THE Freeman

APRIL 1955 50¢

The Sainted Book Burners

W. T. Couch

Railways in the Red

Colm Brogan

Bracken Lee of Utah

Frank Hughes

THE Freeman

A Monthly For Libertarians

Editor FRANK CHODOROV
Managing Editor MABEL WOOD
Business Manager JAMES M. ROGERS

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Whereof They Speak

Two of our writers in this issue have had personal experience with the going "academic freedom."

A. H. HOBBS is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1953 he wrote a book, *Social Problems and Scientism*, in which he demonstrated that what goes by the name of "social science" in our colleges is merely propaganda for collectivism, that the word "science" has been appropriated by the advocates for its prestige value, that in fact the approach and the methods of these advocates follow none of the prescriptions of science. Shortly after the book appeared, Dr. Hobbs was told by the head of his department that he could not expect any advancement at the university, regardless of the merit of his work.

The other case is that of W. T. COUCH. Dr. Couch had been assistant director and director of the University of North Carolina Press for twenty years when he was invited by Robert M. Hutchins to take charge of the University of Chicago Press. Five years later, Dr. Hutchins fired Dr. Couch, on six and a half hours' notice, for publishing a book which displeased the authorities at the University of California; the book dealt with the treatment of Japanese-Americans during the war. Robert Hutchins, as is well known, is foremost in the fight to protect "academic freedom" from the onslaughts of something he calls "McCarthyism." Currently, Dr. Couch is editing *Collier's Encyclopedia*. He writes: "I was shocked . . . to discover that there was a serious problem of propaganda in encyclopedias and that eliminating the propaganda was not as easy as it might appear to be."

FRANK HUGHES is on the staff of the *Chicago Tribune*. His monumental book *Prejudice and the Press* has brought him recognition as an authority on freedom of the press. He is author of a forthcoming book on propaganda in high school education.

CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT is President of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company.

A. J. GALLAGER is an engineer, market consultant and business analyst. The facts he presents are drawn from the audited statements of business and official reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission and Bureau of Labor and Department of Commerce.

F. R. BUCKLEY, a new member of the FREEMAN staff, was graduated from Yale in '52, then served in the Air Force.

CHARLES F. HAMILTON has been editor of, and is now contributing to, lumber and architectural trade journals.

The FREEMAN is devoted to the promulgation of the libertarian philosophy: the free market place, limited government and the dignity of the individual.

Readers also write

[Letters to the editor commenting on the March issue, which was devoted entirely to the United Nations and One Worldism, are pouring in. Here are excerpts from a few of those that arrived before we went to press.]

Buck Fifty

Your issue on the United Nations (March) is perhaps the finest which you have ever published. Indeed, it is the finest copy of any magazine which I have seen in a long time.

Had you tripled the price for this one issue, no one who bought would have been overcharged. I hope that you will see fit to print more on this vital subject and will, in addition, continue the practice of devoting a whole issue to one question.

CHARLES H. DOCKENDORFF
New York, N. Y.

Outstanding

The "One World" issue is an outstanding contribution to the literature of freedom.

Washington, D.C. JAMES L. WICK

The Best Refutation

May I congratulate you on the contents of the March issue? It is the best refutation to all arguments for the UN or One Worldism. My only wish is that I might send a copy to everyone in the country.

JAMES G. PURDY
Benton Harbor, Mich.

Churches Internationale

In his otherwise excellent article on non-governmental organizations affiliated with the United Nations, Cy Peterman reverently crosses himself and genuflects to the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs. This outfit, he says, is "valuable." It emphasizes "practical measures to keep peace" and is "undoubtedly a positive force among the NGO's." Ugh!

The pietistical Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr and Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, who seem to strike Mr. Peterman numb with awe, have Red front records which must be known to most readers of the FREEMAN. But it is Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, director of the CCIA, who evokes the full measure of Peterman's adulation. . . .

This egregious worthy submitted to the World Council of Churches, at its Evanston assembly last August, a report calling for "peaceful coexistence" with communism and full use of the UN as "a center for harmonizing the actions of the nations." Implying that Red China should be admitted in due time, he said that "the seating of representatives in the UN is not conditioned upon the form of their government." He suggested "private negotiations" on disarmament by a small committee representing the United States and the USSR. He pronounced a malediction upon those in the United States who "see a communist threat in every shadow, press investigations which violate the traditional right for free trial," and "promote an atmosphere where people are afraid to speak freely."

The WCC rejected Nolde's "peaceful coexistence" proposal, so great was the revulsion of rank and file delegates. The assembly adopted a report condemning "appeasement of totalitarian tyranny and aggression . . . ."

Chicago, Ill. CHESLY MANLY

UNESCO

As a constant reader of your magazine I had to write and congratulate you on your March issue. I have been seeing the UN from exactly the same viewpoint as your able writers for years and have fought against it—especially UNESCO—as its vicious teachings have such an effect on our schoolchildren.

Oakland, Cal. EDNA BELL SEWARD

A Dissenting Voice

Just as you would propose that we have a national government, so I propose we have an international government such as the United Nations. . . . If America stays strong and forgets the other nations, except militarily, communism will soon envelop us. . . .

Eldon, Mo. EDWIN E. BARNES

Familiarity Breeds . . .

Being connected with the United Nations I can fully appreciate what you say.

New York, N.Y. UN EMPLOYEE

Counteracts Illusions

The UN issue will have lasting value for teachers and students. Its down-to-earth facts and arguments by outstanding authorities are the only full presentation I know to counteract the rosy illusions so widely spread by the One Worlders.

Miami, Fla. R. S. DEAN

THE Freeman

APRIL 1955

Meaning of the Merger

THE One Big Union has arrived. It came by way of "democratic centralization." That is to say, the hierarchies of the CIO and the AFL have found a formula by which they can join forces for some as yet undisclosed purpose without relinquishing any of their several privileges and prerogatives; the demos—the workers who foot the bills—were thus "democratically centralized."

The announced purpose of the One Big Union is to improve the circumstances of the dues-paying demos. Just how this will be accomplished has not been revealed. Yet, the strategy and the goal of the merger are of vital importance to all of us who will have to live with it, as well as to its presumed beneficiaries.

Unionism has always rested its case on a theory of wages which, though knocked into a cocked hat by the evidence of experience, is still the basis of its "economics." The theory holds that the owner of machinery, the capitalist, buys the skill and energy of his employees at the lowest possible price and sells their product for as much as the traffic will bear. That part of the returns which he gives them is called wages; what he retains, always the larger share, is called profits. He is quite arbitrary and selfish about the allocation, and they are, individually, at his mercy because without the use of his capital they cannot earn a living.

However, the unionist argument goes, the capitalist has a weakness. Unless his machinery is put to use by the workers it will produce nothing, except the cost of maintaining it; and if they resolutely, and unitedly, keep it idle he will lose all. Hence, the way for workers to improve their lot is to quit work in a body, and to prevent others from taking their jobs, until in desperation he transfers some of his profits to their pay envelopes. The strike, therefore, is the only means of increasing wages; and for the strike, which is a sort of economy battle, you must have a united army.

The theory is still the battle-cry of unionism even though it has been well demonstrated that wages are not derived from profits. The word "profits" is a bookkeeper's designation for the excess of income over certain forms of expense; though bookkeeping systems vary, profits generally include such variable costs as wages of superintendence, replacement of obsolescent equipment, payment for the use of borrowed or invested capital. Without profits there would be no business. For accountancy reasons, wages are included in primary costs, along with the cost of raw materials and other predeterminable items, and appear in the price of the commodity offered for sale. The consumer, of course, pays all costs, including wages. That is, he pays them if he wants the product; if he thinks the price is too high he rejects the product and then there are no wages; and no profits for that matter.

If there were anything to this theory of wages —the exploitation theory—then profits would go up as wages go down, and vice versa; and that is not so. The fact is that an increase in production (which of course means an increase in consumption) causes a greater demand for both capital and labor, which is reflected in a rise of both profits and wages; a lessening of production has the opposite effect on both. That is to say, the source of profits and wages is production, and the strike is not an instrument of production.

Only indirectly, and perversely, does the strike increase wages. When the employer is compelled, at the risk of losing his capital, to raise the rate of pay, and therefore the price of the commodity, he may run into a consumers' strike. He will then try to reduce his labor costs by introducing labor-saving devices, so that he can offer the commodity at a price the market will accept. It is the increased production resulting from the improved machinery, not the strike, that enables him to meet the union's demands. If there is no way of increasing his production, the union has simply priced him out of business,

and the workers out of wages. This has happened.

That the union hierarchy is not unaware of the fallacy of their wage theory—even though they still use it for propaganda purposes—is shown in their current enthusiasm for means unconnected with wages to improve the circumstances of their demos. Their present preoccupation is with politics. They took to it in the Depression, when it was demonstrated that unionism could not stir up even subsistence wages, and the disillusionment of its membership threatened the entire structure. The jobless, the hierarchy discovered, had votes even though they had no wages, and votes have an exchange value because they are the bread and butter and honey of the politicians who control the tax-fund. A trade was made. The politicians were promised support at the polls in exchange for direct and indirect handouts from the public till.

The political means has since become the standard practice of unionism. The tax-fund theory of improving the welfare of the worker has replaced the wage-fund theory. The hierarchy therefore apply themselves vigorously to such schemes as subsidized housing and social security, to unemployment relief and government subvention of industry. They have learned that the citizen-worker does not really care whether his pay envelope contains an earned wage or an unearned tax dollar—it's a living either way—and so they have effected means for using his vote rather than his productive skill to satisfy his desires.

That is the reason for the One Big Union. It is a political rather than an industrial organization. Its implied threat of a general strike can be dismissed offhand; in a general strike the worst sufferers are the workers and their families, and public resentment toward the hierarchy is too high a price to pay for a dubious victory. Rather, the potential of the One Big Union is in the promise of "delivering" fifteen million votes in exchange for legislation "favorable to organized labor." Whether or not delivery can be effected, the conscience of the politician on-the-make is not strong enough to make the test; besides, the unions can make substantial contributions to campaign funds.

What we have in the offing, then, is government by, of and for the One Big Union. Legislators from the populous industrial districts will be amenable to the dictates of the hierarchy, even more so than now, and we can expect an ever increasing number of laws which will have the effect of canalizing tax funds into the pay envelope. The powerful pressure group will see to it that the administration of these "favorable" laws will fall into the hands of its appointees. It will be class legislation, the beneficiary class being the management of the One Big Union.

Will there be opposition? The non-organized rural areas will offer some, as will segments of the "white collar" class. Even the membership will on occasion use their ballots to record dissatisfaction with the rule of their bosses. Big Business, however, will find it expedient to go along with the One Big Union, in the main, because our industrialists have also found that doing business with the One Big Buyer is easier than meeting the competitive conditions of the market place, and can be just as profitable. Besides, the union bosses have proved themselves capable of holding restive workers in line; a well-regulated labor force makes for industrial tranquility.

There is also the possibility of an alliance between Big Business and the One Big Union. That, of course, is the prelude to fascism.

Political Economics

To a politician, economics is something that has something to do with the winning of votes; otherwise, it has no meaning. Two recent congressional events illustrate this point of view.

The Democrats, in dire need of some claim to popular favor in 1956, dug up a proposal to grant an across-the-board income-tax exemption of twenty dollars. They knew, of course, that the Administration, in equally dire need of funds with which to carry on its national and international boondoggling schemes (for which the Democrats had voted), would oppose the measure. That is what they counted on. For, whether the measure would pass or not was unimportant; in either case they could go before the electorate next year and berate the Administration as heartless while claiming for themselves a for-the-people compassion that deserves consideration at the polls. One of the arguments for the twenty-dollar exemption, curiously enough, was quite sound; they said that the economy as a whole would benefit from it.

But, a short while before, most of these same congressmen voted for an increase in income taxation. In that case, however, the increase was camouflaged with the charming phrase "social security," so that the citizenry would not recognize it for what it is. They raised the "social security" tax limit from $3,600 to $4,200, and drew into the net farmers and self-employed persons who had been free of this imposition. In that case they were legislating "for the good of the people"—and you don't vote against socially conscious legislators. They did not speak of the economy as a whole; nor did they mention the fact that the "social security" tax is nothing but an income tax, levied for the purpose of meeting the current expenses of government.

In both cases, the congressmen's economic thinking was "sound"; it was geared to the ballot box.

Message from Moscow

THE CONSENSUS among those who seek hidden meaning in Moscow pronouncements is that the recent shift in the Kremlin command portends trouble for us. The reasoning runs like this: the shift was accompanied by the announcement that henceforth the Soviet economy would stress heavy industry, rather than consumer goods; and since heavy industry is associated with armament production, the thinking of the new regime is more oriented toward war.

But when did the Kremlin stop thinking of war as an instrument of policy? That kind of rulership rests on its military—to prevent insurrection, to feed its insatiable hunger for prey, to create a diversionary interest when internal unrest becomes threatening. War is inherent in dictatorship. Besides, the well-advertised communist plan for world conquest bristles with bayonets. The change in the Kremlin guard is, in that respect, no change at all.

The message from Moscow hardly needs interpretation. In unmistakable words it tells us that the Russians are a very hungry people. Malenkov's "resignation" underlined that fact when he gave as proof of his inadequacy "the unsatisfactory state of affairs that has arisen in agriculture." An "unsatisfactory state of affairs" in agriculture simply means that there is a shortage of food in the country.

But Malenkov was only repeating what Krushchev, the real bossman in the hierarchy, had told the Central Committee of the Communist Party in September 1953, and again in February of last year. (See "Achilles Heel of the Soviet Giant" in the January 1955 FREEMAN.) At these conferences the Secretary of the Communist Party spoke of the "criminal negligence" that had frustrated his plans to increase the country's food supply, and proposed measures to correct the evil.

The question then arises: if the commissars' plans to improve food production failed, what assurance is there that their plans to improve industrial production will succeed?

The economy is a unit. Except in a technical sense, there is no difference between the growing of potatoes and the making of steel. The farmer cannot eat all the potatoes he grows, and he grows the excess over his own consumption so that he can exchange it for something else he wants, perhaps steel wire; and the steel worker's interest in steel is determined by what satisfactions he can get out of the market in exchange for his contribution. Certainly, if there were no prospect of swapping his share of the steel output for food, all his enthusiasm for steel would vanish.

Agriculture is the basis of every economy. Every other occupation depends on it; even a doctor (or an editor) cannot work on an empty stomach.

Therefore, if the grandiose plans of Krushchev for improving the food output of the nation have come a cropper, as admitted, there is no reason to believe that he will do better in the field of industrial (or armament) production. The factory worker will be as guilty of "criminal negligence" —or "rightist deviation," as Krushchev has charged—as is the farmer, and for the same reason: lack of proprietary interest in his output. Why work when "there is nothing in it"?—which is another way of saying that where the right to private property is abolished, production tends toward the minimum of mere subsistence. Slaves are notoriously poor producers.

Something, of course, can be got out of slaves by the application of the whip. For the avoidance of pain is also an incentive to work. But, aside from the fact that in a slave economy there must be an army of slave drivers, who produce nothing and consume much, the avoidance of pain has never proved itself to be much of an incentive. The inner drive of profit is far more dependable.

Since the message from Moscow said nothing of restoring the right of private property, of wages in proportion to production and of free choice in the expenditure of these wages, we can depend on it that the proposed plans for increasing industrial production will meet the same fate as the agricultural program.

How Safe Is Cash?

"THESE BONDS," declares an advertising circular issued by the United States Treasury, "are actually safer than cash." They are safer, the circular explains, because if they are lost or destroyed they can be replaced; that is not true of cash.

In quite another sense, government bonds are safe. They will always be worth their face value, because the government will always return to the owner the same number of dollars that he or his forebears put into the bonds; it can print the dollars if necessary. The only question for the purchaser of a government bond to consider is whether the dollars he receives are equal in purchasing power to the dollars paid for it. That is, how safe is cash?

The answer to that question calls for another question: "When?" Your mother, or maybe your wife, can supply some information on that point. She will tell you that the dollar she has will fetch her one pound of steak; while before World War One, when government bonds started coming off the presses in profusion, a dollar that looked like the present one brought home four pounds of the same quality of meat. In respect to its safety—or

purchasing power—cash is closely related to government bonds.

The fact is, when you buy a government bond you actually undermine the value of the dollars you put into it, as well as the dollars you have left or may acquire in the future. For the bond is indeed money—a claim on production—and the more money there is around the less valuable it becomes. Hence, when the bond matures, you will get poorer dollars than those you invested in it. And it is obvious that if the government continues to distribute bonds, the safety of cash must diminish.

Which brings us, in a roundabout fashion, to the current inquiry into the stock market instituted by Senator William Fulbright. His committee is curious about the cause of the rise in the value of industrial securities during the last eighteen months. It might have its curiosity satisfied if it considered the evidence of the housewife who remembers the price of steak when the national debt was low. For such evidence might indicate that the citizenry are becoming conscious of the safety factor of cash, and are putting their savings into securities that may appreciate in value and thus overcome further depreciation of money. The dollar may be seeking to protect itself in the stock market against the fiscal policies of the government.

Public Money Is Private Property

IT IS unusual, to say the least, for an editor to quarrel with one of his contributors. But, in taking issue with Dr. Hobbs over a point in his article (page 437) "Can We Afford Foundations?" I am really questioning a principle laid down in the Report of the Reece Committee, namely, that the *government has a claim on money it has not taxed.* The Report repeatedly refers to the tax-exempt funds on which foundations operate as "public money," and insists that because it is "public money" the government has a right to concern itself with the purposes for which it is spent. In support of this contention, the Report argues that because of the exemptions the burden of the taxpayers is proportionately increased; hence society, acting through government, acquires a vested interest in the funds of the foundations.

