whom did so much to make institutions like Yale possible—and left free to give his undivided, unashamed attention to the Foundation Grandsons who have done so much to make the social sciences respectable and such Reports as Kinsey's possible.

Time for White Rats

The advantages accruing to the Yale faculty from the adoption of our suggestion practically defy tabulation. As Mr. Buckley so convincingly shows, neither Christians nor atheists are happy at Yale today. The atheists can't get on with the real work of a modern university until they have cleared away a lot of obsolete theological rubbish; while the Christians are so full of atavistic Mosaic qualms and staggering Pascalian doubts that they often fail even to get started. The former invariably have to toss God out at the beginning of their lectures; the latter usually feel conscience-bound to drag Him in at the end of theirs.

From now on, though, the philosophers, for instance, can devote all their time, instead of merely most of it, to plugging hard for Existentialism and Logical Positivism. No longer will God's Winged Chariot be always at their backs—only *Time's* or Bergson's. And the psychologists will no longer find Superstition dogging their physiological traces, poisoning their fine, subtly human clinical relationships with the white rats. The economists, at long last, will be able to dispense with their witty but time-wasting iconoclastic preliminaries (in all save the introductory courses, that is); and begin their lectures *in media* Keynes. When their teachings lead in good time to the liquidation of our capitalistic system, with the resultant wiping out of all privately supported educational centers like Yale, it will be a source of real satisfaction to everybody concerned to know that the government will be taking over a large, flourishing university.

In economics and political science classes, old-fashioned questions of right and wrong will soon

cease to arise. All problems will be elevated to the plane of Left or Right, and that sonorous but semantically hollow ideal, the Golden Mean, will be supplanted by that far more meaningful, far more normative construct, Left of Center. Furthermore, poor discredited Economic Man will again be allowed to rear his crew-cut head in the classroom, and, quicker than you can say cybernetics, assume his rightful place in the hierarchy of Dr. Weiner's honest, industrious thinking machines.

To the sociologists, the Footnote will come as nothing less than a veritable Emancipation Proclamation. We can hardly imagine President Griswold being so cruel as to want to keep Yale's social scientists confined in a theological rat-trap when they could be out in the fresh air checking up on the sex habits of the American housewife, tending their IBM machines, or pursuing their Ford Foundation studies of that pressing subject first dealt with so tellingly by sociologist Loos in her two trail-blazing monographs, "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes" and "But They Marry Brunettes."

The Footnote should come as a breath of new-mown hay to the English Department, too. The New Critics, who have been looking on Beauty bare these many moons, will feel wholly free to rid poetry of all impurities, up to and including the religious and ethical ones. And the General Semanticists who rule our English Departments today will have no further compunctions about giving the *coup de grace* to "those grievous Prejudices of Education, which, under the Names of Virtue, Conscience, Honour, Justice, and the like, are so apt to disturb the Peace of human Minds. . . ."

But enough. Yale's course, we repeat, is clear. The Yale authorities have probably known for a long time what they ought to do, but if something like "God and Man at Yale" had not appeared to prod them into action, they might have gone on temporizing from here to eternity, content to allow Yale to remain half-God, half-free.

We would be derelict, however, if we failed to mention one or two disadvantages which will result from the Footnote of '52. For one thing, the "Whiffenpoof Song" will have to go. For another, the playful raillery and savage invective directed against religion will become a rarity in Yale classrooms.

If there are other material disadvantages which will ensue from the Footnote, they escape us at the moment. So, remembering an impious observation ("God couldn't have graduated from Yale. His moral code is far too corny"), let us salute the Yale of Tomorrow.

A toast, gentlemen—"For Godwin, for Collectivism, and for Yale! Bah, bah, bah."

McCarthyism: taking hold of a tiger's tail by proving that a sacred cow is really a Trojan horse.

THADDEUS ASHBY

Time

In one career, 1952 Br my own have relatives. B probium his power flicker o Mr. Jos which, i right ne went to perhaps a Camer that Mr

The b istential Rome, E to claim of statu sole exc join the York T pondent into pas promising Tolstoy.

Today stitution vulnerab period o uniquely

The su Nathan boredom small tal on the A original of the l timely p er or no sible for the univ stage, I in no ot

One-sh the exist sense of



ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENTS

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

Time for Repertory!

In one of the rare understatements of his ebullient career, Mr. George Jean Nathan recently called the 1952 Broadway season the worst since 1912. To suit my own horror of our theatrical vacuum, he could have reached for considerably more dramatic adjectives. But though Mr. Nathan's vocabulary of opprobrium may be getting mellow, no one will dispute his powers of recollection. And as if to dispel a last flicker of serenity, the Pulitzer judges have crowned Mr. Joseph Kramm for a shocker ("The Shrike") which, in comparison, moves "Trilby" to the front right next to Euripides; and the Critics' Award went to the most putrid dramatic concoction I, and perhaps even Mr. Nathan, can remember ("I Am a Camera"). So it seems to be the general consensus that Mr. Nathan is right.