If we follow through on this premise—that tax-exemptions constitute "public money"—we come to some disturbing conclusions. It is a fact that all of us live by exemptions, for they are written into the tax laws and we all take them. If the government which grants these exemptions thereby acquires a supervisory interest in their use, then none of us is really free to spend the exempted money as he chooses; it is within the province of government to question the use of that money which it has permitted him to keep. Thus, because it allows me to deduct from my income, for tax purposes, what I spend for medical services, does it not have a right to specify what doctors I may engage? Or, because of the personal exemptions, may it not specify that I spend none of this money on whiskey?

Furthermore, the designation of exemptions as "public money" leads logically to the conclusion that the government may inquire into, or even supervise, religious doctrine and rituals, since the churches operate largely on exemptions. And the curricula of our tax-exempt colleges, following this reasoning, become the proper concern of government.

When you cast a clear eye on the federal taxing powers you see that "public money" does, in fact, include everything we earn, that there is no such thing as "private money." The Sixteenth Amendment definitely gives the government a prior claim on everything the citizen produces; legally, the government may take every bit of his income. What he lives by is what the government permits him to keep. Hence, under the proposition propounded by the Reece Committee, the government would be justified in scrutinizing the expenditure of every dollar he spends.

It goes against the grain of the American tradition of private property to admit it, but the wording of the Sixteenth Amendment and the laws that have been passed under its authority plainly contradict the tradition. There is no absolute right of private property, legally, in this country. This fact, no doubt unwittingly, is implied in the Reece Report, where it refers to exemptions as "public money."

Nevertheless, the old tradition hangs on, and the legal denial of it is ignored, because of a deep-rooted conviction that all property is private on moral grounds. No amount of law can eradicate from our consciousness the belief that each of us is possessed of an unqualified right to life; from which follows a sense of absolute ownership in the things each of us has produced or has acquired through honest exchange. All property, therefore, is private, in the nature of things, and though title to some of it passes to government by force, we feel that what the government takes is still "our" money; we reserve the right to question its expenditure, as when we express our views on congressional appropriations. This is quite the opposite position from that taken by the Reece Committee; it stems from a moral, rather than a legal, definition of property.

By way of analogy, does the highwayman who kindly lets me have a few dollars from the wallet which he has taken from me acquire an interest in the way I spend these few dollars? Has he a clear title to what he keeps?

Railways in the Red

By COLM BROGAN

How State operation has turned "Our Railways" into an unhappy joke for the British people.

London

Any American who still believes in the virtues of nationalization should look long and hard at the British railways. When the war ended, our railway system was in poor shape. For five years an enormously increased traffic had been carried with only the minimum of repair and maintenance work. Improvements were quite out of the question. Even before the war the railways had been too hard hit by the depression to be able to do much in the way of modernization. When Dalton, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, described the railways as "a wretched bag of assets," he was guilty of exaggeration and was less than just to the companies; but there is no doubt that the railways were a bad buy except at bargain rates.

In fact, if the nationalizers had been thinking in economic terms, they would have left the railways severely alone for a very long time, or until some repairs would make them more desirable; but their urgency far overshadowed all other considerations. The first postwar socialist government set out to make itself master of the whole economy by taking over those industries and services on which all the rest depended—coal, electric power, long distance road haulage and the railways. With these in his hands, the socialist politician saw himself in the position of a medieval baron who controlled the whole neighborhood because he controlled all the fords, bridges and crossroads.

When the railways were taken over, the shareholders were given stock paying 2.5 per cent. For those who held good shares this was a thoroughly bad bargain, in fact a partial expropriation. But there were other shareholders who had never seen a dividend in their lives and now found themselves comfortably installed as first claimants on railway revenue for the rest of time. The "C" stock of the huge London Underground system carried a 3 per cent rate of interest which had been officially guaranteed by the Treasury when the issue was first floated. There was a storm of protest when it was proposed to pay only 2.5 per cent to the holders of this stock. It was blandly explained that the 3 per cent was to have been paid by the London transport authority; but that, with nationalization, the Underground would come under a new authority. The government gave way under severe pressure, but the whole financial arrangement neatly illustrated the near impossibility of securing justice all around in an enforced sale.

"Our" railways at once became something of a music-hall joke, but those responsible for trying to make them pay found very little to laugh at. The "wretched bag of assets" was also a very mixed bag. The Transport Commission became heirs to a number of large hotels, a number of large industrial plants, thousands of houses, dock facilities and even a good deal of land, plus some curious odds and ends. All of these came under the overriding authority of the Commission; but there were various Executives under the Commission, the most important being the Railway Executive. Where did the politicians come in, and where did "we" have a say in the running of "our" railways? The Commission is responsible to Parliament, and Parliament is responsible to the people—and so the private citizen finds himself tugging feebly at the end of a very long rope with a whole line of people firmly grasping the same rope further up.

Parliament's Control a Sham

But even the control by Parliament through the Minister is exceedingly weak. It was laid down that the Minister responsible for any nationalized concern could not be expected to answer Parliamentary questions on the day-to-day working of the concern. The rule was understandable enough, for the asking of nuggling questions is the British MP's easiest way of convincing his constituents that he is a brisk and fearless person, sleepless in their interests.

Nevertheless, the rule reduced parliamentary control of the nationalized industries to something like a sham. When Mr. Aneurin Bevan described the nationalized boards as constitutional monstrosities, he won hearty agreement in highly unexpected quarters. But neither Mr. Bevan nor any other man has yet discovered a method of running a public commercial business by public debate. The dilemma was especially acute in the railways, for it is in the day-to-day working that the seat of the trouble is to be found.

The heaviest burden that the war left on the British railway system was a grossly inflated staff. (The Scottish staff was doubled during the war.) The first duty of managers who wanted to make this business pay was to cut down the payroll drastically and without loss of time.

But the railway workers were in no mood to accept any efficiency drive which meant a reduction

in the number of jobs. Restrictive practices were part of a deep-rooted railway tradition, and the new conditions reinforced rather than diminished the resistance of the men to change. Many engine drivers refused to work "lodging turns." That meant that they took a train only to a point from which they could return home in working hours; they traveled as passengers "on the cushion" for perhaps half of their working time. One loud-voiced propagandist painted a lurid picture of the sordid conditions in the railway hostel of Hull, where drivers and firemen were expected to sleep when they reached that city and could not get home that night. He failed to mention, and probably did not know, that at the time of his speech the hostel had been closed for ten years.

Until not much more than a year ago, the railways employed quaint survivals of the past called "knockers-up." These were men who patrolled the streets of railway towns knocking at the windows of men who were scheduled to go on duty. They were as useful in modern life as eighteenth-century link-boys would have been, and there were five hundred of them; but it took quite a fight to get rid of them.

Before nationalization, a large railway shed in Manchester was shared by two companies for the repair and maintenance of engines. The companies only shared a common roof, and each employed its own men to do its own jobs. After nationalization, when all the engines were owned by "our" railways, the maintenance workers formerly employed by one company refused to touch the engines formerly owned by the other; they still do.

These are some of the more grotesque examples of padded employment and subsidized idleness that are visible to every traveler, even on a suburban line. Railwaymen are enrolled in three unions, the largest of which is the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) which has all the unskilled men. Three times in its search for higher wages, the NUR has pledged itself to cooperate in the pursuit of efficiency, but the rank and file have simply refused to play. Scores of committees have been set up to investigate and get rid of "redundancy," which is the polite name for useless jobs, but the results have been unimpressive. In January of this year, a local committee decided that five manual workers could be dispensed with in Southport Station. The four NUR representatives on the committee promptly resigned. They were quite willing to see five of the clerical staff dispensed with instead; the clerks belonged to another union.

The obduracy of the men is irrational in its expression, but not in its fundamental causes. Before the war, British railway workers had a high standing of performance. With security of employment and other incidental benefits, they felt themselves a cut above most other manual workers, and their pride in their service was a real thing. But the coming of the Welfare State wiped out most of these advantages and, at the same time, they were left behind in the postwar wage race. The miners and the dockers, blue-eyed boys of the socialist regime, did far better financially than the railwaymen, though they had nothing like the same tradition of responsible service and pride in the job. The railwaymen felt with justice that they had been socially downgraded.

A Premium on Inefficiency

The more skilled men had a special cause for discontent. In recent years the philosophy of egalitarianism in Britain has been heavily reinforced by the political and industrial power of the unions of unskilled workers. The NUR, which caters mostly to the unskilled railway workers, has been able to make the pace in wage negotiations, with the result that there is only a derisory difference in the range of basic wages between an express driver, a shunter and the highly dispensable porter who spends most of his working day leaning against a wall. One engine driver nearly sixty years of age recently got himself put on a shift which left him with his late afternoons and evenings free. He got employment as a spare-time window cleaner and made more money in his off hours than he did on his serious and responsible job. He is now a full-time window cleaner, and has left the railway.

Nearly all wages on British railways have been too low. But the socialistic wage system, if it can so be called, seems to have been devised to get rid of the men the railways really need and to keep the men they would be better without. Men doing responsible or arduous work are discouraged by an almost contemptuous reward, whereas the lowest-paid men (who have always been the first to get a raise), are tempted to put up with poor wages rather than look for a better-paid job where they would be expected to put in a serious day's work. Thus, the railways have been understaffed with men doing important and vital work and overstaffed with men mostly standing about.

Principles of business efficiency would have produced the sharp raising of wages for responsible men, the dismissal of redundant staff and the closing of a large number of rural stations that are now about as useful as the knockers-up. But a nationalized industry is a political industry and business principles do not apply. The result of political and union pressure is that in a time of prosperity the railways are heavily in the red, with the working staff in a ferment of discontent.

If this had happened with a private company, the shareholders would also have been in a ferment of discontent. There would have been a suspension of dividends, a reorganization of capital and a new board of directors. But nothing of that kind happened or could happen. The former shareholders are sure of their 2.5 per cent so long as the Treasury holds together and regardless of the state

of the concern. There is no body with a real say in the business and also a genuine and vital interest in efficiency and consequent prosperity.

Thus, two years running, we had a threat of a national strike at Christmas time. The strike movement was led irresistibly from behind, for the dynamic was the deep anger of the rank and file. Last December the leaders of the NUR were forced to repudiate an agreement that was only weeks old. Strike notices were issued and pickets were arranged. The men meant business and they had much public sympathy.

As soon as the strike notice was given, it became clear at once that any strike in a nationalized industry is a strike against the government itself. The Transport Commission expressed sympathy with the men but explained that they were bound by statute to make the railways pay, taking one year with another, and that the most recent increase had already left them with a large and incurable deficit.

The government stepped in and appointed a Committee of Inquiry headed by Sir John Cameron, leader of the Scottish Bar. Everybody knew that the government expected this committee to report in favor of the men. There was no surprise but rather relief when the committee did just that, but its interim report contained some statements of principle that shook the whole of British industry to the heels.

The Cameron committee promptly seized the only surviving safeguard of efficiency in a nationalized industry and threw it out of the window. The Report roundly declared that as the nation had willed the end (nationalization), it had also willed the means, which included that payment of fair and adequate wages, equal to what the men might expect in comparable occupations. This high-sounding declaration set heads buzzing with speculation. What job was comparable with what? Was a railway clerk comparable to a bank clerk, a signal man to a traffic policeman?

But much more serious was the general wage principle laid down. Adequate wages were now held to be a first charge on the railway revenue. But stock interest was already a first charge. Parliament had instructed the commission to make the system pay. But the Cameron committee in effect instructed the commission to ignore this instruction, and the government hastened to endorse the report.

Many people with no love for nationalization had nevertheless felt that the state of the railways was so bad that a strictly temporary subsidy would be justified if it were tied to a rigid scheme of improved efficiency and economy of manpower at all levels, not forgetting the administrative class. But hardly anybody had hoped for a recommendation that would entitle the railways to bumble along forever without regard to profit and loss.

But that is what the report seemed to favor, and that is what the government seemed to accept. And the damage spread much further than the railways. If wage demands in that nationalized industry need bear no relation to revenue, why should wage demands in others? The miners had already put in a heavy wage demand, and they must have welcomed the report most heartily. Government spokesmen have hastened to deny that the report has any relevance to other industries; but the words are clear enough, and they were a statement of a quite general principle.

It goes without saying that the immediate basic demands of the NUR were at once conceded, but the men of higher skill and only slightly higher pay at once pressed for the preservation, if not for the increase, of their "differential." Most people were pleased enough to see the railwaymen getting something like basic living wage, but the course of negotiations deeply disturbed every thoughtful observer. The commission was short-circuited and effectively disowned. The politicians had at last assumed command of a nationalized industry. But they had assumed command only to negotiate an armistice of virtual surrender, and to accept a principle which is flatly in defiance of what the nation "willed" and is only too likely to open the way for many another surrender in the future.



The Individual: Key to Progress

By CRAWFORD H. GREENEWALT

Certain things can be done only by group action, but the creative impulse which produces progress is always the result of an individual's pitting himself against conditions he thinks need change.

One hundred years ago, something like four out of every five persons were self-employed; today four out of five are employees. In the 1850's even the one in five who was an employee was very probably one of a small group working under the direct eye of the proprietor. Business units were small and compact, and communication was simple. Every man was, in effect, in business for himself; and his own responsibility either as manager, owner or artisan, was clear, well-defined and easily understood.

As time went on, tools and techniques became too complex and expensive for the individual either to own or to use by himself. He devised organizations which permitted him to share the cost, the risk and the effort with others. The demands of the times brought forth the integrated team into which were consolidated the specialized services of many different kinds of workers and technicians. Even research, with the advance of science, has of necessity come out of the attic and the backyard workshop into the laboratory with hundreds of employees.

This merging of individual into group effort was perhaps inevitable—and, in a sense, is a measure of our progress. The team exerts a leverage upon human effort that enables us to do together things far beyond the range of any of us working alone. It is a trademark of our times and, I am sure, a hallmark of our future. It is probable that we will become even more dependent on large organizations as our science and technology advance.

Unfortunately, as we become more and more dependent upon team performance, it becomes increasingly difficult to isolate and recognize individual accomplishment. Because we are faced with complexities and challenges which often are too sweeping for personal solution, the importance and significance of the individual is very likely to be minimized. In the fields of science, business and politics, and in the military, we see emphasis placed on the theory that the individual exists only as a member of a group and that he is valuable and effective only as he works well with others.

This situation has created what seems to me to be a major management problem. For we must always, no matter how conditions change, preserve the individual incentive and individual opportunity that is vital to all successful endeavor. To the extent we sacrifice that opportunity and incentive, we sacrifice, as a simple matter of cause and effect, the dynamic thrust of our industrial economy.

Whether he is a member of a group or a solitary independent, it is the individual to whom we must look for accomplishment, for no group effort can ever be anything more than the summation of combined individual efforts. Our progress in the past has come about because we have given the widest possible scope to individual achievement and because we have lived in an atmosphere in which each individual was encouraged to give of his best.

The Trail Blazers

The raw stuff of all progress is people. No matter how well organized or how technically sophisticated we become, the fact is that progress originates in creative thought, a purely personal attribute—just as true of the worker on the machine as it is of the scientist in the laboratory, or the writer in his study.

The great advances in science and in thought have come about through the efforts of people—people who perhaps struggled against the restrictions of environment, and who had the vigor, imagination and initiative to question traditional patterns of thought. We have progress only when some individual, distrustful and impatient with existing concepts, blazes a new trail into the unknown, or has a dream and the initiative to make it come alive.

We must not obscure the essential uniqueness of the individual by permitting the composite of the many to become a standard. There is evidence that we are in danger of doing so. Too many of our research establishments have a tendency to measure their stature in terms of staffs, buildings, equipment and budgets. Too much of our legislation appears to discriminate against and to discourage individual accomplishment. Too many of our schools seem to teach us that man's highest pedestal can be reached through harmonious conformity rather than original personal achievement.

It seems to me that there is much danger in the assumption that quantity will ever beget quality. It is fallacious reasoning to expect that if five men in a laboratory can produce a given

result, ten men will produce twice as much, or that any amount of money and staff and building can substitute for the creative output of a single gifted individual. I suppose the earliest team efforts on record were the military exploits of armies in the field. Time and again, history has shown that mere weight of numbers does not win battles. Time and again, we have seen the inspiration and example of determined and dedicated men upset mass action. Time and again, we have seen an individual with an idea redirect the energies and objectives of a multitude.

Our problem is to keep alive the powerful stimulant of individual thought at all levels and in every phase of our effort. We cannot afford to make a displaced person out of the Man with the Big Idea.

Would Franklin Pass a Modern Test?

Individuals cannot be classified into neat little bundles and judged wholly on their capacity for adjustment. The other day I took one of the standard psychological testing sheets used so widely now in personnel work and applied it to a rare and highly individualistic American—Benjamin Franklin. Based on what we know of Franklin's character, I could only conclude that he would have had bad luck winning a place for himself today if he were judged on these standards.

Some of the questions are rather interesting. One, for example, asks, "Do you daydream?" Ben, I am afraid, did. An affirmative answer would merit a poor score on the test, although Franklin's daydreams brought useful results in fields ranging from political science to stoves and bifocal spectacles.

"Are you impatient?" another question reads. Ben was—at least, he was impatient with conditions he found unsatisfactory and equally so with the people he thought responsible. "Are you more entertained by books than by companions?" I would guess that he was, at least more by some books than by some companions. The response would be held against him, presumably on the theory that it is better to be gregarious than to be well-read. On some questions, I must concede I was unable to find any answer.

Did he, for example, "get hungry suddenly with a quick pang?" I don't know, nor am I sure what that question is supposed to bring out.

My guess is, too, that Charles Goodyear and Elias Howe would have been rated as impractical dreamers, and Thomas Edison, with a history of insomnia and carelessness in dress, might well have been regarded by the modern personnel manager as an undesirable risk.

I commend this little exercise to you as an amusing way of passing an afternoon in testing yourself and your contemporaries, but don't be too distressed if you fail to make the grade.