The blight covers the planet. In Paris, the "existentialist" postwar bubble has burst completely. Rome, Berlin and Vienna have not even bothered to claim, ever since 1945, that a single dramatist of stature has emerged on their stages. With the sole exception of Christopher Fry, London would join the statement of bankruptcy. And the *New York Times's* consistently lenient Moscow correspondent has recently charmed the Soviet censors into passing a report that their theater's most promising young playwright seems to be one Leo Tolstoy.

Today I should like to contemplate a purely institutional aspect of the global mess—the special vulnerability of the American theater in such a period of dearth. I am referring, of course, to the uniquely American lack of repertory theater.

The subject must have been exhausted when Mr. Nathan was young, and I am not going to revive the boredom of what is perhaps the oldest gambit for small talk at Sardi's. But the two newest pressures on the American theater—the fantastic scarcity of original playwrights and the electronic duplication of the live stage—have added, it seems to me, a timely perspective to a dead discussion. For, whether or not it was culturally and financially permissible for this country to deviate in the past from the universal tradition of repertory, the American stage, I am afraid, can survive these two new jolts in no other institutional form.

One-show stage companies always depended on the existence of a rather virginal audience whose sense of discrimination was not yet awakened—an

audience responding to the glitter of a big production rather than its intellectual content. But when an audience expands qualitatively, it shrinks quantitatively: there just are not enough brassy people left in New York to keep thirty brassy spectacles going for a whole season; and there are not enough first-rate plays produced to keep an *educated* audience returning to the theater thirty times a year.

But in the world theater there was never a year so productive that its fresh dramatic crop could satisfy an educated audience. It always fed on the constantly available *total* heritage of the world theater. And if this was true in the most sensationally creative ages of the drama, how inescapably true is it for a generation of such fantastically atrophied dramatic creativeness!

The American theater, I mean to say, is not necessarily dead because there have been no new playwrights for a decade or two. But it *ought* to die when, on top of this, a youngster in New York can grow up to be a grandfather without ever having had a chance to see a professional performance of "King Lear." This is the real scandal of our stage—and also its stupidity. For none of our producers seems smart enough to notice that there now exists a sound *economic* basis for repertory.

If I were a producer, I would have noticed two years ago that, thanks to television, an integrated group of actors, trained in repertory, is now excellent business. So unlimited is TV's need for varied theatrical fare that a producer who could supply it regularly and readily (on lend-lease terms or in "package" deals), could write his own ticket. Consequently, rather than bet half-a-million on one or two "big" productions, I would have invested a million dollars in a repertory theater on Broadway; would have put a few dozen actors under a contract making me a participant in their TV incomes; and would have calmly proceeded to produce about thirty excellent old plays, presented alternately throughout the season. I suspect I would have made money on this live operation alone: there must be 30,000 people in New York mature and prosperous enough to buy tickets for thirty noble plays a year. And if my stable of actors had transported only ten of my productions to the TV screen, my profit would have pushed me into the Rodgers & Hammerstein bracket.

I am, however, no theatrical entrepreneur. So I am kept busy with repetitious critical autopsies of "new" plays, while Broadway loses not only our dramatic heritage but also its own shirt.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

The income tax is one of the divinest engines for rectifying the mal-distribution of national income ever invented. How we were able to get it on the statute books passes belief.

STUART CHASE, "A New Deal," 1932

The Russian teachers who want to stay here and not return home, and the efforts that have been made on the part of the Russian authorities to oblige them to return, present no very great difficulties. The Russians themselves have accepted American citizens who have decided they want to live in Russia in preference to the United States. The authorities in Russia could easily be reminded of this fact.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "My Day,"
August 16, 1948

The USSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR, Article 129

Our Absent-Minded Diplomats

I can without hesitation assert that from the time when Hitler invaded Russia . . . the President [Roosevelt] regarded understanding and cooperation between Moscow and Washington as one of the indispensable foundations for American foreign policy. . . . He believed it perfectly possible for a stable world order to be created within which our traditional form of Western democracy and the state socialist form of Russian communism could exist side by side without inevitable collision.

SUMNER WELLES, "Where Are We Heading?,"
published in 1946

He [Roosevelt] saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries that the power and the menace of communism came from the fanatical faith of its prophets and of its addicts, even more than from the military force and vast potential resources of the Soviet Union. To him communism was a bloody, stifling and intolerable ideology.

SUMNER WELLES, "Seven Decisions That
Shaped History," published in 1951

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS

Think!

In a recent column for the *New York Post*, that crypto-historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., took time out from his devoted smearing of Herbert Hoover and others of his betters to dash off a screed on the "genus of 'anti-anti-Communist.'" As the ideologue of the anti-anti-Communist Americans for Democratic Action, Junior was in a position to offer some specialized insights on that genus.

Plowing past the Olympian lead—"To think at all we must make distinctions"—I read on. For about half the column young Schlesinger approximated sense. He inveighed against those who hound "Fascists" but weep for a Communist lawbreaker as if he were Adonais himself.