It is quite obvious that these men of unusual gifts would fail to measure up by accepted group standards for the very reason that they were unusual men, and it was their unusual characteristics that led them to greatness. In their refusal to accept without question the conventional restriction or the status quo of their times, they pioneered along trails where none had ventured before, and created much of value to the world. Others, happily, were to follow them—individuals making singularly individual contributions. We have many of them today, men whose imaginations soar far beyond the limited horizons of the past.

Here then is a major problem—our economy requires group effort to perform its increasingly complex tasks; it requires also individual genius and accomplishment if we are to go on to greater spiritual understanding and material well-being. The task of the administrator in government, in business, in science, is to create group harmony, while at the same time encouraging high individual performance. The conquest of the atom could not have been accomplished without group effort on an enormous scale—it certainly could not have been accomplished without personal contributions of the highest order. The group serves as a powerful stimulant of ideas and a profound judge of their merit, but it cannot produce the flash of inspiration on which success and progress depend.

Pioneers Still Needed

The horizons before us are indeed unlimited. Where the new pattern of science will lead, I do not pretend to know; but I am certain that the future will make the present as obsolete as the present has made the past. I will make one prediction—the scientific miracles of the future, like those of the past, will be wrought by men and women with courage, with the pioneering instinct to take the bold chance.

The great American experiment in freedom as it was first conceived had, at its core, a revolutionary principle; that the individual was endowed with specific rights and privileges which could be neither limited nor taken away. Our whole body of law was responsive to the obligation to protect the individual against any intrusion of these rights; witness the specific provisions against seizure of his person or property, and for his right of fair trial, his right to freedom of speech, assembly and worship.

Today this concern for the individual has been to some extent replaced by a rationale which persuasively justifies itself under the pleas of "the greatest good for the greatest number." This is perhaps a fine ethical principle, but, inasmuch as its application is largely a matter of opinion, it can serve to impose the will of the current majority, however adverse the effect upon the individual might be.

Armed with this thesis, there is no limit to

the impositions and deprivations that might be directed at any individual or any minority group. Already we have seen them at work—the rights of individuals in the economic area, for example, have been disregarded to the point that the ancient virtues of thrift, enterprise and initiative lose much of their original meaning.

National safety demands of us that we stand together and present our enemies with a front as solid as it is strong. This we can do without compromise of either our conscience or our substance. When we attempt, however, to use this concept to submerge the privileges of the individual and to infringe upon his rights, we lose both conscience *and* substance.

First, by giving one individual a mortgage on the efforts of another, we execute a twin injustice. One we deprive of the fruits of his labors and the rightful rewards of his industry and thrift. The other we deprive of his sense of responsibility. In the long run, I am not sure who suffers the greater loss.

Secondly, we impoverish ourselves, because, in time, we will have less and less to share as the will and the incentive to gain are weakened.

This is a serious turn of affairs and calls for serious thinking. When it is reasoned through, only one answer can emerge; and it is this that gives me heart. We have progressed, in the past, in direct proportion to the degree of individual freedom afforded us, and our progress in the future will be measured on precisely the same scale of values. I am quite sure that, when the facts become apparent, the American people will reaffirm their faith in those principles that have served us so well.

Culture and Pedantry

By ALBERT JAY NOCK

[*The following excerpts are taken from Albert Jay Nock's* Free Speech and Plain Language, *a collection of essays published in 1937 by William Morrow and Company and now out of print. We hope that this sampling will convey something of the essence of this rare work.*]

Culture is one of those things that are perhaps better understood by not being too clearly defined, like certain stars that become visible only when one looks a little away from them.

Concerning culture as a process, one would say that it means learning a great many things and then forgetting them; and the forgetting is as necessary as the learning; otherwise the process is one of pedantry, not culture. The trouble with the pedant is not that he has learned too much, for one can never do that, but that he has not forgotten enough. . . . The pedant's learning remains too long on the surface of his mind; it confuses and distorts succeeding impressions, thus aiding him only to give himself a conventional account of things, rather than leaving his consciousness free to penetrate as close as possible to their reality, and to see them as they actually are. . . . Learning has always been made much of, but forgetting has always been deprecated; therefore pedantry has pretty well established itself throughout the modern world at the expense of culture.

Perhaps the prevalence of pedantry may be largely accounted for by the common error of thinking that, because useful knowledge should be remembered, any kind of knowledge that is at all worth having should be remembered too. By overlooking the fact that useless knowledge, if properly forgotten, has value, the common assumption is that the only kind of knowledge one should try to get is the kind that must be remembered. Here one has a crow to pick with the universities for promoting this error, for this is the ground of resentment against their wholesale adoption of ideals and methods that belong naturally and properly to the scientific school; and this too is the ground of particular resentment against their taking the scientific school into full partnership as a member of the academic organization. The university's undiscriminating attitute toward learning, its failure to establish a clear line between useful and useless knowledge, its misapprehension of values and its consequent misdirection of responsibility—all this the believer in culture is bound to regard as most unfortunate. . . .

The business of a scientific school is the dissemination of useful knowledge, and this is a noble enterprise and indispensable withal; society can not exist unless it goes on. The university's business is the conservation of useless knowledge; and what the university itself apparently fails to see is that this enterprise is not only noble but indispensable as well, that society can not exist unless it goes on. The attitude of the university being what it is, one scarcely sees how the exceeding great value of useless knowledge is ever going to be properly appraised; and this is a hard prospect for the student of civilization to contemplate.

Bracken Lee of Utah

By FRANK HUGHES

Governor J. Bracken Lee

Does the state governor where you live believe that government ought to be made to live within its income? Does he hate bureaucracy to the extent that he cuts his own office staff in half and abolishes whole state bureaus? Does he really reduce taxes, instead of just talking about it? Does he tell the pressure groups and special interests to go you-know-where, and run the state on a common-sense, businesslike basis?

Does he recognize the fallacy of the United Nations and say so publicly? Does he come out publicly for repeal of the federal income tax as the root of all our government evil? Does he practice and preach the doctrine that federal grants to states ought to be abolished because the federal government takes $48 from your pocketbook and gives back only $8? Does he tell his own party commanders that there ought to be a return to George Washington Americanism and an end to foreign intervention and give-away?

If you live in a state where the governor does not do these things, and you think he ought to, there is one thing you can do about it. You can move to the sovereign state of Utah. There you will find a man in command of the state house who believes as you do, and who puts his beliefs into practice. The people of Utah seem to like it. They have elected him governor twice. His name is J. (for Joseph) Bracken Lee.

Taxes Actually Reduced

It has been a long time since Americans have had a chance to vote for candidates for office who repudiate the "tax, spend, elect" formula invented by Harry Hopkins two decades ago. To be sure, there have been some who promised a reduction in political expenditures and in taxes, as did Bracken Lee when he first ran for the governorship of Utah in 1948. However, after election, very few of these promisers were able, even if willing, to withstand the pressure groups and the privilege seekers; political expediency drives the officeholder to resort to the technique which has become standard in American politics. Not so Bracken Lee. It is not only because he has kept state expenditures down and thereby reduced taxes, but because he has underlined his economies with a kind of thinking that gives him a unique position in the political arena.

For instance, shortly after he was elected in 1948, the backers of the famous Utah Symphony came to him with a strong plea for a state subsidy. It was a strong plea because it was backed by the musicians' union, which in turn had the support of other unions. It has become an axiom in the political business that you never definitely and unequivocally turn down organized labor. However, Lee did just this, emphasizing his rejection of the request with the argument that he did not think it the business of the state government to subsidize activities which, no matter how worthy, were in the province of private affairs. It is interesting to note that, though the sponsors of the Symphony predicted it would have to disband without a subsidy, the organization managed to sell its services to the music lovers and is still a going concern.

The political anomaly that is Bracken Lee is further illustrated by his unusual insistence upon turning back to the political subdivisions of the state functions which are rightly local and ought not to be performed by the state government. One of the first things he did as Governor was to abolish the State Liquor Department Enforcement Agency, turning the job over to the county sheriffs and city police. The state saved some $90,000 a year by this transfer of police function. But that is not the essential point of his action. In this era of centralization it is refreshing to find an Executive who leans in the opposite direction.

Where do we find, in the political scene today, a politician who not only refuses to increase government intervention in private affairs, but also strives to get the government out of ventures in which it is already entrenched? Long before Lee became Governor of Utah, the state had taken over from the Mormon Church three colleges devoted mainly to the training of school teachers. Lee, who is not a Mormon, had observed that these

schools, like many such throughout the country, had become spawning grounds for socialistic propagandists. This disturbed him. Looking into the law, he found that it was possible to return these institutions to the Mormon Church, thus relieving the state of a considerable financial load. The Elders agreed not only to take back the schools but also to reimburse the state for its investment in the physical equipment of the institutions.

A Nonconformist Politician

It can be well imagined that the proposal to return to private operation colleges which had become integrated in the state system would meet with opposition. The organized teachers of the state, supported by other labor unions, came down on Lee with all the invectives of the collectivistic lexicon. And, of course, there were plenty of local politicians who for reasons of their own joined in a battle against Lee. It was characteristic of this nonconformist politician that he carried on the losing fight alone. When he's sure he's right, he ignores the odds against him.

As an example of the forthrightness with which Lee carries on his campaigns, the following excerpt from one of his messages to the Legislature is worth recording:

> That there is a growing dissatisfaction with our schools, despite the NEA and other professionals, is becoming increasingly apparent. This dissatisfaction can be found among educators themselves, a number of whom have written articles or books on the subject. The general theme of the criticism advanced is that present-day education is not achieving the desired result in the schools. There is evidence that the quality of education is not keeping pace with ever-increasing cost. It is little wonder, under the circumstances, that a demand is growing that the public be assured of a better school product before being asked for a greater tax load.

That is, to say the least, refreshing. So, too, is his most recent blast at the "divorce" bill which has been introduced in both the House and the Senate. This bill would provide for the appointment of domestic relations counselors to aid the courts in a fight against divorce. Promising to veto the bill if it is passed, Governor Lee declared: "I'm not going to participate in the building of more government agencies . . . I'm against setting up an agency to interfere in the marital problems of the people. That's something the church, or the people's friends, should do. There are too many government agencies going about interfering in private affairs now." This is certainly quite out of line with standard political thought.

On the national scene, Lee has repeatedly called the attention of the leaders of the Republican Party to the fact that its future lies not in following and trying to outdo the socialistic policy of the Democrats, but in offering the electorate the traditional American ideals of limited government, reduction of the bureaucracy, nonintervention in foreign affairs, restoration of the autonomy of the states and less intervention in the economy. Even though Utah is largely an agricultural state, he has not hesitated to express the opinion that farmers are a bit oversubsidized. And at the last Conference of Governors, he went so far as to offer a resolution for the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment. Needless to say, the professionals of the GOP have paid little attention to Bracken Lee.

In 1950, after Lee had been in office two years, *Life* magazine ran a story on him which it headlined "A Politician Without A Future." This may have been wishful thinking on the part of the editor. Nevertheless, it was a conclusion in which many admirers of Lee regretfully concurred. It seemed impossible that a politician who rejects the "tax, spend, elect" formula could be returned to office these days. Yet in 1952 Lee was reelected by a larger majority than he got in 1948 —in a normally Democratic state.

Lee's political career suggests that perhaps the national strategists in the GOP may not be as sound in their thinking as they believe they are. Since the advent of Franklin D. Roosevelt, these professionals have taken it for granted that only by buying up pressure groups with tax money can one hope for success at the polls. It is quite possible that many Americans would welcome an opportunity to vote for something else than the current political orthodoxy. After all, since 1932 the electorate has been denied a chance to vote for a policy of less government, less intervention and less taxes. Is that why nearly 50 per cent of them regularly stay away from the polls?

When I was a boy, wealth was regarded as a thing so secure as well as admirable that almost everyone affected to own more property than he actually possessed. . . . Now, on the other hand, a man has to be ready to defend himself against being rich as if it were the worst of crimes; for it has become far more dangerous to be suspected of being well-off than to be detected in crime.

SOCRATES, 354 B.C.

The Sainted Book Burners

By W. T. COUCH

Because of undercover censorship by liberals, the Freedom to Read that is piously championed by the American Library Association may well become merely Freedom to Read Propaganda.

On June 25, 1953, the American Library Association (ALA, 21,000 members), in session in Los Angeles, issued a manifesto in which it proclaimed that "The freedom to read is essential to our democracy. It is under attack. . . . We believe that free communication is essential to the preservation of a free society and a creative culture. . . . To stifle every nonconformist idea at birth would mark the end of the democratic process. . . . It is wrong that what one man can read should be confined to what another thinks proper."

The ALA manifesto was received with enthusiasm by American liberals. President Eisenhower wrote a letter of approval, and the *New York Times* applauded in a leading editorial. "Who are these persons," asked the *Times*. "who assume to tell us what an adult citizen residing in this country is to be permitted to read?"

I give below from my own experience some facts bearing on this question that I believe the public ought to have. It happens that three of the cases involve the American Library Association.

1. In 1949 the Columbia University Press published *The Book Industry* by William Miller. This book was sponsored by the ALA and financed by the Carnegie Corporation, one of the leading foundations of the country. On reading the first printing immediately after the book was published, I was puzzled by a reference to *The Road to Serfdom* by F. A. Hayek as "a sensational book previously refused by at least one notable trade house which was quite aware of its sales possibilities." *The Road to Serfdom* is an argument that a free society can be transformed into a communist society by the use of governmental power over wages, prices, taxes and money. Of all subjects that the American people needed to understand, this one seemed to me to be at the top.

The Road to Serfdom was published by the University of Chicago Press; and, while I was not at the Press when it was published, I had taken charge since and I felt responsible for what we were publishing. I wrote to Mr. Miller and received from him a letter in which the following statement occurs:

> As to your query whether I intended to suggest that this book was unfit for publication by a reputable house, my answer is that that is what I say, not merely suggest. It just happens that I personally had the opportunity to say as much to the great house for which I read manuscripts, and that I then also took the opportunity to say that in my opinion the book would sell very well. I recommended, nevertheless, that they reject it and remain gratified, as I think they do, that they did.

I placed the above statement before the headquarters officials of the American Library Association immediately after corresponding with Mr. Miller in 1949. The ALA showed no interest. It has made no move to try to find out how far sentiments such as Mr. Miller's exist and have succeeded in establishing a virtual censorship of American publishing.

If such a censorship exists, the manifesto of the ALA was not an action to break the power of this censorship, but rather was one to hide its existence and to make its control of American publishing complete and without hindrance.

Press Freedom for Germans?

2. In the same year, 1949, while I was director of the University of Chicago Press, Leon Carnovsky, editor of the *Library Quarterly*, a member of the Library School Staff at the University of Chicago, and chairman some years ago of the ALA committee on the freedom of libraries, asked my closest associate in the Press, Fred Wieck, a German who had fought the Nazis before and during World War Two, to review *German Book Publishing, A Report*. As late as 1948, the U.S. Government through its officials in Germany was still censoring German publishing. I quote from the *Report*: "Military Government began by banning the publication or distribution of any printed matter without authorization." (p. 122) "The Publications Branch [of the U.S. Military Government] is now [1948] left with only one effective control, the power to veto the publication and distribution of a book, a power which would seem to imply also the right to confiscate or impound stock of an offending title." (p. 123) In his review, Mr. Wieck concentrated on the question, how could the U.S. Military Government, while exercising censorship over German book publishing, teach the Germans, as it claimed to be trying to do, the values of freedom of the press? But Mr. Carnovsky who, let us remember, had been one of the chairmen of the ALA committee to guard freedom to read, rejected

Mr. Wieck's article on the grounds that librarians would not be interested in discussion of freedom of the press in Germany.

No Correction Desired

3. Let us now go back in time a little. In 1938 the *New Republic* asked me to write for them an account of the November 1938 meeting of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama. I did so, and the *New Republic* published my account. The Conference met again in March 1940, this time in Chattanooga, Tennessee. I wrote the *New Republic* asking if they would print an account that I wanted to write, and I made it clear that I wanted to write because I felt honesty required that I add to what I had said in my first article. In that article I had scorned the idea that the Conference was dominated by Communists or communist sympathizers. The Conference in 1938 had gone on record unanimously in favor of collective security, when collective security was the communist line. But in 1940, during the communazi pact, the Conference had given strong evidence of being willing to ignore the question of collective security. I now had evidence that the Conference was following the communist line, and I felt that I ought to give my evidence in public. I wanted to tell about the fight I had had to make to secure reversal of a ruling of the executive committee to exclude the question of collective security from those to be discussed in Conference sessions.

The *New Republic* was not interested in allowing me to tell the story. The editors of the liberal journals of the country certainly had heard of the fight I had made in the Conference; but none asked me to tell the story, and it has not been told to this day.

4. In 1949 Irita Van Doren, editor of *Books*, the *New York Herald Tribune* weekly book review, asked me to write an article on university presses for her twenty-fifth anniversary number. I wrote an article in which I said a few of the things I had been trying for years to get before audiences of some size. Mrs. Van Doren didn't like the article and asked me to rewrite. I rewrote and I gave her more of what I knew she wanted—but again I said a little of what I felt needed most to be said. I quote a sample:

> . . . it was clear before and during World War Two that America did not know how to use her power. Nothing of any importance was published during this period criticizing the use of national power and suggesting that the policies that were being followed were building up communist power—a consequence that the country did not want any more than it wanted a Nazi victory in Europe or a Japanese victory in China.

Mrs. Van Doren printed the article in the anniversary issue (September 25, 1949), but you will not find the above passage in the article, or anything like it.

5. On April 20, 1953, I received a wire from Mr. Raymond Walters, review editor of the *Saturday Review*, asking me if I would do "an essay on the case of the Southern liberal, using Hodding Carter's *Where Main Street Meets the River* as springboard." The *Saturday Review* had long been following the line that I had been trying to attack, and I was sure its editors would not want to print anything I wrote. I knew there was a mistake somewhere.

My first impulse was to save myself time and labor and say no. Then I decided it might be interesting to see how the *Saturday Review* would handle the situation. I called up Mr. Walters and asked him whether he didn't know the *Saturday Review* wouldn't print any opinion of mine unless it could immediately smother it with at least ten opposite opinions. I said I couldn't write anything sympathetic to liberals, Southern or other; that they all looked alike to me, a bunch of time-servers, not essentially different from the time-servers of Nazi Germany and with less excuse; that I couldn't say anything about them in public unless I was allowed to beat them for the mess they'd made of the world, building up communist power and making more war or submission inevitable.

Mr. Walters said the *Saturday Review* was not a propaganda sheet, that they had asked me to write for them, and if I would do the writing, they would do the printing and publishing.

I agreed and I wrote the article. Mr. Walters surprised me by saying it was what he wanted, something really original—and it certainly was to the *Saturday Review*. And he asked me to give him a couple more paragraphs. I gave him the additional paragraphs. Then Mr. Walters called me up and said everything is fine, but I've got some suggestions I'd like you to see, and will you consider them? Of course I would. The suggestions arrived, and I looked at them. Walters had rewritten a part of my stuff to make me follow the *Saturday Review* line. If I would just put my name to this, or something like this, everything would be fine.

I wrote Mr. Walters a note saying: print the article as I wrote it or drop it. He dropped it. I, of course, kept the evidence of his effort to make a Charlie McCarthy out of me—no crime, but as between Charlie and Joe, I'd rather be Joe.

The ALA President's Censorship

6. On May 30, 1953, the director of libraries at the University of Georgia asked me if I would participate in a program dedicating two library buildings, one at the University of Georgia at Athens, the other at the Georgia School of Technology at Atlanta. The subject of my paper was to be the scholar's publishing problems. The paper was to be delivered at Athens and later published

> **If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.**
>
> **JOHN STUART MILL, *On Liberty*, 1859**

in *Library Trends*, issued by the University of Illinois Library. The director of libraries at the University of Illinois, R. B. Downs, was the president of the American Library Association in 1953 when the ALA issued its Freedom to Read manifesto.

The paper that I submitted was the second one I wrote. In the first, I started by saying that I was going to talk "only about the problems that are causing the scholar the greatest difficulties, those that are keeping him awake at night and that are making him wonder whether he is doing his duty in society." But when I finished the first draft, I decided that what I had written would merely anger my audience. The typical academic audience, as I knew only too well, was so intolerant of dissent from its views that you couldn't say the things that most needed to be said and get any hearing at all. So I dropped this paper and started over again. This time I would say only a little fraction of what I felt needed to be said, and I would say it by quoting a distinguished scholar, one to whom scholars in his field everywhere had listened with respect.

In the month of February 1954 I received proofs from *Library Trends* of an article that carried my name as author. The article was not mine. It was a hash that someone had made under the instructions of Mr. Downs. I had to say to Mr. Downs, as I had said to Mr. Walters of the *Saturday Review*: print the article as I submitted it or drop it. Mr. Downs dropped the article and gave as his explanation that I had not written on the subject assigned, that the altering and cutting had been done to keep me to the subject.

The most important thing in the paper, from my point of view, was the following quotation from Joseph Schumpeter, one-time president of the American Economics Association and professor of economics at Harvard until his death in 1950:

> The conditions of American politics are not favorable to the growth of an official Communist Party—a few county treasurerships do not go far from the recruiting standpoint. But the importance of the communist element must not be measured by the membership of the official party. Those intellectuals who are either straight Communists or fellow-travelers have really no motive to join it. They have every motive to stay out of it, for they are much better able to serve if, without carrying the badge, they conquer positions on opinion-producing committees or in administrative bodies and so on, remaining free to deny, with perfect truth, that they are Communists in a party sense. [*Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, p. 363]

Schumpeter wrote this passage in the late thirties and first published it in 1942, long before the present controversies over communist and fellow-traveler influence. I had quoted the passage to clinch my argument on the problem of censorship—certainly the most important by far of the scholar's publishing problems today. In the rewriting and cutting, this passage and everything I had said in support of the case stated in this passage was either altered or cut.

The Case of Dr. Conant

Now if there is a virtual censorship in American publishing today, why has more evidence of this censorship not been given to the public? The answer is, of course, that those who know what they have been doing won't tell, and the others can't because they are ignorant and don't know. Those who know realize there is danger that they will be deprived of their power if the public learns the truth, and they are determined that this shall not happen. And people in positions of great influence in American life, almost certainly innocently and ignorantly, have been giving their support to the censorship. Let me give one name to rank alongside the American Library Association and the *New York Times*.

The name is that of the former president of Harvard University, now U.S. High Commissioner in West Germany, James Bryant Conant. During the book-burning flurry, Mr. Conant was asked some questions by Senator McCarthy. The *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* quoted from the Conant-McCarthy colloquy, but both omitted the most significant passage. After McCarthy had made the point that the U.S. Government should not have been spreading communist propaganda through its libraries over the world, and after Conant had agreed with McCarthy that books by members of the party "should not be on the shelves" of American libraries abroad, according to the *New York World Telegram* (June 16, 1953, p. 2) Conant said: "I regret the fact that you felt it was necessary to do it publicly." And Conant explained. He would have had the books taken off the shelves by executive order without public fuss and controversy. What Conant did not explain is that secret action of the kind he advocated is really dangerous, and that without the public fuss and controversy, the left-wingers would have remained in complete control and would have been able to continue spreading their propaganda and suppressing everything that seriously threatened the continued dominance of their views.

I find it impossible to believe that Conant and

the *New York Times* and the American Library Association want the actuality of censorship under the guise of freedom. But I cannot explain their conduct and I doubt whether they can. It is not necessary to do a lot of thinking to see that there has been a rigorous and largely self-imposed censorship in the United States since the early forties, particularly in the period while the decisions on policies during World War Two were being made. This was the crucial time. This was the time when discussion was most needed, and when failure to discuss entailed the erection of an almost hopelessly difficult psychological barrier to full and free discussion in subsequent years. Who in Washington is free of blame for the policy of unconditional surrender? Who in Washington stood up during World War Two and condemned the War Crimes trials? Who told America how re-education would look a few years later? Who today in the United States, in a position of leadership, can afford to do anything but keep in the dark, as completely as he can, his share of responsibility for turning Asia and half of Europe over to the Communists?

The public knows that somehow it was deceived, that the policies followed during World War Two which cleared the way for the growth of communist power were not dictated by necessity. Why the deception nobody knows. The charge of conspiracy, fantastic as it is, is certainly true; but if there is such a thing as an open conspiracy, the one that was open was far more serious than the one that was secret. Who does not know today that the communist game can be played with centralized planning, taxation, wage and price and monetary controls? Who started this game, and supported it, and continued to support it in the United States, even after its meaning was clear?

It is now more than a decade after the disastrous decisions of World War Two were made, and the real issues have not yet been given serious attention in public. Why? The government of the United States has not yet forbidden its citizens to support scholarly study and engage in public discussion of questions of public importance. What is the explanation of this strange failure? Could it be that Americans today, thanks to their intellectual leaders and such agencies as the American Library Association, are forgetting the meaning of censorship and freedom and are progressing toward the condition of the totalitarians, that of freedom to read propaganda?

What Is A Boy?

By CHARLES F. HAMILTON

What is a boy? With each passing day he is something that becomes more and more difficult to define.

Basically, he is, as he always was, an absentee. He is more easily described by the marks he leaves behind. So, nostalgically, we sometimes say a boy is a jelly smudge on the pantry door; a broken window across the street; a pocketful of assorted junk from agates to zombie "potions." A boy, we say, is a fellow who starts for school and ends up at the swimming hole, or who on his way to the store is sidetracked by a ball game. A boy is an ever-present and ever-absent Kilroy who leaves his mark on heart, home and community. Boys are boys the world over; but when we get sentimental enough to try to describe them, we call to mind our American boys.

But do we really *think* of them? If we do, how does this sound to you? What is an American boy? Basically he is as he always was, an absentee. Only today he is more of an absentee than ever before. Here, a boy is a fellow who starts out to think about his high school studies and ends up thinking about war; a lad who, in need of a job, decides to have a little fun before he is drafted. Then, he is a letter from training camp or from one of many far-off countries—democracy's outposts. He is a photograph on his mother's dresser.

What else is an American boy? An American boy is a lad whose government has contributed him to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and who ends up a prisoner in solitary confinement—*judged and found guilty by laws of another country!* He is doomed to serve his sentence in a foreign jail because as the Constitution now reads, *treaty agreements supersede the law of our land.* An American boy is an American who, without his own consent, is sent abroad to fight for the preservation of our inalienable constitutional rights but ends up having his own rights arbitrarily taken from him. An American boy is a lad who volunteers or submits to military draft as an *American* soldier and ends up being a *United Nations* soldier in a communist prison. He knows who sent him because he swore allegiance to his country on induction, but he doesn't know who will bring him back. He is a boy who wonders, "Is allegiance reciprocal—or is it transferable without consultation?"

An American boy is a bewildered chap, dearly loved by his parents back home who hopefully await his return and meanwhile wonder—wonder how the promise of a man has become driftwood on a sea of political blunders.

Inhumanity of the Minimum Wage

By PAUL L. POIROT

Why the compulsory minimum wage injures the very people that it proposes to help.

The Republican President of the United States believes that no person should be allowed or required to work for less than 90 cents an hour. The Democratic Governor of New York urges raising the minimum wage to $1.25 from its present level of 75 cents. Except for such differences in detail, fixing a minimum wage by law has come to be a bi-partisan project. That may indicate good politics—but it is no assurance that a minimum wage law will accomplish what is claimed for it.

Beginning with the truism that "the laborer is worthy of his hire," proponents of the minimum wage interpret it to mean that anyone who works thereby establishes a valid claim against his employer, or against society, for a wage sufficient to assure an adequate standard of living. Though it may be difficult to say precisely what constitutes an adequate standard of living, the opinion is widely held that such a standard lies somewhere between the prevailing extremes of wealth and of poverty; underlying this opinion is the assumption the poor are poor because the rich are rich; that is, that employers exploit their employees. It is supposed that employers withhold as much as they can of what the workers have produced — that the so-called "wages fund" is not fully disbursed as wages—and that this is a crime against workers in particular and society in general. And if crime is being committed, it is the duty of government to intervene; hence, a minimum wage law.

If this theory is correct, how is the injustice of inequality, or exploitation, done away with by a minimum wage as low as 90 cents or $1.25 an hour? If the compulsory equalization of wealth is a proper means to a better society, why shouldn't the minimum wage be at least $5 an hour?

The answer, of course, is that the minimum wage theory does not square with experience. The reason is that work, as such, is not something scarce and useful to human beings. Sheer effort is not one of the things men will buy in the market place. The goods and services produced by workmen are the things valued, regardless of how much or how little labor went into their creation. If a horse can pull ten times as many cabbages to market as a man can, who in his right mind would hire a man instead of a horse for that job? But if the horse is hired, should the cabbage-mover then be required to pay ten men to sit by and watch the operation? That would be a logical development, according to the minimum wage theory that human labor is the only thing of value to society.

That theory is wrong because horsepower also has value, as tools are valuable, and scientific knowledge, and a great many other things besides direct physical labor. How valuable? Why, just as valuable as producers and consumers jointly determine in the market place. There is no such thing as a "wages fund" in the minds of individual buyers and sellers who bargain with one another. The money a man owns, or the property it symbolizes, may be offered in exchange for labor—a service—or it may be offered in exchange for other property. The fund, if one chooses to call the earnings and savings of individuals a fund, cannot be paid solely and exclusively to labor. Some of it must go as a return for the use of tools and capital, or else there will soon be none of those savings which create job opportunities and which help to improve the productivity of the laborer.

Unemployment of the Least Capable

A dictator, it is true, can arbitrarily declare human labor to be the only thing of value in the world; and he can set a minimum or a maximum wage, or just fix prices. But he cannot enforce his dictates because they run contrary to the rules of human behavior. As long as men harbor their own distinctive sense of values, there is no way of predetermining the price they will pay for what they want. That is set in the market place, whether it is legal or "black."

A $5 minimum wage is indeed ridiculous, not because $5 is the wrong amount, but because it is ridiculous to try to set a minimum wage at any level. It doesn't work. And it is an injustice to the people it is supposed to help—the less productive and less fortunate members of society. If a minimum wage is set high enough to have any effect, that effect must be a closing of the market to those persons least capable of earning a living. For the minimum wage denies such persons the right to offer their services for what they are worth. The law says in effect, "If you are not worth the legal minimum wage, you are not worth anything." This, of course, is arbitrariness of the very worst kind. It is difficult to visualize a greater injustice than this among supposedly civilized human beings—the strong ganging up to deprive

the weak of their limited means of helping themselves.

Setting a minimum wage, below which no man may sell his services, is like setting a floor price for potatoes. The higher the floor price, the less demand there will be for potatoes. Those growers of potatoes who are least skilled in the arts of production will have been forced out of the market arbitrarily. And so will those buyers who can least afford to pay the price for potatoes.

If government intervenes to support the market at the floor price, then these two groups—the poorest producers and the poorest consumers—become the wards of the government, each dependent on a subsidy for survival. The government assumes the obligation, by means of unemployment compensation, to support those who were either directly or indirectly forced out of productive employment. The higher the minimum wage level, the more unemployment there must be.

Denying a man the right to offer his services, by fixing the minimum wage at more than his services are worth, is to deprive him of a market for the only thing in the world he could have justified as his own. But that is not the end of the evil of the minimum wage. Those unused productive powers are lost, and society is poorer because of it. And if there is this kind of restraint upon the available supply of goods and services in the world, who suffers first and most? Why, the victims are those least able to pay the price for even the barest essentials of life!

Lessons of the Depression

The inhuman consequences of the minimum wage idea were shown up during the great Depression of the thirties. Labor unions, which had been gaining membership steadily during the twenties, were so bound to a philosophy of ever-rising wage rates that they could not adjust to a changed market situation, even though such rigidity forced many of their own members to join the ranks of the jobless. Equally well-meaning businessmen, lured by the promises of the National Industrial Recovery Act, pledged themselves to codes which would not let prices or wage rates find their proper level. Though most of the minimum wage legislation did not come until later in the thirties, the early years of the Depression were none the less marked by government compulsions along the lines of the minimum wage idea. And the direct consequence of this organized coercive interference with the free market was a prolonged and unnecessary period of hardship for people who sought to earn a living.

The "experts" on social problems speak glibly of the free market and open competition as forms of barbarism. They describe the individual bargaining process of price and wage determination as an outmoded application of "the law of the jungle." But the basic law of the jungle is that might makes right; differences of opinion are subject to settlement by violence or compulsion. Perhaps the most significant departure human beings have ever made from jungle law is in the direction of a reasoned and deliberate tolerance for individuality—a mutual respect for both inherited and cultivated characteristics which make each of us different from every other person.

In the economic or material sense, this tolerance and respect for the rights of one another is reflected in the concept of private ownership and control of property. It allows and encourages exchange of goods and services among those who have something to offer and are willing to trade.

It is true that such voluntary exchange serves the self-interest of everyone involved. But that is no reason for referring to the competitive market process as though it were an evil example of the law of the jungle. Voluntary exchange rejects rather than follows the rule that might makes right. The rule of the market is that personal choice is right, up to the point that such choice begins to injure an innocent person. This is quite the opposite of jungle warfare which considers weak and relatively defenseless individuals to be fair game for the strong and cunning.

There is one big humanitarian reason for adherence to the market method of voluntary exchange, and that reason is the desire to act charitably toward those less fortunate than oneself. They are the ones who would not survive the rigors of the jungle and who would end up most permanently enslaved in any politically regulated society. The one great blessing of the market economy is that it encourages every individual to develop his talents, however limited they might be. And it assures each a full measure of value for the much or the little that he has to contribute to the satisfaction of human needs. Thus does a free society inevitably outproduce any other kind, creating more useful things the very abundance of which is the poor man's assurance of a chance for survival.

There are sound reasons why some men should earn more for their efforts than do others—why skilled labor should be worth more than unskilled —why the successful manager of a business should receive more than any of his employees. Human beings are not all alike, in either capacities or desires. Prices and wages as determined in a free market, unrigged by political intervention, are the best means of insuring the production and equitable distribution of the goods and services all men seek. Those who have most clearly proved their productive capacity are rewarded accordingly through the voluntary acts of their fellow-men in the market place. This is the signal to produce even more, and it is the incentive which attracts other men to lead more useful and productive lives.

A compulsory minimum wage, at any level, can only add to the hazards of the jungle.

Your Job: Where Does It Come From?

By A. J. GALLAGER

If we know what it takes to make one job, we will have a better idea of what it takes to maintain the many we have today—and to create the necessary new jobs for tomorrow. That great, sprawling thing we call the "national economy" is nothing but a lot of individual jobs. This confusing subject called "economics" can be quite simple.

A Job is the security of the home.

A Business is simply a group of Job-Holders at work: Buying—Production—Selling—Managing.

A Community is just a group of different businesses: Merchants — Manufacturers — Farmers — Services.

The Nation is the sum of its communities, or 60,000,000 Jobs.

If you have a job, you're a valuable person. To your family, your pay is what buys the groceries, clothes the kids and provides the other things that make a comfortable home.

Sales necessary for each job. But to your employer, your pay means something much different. To meet your wages and other costs and keep you on the job for a year, the company must sell about $14,000 worth of goods. That's the average for a great many types and sizes of businesses, with some requiring as much as $40,000 in sales. Let's look at one job in a big steel company (United States Steel) whose products are used for anything from a kitchen paring knife to a giant steel-framed skyscraper.

U. S. Steel's sales of $12,850 for each one of the people on the payroll are close to the average for all types of business. Let's see how this money was divided in 1953 among those who had a claim on it.