But after all, Junior was writing for the *New York Post*. So he quickly returned to the old stand, applying a Harvard shillelagh to all those who do not believe they should surrender the world to Stalin in order to devote their major energies to the suppression of "McCarthyism . . . the present American danger."

Nevertheless, a start is a start. I wrote the junior Schlesinger a little mash note.

" . . . As you may know, I have frequently attacked the *Post* for its particular brand of anti-anti-communism," I said. "As a matter of fact, I think your writings on those who testified before the McCarran Committee fall into that category. I am glad to note that you have come over." But I could not resist asking Schlesinger two questions:

1. Do you believe that the Justice Department and Mr. Truman were anti-anti-Communist when they did their best to block the granting of permanent residence in the United States to Arthur Koestler? And do you think Senator McCarran was a gangster when he pushed through the private law on Koestler by main force against Justice Department objections and Mr. Truman's pocket veto?
2. Do you think Jimmy Wechsler is an anti-anti-Communist because he has vowed openly to "get" Irving Kristol and *Commentary*—his ire being aroused by Kristol's piece, "Civil Liberties—1952"? Since this piece paid adequate lip-service . . . to the "McCarthy is a beast" myth, its only crime was to analyze calmly the liberal double standard which you yourself criticize in your *Post* column.

Exactly one week later, young Schlesinger answered me in a single sentence which was clear, succinct, and completely irrelevant:

I hardly know how to reply to your letter except to say that, in my judgment, Jimmy Wechsler has fought communism much harder, much better, and much more successfully than Joe McCarthy.

At first I was a little annoyed by Junior's artful evasion. And then I realized that this was really very shallow of me. After all, to think at all we must make distinctions. So I shall ponder his answer, preferably standing on my head, but always making distinctions.

RALPH DE TOLEDANO

The wor
dustriali
anti-tax
(Dutton,
clusions
sequence
nique of
believe V
the conte
women:
of our m
mon that
a distinc
women a
Fountain
ously ex
\$3.50) h
total sile
direction
author o
Lane, a
brilliant

It is not
constitute
dom and
individua
never bee
sniff con
spent son
ism. Risk
ever, I, a
sential in
am inclin
is so fort
little mon
the whole
men, the
and use ti

Take the
Her "The
original
lectual, th
for the lin
represent
our foref
on the A
called "ca
her. Yet t
supinely r



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The women! Vivien Kellems, the Connecticut industrialist who has just written a galvanic personal anti-tax manifesto in "Toil, Taxes and Trouble" (Dutton, \$2.50), insists that they reach their conclusions by intuitive processes, not by the "logical" sequences that are supposedly the exclusive technique of the masculine thinker. Well, I just don't believe Vivien. The most logical people I know in the contemporary writing world happen to be five women: indeed, their sharp, unblinkered analyses of our modern chaos of values have so much in common that these women might be said to constitute a distinct movement in modern letters. Two of the women are novelists: Ayn Rand, author of "The Fountainhead," and Taylor Caldwell, whose tumultuously exciting "The Devil's Advocate" (Crown, \$3.50) has just been published amid the almost total silence of those who know how to kill by indirection. The other women are Isabel Paterson, author of "The God of the Machine," Rose Wilder Lane, a fiction writer who also happens to be a brilliant pamphleteer, and Vivien Kellems herself.

It is not to be supposed that the five women who constitute this movement for individualism, freedom and sanity necessarily approve of each other; individualists seldom do. Mrs. Paterson, who has never been a collectivist of any sort, would probably sniff contemptuously at Rose Wilder Lane, who spent some youthful years in dalliance with socialism. Risking being caught in their crossfire, however, I, a mere intuitive male, insist upon their essential intellectual and moral kinship. Moreover, I am inclined to think that their presence on the scene is so fortunate that it makes personal differences of little moment. The only thing that bothers me about the whole situation as it affects these women is that men, the dopes, don't know how to listen to them and use them.

Take the case of Isabel Paterson, for example. Her "The God of the Machine" was a brilliantly original and sound exposition of the moral, intellectual, theological and psychological justifications for the linked phenomena of free capitalism and the representative and strictly limited government of our forefathers. Since she has written a basic book on the American system, you would think the so-called "capitalist press" would continue to feature her. Yet the "Republican" *New York Herald Tribune* supinely retired her. And none of the free enterprise

journalistic entities—the *Wall Street Journal*, *Baron's* magazine, *Human Events*, to name a few—has sought her out. Since she is intransigent and therefore "difficult," there may be reasons for this; editors, like other people, like to exist in comfort. But the good editor, the *really* good editor, has no right to consider his own comfort: *he should be prepared to suffer to get the good stuff.*

To continue, let's take the case of Rose Wilder Lane. She can write like a breeze, she can make abstruse things come alive, and she knows American history far more thoroughly than any baker's dozen of professional Ph.D's. Her early experiences of socialism have sharpened her appreciation of capitalistic freedom. But, for one reason or another, she lives up near Danbury, Conn., in communion with her honey bees. Some one ought to put her to work. (I've tried, on occasion, but it is a reflection either on my powers of persuasion or my choice of suggested topics that I haven't been able to succeed.)