Sales of $12,850 worth of products for each one of the 301,560 jobs was used for:

Wages and Benefits	**$5,200**
Products and Services Bought	**$4,700**
Taxes	**$1,370**
Other Expenses	**$843**
Put Back in the Business	**$393**
Paid out as Dividends	**$344**

Of the $737 per job that remained after all costs and expenses, $393—more than half—was reinvested in the business to improve methods and buy better equipment, which results in lower costs, better products, more customers and more jobs. The $344 left was paid out as dividends to the 286,240 people who had their savings at work in the business.

Investment necessary for each job. As important as they are, the sales it takes to keep a job going are only one side of the picture. Before there can be any sales, someone has to save the money to provide all the necessary things to make a job possible, such as land, buildings, machines and materials.

In U. S. Steel, about $14,000 was at work in plants and equipment alone for each of its 301,560 employees. Thus, a small fortune is at work for every individual on a payroll.

Only customers make jobs. In any business, however, you, the customer, are all important. You are a job-maker for countless people you have never seen. And these people, as customers for what you help make or sell, keep you on your job.

To Keep One Person at Work

For example, here is what the customers of the country must do each year to keep one average job-holder at work making the following typical products:

Soap—take 6,000,000 baths
Steel—use 750,000 household cans
Gasoline—drive 1,000,000 miles
Shingles—roof 230 houses
Stockings—buy 12,000 pairs
Refrigerators—buy 60 new ones
Frozen food—eat 150,000 packages

and so on for thousands of other products.

These are not unusual examples. The sales required to maintain one job in any business are large and steadily growing.

In terms of jobs, all businesses look much alike. A great food manufacturer and the corner grocery store . . . a dairy and a department store. Measured by jobs, the big total figures become small, understandable figures. For instance, the vast steel company, whose profits in 1953 were $222,000,000, made about the same amount of money *per job* as a roadside diner whose profit was $7,300.

To keep our present living standards, we need about three jobs for every two families. You can imagine the vast task of maintaining more than 60,000,000 jobs.

The automobile industry, largest in the country, maintains something over half a million jobs. All manufacturing combined supplies little more than a fourth of the total.

The big share of creating jobs is done by the more than two million small businesses and farms, started by people willing to risk much time and money in the struggle to progress.

In every community, farmers, merchants, manufacturers and service people might well hang out the sign, "Job-Maker."

The security of your job depends upon the sincere cooperation of business, labor and government —backed by general understanding of what it takes to maintain a job; who the job-makers are; what helps and what hinders them.

Crusading in Asia

By SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL

Abandoning our long-established policies in the Far East, the United States drove Japan out of Asia only to have the Communists take over.

Consider Japan as one of the problem children picked up in our crusades to reform mankind. Now that we have the Japanese bottled up on their home islands, can we expect them to all stay there forever?

If the United States had the same population per square mile that Japan now has, we would have 1,750,000,000 people to feed, clothe, house and promise "social security" to. That would be more than a billion and a half more people than we now have, or eleven persons where we now have one. It would be more than half the population of the planet. What would we do under such circumstances?

If we compare Japan with California, we have a smaller, but just as impressive a yardstick—at least to Californians. To see it clearly let us put the approximate figures in parallel columns.

	California	*Japan*
Square Miles	158,093	146,690
Population per square mile	79	588
Total Population	12,500,000	86,300,000

California already has smog and a serious water shortage. But suppose she had 74 million more people to feed than she now has! She would have to absorb our entire population as far East as Ohio to equal Japan's. That would still give California the advantage, as she has 12,000 more square miles than Japan. This extra mileage about equals the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut.

Total area, however, does not alone tell much about food supply. Leaving out the scenery, only 16 per cent of Japan's mountainous archipelago is arable. California has almost the same number of square miles of cropland. Her farms average 267 acres; Japan's, three acres.

With the same population, California would still have another immense advantage over Japan. California is part of the North American Continent with rail and highway access to a huge free-trade area with the richest markets in the world in which to buy and sell. Suppose California were an island from one hundred to four hundred miles out in the Pacific and separated from the mainland by much more than open sea—by tariff walls and immigration restrictions of all sorts.

How would California eat? How will Japan eat? In short, what gives? The home islands to which the Japanese have now been driven ceased to be agriculturally self-sufficient when her population was half her present 86 million.

We Americans have marvelous chemical fertilizers and insecticides; power farming which frees millions of acres formerly devoted to keeping horses, mules and oxen alive, but now used to feed people; and we have a continental land area, not counting Alaska, twenty times that of Japan today. We also have an agricultural surplus. Hence, we have a somewhat smug feeling that "living space" is no problem for a growing population. But even here at home a meat shortage in peace time was a big factor in overturning a political majority in both houses of Congress only a few years ago.

Japan Lacks Raw Materials

But food or its shortage is not the sole source of a nation's happiness or despair. The raw materials of industry come next; and American firms are pushing into Canada, South America, the Middle East and Africa—as Japan formerly pushed into Asia—for iron ore, petroleum, copper, pulpwood and dozens of other commodities. We are already beginning to feel the pinch.

Japan, in her home islands, produces about as much petroleum *in a year* as the United States produces *in eight hours*! She is short of copper, iron ore, lead, tin, zinc, rubber, leather, cotton, wool, lumber, milk, meat, potatoes, soybeans, sugar and wheat. She is dependent on outside sources for much of her rice and has a really good supply of only a few commodities such as coal, cement, fish, silkworms and hydro-electric power.

Before World War Two, Japan had expanded into land areas totaling 665,000 square miles as against her present 146,690 square miles. She acquired Formosa, the Pescadores Islands and part of southern Manchuria in 1895; southern Sakhalin and Russia's port and railroad rights in Manchuria, including Kwantung (Port Arthur) in 1905; Korea in 1910; and set up her puppet state of Manchukuo (Manchuria) in 1931. Of these, Manchuria is the most important. Its land area equals that of France and East and West Germany combined. Its population per square mile is only 86, which is about that of California. Its soil is one of the richest in the world, raising soybeans, corn, wheat and rice. Manchuria has large deposits of iron ore, coal, and oil shale. It has been called the Ruhr of Asia. Who is filling the Manchurian vacuum caused by the forced retreat of Japan? You guessed it—the Communists.

We drove the Japanese out of Formosa where they had been in possession for a half century, and now we send troops to defend it against the country Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill proposed to give it to—without consulting the Formosans!

Twenty years ago the population of Japan's home islands was 469 to the square mile; it is 588 now. Due to the forced repatriation of soldiers and civilians to the home islands, more births and fewer deaths, the *increase* since 1935 has been 119 to the square mile, which by itself is twice the population density of the United States.

Again, what gives? Is Japan to stay on the American dole from now on?

Few people realize that our official attitude toward Japan these past twenty-five years has been almost the exact opposite of what it was a half century ago. Both Russia and Japan sought to develop Manchuria in their own interests long before Stalin and Lenin were heard of. This struggle for position came to a head in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, in which the Russians suffered a humiliating defeat. American public and official opinion was then on the side of Japan.

This war ended in the Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1905. The United States urged and Japan demanded the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia. President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root were realistic enough to see that Japan's prolific and industrious people were bound to go somewhere, and that it was better for us that they expand on the continent of Asia rather than go southward toward the Philippines or eastward to our Pacific Coast where the feeling against Japanese immigration was intense.

This policy was confirmed by the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908, which gave Japan what was called "a free hand in Manchuria," although this somewhat overstates the case. Nevertheless, *Japan went into Manchuria with our consent.* At about the same time, we ignored the appeal of the Korean emperor and placed no obstacle to Japan's domination of Korea.

Another realist on the Far East was Secretary of State Lansing. In 1918 he said, "I cannot see how the Japanese government can adopt any other policy in view of the very real peril to Japan if the Bolsheviks gain a foothold in Manchuria and cooperate with the Korean revolutionists."

In 1927, an American diplomat in Peking wrote Secretary of State Kellogg, "We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically in view of measures we have taken in our corresponding vital zone, the Caribbean"—where we sent Marines more than once to establish governments friendly to us.

Our recently developed self-righteousness came to a peak in a speech of Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 12, 1944, when he found it possible to speak of Pacific "islands which we are in the splendid process of throwing the Japanese out of," and in the same breath demand for the United States "forward bases nearer to Japan" than the Hawaiian Islands. What was immoral for Japan was moral for us!

This unctuous Pharisaism may please our ego, but what has it gotten us? Certainly, Asiatics can see through it. One of them has put it this way: "The Western powers taught the Japanese the game of poker, but after acquiring most of the chips, they pronounced the game immoral and took up contract bridge."

The New Cult of Interventionism

Our former policy of hard-headed realism in the Far East has been succeeded by the policy of busybodyism and interventionism in foreign quarrels. The high priests of this new cult have been Wilson, Stimson, Hull and F. D. Roosevelt. In 1918 Wilson sent an American army into eastern Siberia. Whatever his motives, this was considered by the Japanese as an unfriendly act. It had the effect of discouraging Japanese settlement of that area, with the result that the Siberian maritime provinces bordering on the Pacific were saved for the regime of Red Russia. This was our first futile intervention in Asia.

Then came the bellicose Henry Stimson, who as Secretary of State under Hoover, and a decade later, Secretary of War under Roosevelt, seldom lost an opportunity to bedevil Japan. Stimson was the chief advocate of the new doctrine that we would never recognize an "aggression" by a foreign power of whose morals we disapproved. He wrote in his diary thirteen days before Pearl Harbor,

"The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

Roosevelt regarded Stimson as a modern Lancelot engaged in a desperate struggle with the dark forces of evil all over the globe. "How could you expect me not to go along with Stimson in Japan?" he said to Raymond Moley before his first inauguration in 1933. This was soon followed by his recognition of the communist dictatorship which gave the Kremlin world-wide prestige. Eleven years later, in 1944, Roosevelt told the Foreign Policy Association: "We could have compromised with Japan and bargained for a place in a Japanese-dominated Asia by selling out the heart's blood of the Chinese people. And we rejected that."

So he drove Hirohito out of Asia and invited Stalin in! Just how much blood of the Chinese people or of American young men his policies in Asia have saved, or will save, remains to be seen.

Meantime, before plunging into any more great "crusades" in foreign lands and pouring out more tons of the heart's blood of American boys to make the world behave, we might take time out to ask ourselves how we would feel and act if we had 1,750,000,000 mouths to feed in the United States.

No one will gainsay that the Chinese people, with whom we have been friends for many years, have as much right to Asiatic real estate as the Japanese. Certainly, also, we can condemn the barbarities of the Japanese-Chinese war that began in 1937. But the question remains whether American interventionism has done or can do the Chinese people, or the American people, any good that can compensate for the cost to us in blood and treasure.

The Conformist

By EUGENE LYONS

He followed all the twists of the party line, but was never happier than during the middle thirties, when the line happened to coincide with his urge for bourgeois respectability.

The cream of the jest, for those of us who knew him well in life, was that the capitalist press and the *Daily Worker* agreed on the main point. They reported, that is to say, the seemingly obvious fact that he had been a "revolutionary." The tone of the reports varied, naturally, but on the central point there was unanimity: Benjamin Lindin, having been a pioneer of American communism, having died while still in its ranks, was an authentic revolutionary—even, in the warmer obits, a revolutionary leader.

Poor Lindin would have been pleased by the verdict, would have seized upon it gratefully as confirmation and reward. He was one who weighed and valued respectability—in his own little world, I mean—and it was a lot to have died as he had lived, a certified rebel.

The verdict, indeed, would have taken some of the sting out of his disappointment over the death notices. When he had thought of his own demise, under the melancholy to which he was more and more subject in his later years, he liked to visualize it as an event, rating attention in the news columns of the big papers. Instead, except for the front-page display in the *Worker* that was his due and a farewell editorial in the *Nation*, his death was recorded only on the regular obituary pages, part of the day's budget of obscure prominents departed in time for the last edition.

But all the notices, as I say, referred to him as a revolutionary, in much the same way as his neighbors in the obits were identified as a long-ago actress and a manufacturer of pipe couplings. And that, from what I knew of the man in the flesh, must have been cause for satisfaction to his hovering shade.

The information that Lindin was also a writer was there, too, but incidentally, as it were. It was a circumstance overshadowed, in death as in life, by his political status. That, I think, Ben would not have minded especially. Writing, he had insisted, and the arts generally were overrated in our decadent bourgeois society. This belief had taken root in his mind about the time he began to suspect that his literary talents were pretty thin, and it flourished as the suspicion turned into a certainty.

To the capitalist obit writers, I suppose, and to most of their readers, the revolutionary tag carried implications of heroism, idealism, even glamor. It suggested a bold and mutinous spirit, defiant of conventions and dedicated to a selfless cause. And this substantially was the portrait of himself and his life's work Ben Lindin had labored to achieve. It was a portrait in which he really believed, except during those aching interludes of self-knowledge that touched off the spells of melancholy.

Only a few of those who read of Lindin's demise

could know the central and essential truth about the man. The secret had been well kept, not only from the world but from most of his intimates. It was, one might even say, the very price of maintaining that intimacy.

I refer to the fact that Ben Lindin was by his every instinct a conformer, with something close to a genius for conformity. He was by nature the herd-man, the marcher in step, the singer in chorus, under compulsion always to merge and lose himself in his particular group. The thought of losing touch with the group gave him a shuddery feeling of nakedness, exposed and vulnerable and indecent.

No Risky Investments

Ben actually hated, as well as feared, men and women who dared speak out of turn or put logic above law. They seemed to him disturbers of the peace. The zeal with which he attacked deviators from the party line, factionalists and skeptics, was not put on—it came from the core of his being, hot and genuine if faintly tinged with envy. It is fair to say, in fact, that his feckless reputation as "a fighter for the cause" derived from his very anxiety to agree, to avoid a fight; from his automatic respect for constituted authority.

He hoarded his fame as a Communist, such as it was, like a miser. Not once did he knowingly invest it in risky enterprises, sticking to gilt-edged political securities and blue-chips party viewpoints. Being human, he had on occasion been touched by a wild impulse to venture his ideological capital on some unorthodox position, to have his fling for once, so to speak. But his fundamental conservatism always saved him from such folly.

I don't mean to spin paradoxes. To understand Ben Linden one needs only grasp the simple principle that to be a revolutionist among revolutionists calls for no more spirit, daring or high resolve than to be a Methodist among Methodists. Born into an immigrant family of Socialists in the slums of Manhattan, Ben considered himself a Socialist long before he could pronounce the word. It seemed to him that his playmates and classmates, unaware of the radicalism which was his heritage, were the real eccentrics. He was a little sorry for them, in the way a Christian in deepest Africa might be sorry for the heathens around him.

There is no call to exaggerate, of course. Ben's radical assumptions, in his earliest years at least, did have in them elements of social protest, even an edge of real revolt. The desperations of the slums did stir a vague indignation in his viscera.

But this was not so much the source of his political sentiments as confirmation of their rightness. The capitalist evils which he was ever ready to inventory did not make him a rebel; they merely gave him a warm sense of self-esteem about being opposed to them almost as an act of nature. Not everyone, he knew, was so lucky.

When he was old enough he began to channel his literary itchings into propaganda for the Cause, and again he was mindful of his advantage. Other would-be writers had to search for subject matter—his was ready to hand. Others had to analyze their emotions—his were implicit in his materials.

Ben Lindin must have been twenty-one when the Russian Revolution burst upon the world. Its blinding impact confined him for good within the revolutionary orbit. Whatever marginal chance there may have been of diversion and escape was wiped out. His destiny was fixed. For now he had not only a faith but a firm and awe-inspiring center of authority, a church to guide his every thought and act.

I was aware of Benjamin Lindin and rather overawed by his burgeoning reputation long before I met him. His by-line was becoming familiar to readers of communist and near-communist publications, over staccato verses full of exclamation marks, articles sizzling with insults to nonbelievers, an occasional piece of fiction. Now and then I had seen him at debates and mass meetings, and he had seemed to me the prototype of the young writer-rebel—tall, thin, his dark hair overlong and matted, his clothes rumpled, a knobby Adam's apple bobbing above an open shirt. His features, too, seemed in disarray, as if thrown together hurriedly and held together only by his heavy horn-rimmed glasses.

What struck me most at our first meeting was the eyes behind those glasses. They were pale, watery, almost spiritless—not the eyes, to put it crudely, of a flaming revolutionary or a flaming anything else. I suppose I had expected flash and defiance and was rather let down not to find them. In those eyes I caught a glimpse of a cautious and timorous soul which left me uneasy, romantic that I was.

Inevitably our talk that night, in a noisy cafeteria patronized by the comrades, led to the great struggle then under way in the Russian Party. I had pretty strong views myself and pressed them on my new friend. I would have been pleased if he had agreed, stimulated if he hadn't. But Ben seemed to avoid doing either. He just shied away from real discussion, and the diffidence seemed somehow related to his watery eyes.

The more I tried to pin him down, the vaguer and wordier Ben grew. I hated to admit to myself that he was hedging, since it didn't jibe with my youthful notions of an iron Bolshevik. Besides, there was something portentous about his evasions, supported by allusions to "dialectic processes" and the "monolithic party." His was not the candid indecision of inner struggle but a sort of eloquent vagueness, proud and self-righteous, as if uncertainty, too, could be enlisted in the service of the Cause.

All that changed after Trotsky's exile to Alma Ata at the end of 1927. Ben Lindin, whom I was seeing fairly often, became at once the Stalinist

through and through. "Became" is scarcely the right word. He had always been one, to hear him explain matters. He was cheerful, as if relieved that the party had caught up with him and truth was once more clear-cut, without any seditious edges.