Vivien Kellems, being a competent industrialist (the president of the Kellems Company of Stonington, Conn.) as well as a writer, would probably not allow herself to be affronted or maneuvered into silence: a scratch-and-claw-'em exponent of the "savage poetry" that is at once the glory and the necessary hardship of the free business world, she would hardly pay her enemies the compliment of allowing them to shut her up. Her book, which comes to us with an introduction by Rupert Hughes, is a fighting recapitulation of her attempts to get the Federal government to indict her and her cable-grip manufacturing company for refusing to collect the withholding tax from her employees for the U. S. Treasury.

Being a creature of refreshingly direct logic, Miss Kellems knows that the withholding tax law is in direct contravention of the Federal Constitution. How so? It's really simple, my dear Watson: the Constitution expressly forbids involuntary servitude, and when the officers of a corporation are compelled, without compensation, to collect U. S. tax money from their employees they are being reduced to slave status. No legal verbiage can disguise the point—which is why Secretary of the Treasury Snyder has never been willing to allow the withholding tax law to be tested in court. His method of dealing with Miss Kellems was the method of

indirection. The law says the government can exact penalties for failure to pay income taxes. By making this law apply to a *method of collecting taxes*, the government was enabled to seize certain funds from Miss Kellems's bank accounts—an amount totaling close to \$8000—for “penalties.” (The money was not to cover unpaid taxes, for Miss Kellems personally saw to it that every single one of her employees paid every cent of his Federal income tax on the dot every quarter.) When Miss Kellems sued to recover the money, Judge Hincks, a neighbor of mine and a personally upright man if there ever was one, ruled that Miss Kellems was liable because the law, as Miss Kellems quotes him, “plainly puts a duty on the *tax collector* as well as the taxpayer.” To which Miss Kellems retorts: “Right, Judge Hincks, absolutely right! But *who is the tax collector? Certainly not I, because the Bureau of Internal Revenue has never appointed me a tax collector and it has never paid me one cent for my services in collecting its larcenous taxes for it.*” (Italics ours.)

Miss Kellems's book is mostly about her campaign to force the Federal government to respect the Constitutional rights of individual citizens in this matter of involuntary servitude as it affects tax collecting. But there is more to the book than that. Vivien Kellems does not doubt the fact that the income tax is a legal tax: the sixteenth amendment, certified for adoption in 1913, made it so. But Miss Kellems does argue that the sixteenth amendment is not compatible with the original architecture of the Constitution, which was set up to protect the states and their individual citizens against overweening encroachments by the Federal government. The original Constitution insisted that “representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers . . . No capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration hereinafter directed to be taken.” The Founding Fathers wrote that language into our basic legal document to keep the Federal government from putting extortionate taxes on the industrious citizens of New York and Connecticut in order to buy votes in Idaho, or to build pyramids in desert regions, or to subsidize milk drinking among the Swahili. Miss Kellems thinks we ought to return to our original law. Therefore she is out to repeal the sixteenth amendment. Not just to whittle it down, as the proponents of a ceiling on income taxes (say, at 25 per cent of income) propose. She wants to get rid of it completely, and she swears that her organization (the Liberty Belles) is going to do it. Just leave it to the women, she says. Maybe she is right in trusting the women: after all, they are the logical sex. If the way to resume is to resume, the way to repeal is to repeal. And a government deprived of its fantastic and predatory income would soon be

forced to take itself off the people's backs and let them go to work to support themselves.

Taylor Caldwell's novel, “The Devil's Advocate,” is a gripping melodrama of the totalitarian future that awaits us if people like Vivien Kellems fail in their various libertarian crusades. Her story is set in the years 1969 and 1970, and it takes off from a Scottish legend about the lawyer who sought to discredit the devil by defending him with such an excess of zeal that the people would be able to see through the tragic farce. In Miss Caldwell's own version of the frightful Orwellian future, the America of the super-Fair Deal (rebaptized as The Democracy) will be saved, not by a rebellion from below, but by an organization of devil's advocates who can be counted upon to worm their way into powerful place in the totalitarian State apparatus. In “The Devil's Advocate” a band of these devoted souls take the totalitarian dictator's words at face value: they insist that everybody, even including the farmers and the administrators of big State enterprises, live according to the slogans of “work, suffer, sacrifice.” By goading everybody, from bureaucrat to common laborer, the Minute Men concealed in the government finally provoke the government's overthrow.

Miss Caldwell has written a fable for our times that may seem wildly improbable. But don't be too sure that it is improbable. Anyway, improbable or not, the story is a humdinger thriller. If anyone is dumb enough to miss its profound, yet simply stated, truths, he or she can still read it with excited admiration for its quality as a tale of adventure.

We hope Taylor Caldwell has another best-seller on her hands. We hope Miss Kellems can enroll all of America's women in her Liberty Belles. It is our masculine intuition that the logic of women will yet save us from the consequences of the cretinism that seems to have assailed the male population of America when it began trifling with the governmental architectonics of Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson back around 1908 or 1912.

Nothing Remains

A century earlier there was grass
And the lowing cow and sheep;
Now nothing remains
But the dwarfed orchard trees
And tares, and the sand, and the nettles
That Adam ate.

How can the vine,
The apples, and the house
Sing
If there is no one?

EDWARD DAHLBERG

Cook

Return f
ited by
& Cud

This is
Frederic
what it
the lost

Cook r
He plann
he was c
nounce h
Five day
1909, he
Pole.”

It was
ginning
“the mos
He refer
on Septe
Cook has

Rather t
character
months.
that God
was bles
hundreds
petitions
magazine
rise in th
ness, ob
concepts.

Outsta
had paid
rights” o
Geograph
to that e
the New
“zoomed.
nual,” th
In 1909,
rise of 7

The N
authority
70,000 in
the Peary
producing
examined
proof tha
of that c
ords it sa
ments. T
Washingt
examined

The fo
would Co
penitenti
in the fa

Cook and the Pole

Return from the Pole, by Frederick A. Cook. Edited by Frederick J. Pohl. New York: Pellegrini & Cudahy. \$4.50

This is the story of a lost year in the life of Dr. Frederick A. Cook. It is fascinating not only for what it relates but for what might have been had the lost year not occurred.

Cook reached the North Pole on April 21, 1908. He planned to be home that autumn, but because he was carried off his course, he was unable to announce his accomplishment until September 1, 1909. Five days later, Peary radioed that on April 6, 1909, he had "nailed the Stars and Stripes to the Pole."

It was a weird turn of events, but only the beginning of what Lincoln Steffens once said made "the most inventive novelists . . . look very puny." He referred to the polar controversy which began on September 8 when Peary sent this wire: ". . . Dr. Cook has handed the public a gold brick."

Rather than a controversy it was a campaign of character assassination intensively waged for six months. It was inspired by Peary who once said that God had chosen him to find the North Pole. It was blessed by wealthy friends who contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to finance his expeditions. It was carried out by newspapers and magazines more interested in the unprecedented rise in their circulation figures than in justice, fairness, objectivity and other vaunted journalistic concepts.

Outstanding were the *New York Times* which had paid Peary \$4000 for "news and literary rights" of the 1909 expedition, and the *National Geographic Magazine* which had contributed \$1000 to that expedition. Meyer Berger, in "The Story of the New York Times," says the *Times's* circulation "zoomed." According to "Ayer's Newspaper Annual," the *Times's* circulation in 1908 was 100,000. In 1909, it was 150,000, and in 1910, 175,000—a rise of 75 per cent.

The *National Geographic*, according to the same authority, had 35,000 in 1909, 49,500 in 1910 and 70,000 in 1911—a gain of 100 per cent. It carried the Peary banner with greater zeal than the *Times*, producing a so-called committee of experts which examined the Peary records and pronounced them proof that he had reached the Pole. Every member of that committee was a friend of Peary. The records it saw consisted of a notebook and some instruments. The instruments were in a trunk in the Washington railroad station where the committee examined them. On its decision rests Peary's claim.

The foregoing would not have occurred, nor would Cook have been sentenced to Leavenworth penitentiary for an oil fraud, had he returned home in the fall of 1908. History shows that the oil in-

dictment was urged by Peary satellites and that the government prosecuted Cook in an effort to cover an oil scandal of greater proportions—Teapot Dome. It should be noted that while Cook was a prisoner, newspapers reported that lands he once controlled were producing oil and gas in quantities greater than any claim made by his company. Had that year not been lost, history in all likelihood would record that Cook was the first man to reach the North Pole.

What happened in that year? "Return From the Pole" tells it.

On April 23, 1908, Cook and two Eskimos, driving two sleds drawn by 26 dogs, left the Pole. Their destination was Axel Heiberg Land across which they had left ample caches of food and other supplies to enable them to return to their base camp at Annoatok, Greenland. Prolonged periods of fog followed. When at last Cook was able to determine their position by sextant, they were far west of Axel Heiberg Land with miles of open water and broken ice intervening. His only choice was to continue with the drift in the hope of being picked up by a whaler either in Lancaster or Jones Sound about 500 miles to the south. On the sleds he had a collapsed 12-foot canvas boat, a few cans of pemmican and a very little ammunition. That was on June 13, 1908.