Eight Years Later

During the next seven or eight years I was out of the country. But I got tidings of Ben Lindin in talking to people from home, and gathered that he was prospering in party circles; that he had, in fact, become something of a figure in American life generally. His column in the *Daily Worker* and articles in the *New Masses* were sometimes cited even by bourgeois critics, and arguments on proletarian art drew on Lindin's *obiter dicta*.

This was the interval, in short, when he was established as a revolutionary, even among the infidels. Under the pressure of his growing importance my memory of his timid eyes receded. Like everyone else, I began to think of Ben Lindin as a strong, stalwart rebel.

My disillusionment on this score came when I returned to New York in the middle thirties. At a cocktail party I ran into Laura.

"How nice to see you again," she said, all smiles. "My husband will be glad to know you're back."

"Your husband?" I lifted an eyebrow, I suppose. Husband was not the sort of word I expected from Laura, at least not with that faint stress of possessive pride in her voice.

"Why, yes," she said, "Ben and I have been married over a year. Didn't you know? In fact—" I followed her downward glance. She was pregnant.

Laura had been living with Lindin for a great many years. She was, to put the matter charitably, a very plain woman and presumably under no excessive temptation to match Ben's notorious philandering with promiscuities of her own. It was common surmise, especially among the female comrades, that her boasts in this regard were exaggerations if not fibs. There had always been, I recalled, a touch of pathos in her readiness, on the slightest provocation, to hold forth on free love. Marriage, after all, was a bourgeois institution and monogamy an aspect of the property system, and so on. So now I was considerably puzzled.

Later our hostess, in an undertone, set me straight. It was the new party line, as I should have known. "Communism is twentieth-century Americanism and that kind of thing. Free love? That's for bourgeois bohemians. You should see the Lindins' home—an uptown apartment, too, with curtains and overstuffed furniture! Poor Ben doesn't like to be reminded of his alley-cat past. He's gone respectable with a vengeance. Turns out he has the soul of a storekeeper."

Respectable was the right word for it. Lindin's *Daily Worker* column was filled with copybook virtues, old-fashioned domesticity and old-fashioned patriotism. He was proud to be an American *and* a Communist. I remember especially the column he devoted to a blow-by-blow account of the great event that made him a father and the proud head of that fine old communist institution, the family. And another in which he gave hell to those who thought they were "r . . r . . revolutionary" because they scorned neckties and the daily shave.

Now that I see it all in perspective, it is clear to me that those years of reconciliation with America must have been Ben Lindin's happiest. For a while, at least, the conformities of his own little world and the bigger American world had met and almost coincided. He fairly basked in his enlarged respectability—his clothes pressed, his hair trim, his writing purged of the old swagger and obscenities.

This holiday of the spirit, alas, came to a sudden end with the Stalin-Hitler pact of friendship. Rabid revolutionism was again the order of the day; Ben Lindin, as always, fell instantly into line, grimly obedient. The core of his cherished respectability was in the party, not in America, and mutiny was alien to his nature.

By that time, of course, I was no longer in touch with Lindin. Through comrades of his as they escaped the party bondage, and through an occasional Lindin article (he wrote less and less as time went on), I continued to be aware of him. Both he and Laura, I was told, denied ever having been on actual speaking terms with me and other such renegades. He had known always that we had the makings of enemies of the people and so wasn't surprised when we "sold out to the interests."

He remained consistently "loyal" to the party. He weighed his every word, his every facial expression, for fear he might unwittingly stray from the prescribed beliefs and hatreds of the hour. He showed up dutifully at May Day parades, mass demonstrations and the like; his name was duly appended to manifestoes and open letters. But both in private and in the party press he became increasingly silent, again no doubt out of dread of a slip into nonconformist damnation.

In the years before his death the taciturnity became almost total. He was too old and sick to take chances. He wasn't risking his hard-won capital of submissive orthodoxy. He died, as he had lived, a meekly obedient, conventional, monolithic revolutionary. The *Worker* editorial could say without reservations that "Comrade Lindin was a courageous and undeviating fighter for the Cause."

A savings bank asked, on a street-car card: "If you spend all your money now, what will you have in your old age?" A wag scribbled below: "Pleasant memories."

WASHINGTON, D.C.

by Frank C. Hanighen

Senator William F. Knowland, Senate Republican leader, has been creating a dignified and searching record on the subject of the United Nations. In a series of addresses—in Dallas, San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Washington—he has dissected the weaknesses of that body, its lamentable failure to keep the peace and the dangers it presents to American sovereignty. From the public forum, he has offered arguments which none of the defenders of the organization have been able persuasively to answer. Few in Washington would deny that the Californian is the best informed expert on foreign policy in the Senate. Therefore, it seems evident that he has good reason to fear that U. S. membership in the UN may perilously complicate —at some critical juncture of events—the defense and independence of this country.

That his apprehensions are rising appears in a crescendo, so to speak, in the series of speeches given across the country. Commencing with the issue of possible admission of Red China to the UN, he has developed and broadened his criticisms over the past few months, sometimes evidently keying his words to very current situations. Thus, at the time when Judge Harlan's nomination to the Supreme Court was scheduled for hearings in the Senate, Knowland at San Francisco on February 18 stated:

> As for me, as long as I have a voice or a vote in the Senate of the United States, I shall never consent to permitting the guarantees of freedom under our Constitution to be diluted or modified directly or indirectly by any organization having nations in powerful positions which have no appreciation of or respect for free institutions. Lest we be gradually edged into such a world order before we learn too late wherein we have been taken, I believe that every candidate for public office, executive or *judicial* [emphasis supplied] should be asked to give a forthright view upon this great public issue.

The "great public issue" mentioned is obviously that raised by the Bricker Amendment, which is still before Congress, and Judge Harlan was questioned as to his views on the matter exactly one week later. The candidate answered that it would be "the gravest kind of impropriety" for him to commit himself on a question which might well come before him as a Supreme Court justice.

In New York on February 22, Mr. Knowland reviewed a number of points already named in previous speeches, and went into the matter of what utility the UN still possessed. After emphasizing that he believed the United States must not trust its safety and security to the "collective ability of the United Nations to function in the event of aggression," the Senator called for a "realistic appraisal" of the organization. He did not exactly advocate United States withdrawal but he envisaged a "limited" role for the body, saying it could be a forum to present the views of the free world and the communist world—"provided that there was assurance that the debates in the General Assembly on the Security Council were receiving as widespread coverage behind the Iron Curtain as they do in the free nations." It would be astonishing if the Senator believed that his proviso could ever be accepted by the masters of the Kremlin. He had certainly never come as close to urging, in effect, U. S. withdrawal from the UN.

The following day, President Eisenhower—in his press conference—rejected Mr. Knowland's opinions of the ineffectiveness of the UN and said: "As long as we have got a forum, regardless of the fact that our opponents deliberately use it as a propaganda platform, it is a good thing to keep it going because here is something for which mankind has had a yearning since the dawn of history." If the President continues to stand his ground on human "yearning" as against Knowland's appeal for a "realistic appraisal," a great and decisive debate, commanding all public attention, could well follow.

The fans who scored the points as they watched the altercation between the President and Speaker Sam Rayburn over income-tax reduction agree that the Democratic leadership touched a new low in demagoguery. But many also conceded that the President would have occupied a stronger—indeed an unassailable—position, if it were not evident that he plans to ask for a tax reduction twelve months hence, significantly in a year of national election. Perhaps the budget will be balanced by that time. But it would be difficult to find any budget expert here who thinks so. And the Administration has scarcely displayed any great passion for economy in its requested appropriations.

Just at this time, Washington newspapers are filled with details of proposed increases in pay for civil servants. The Civil Service columns of the papers (every paper must have such a feature) provide wholesome instruction for taxpayer tourists. For the private employer in the area, the spectacle is old and bitter stuff. He knows the low standards of competence prevailing in the government offices and the comparatively high pay (not to mention perquisites) which bid him up in his own wage scales to the detriment of his own budget.

Despite contrary arguments from the President and numerous legislators, there is strong statistical evidence that the requested rise in the federal government salary scale is unjustified. The Council of State Chambers of Commerce (1733 H Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.) has released a negative answer to the question, buttressed by abundant figures and an illuminating table. The Council analysis reveals that average federal salaries in ten different jobs are higher than private business pays in all fourteen cities selected for study. In four cities, private business salaries for all twenty job classifications are less than the government pays. In six more cities, salaries for only one of the twenty jobs are higher than the government pays. Only four of the cities have salary scales about equal to federal pay—salaries being higher than the federal scale in eight to ten of the twenty jobs, and lower in the remainder.

The 5 per cent average increase proposed by the President would create a substantial disparity between federal and private business salary scales in over half the twenty job classifications and would reduce to five the number of jobs in which business in any of the fourteen cities pays more than the government. The estimated total cost of salary raises for classified employees is $512,000,000.

The Council deals with the prevalent argument that the rising cost of living since the last pay increase (1951), justifies higher salaries—pointing out that the 1951 increase substantially exceeded previous rises in the cost of living, and says: "If the rising cost of living since the 1951 pay raise were the sole argument for salary adjustments, a general raise of 3.07 per cent (instead of 5 per cent) would suffice, since the consumers' price index rose by that percentage between July 1951 and December 1954." But, the Council points out, the federal worker actually fares much better than the privately employed worker in such benefits as pension plans, group life and sickness insurance, holiday pay, etc. Additionally, unlike civil service employees in most of the state governments, he is eligible for unemployment compensation if laid off.

About all one can say for the President's costly generosity is that it comes to only half of that displayed by Congress: Senator Johnston (D., S.C.) wants an average 10 per cent increase.

Reclamation, which has resulted in rich levies upon the Treasury promoted by members of Congress from dry Western states, receives a keen and ironic analysis from the pen of Raymond Moley in a pamphlet *What Price Federal Reclamation?* (American Enterprise Association, Inc., 1012-14th St., N.W., Washington 5, D. C. $1.00). Dr. Moley traces the history of this federal activity from its inception in 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt launched the Federal Reclamation Act and emphasized the necessity of "getting back the original investment" for the Treasury. By 1911, President Taft began to realize that such reclamation projects would not sustain themselves under T.R.'s Act; and in Wilson's Administration, Secretary of the Interior Lane bitterly admitted: "We mistook the ability of the farmer to pay for his water rights. Ten years was the time. His optimism and our own was too great." Thereupon Lane recommended that the ten-year payout period be doubled.

Then, in the time of Herbert Hoover, talk of the entire abandonment of reclamation was widespread in Washington, and the financially sound Hoover Dam and Boulder Canyon Act temporarily brought some hope for repayment of federal investment in reclamation. But the advent of the New Deal started two decades of rapidly increased federal spending with fantastic schemes for sugarcoating the unpleasant fiscal pill.

"Resettlement," "predevelopment," "rural rehabilitation," "demonstration farms," "benefit cost ratio"—such were the interesting names applied to various social and accounting devices by Ickes and Chapman to sugarcoat appropriations. The old myth of any early repayment vanished into the rarefied air of mountain and Western states. Moley describes the Reclamation Act of 1939 as bringing about "the final destruction of the principle which over the years had been continually violated, that projects should be self-liquidating"; and, he says, it marked "the beginning of an era in which reclamation becomes a form of government aid to land owners and of far-reaching paternalism over their lives and affairs." He perceives no ray of light in the policy of the present Republican Department of the Interior.

One hopeful development appears in what is called "supplemental irrigation," in the humid regions of the South. The term means an additional water supply from streams, lakes or ponds, usually distributed by a system of pumps and sprays. Dr. Moley says this form of reclamation can be provided "by the farmers themselves at a small fraction of the cost per acre that is being spent on arid lands in the West." He is understandably nostalgic for the private enterprise days of irrigation in California in the nineteenth century, when George Chaffey, a resourceful Canadian immigrant, organized communities that "found mutually profitable relationships" in irrigation enterprises and made some money out of them for himself.

Can We Afford Foundations?

By A. H. HOBBS

Some common delusions regarding the "social science" activities of the great foundations are discussed in relation to the Reece Committee investigation.

"Great powers for evil in the hands of persons whom we cannot foresee." Thus, in 1915, Samuel Untermyer and Louis D. Brandeis described a danger inherent in tax-exempt foundations. Then, the concern of Messrs. Untermyer and Brandeis arose from their fear that foundation funds might be used to support "reactionary" programs. Now, with foundations approaching 7,000 in number, with capital of some $7,500,000,000, and with annual income of nearly $675,000,000, some of the activities of the major foundations have been designated "subversive," and many of their projects would be termed "reactionary" only by Communists or by over-eager Socialists.

Surely, if a few foundations with their comparatively small income were considered as potentially "great powers for evil" in 1917, the financial, political and social power inherent in today's multi-billion dollar foundations warrants careful examination. Yet, when such inquiry was made by the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, under the chairmanship of Representative Carroll B. Reece, it was widely denounced. One editorial, among many such, designated it as a "stupid inquiry" for which "no need" existed and which constituted "a disgrace to Congress," failing to reveal "a single specific instance of a foundation engaging in un-American and subversive activities."

Many aspects of foundation activity described in the Report of the Reece Committee make it worthy of examination in its entirety, and here I wish only to stress a few phases which were either overlooked or distorted in news accounts.

Examination of the varied activities of all foundations would require years of investigation; so, limited both by time and funds, the Reece Committee concentrated upon the *social science* projects of several major organizations, granting freely that much good had been done in other areas such as natural science and medicine. It was this probing into the sensitive innards of the sacred cow of social science which roused such anguished bellows from those noisy liberals who shout down anyone who discusses controversial issues which they insist can no longer be discussed. In some instances the degree to which the principal foundations now sponsor "liberal" tenets of collectivism and internationalism may have been exaggerated; but before analyzing this question, we should refine our thinking about such foundations to set the issue in its proper perspective.

Several delusions are associated with foundations such as the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford cyclopean organizations. So commonly are they referred to as philanthropic agencies that we tend to personify them with warm hearts and generous hands. We forget that they are able to function on the scale they do only through our altruism, not theirs. Their resources would soon dwindle were they required, as are we, to pay taxes. Our elected representatives have not only the right, but the responsibility, to determine whether this money is being spent for purposes which the taxpayers consider to be more beneficial than the tax-relief they would otherwise receive.

Would Ford and Carnegie Approve?

Another delusion portrays foundation expenditures as reflecting, down through the generations, the dreams of great Americans who devoted their wealth to this ideal. Such is frequently far from the case. Though prominent trustees ostensibly guard this purpose, they meet only once or twice a year. Concern with other affairs and ignorance of the subtleties of social science techniques make them gullible about innocent-sounding projects which are likely to lead to conclusions that would be abhorrent to the founder and repugnant to the public. In practice, the operations of foundations are conducted by high-salaried administrators who had nothing to do with accumulating the money and who may or may not administer these semi-public funds in accord with the wishes of the founder.

When foundations are investigated, therefore, we do not inquire into the disposition of private funds by generous benefactors such as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford; but we try to ascertain the degree to which bureaucratic administrators spend semipublic funds for purposes which we, as well as the founder, would endorse.

Try to envision ascetic, circumspect John D. Rockefeller reading the Kinsey Reports and exclaiming, "That's exactly what I donated my money for!" Picture solid, self-made Andrew Carnegie endorsing the collectivistic doctrines of progressive education and applauding the appointment of Alger

Hiss. Think of Rockefeller and Carnegie congratulating each other upon the accomplishments of the communist-dominated Institute of Pacific Relations, made possible by their combined efforts. Unless you can picture such reactions, unless you can also think of Henry Ford benignly nodding approval at the expenditure of many thousands of his dollars for a study of *Telegu*, then you must grant that a portrayal of foundations which depicts them as vehicles for carrying out the wishes of their founders is somewhat unrealistic.

The Charges of Subversion

With such delusions discarded, and within a framework of the expenditure of semipublic funds by a professional bureaucracy, let us reassess charges of subversion which were contained in the Report of the Reece Committee.

Professional spokesmen heatedly ridiculed the notion that any foundation funds had been spent for subversive purposes, and their denials were substantially correct if the charge had been that they deliberately expended funds to directly and immediately overthrow and destroy the government. Were this the definition of "subversive," their righteous anger is easily understood. The term "subversive," however, has a standard definition (Webster's New International Dictionary) as: "Tending to subvert; having a tendency to overthrow, upset, or destroy; as hypocrisy is a vice *subversive* of manhood." Such was the definition used in the Report of the Reece Committee, and it is by such criteria, rather than by attempts at direct and immediate overthrow, that subversive activities are to be judged.

Certainly the founders and all but a few citizens would agree that Kinsey's emphasis subverts (perverts or corrupts by undermining morals, allegiance or faith) codes of sexual morality, replacing these with the comptometer conscience of statistical morality (when a given percentage of people engage in perversion, it becomes "normal"); and that the foundation-sponsored cultural relativism and further endorsement of Kinsey's findings in Stuart Chase's *The Proper Study of Mankind* similarly tends to undermine morals and faith. Most people would likely agree that the Institute of Pacific Relations tended to undermine allegiance to American interests in China. Less well-known is the influence of foundation sponsorship of the four volumes of *The American Soldier*. Of principal interest to the public is the manner in which social scientists forced adoption of the "point system" of discharge, despite continued opposition of the military. The resulting chaotic disbanding of our forces created a military vacuum for Moscow to exploit. Military men apparently anticipated this situation but were forced to subjugate their judgment to that of social scientists who, by the very nature of their "scientific" method, could not possibly take it into account.

To such illustrations of foundation-supported projects which have tended to undermine morals and military policy can be added others, such as millions in foundation support for the London School of Economics, academic breeding ground for the gadflies of Fabian socialism; and the Report of the Commission on Social Studies, described by the philosophical leader of Fabian socialism, Harold Laski, as ". . . an educational program for a socialist America."

Perhaps the Committee failed to make clear that it was inquiring into activities which tend to undermine the government rather than into attempts at immediate overthrow, yet the scope of such inquiry is covered in its authorization, and the description of subversion contained in the Report is almost identical with the one used above. Perhaps foundation spokesmen and the press relied entirely upon popular but loose interpretations of "subversive" and felt no need to consult a dictionary. Whatever the reason, most of the press ignored the issue; and the declamatory statements filed by the foundations, while denouncing such charges, failed to meet them.

These and other significant issues raised and documented by the Committee were evaded or only partially answered by foundation spokesmen. Yet the Committee repeatedly warned of the hazards of governmental regulation. With such warnings I would concur, hoping that efforts of other foundations in the field of social science can balance such subversive activities as were disclosed, and well aware that federal bureaucrats who would handle the tax money derived from their loss of exemption are even more ingenious at wasting it.

As a lesser of two evils, and with the hope that huge funds spent upon projects which tend to undermine morality, the Constitution, military tenets and our international relations will be offset by funds devoted to exploring solid bases to support and perpetuate the valuable elements in our heritage of independence, we can afford foundations. Their detailed activities should not be controlled, nor should they all be blanketed with either praise or censure. Foundations should be evaluated separately, and the effects of those which involve semipublic funds dispensed primarily by highly potent professional administrators and their janissaries might well be periodically reviewed. Their "great power for evil" is now magnified many times, and it does reside in the hands of persons whom their founders could not foresee.

It is rumored that Greece has a project which may be emulated in all countries receiving U. S. aid. A monument will be erected to the Unknown American Taxpayer.

No Heroes, No Villains

By F. R. BUCKLEY

Whether he wants to or not, a writer works à la mode. If he is practical-minded, he won't even try to fight the prevailing taste. He knows that people read and buy books which feed their prejudices. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was undoubtedly inspired by the urgency for abolition in the North; Mrs. Stowe wasn't thinking of royalties when she wrote it, but she could hardly have excluded the hope of popular acceptance. She told a story New England wanted to hear.

Currently, the popular thought trend is a pot pourri of those jawbreakers, environmentalism and egalitarianism. The mass mind has been impregnated with the idea that the human being is some sort of "silly putty" which takes its shape from the social pressures put upon it. Man is a spiritual nullity, so that he can neither influence these pressures nor escape from them. It follows, then, that we are essentially all equal in capacities, and when differences in men appear they are due only to differences in environmental conditioning. None of us comes into the world a "hero," and if "villains" appear among us we must look for causes in slums, capitalism, broken homes or The System.

If that is what the mass mind believes—and you want to encourage it to believe—you write your novel or play accordingly. Take Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman.*

The story of Willy Loman, a salesman who wasn't much good to begin with and wasn't much better when he died, is presented as a reproach. The author casts contempt on a heartless business economy which can take thirty-six years of honest labor from a man and then throw him off in his old age. He shows his disgust for a civilization which holds as its empyrean a physical sort of success: the success on a football field, the success in business, the getting ahead in a ruthless struggle for position with no other end in mind than the getting there. He allows pity to sweeten his despair over men who are conditioned by their society to hold such poor values high. The considerable impact of the play is derived from relating what happens to human beings when they cannot reach even these superficial goals. When Willy Loman finds he is a failure as a salesman, when his son, Biff, upon whom he lavishes so much hope, turns out badly, there is nothing left for Willy to live by. Our society has left him no crust of spirituality.

Sounds good. Here is an author who seems bitterly disappointed with the materialism of his age. Himself conditioned by collectivist thought, however, he lays the blame squarely on society—in this case, on our free enterprise economy. This is natural in a writer educated to believe that environment determines the actions of men. His perspective is limited. He cannot see that the corruption of business is no more than a reflection of the general corruption of the human being; of man inflated by the liberal doctrine of equality into the assumption of God-like infallibility; of man disappointed by repeated evidence of his incompetence and turned venal as a result.

Dime a Dozen

But Miller is an artist, not a writer of tracts, and he gets a glimmering that whatever the environmental compulsions, a person has himself ultimately to blame. Biff Loman approaches this perception in a halting manner. Like the author, he has a fumbling, incomplete glimpse of reality. He grabs his father toward the end of the play. He shouts, "All right, phony! Then let's lay it on the line." He crushes his father by telling him that further excuses for failure will not do. He says, "We never told the truth for ten minutes in this house!" He will not let his father meander off into his dream world of inflated hopes, a world which does not exist, a world of boasts and vainglory and lies. He tells the truth. "Pop! I'm a dime a dozen, and so are you!"

That finishes Willy Loman. He cannot accept the fact. He cannot believe that you need to be anything more than "well-liked" to get ahead. That one must be "well-liked" has been his only spiritual conviction. When Willy finds out that it has come to nothing, he is left desolate. Obviously, for such a man as Willy, there is but one course left to take. That course is suicide.

Is this the stuff of tragedy? This tawdry tale of a pathological liar caught up in the meshes of a meaningless life? Arthur Miller seems to think so. He has Willy's wife say, "Willy Loman never made a lot of money. His name was never in the paper. He's not the finest character that ever lived. But he's a human being, and a terrible thing is happening to him. So attention must be paid." She adds, "A small man can be just as exhausted as a great man."

All this is true, and commendatory. It is human-

itarian in an age where humanism breathes with a gasp. Willy Loman invokes the charity in our hearts, but so do a limping dog and a crying child. The dog and the child are not tragic. To think of them as so does violence to the word. And Willy Loman is not tragic. There is nothing of the godly Oedipus about him, little of the princely Satan. His good qualities are love for home and family, his vices are petty infidelities and embarrassing prevarications. Willy Loman has no heroic potential, and his football-playing son has none either. We can pity Willy Loman, and we can sympathize with Arthur Miller's sensitive sorrow over the Willy Lomans of our times. But Willy is a common man, one of the mass of common men. He is a dime a dozen. In the final analysis, he is dull.

Miller Loves Loman

It may strike us as odd that Miller should *love* this exasperating character. But Miller loves Willy Loman because he loves the egalitarian man. Willy Loman is a failure because he does not have the attributes of the egalitarian man. There is no spiritual force in the drama. The failure is preponderantly material—a failure of gumption, an inability to comprehend the real world and go after it. Loman cannot absorb himself into the mass of his fellows. In a sense, he is a nonconformist. But not consciously, not willingly. He does not rise above himself, above his neighbors, above his environment; he sinks beneath. He does not become greater, but littler. To become more common than the lowest level is not criminal to an egalitarian writer. It is a crime only to successfully challenge our Brave New World.

The tradition of heroic presentation—the Dmitri of Dostoevsky, the Oedipus of Sophocles, the Satan of Milton and the Heathcliff of Brontë—is quite out of fashion. Perhaps the egalitarian movement in literature, which forbade heroes and villains as undemocratic criticism of the mass of humanity that is neither heroic nor villainous (nor anything of any interest at all), reached its artistic climax in the works of Joyce. In *Ulysses*, his Leopold Bloom travels through a twenty-four-hour Odyssey which comprises such fascinating events as eating kidneys, going to the bathroom and lusting after a woman without consummation. *Ulysses* is not tragic, for tragedy, like the majestic personalities it requires, has disappeared with their demise.

Joyce's *Ulysses* is a tour-de-force. It is an expression of dullness through dullness, futility through futility, the lack of values through the lack of values. In itself, it is the expression of the anguish of a writer, who as a result of his environment and of the century to which he was born, feels he can no longer subscribe to anything, not even the sterile beliefs of his century; and who recognizes that without belief, without some kind of faith, life is blankly meaningless.

That should have been enough. But Joyce left a legacy whose import was misunderstood by his inheritors. Joyce bridged the old world of value and the new world of no value. Unfortunately, writers born in the next generation, our Arthur Miller, our Herman Wouk, our Tennessee Williams, were not given this historical perspective. They were slapped into consciousness of the world as it was, with no nostalgia for the past and with characteristic twentieth-century disdain for the prescriptions of history. Unlike Joyce, they do not recognize that the mass tastes of the mass Blooms reflect an inner decadence in man.

Whatever may be their doubts, writers today are adjusted to the modern world. They accept with love its major precepts and values. They have found the new faith Joyce cried for. In Ezra Pound, this faith took the form of fascism. In Howard Fast, relief and hope was found through communism. In John Steinbeck, socialism gave surcease and meaning. Other writers vacillate between and spread their numbers among the extreme left-wing and a moderate sort of collectivism. What writers hold in common—the key to our new literature—is that they all espouse egalitarianism. This is the great dogma of modernity. Whether it be majoritarian (democracy), oligarchic (fascism) or proletarian (communism), it is all the same thing: it is egalitarianism. Hence, there can be no heroes, no villains; for the greatest good is *to be of* the greatest number. To admit the spiritual difference required by the concepts of hero and villain is to assume that there *is* a difference in people, that some people can be as bad as Iago and as good as Othello. This, so egalitarianism ordains, is impossible. They are all like Joe Dough. If they are not, if their temperaments vary, if their potentialities for good or for evil differ, how can one manage a planned State where a population amenable to statistical tabulation has got to be presumed? We must never forget that such political implications are always latent in an egalitarian writer, and beyond producing literature of the gutter, egalitarianism in literature is a collectivist weapon in the battle of the mind.

Dregs in The Trolley

A Streetcar Named Desire, by Tennessee Williams, exemplifies this attitude. The dregs of humanity are again selected for dramatic portrayal. The hallmark of egalitarianism is evident. There are no heroes, and nobody is really villainous; consequently, there is no tragedy. In the jungle of materialism, it is not criminal for the father tiger to eat its young. And in the world of *A Streetcar Named Desire*, where amorality is a condition of being, there is no real reprehension in Stanley's rape of his sister-in-law. It is an act. It exists. People do it.

I suppose we are all horrified by the rape, sitting in our capacity as an audience. But what is more

horrible than our discomfiture is that Stanley is untouched by the event. His one-dimensional character is capable of no moral repercussions. He is an animal. He leaves his meal when it is done.

And Blanche du Bois, the aging belle of a decayed Southern family, what is the effect on her? Imperceptible. She veers into madness, but this means little more to her than a further retreat from life. With the conventional disdain of history, culture and tradition which characterizes the egalitarian writer, Tennessee Williams portrays Blanche as a shoddy sort of being who cannot adjust to new circumstances. Her tradition, instead of giving her strength, vision, spiritual resources, serves only to make her unfit for the proletarianization of the human being. In Williams' view, Blanche is more sinning than sinned against. There is a certain amount of sadistic satisfaction (mixed with our blushes) in seeing her assaulted by Stanley, seeing her "taken down a peg or two."

Environment rules the drama. The protagonists move in a kind of coma toward the final dissolution. It is apparent that although Williams wrote the play to show us how rotten life can become, he writes without the benefit of moral conviction and the ensuing knowledge of what can be done about life. How can one of his characters express more perception than he has got himself? Arthur Miller can at least discern, though dimly, that what is wrong with society is what is wrong with man. But Williams is immersed in the evil. When you are under water, your vision is blurred.

The Caine Mutiny

Herman Wouk's *The Caine Mutiny* differs from the two plays discussed. Wouk is not concerned with "sociological significance." Principally, his object is to tell a good tale, and he succeeds in his object famously.

The narrative follows Willie Keith, a Princeton graduate of some means, from the shelter of his home through the savagery of war. In the process of this journey, Willie Keith matures. He boards the ship *Caine* as an ensign, feckless and untested, and he leaves the *Caine* as its last captain, a hero and a wiser man.

He *is* a hero. He does get a medal, a bronze star, for gallantry. But the heroism of courage is inadequate for the heroism of literature. Hamlet, after all, was two parts coward. What Keith needs before he can approach this heroic stature is the sensitivity of perception. He is without this necessity. He plays his part in the mutiny and in the subsequent trial with a dumb absence of understanding. Later, after the banquet of celebration is interrupted by the defense counsel, who tells the mutineers that they were actually at fault, Keith takes on added perspective. He gains partial appreciation of what it is all about. But the perception is surely dim, and disappointing. It disappoints the potential of the book.

The lawyer, one Barney Greenwald, confesses to the assembled mutineers that he got them acquitted through the use of legal trickery. He tells them that there is no excuse for their mutiny, that their evidence of the paranoiac tendencies of the captain was shaky. He explains this in terms of his Jewish background, a subjectiveness which I believe is weakening.

Greenwald's sermon is highly sentimental, involving his grandmother, soap, and the gallant professional soldiers who defended America while civilians were busy making money. It breaks the book in two. For Keith then turns from an intelligent (and 75 per cent correct) criticism of the military to an abject trust in it. This is supposed to be a sign of his maturity. In reality, it sinks him into the mass of unthinking men, deploring unilateral action of any sort, willing to adjust to the precepts of his society, whatever these precepts may be. Keith becomes an egalitarian, a dependable automaton—the kind of robot essential to the Navy in wartime, of absolute necessity in a planned State where orders are to be taken by the populace without reflection or contradiction.

Keith is no real hero. He does not come to grips with the problem. He accepts Greenwald's analysis —a facile acceptance of emotional thinking. Greenwald's explanation is accepted by the author, and this fact reduces all the characters in proportion. Captain Queeg becomes a pitiable wreck. Steve Maryk, the executive officer whose career is ruined by the mutiny, remains a dumb foil, who inspires sympathy but can hardly be called a hero. And Keefer, the novelist who agitated for the mutiny and then backed out of responsibility, is as villainous as anybody gets; but it is a villainy of the unconscious. Keefer cannot help his weakness, we are told, and he disappears also into the egalitarian morass where individuals are "other-directed," in David Riesman's phrase—where they are not culpable for their actions.

The three authors singled out for illustration of egalitarian literature belong to a higher plane than most of their colleagues. It would have been easy to berate such posturers as Mickey Spillane and John Faulkner. Egalitarianism with them has been brought to the depths of pornography and sadism. Human beings cease to exist as such and become mere environmental improvisations. But it seemed more important to show what egalitarianism has done to our better writing, how egalitarianism has hurt it, and how this infected literature is hurting us, causing us to forget that it is the uncommon individuals who determine society.

A Reviewer's Notebook

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The books on Dr. Albert Schweitzer, the good physician of Lambaréné in French Equatorial Africa, threaten to become almost as numerous as the stars in the Milky Way. There is Joseph Gollomb's popular *Albert Schweitzer: Genius in the Jungle* (249 pp., New York: Vanguard, $3), which rips through seventy-five years of its subject's life with no attempt to be profound and is perhaps the better for that. There is George Seaver's *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind* (346 pp., New York: Harper, $3.75), which neatly separates Schweitzer's active life from his contemplative. There is Schweitzer's own *Out of My Life and Thought* (274 pp., New York: Holt, $4, postscript by Everett Skillings), which is somewhat random and meager if it is to be taken as anything more than a book of clues for future biographers. There is Oskar Kraus' *Albert Schweitzer: His Work and his Philosophy* (73 pp., Boston: Beacon Press, $1.75), a book which mingles some touching tributes to the man of action with a spate of cloudy criticism of Schweitzer's failure to explain the whole universe *tout court* in his works on Jesus and Saint Paul and in his answer to Spengler. Finally, in addition to numerous Schweitzer anthologies, critical studies and reprints of his major and minor works on everything from music to Goethe, there is Erica Anderson's recent book of photographs, *The World of Albert Schweitzer* (144 pp., New York: Harper, $5, text and captions by Eugene Exman), which has happily become a best-seller.

All of the books listed above tell a story that is a "natural," about a young Alsatian boy who grew up to be a many-sided genius. Schweitzer is an organ-player and a student of Bach, an original commentator on Biblical texts, a provocative historian of the origins of Christianity, a doctor of medicine who apparently has the hands of a first-rate surgeon, a fair-to-middling jungle carpenter-builder, a philosopher with a message which might ultimately help to save a world that must some day experience a revulsion against contemporary barbarity, and a living illustration of the old truth that he who loseth his life shall find it. But what interests me particularly about Schweitzer is his stature as a voluntarist and a libertarian, which is something that tends to escape the many humanitarian cultists who flock to worship at his shrine.

What makes Schweitzer a towering figure is that he is a "do-gooder" with a difference: he has never relied on compulsion to create and sustain his hospital on the Ogowe River in the middle of the African jungle. The money for Lambaréné has been raised partly by the willing sacrifices of friends and admirers, but it is Schweitzer's own sacrifice that has been pre-eminent. The hospital at Lambaréné has come into being because Schweitzer has been willing to lecture for it, to play the organ for it, to write books and articles, and, finally, to get out and work on the site with his own powerful hands and ingenious brain. Schweitzer has poured his own life, his own sweat, his own money, into his mission. We have no Harry Hopkins here, no supercilious settlement worker who demands that the State put the tax pistol at the heads of citizens in order to bring "good" to those who are "too damned dumb to understand." Schweitzer has respected everybody in his humanitarian career, even those who do not care to be humanitarians.

The curious thing about it is that he seems hardly conscious of his own uniqueness, or even of the purity of his own action. When he is writing about forced labor in a colonial system he blurs the fundamentals by assuming that force can be justified if it is for the slave's own good. He talks of "rights" as being a "function" of the "normal" organization of society, which would seem to deny that rights can be "natural" and "inalienable." But if Schweitzer is incurably empirical when confronted with a "condition" that does not easily bend to the application of libertarian principle, he does not accept force for himself. And his ethic of "reverence for life" has no truck in actual Schweitzerian practice with any gabble about rights being a "function" of the organization of society. A veritable St. Francis, Schweitzer unconsciously accepts a Bill of Rights even for the animal kingdom: a monkey, an antelope, even an ant, has a "natural" right to existence, as Schweitzer is prepared to admit in ordinary practice. And this without reference to the "functions" of "normal" ant or antelope society.