Throughout the months that followed the Cook party lived in the shadow of death, escaping starvation, freezing, drowning, insanity and numerous other hazards. Because they had run out of ammunition their trials were worse than those of Fridtjof Nansen and Johansen after they left the "Fram." Since meat was their only source of food, Cook had to devise new ways of killing big game. After vainly trying the bow and arrow, a lance and a harpoon which they made of the bones of animals and wood from the sleds, they turned to the lasso. Cook described the capture of a mush-ox in this way:

A large slip loop was made in the center of the [sealskin] line and the two Eskimos took up positions on opposite sides of the animal. They threw the rope with its loop on the ground in front of the creature while I encouraged an attack from the front. As the head was slightly elevated the loop was raised and the bull put his horns in it, one after the other. The rope was now rapidly fastened to stones and the bull tightened the loop by his efforts to advance or retreat. . . . Then we had the bull where we could reach him with the lance at arm's length and plunge it into his vitals . . .

This device enabled them to store sufficient food on which to subsist throughout the months of winter darkness. They lived in a cave at Cape Sparbo on Jones Sound where Cook devoted many hours in front of a small blubber lamp working up his notes for a more complete report on his journey. When daylight came they set out for Annoatok 300 miles away where they arrived on April 18, 1909, in a semi-starved condition.

The ingenuity, resourcefulness, stamina and courage Cook displayed while attempting to get back to his base camp were recognized in Scandinavia as attributes of a great polar explorer. On the other hand, Peary and his supporters minimized and ridiculed them. While his detractors did not deny that he made the journey around Jones Sound they charged that he spent the year there in order to manufacture his story of the Pole.

In today's perspective such a charge appears ludicrous, yet it was accepted at the time and believed as were scores of other groundless accusations developed in the propaganda campaign financed by the Peary Arctic Club, an organization which existed to raise money for Peary.

The facts of Cook's attainment of the Pole and the efforts made to discredit them are objectively and calmly reviewed by Frederick J. Pohl, author of "Amerigo Vespucci: Pilot Major," in a lengthy introduction to Cook's narrative. In that presentation two points stand out:

1) No one had ever questioned or doubted Cook's reputation as an explorer and as a man until Peary sent his gold brick message.

2) Cook was the first man to publish a description of conditions at the North Pole. So similar was Peary's which followed that it could have been corroboration or plagiarism.

Cook's case is the saddest of its kind in history. Pohl says that it parallels that of Columbus who "was rejected, despised, imprisoned and neglected." It would be tragic indeed if Cook had to wait for vindication as long as Columbus did.

ANDREW A. FREEMAN

Betrayal of China

The Enemy Within, by Raymond J. de Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn. New York: Doubleday. \$3.75

About the time Edgar Snow's heroic portrait of the Chinese Communists, "Red Star Over China," was stirring the free world—and starting a propaganda which still warps the free world's judgment—there occurred an incident in An Kwo, a town 100 miles south of Peking. The Jap invasion of North China (it was late 1937) had not yet overrun An Kwo, but the town's National Government officials had already pulled out. To keep law and order, a local authority had been set up by neighboring elders with the vigorous help of Father de Jaegher, Belgian Jesuit missionary stationed in An Kwo. The elders governed decently and effectively, depending on a small police force to ward off bandits in a region embracing 400 villages.

Then entered the Communists, with guns, from a nearby guerrilla hideout in the Wu T'ai mountains. "Although we had been expecting them," writes Father de Jaegher, "we had not the faintest

suspicion of the extent and depth of the tragedy for China, and, indeed, for the world, that was presaged by their arrival."

The Red commander, one General Lü, was polite enough at first (in the manner that Chinese peasants came stinging to describe as the Communists' three-head policy—first they bow their heads in friendliness, then they shake their heads in tyranny, and finally they cut off the heads of opponents). He invited Father de Jaegher to dinner, blandly approved the civil rule of the elders. But a few days later General Lü turned rude; he jailed the elders (three of them) and summoned Father de Jaegher to hear a shakedown ultimatum. What the Reds wanted: 200 rifles and 20,000 silver dollars. "If you haven't brought me the arms and the money by eight o'clock tomorrow night," warned Lü, "your friends will be shot."

An arduous effort raised the ransom from the villages. But it didn't buy freedom for the elders. In the pattern now become dreary, from Potsdam to Panmunjom, one outrageous Red demand led only to another. The elders had to pay back the ransom—that is, another 200 rifles and 20,000 silver dollars—to "the people." Collectors for the people, of course, were the Communists. With such tricks, the Reds built up their arsenal, treasury and power over An Kwo.

The tragedy and irony of all this is that Edgar Snow and other pro-Communist observers of that time (including Owen Lattimore and John Davies) were a good deal nearer to An Kwo than to Yenan, at least in mileage. Yet they could not see, or did not think worth reporting, what was happening virtually under their noses. In fairness to those who then accepted the line that the Chinese Communists were really agrarian democrats and reformers, it must be said that a lot of non-Communist Chinese also believed it. A few did not, for stories had come up from the Kiangsi region about Communist methods there in the ferocious civil war that preceded the Long March to Yenan. At An Kwo, Father de Jaegher was allowed to carry on his mission, though there were growing restrictions and his Chinese flock was harassed. He learned to resist covertly. He understood, of course, that the enemy was fundamentally and unalterably anti-Christian (and anti-Confucian) but his knowledge of its methods came slowly and by harsh personal experience.

It's interesting to wonder how differently U. S. policy might have turned out, back in the early nineteen forties, if the reports and recommendations of the State Department's officers in China had been based on what Father de Jaegher saw and heard. Take the myth, so passionately spread by General Joseph Stilwell, that the Reds were stout fighters against the Japanese. The invader's atrocities lit fierce fires of patriotism among many Chinese, of which the Communists took clever advan-

tage. But power u little all explained Jaegher:

Our Kai-shek enemy the Jap too strong hard then co are too

The R the Natio pretty cl how the united fr their exp 1940, in Chiang K destroyed Army in China.

As Fath assistance tion, inhu munists i tellingly v on the Co ice in me tracts fro of the W well-to-do divided in the young buried ali de Jaeghe compared nists then two years. seems also control wh Edward H China").

From 15 Jaegher w camp at V after his Communis sion. Curie eral Georg Kai-shek i was never communism Once, in ea retary and Ching Nu from seeing that Ching

tage. But while they dragooned recruits and grabbed power under anti-Japanese slogans, they did as little all-out fighting as possible. Red General Lü explained it, rather arrogantly, to Father de Jaegher:

Our great enemy is not Japan. . . . [It is] Chiang Kai-shek. . . . And because Chiang is our great enemy is why we Chinese Communists mustn't fight the Japs too much. We must not let the Japanese be too strong in China but we must not fight them so hard they'll get too weak. If they are too strong, then communism can't win in China. And if they are too weak, Chiang Kai-shek can not fail to win.

The Reds saved most of their ammunition for the Nationalists. Father de Jaegher happened to be pretty close to one of the important examples of how the Communists really felt about the so-called united front against Japan (it was a cover for their expansion). This was the incident, in early 1940, in which the Communists, nominally under Chiang Kai-shek's over-all command, ambushed and destroyed nearly 60,000 men of Chiang's Fifth Army in the mountain passes of north central China.

As Father de Jaegher reports it, with the able assistance of Irene Kuhn, the infiltration, deception, inhumanity and terror practiced by the Communists in the villages around An Kwo contrast tellingly with the praise and enthusiasm bestowed on the Communists by John Davies and John Service in memos for the U. S. State Department (extracts from the memos can be found in the annexes of the White Paper of 1949). The comparatively well-to-do were despoiled, peasants malevolently divided into warring classes, filial piety mocked, the young encouraged to revile the old, anti-Reds buried alive or decapitated. Of course, what Father de Jaegher witnessed in those days is small-scale compared to the mass purges which the Communists themselves have loudly publicized these past two years. Much of what took place around An Kwo seems also the mere prelude to the fanatic thought-control which now binds all mainland China (see Edward Hunter's powerful "Brain Washing in Red China").

From 1943 until the Japanese defeat, Father de Jaegher was interned in a Japanese concentration camp at Weihsien, Shantung Province. He failed, after his release during the postwar years, to get Communist permission to reopen the An Kwo mission. Curiously, though he was around while General George Marshall was trying to force Chiang Kai-shek into a coalition with the Communists, he was never quite able to tell what he knew about communism in the villages to the American envoy. Once, in early 1946, he got as far as a Chinese secretary and receptionist for the Americans, one Ching Nu-chi, who contemptuously blocked him from seeing Marshall. Eventually, it turned out that Ching was a Communist agent.

Even if Father de Jaegher had reached General Marshall it would probably have made no difference. The Red enemy within China had by then already won an all-important struggle on the outside—the battle to influence U. S. opinion and U. S. policymaking on China. The American misjudgment of the nature of Chinese communism was leading inexorably to misjudgments about Russian intervention in China, about the kind of aid Nationalist China needed, about the nature of the Chinese Nationalist movement—and all the misjudgments put together were leading to the loss of China to the free world and to war in Korea and Indo-China.

The battle of opinion and policymaking in this country still goes on. This book should help get the record straight and the misjudgments retrieved.

FREDERICK GRUIN

Creation of Evil

The Reds Take a City, by John W. Riley, Jr. and Wilbur Schramm. Narrative translation by Hugh Heung-wu Cynn. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers. \$2.75

The peculiar value of this small book is that it represents the first scientific study of an area behind the Iron Curtain. On June 25, 1950, the Iron Curtain drawn along the 38th Parallel in Korea moved southward. For ninety days it covered Seoul, a city of a million and a half people, and then was forced back. Upon its recession the United States Air Force assembled a team of specialists to assess what the Communists had done in the Korean capital during their occupation, and this book is substantially, though not officially, the findings, interspersed with eleven what-happened-to-me narratives by residents.

The Reds came down prepared to stay, knowing they could quickly rout an army lacking heavy weapons, and expecting nothing but a bustle of debate from the United Nations. The war would be over in July, the government would be moved to Seoul in early August, a general election would be held in the middle of the month, and in September would come the grand celebration of "unification." The conquest was planned down to the minutest detail. Personnel for the key posts had been selected and trained. A pre-fabricated government for Seoul followed the invading tanks. Each step for liquidating South Korean leadership, destroying the established patterns of life and installing a Soviet order had been blueprinted and rehearsed. A system for universal regimentation of every individual was ready to operate.

It is in the cool description of this system that the book makes its most impressive contribution. The Communists have studied human behavior as Pavlov studied his dogs, and have learned how to run them through a wringer and make them come

out a set of conditioned reflexes. Communism is far more than mere brutality, which is a dull and ancient phenomenon. It is a new creation of evil. It has perfected a technique for besieging and reducing the spirit of man; for removing every last vestige of freedom, dignity and personality from persons, and replacing these items with an abject and utter dependence upon the Party. The application of this new science is far more revelatory of twentieth-century totalitarianism than the murders it commits, for anybody can kill.

"The Reds Take a City" comes close to describing this indescribable thing, particularly in its description of the Communists' wholesale application of a technique quaintly called "confession." It is difficult to read the book without sharing the dismal conclusion of Hun-Ho Lee, citizen of Seoul:

Look straight at the revealed evil of the Reds. There can be no compromise, no concession. Here is the clear need for battle. We may have to sacrifice everything, but only by winning this battle can we keep alive the hope for man.

HUGH STEVENSON TIGNER

French Decorative Arts

French Provincial Decorative Art, by Catharine Oglesby. New York: Scribner. \$8.50

Before the sixteenth century few freedmen had their own homes, and it was only during the latter part of that century, with the reign of Henry IV, that decorative arts had any importance in the history of France. Henry IV, "*le Vert Gallant*," a king responsive to his people, united the warring factions of his country. His second wife, the "fat bankeress" Marie de Medici, was uncultivated but loved pomp and spectacle. Henry once wrote her, "God's life, my love, you could not have sent me more agreeable news than that you have taken to reading." All phases of the culture of Flanders appealed to Marie, and to a large extent she grafted this massive and somewhat primitive style on the decorative arts of France. Marie gave Henry a son, Louis XIII, neither as amorous as Henry nor as handsome, but he had more aesthetic tastes and definite ideas on art.

As the succeeding kings (also named Louis) came to the throne, the styles changed. Louis XIV, "protector of science, literature and art," began the Gobeline manufacturies where all the arts, fine and decorative, flourished, and he built Versailles. Rococo adorned everything under the regency and Louis XV. The rococo all but vanished during the reign of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and the playful curves of the earlier kings became classic. Grace in the arts ended with the Directory and the Empire of Napoleon.

While the styles changed, the workmen of various provinces took Paris designs and modified them for country use, just as American craftsmen borrowed

from the work of Boston and Philadelphia artisans. The Bretons, like the New Englanders, were austere seafaring folk. Their furniture was rustic, the carving shallow, and the decoration often the simplest balusters and spindles. The French Normans can be compared with our wealthy seaboard patri-cians of Virginia and the Carolinas. The Normans were richer than their neighbors, less industrious and gayer. They were, as Miss Oglesby points out, more susceptible to outside influence, and consequently their furniture, like the furniture of Virginia, was closer in style and spirit to the cities. The Basques and people of the mountainous regions in the south of France clung to the strong primitive types of Henry IV and Louis XIII.

The most important piece of furniture in the provincial home was the *armoire*, a large cupboard for clothes, silver, linens, and even food. The *armoire* was the predecessor of the cupboard which in turn, during the eighteenth century, was built into the paneling of the room. The bed was next in importance. Originally it was hewn out of oak, but as the style varied, the bed became a more decorative object. Miss Oglesby pictures a Louis XV bed that has mirrors and shelves in the headboard, a clock as one of the sideposts and a cupboard for the other post. The buffet closely resembled the *armoire*, but was used for household utensils and often, in later times, for books. One collector of French provincial art, whose home was stocked with good books in fine old *armoires* and buffets, said that her idea of Heaven "was a place where books stood at hand's reach in single rows."

In the decorative arts of any country, the change of styles is best seen in the chair. Miss Oglesby includes a number of pages of illustrations to show the development of the French chair from the sturdy, small sidechair to the comfortable, roomy upholstered armchair and the padded bench. One of the most delightful pieces illustrated is an early eighteenth century bread-trough and table. Carved and decorated in an unusual manner, it still preserves something of the rustic charm of such dual-purpose pieces.

Canadian furniture, while deriving from French provincial, has the stamp of primitive, rural American work. A provincial commode, or a buffet, will always be distinctively French, but it would be difficult to distinguish between a monk's bench and an early chair-table from Pennsylvania, or a Canadian single-drawer painted table from a similar one made in Massachusetts. These pieces show as much American influence as French.

Catharine Oglesby also shows examples of gaily decorated chests and colorful textiles, ornamented mirrors and handsomely carved paneling. She chronicles the development of styles and shows the methods used by provincial craftsmen. For any student or collector of French decorative art, her book is useful and informative.

RENE HOWELL