Schweitzer is a religious personality and a practicing follower of Jesus, but, as Oscar Kraus legitimately points out, he is at bottom an agnostic about such things as the immortality of the soul, or the doctrine of ultimate ends. To Schweitzer, even as to Herbert Spencer, the universe is knowable in its manifestations but unknowable as to its cause, its fundamental make-up, its extent and its destination. But if Schweitzer makes no attempt to explain the final mystery of the world outside of himself, he does not take the easy way out into a fashionable skepticism about human purposes. It is enough for him that man can be logical about himself. It is enough for him that something, call it a "principle" or "God" or simply the unknown "X" of the equation, has caused a differentiation between life and non-life, between consciousness and non-consciousness.

This is something that escapes "scientific" explanation; hence it must be projected symbolically, by dramatic analogy and by myth. And, since it indubitably exists, consciousness establishes its own valuation; the sentient being feels intuitively that he is worth more than a stone. It should follow, as a matter of reason, that a belief in one's own worth must be extended to a belief in the worth of all living things. (Like things must have like values.) Besides, as a selfish matter, it is only by such an extension that the individual can be sure of his own comparative safety. "Reverence for Life," which is deservedly Schweitzer's most famous phrase, thus carries with it the whole political corollary of the libertarian revolution. It also carries with it the corollary of the Golden Rule—indeed, save for those who are afflicted with a death-wish, it *is* the Golden Rule.

Schweitzer is not foolish enough to believe that Reverence for Life can make all problems simple. As a surgeon, he has often had to sacrifice the lives of bacteria to save the lives of human beings. He kills poisonous snakes, he weeds his tropical gardens and he prunes his trees, all of which is hardly "reverent" from the point of view of reptilian and vegetable tissue. But Schweitzer recognizes that the practical necessity of shooting a vicious leopard or tearing a creeper away from a mango tree entails the acceptance of a horrible responsibility. He seems to argue that awareness of the awful responsibility for killing one thing in order that another may live is sufficient to keep one humble—and safe.

It is right at this point that Schweitzer's "ethical mysticism" breaks down as an infallible guide to right conduct. For Lenin justified the killing of "bourgeois obstructionists" on the precise philosophical grounds that Schweitzer uses to justify the slaughter of a coral snake or a boa constrictor. Lenin liked to pet children and cats and listen to Beethoven and talk about the day when killing would be unnecessary. As for Hitler, even he revered life—provided it was German, "Aryan" and properly worshipful of the State. And John C. Calhoun accepted the awful responsibility of keeping black men in slavery on the ground that a "higher" good for more valuable human beings was involved in the act.

"Reverence for Life," then, even on Schweitzer's responsible terms, does not solve the terrible contradiction of a world in which life preys on life and in which human beings sometimes conveniently assign other human beings to the category of leopard, bacteria or coral snake. Insofar as human life is concerned, the concept of reverence must be coupled with a highly articulate concept of human rights as entirely antecedent to the formation of society, or the organization of a State. There must be no talk of rights as a "function" of the "normal" organization of society, for if rights are a mere "function" who will respect them when it is considered "normal" expediency to infringe them? In speaking of rights as a "function" of "normality," Schweitzer involves himself in a logical mare's nest. For what is "normality" worth if it is not a result of a just relationship between human beings? And how can we have a just relationship that is not firmly rooted in "inalienable" rights? As for the animals, "reverence" will hardly save the cattle in the abattoir, or the ear of corn on the stalk. Perhaps Schweitzer's rule must be amended to read: "Reverence for the rights that guarantee human life, and pity for the animals and plants whose lives are bounded by human sufferance."

A. D. Lindsay, the Master of Balliol College, objects that nobody has a right to ask for "an unshakable intellectual certainty" in the fields which Schweitzer has explored as a philosopher. But surely one can ask for as much clarity as human language is capable of yielding. It ought to be apparent to anybody that a "right" and a "function" may or may not be coextensive, and that to identify the two might easily lead to the very capitulation to *Realpolitik* which Schweitzer has all his life condemned.

When all is said, however, it is the example of Schweitzer's life, not the logical consistency of his vocabulary, that is important. That example comes through vividly in Mr. Gollomb's short, tumultuous book which makes full use of anecdote and incident. Mr. Gollomb has taken the clues vouchsafed by Schweitzer's own *Out of My Life and Thought* and gone on from there, using a popular novelist's pace to carry the reader from Alsace to Africa, and from a World War One detention camp in France to organ recitals in Sweden. George Seaver tells the same story in more restrained terms. The example gleams far more fitfully and intermittently through Schweitzer's own prose, which is altogether too modest when the man is writing about his own triumphs at the organ or in the operating room.

The living example that is Schweitzer becomes most nebulous in Oskar Kraus' book. This is odd, for Kraus values Schweitzer primarily as a man of action, not as a thinker. But Kraus gets so wrapped up in spinning heavily Germanic distinctions between *Weltanschauung* and *Lebensanschauung* that he has little time and space left for Schweitzer as the Doer of the Word.

Since Schweitzer has always been the most uncompromising of activists in promoting his many causes, it is scant cause for wonder that Erica Anderson's book of photographs has something superlatively good to work with and on. The "antediluvian landscape" which Schweitzer describes so well in certain passages of his *On the Edge of the Primeval Forest* is nothing if not pictorial, and Miss Anderson is skillful in catching it with the camera. The great cumulus clouds over the placid reaches of the Ogowe River; the palms that tower over the packing boxes at Lambaréné landing; the burly, tall figure of Schweitzer as he surveys a native putting out in a pirogue; the half-mistrustful, half-hoping look in the eyes of a patient as she gets her first introduction to the hospital station; the unrolled lepers' bandages as they flap from a clothesline in the sterilizing sun; the busy action of strong men rolling mahogany logs to the sawing pit; the shots of Schweitzer's sinewy arms and hands as they feed a pet antelope, or gently hold a lizard, or rest on the keys of the piano—these, and scores of pic-

tures like them, make this a book to be remembered for a long time to come. And the beautiful bucolic shots of the Vosges mountain country of Schweitzer's Alsatian origins provide a remarkable foil for the African sections.

None of the books on Schweitzer, however, does the man full justice. The perfect book awaits the writer who can relate Schweitzer's life to his statement that "modern man dares not face the world alone; he shrinks from freedom and from duty; he prefers to accept the domination of an impersonal arbiter—the State—which is the custodian both of his conscience and of his reason." Schweitzer himself has never shrunk from freedom or from duty, and he has never, as a practical matter, accepted the domination of the State. But not even he has realized the full implication of his wonderful diagnosis of the plight of modern man.

Cold War Tactics

The New Warfare, by Brigadier C. N. Barclay. X + 65 pp. London: Philosophical Library, Inc. $2.75

This book is a gem. In 65 pages, Brigadier Barclay, editor of the British *Army Quarterly,* gives a fresh analysis of the struggle with the Soviet Union, and proposals for meeting the "new warfare."

In World War One, he says, we waged war for the first time with credit. ". . . Up to 1914, man waged war on a scale he could afford. Since 1914 he has waged it on a scale which is beyond his means." Today, preparation for war is as costly as war itself used to be. That is why Brigadier Barclay believes the "cold war" is the decisive form of warfare today. We may be drawn into a shooting war by accident, but the cold war is the war we must win. Our basic error is to meet the new attack with defense and retreat. We can win the cold war only by "superior methods, better organization, and greater determination than our opponents."

There are no quick remedies. The author sees, for example, no early hope of arms reduction. "In the vast areas involved—practically the whole land-mass of the world—it appears impossible to devise a system of inspection sufficiently watertight to satisfy either East or West."

Our side must avoid dashing enterprises, which are not a help, he believes. The war in Korea, which was fought on the territory of the victim, is a grim warning of the high cost of liberation. Barclay cites the Berlin Island, British recognition of Red China, and refusal to deal with Iran and Spain, as instances of our not understanding the game we are trying to play.

Brigadier Barclay is not proposing answers, but methods. First, "We must fight every aspect of the new warfare with skill and determination." (That we have never tried.) We must be ready (materially and morally) to win a shooting war, or we cannot win in negotiation.

Then we can look for areas of "reasonable compromise." The Soviet Union must abandon its fifth columns. "We can never agree to her right to use *any means* to convert the whole world to communism." The author believes we must give up attempts to free the satellites. This is crucial, but not simple. Some people will argue that morally we cannot abandon the satellites. Others will say that a series of little wars has not freed them, and a great war will smash us. Some will say leaving the satellites under Red control will soon give the Communists an overwhelming military advantage. Others insist that, if we really destroy the fifth columns, the Soviet Union will collapse.

The "new warfare" is the struggle for existence in a new and larger dimension. In such crises of history, the attackers enter the contest prepared. The peaceful side has to invent new means of survival while carrying on its defense. Failure to understand the changed character of the struggle means death.

What of the United Nations as an "instrument of peace" in this conflict? Outwardly, the UN is an eighteenth-century debating society where reasonable men settle great issues by logic. Does any one believe the Communists seek this forum for the sake of sweet reason? Or that the free nations will create a difficult new strategy while dwelling in the comfortable past? But, under the surface, the UN is also a pyramidal bureaucracy, subject to no law, which works unceasingly to centralize power and management in one world organization. Will that governmental control-tower ever favor the free society?

If the free nations permit their policies and their resources to be entangled with the UN, when they should be creating new strategies for survival, the cold war is already lost.

EDNA LONIGAN

Betrayal by Treaty

The Treaty As an Instrument of Legislation, by Florence Ellinwood Allen. XXI & 114 pp. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. $2.00

Judge Allen's book is a warning that the United Nations and the exercise of the treaty-making power may result in the destruction of our political and social system.

In virtue of Article VI of the United States Constitution we are in a unique position with regard to international treaties. Elsewhere, ratification of an international treaty merely creates an obligation for the government which has ratified it. In the United States it imposes direct obligations on each individual citizen, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Thus, while a Canadian or a Swiss remains unaffected by the terms of an international treaty which his government has ratified until such time as his legislature has enacted laws to enforce it, an American may be hauled into court for failure to observe it as soon as ratification has taken place.

That means in practice that in the United States it is possible not only to enact domestic legislation without the participation of the House of Representatives but even to circumvent the constitutional provisions of Article V for amending the Constitution. This was obviously not the intention of the members of the Constitutional Convention who looked upon international treaties as contracts concluded between governments, which would grant rights to governments and impose duties upon them, but not as a substitute for domestic legislation.

It was apparently not the intention of the framers of the United Nations Charter either, for they agreed on Article II, 7 which says

that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." As Goodrich and Hambro have pointed out, however, "A matter ceases to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction if it is regulated by an international treaty [*Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*]."

Moreover, the restrictions of Article II, 7 do not apply to the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, which flaunts a shocking disregard for law. One of the first pronouncements made by Mr. Norris E. Dodd on August 9, 1948, shortly after his appointment as Director-General of that Agency, dealt with the organization's contractual obligations. It runs as follows: "A contract can exist only where there is a court of law in which it can be enforced. FAO is not subject to any national judicial authority. The interpretation of its statutes and regulations is a matter for the Director-General." The United States, which had joined that organization on the expressed understanding that it would never be required to contribute more than one fourth of the budgeted revenue, was put under pressure until it consented to take over a larger percentage share directly and a still larger one indirectly, camouflaged as funds devoted to technical assistance.

The growing power of the United Nations Agencies must be viewed as a threat to the system under which we are living. National law-making is accompanied by wide publicity and public discussion and prepared by the representatives of the people who are affected by it. The international treaties which threaten to supersede it are drafted by remote commissions and hardly ever subjected to adequate public discussion. As things are now, it is almost unavoidable that they will subvert our way of life in the long run. The United Nations Agencies want to have their proposals universally accepted. As long as the Communists insist on the observance of their principles while the free world is ready and eager to compromise, universality must be paid for by obedience to the party line.

HUBERT MARTIN

Clay Feet of the Soviet Colossus

How Strong is Russia? A. Geographic Appraisal, by George B. Cressey. 146 pp. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press. $3.00

If this is the age of treason, it is also the age of fear—a fear engendered by a consistent build-up of Russia in the minds of war-weary people. This idiotic Western propaganda began with the benign wartime picture of "Uncle Joe" Stalin and was given a sinister impetus in the suicidal concessions of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Now our psychological warfare "experts" attempt to reverse a trend which they themselves encouraged or condoned. Fortunately libertarian, revisionist historians like Tansill, Barnes, Greaves and Chamberlin have made recent progress with exploding collateral myths.

George B. Cressey's *How Strong Is Russia?* is easily one of the most important efforts to correct false impressions and examine the clay feet of the Soviet colossus. His book has the disciplined precision of a textbook but reads like a novel of adventure. Equipped with superb maps—especially the end papers—this small volume contains an enormous range of precise information. It can be read with profit by laymen as well as the politico-strategic experts of the Pentagon and the State Department—perhaps with greatest profit by laymen, since it will make them independent of the "experts." The study is developed within the framework of geophysics, but moves swiftly into economic factors; the lucid sequence of conclusions is impressively sound.

Within the 8,500,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, there is ample room for all of the United States, Alaska, Canada and Mexico. The land area of the Soviets is as big as the face of the moon; it covers one seventh of the whole earth. But size is no guarantee of importance; it may even be a handicap. Relatively few patches of the Soviet earth are really good. Vast areas are too dry; parts of the steppe resemble the American "dust bowl." More than 3,500,000 square miles are underlain by soil which never thaws; this is an area larger than the United States.

Where is the good land? It lies roughly within an irregular triangle between the Baltic and the Black Sea, tapering eastward into Asia. But this wedge represents less than a million square miles with any real agricultural possibilities. Even within this cultivated area, there is land poorer than the New England hillsides which were abandoned a century ago. The land area which actually grows food covers only about 500,000 square miles, some 6 per cent of the country. While this is about the same cultivated area as that of the United States, the over-all quality of American farm land is far superior. We have to feed only 160,000,000 people, whereas the Soviets are saddled with a population of well over 210,000,000. The conclusion is inevitable: limited soils and marginal climate will always handicap the Soviet food supply. This has spelled trouble for the tsars as well as the commissars.

The picture is radically different as regards mineral resources and the resulting potential of industrial development. The Soviet Union is a land with enormous mineral wealth, second only to the United States; it comes nearer to being a self-contained national unit than any other country. The Ukraine, the Urals and south central Siberia are the centers of fabulous mineral output. The Kuznets coal field in central Siberia is Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia rolled into one, and much is high-grade coking coal.

The prospects are less favorable as regards oil. The Baku fields still supply about half the Soviet requirements. Tested reserves are reported as large, but long rail hauls are required for distribution. Eddy Gilmore, who lived in Russia for eleven years, observes that the end products—gasoline and lubricants—are very unsatisfactory.

On the other hand, the position with regard to metals is exceptional. Iron ore is abundant, but as with oils, the problem is not with quantity but with location. The Urals contain great deposits of iron ore at Magnitogorsk, but coking coal is 1,500 miles away at Kuznets. Nowhere in the capitalist world does it pay to haul coal ore 1,500 miles by rail—but under communism

costs are hidden. The Ukraine locations are more advantageous. The iron ore of Krivoi Rog is only two hundred miles west of Donets coking coal; midway lies the Dnieper dam and immense hydro-electric power. This is one of the great steel areas of the world. Of copper, lead, zinc, tin, nickel and maganese, the Soviets have a good supply. Gold is superabundant; production appears to exceed five million ounces a year. Dug out of the ground in Russia, the gold is sold on the world market of London and finds its way back into the ground at Fort Knox; the huge profits finance some of the Soviets' purchases abroad, including payments for espionage. Thus there are great mineral reserves to underwrite the making of a great industrial nation; an economic embargo would pinch, but not seriously. Heavy industries support a threatening military armament—a momentary advantage, offset by the fundamental weakness of a deficient civilian economy.

In general, Cressey's book is an impartial, scientific appraisal stripped of any ideological prejudice. Communism is considered in its economic impact only. Surprisingly, the author fumbles here and there: the end papers show Poland in undisputed possession of the Oder-Neisse line, while the Soviets collect the area alloted by Lord Curzon; if that thesis were tenable, Texas would have to be returned to Mexico. In discussing tsarist support of the Greek Orthodox Church, the author seems to accept a notorious Red slogan that "religion is the opiate of the people." In spots, Cressey reads like a discreet apologist for Soviet foreign policy: he wants "less tension" between the U.S. and the Soviets; the latter "base their criticism of the U.S. on its treatment of Negro citizens"—a spurious claim indeed, considering that the Soviets prostitute 15,000,000 of their own people in slave-labor camps. He blandly accepts the Soviet arguments of "strategic security," but ignores the bald-faced threat of 175 Soviet divisions vis-à-vis an estimated fifty divisions of an incomplete NATO.

The author is devastatingly convincing if he sticks to his specialty of geophysics and economic geography; he is less impressive in an interpretative analysis of Soviet foreign policies and their justification. Incidentally, his accurate appraisal of Soviet assets and liabilities plays havoc with MacKinder's "heartland" thesis, which was really promulgated as a warning against the Versailles Treaty—a monument to Western folly equalled only by Yalta and Potsdam.

CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY

The Constitutionalist

The Political Writings of John Adams, edited by George A. Peek, Jr. 223 pp. New York: Liberal Arts Press. $2.25 cloth, $.90 paper

This is one of the most valuable publications in the excellent American Heritage series, which also offers selections from the works of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun and the collective authors of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison and Jay. Adams is sometimes, and very unjustly, remembered as a one-term president, overshadowed by his predecessor and successor, Washington and Jefferson.

A more enduring title to fame was his grasp of the principles of republican conservatism. In an age when there was an abundance of learned and acute political speculation, Adams vindicated with vigor and consistency such basic ideas of the American Constitution as the balanced and limited powers of the three coordinating branches of the government, the right of the minority to protection against the tyranny of the majority and the inseparable connection between liberty and property.

Few modern Americans would have the time or patience to read through the prolific writings of Adams. So Professor Peek performs a useful service by presenting, with commentary and editorial notes, those salient excerpts from the longer works of Adams which set forth his beliefs in clear perspective.

The heart of the second President's political philosophy is summed up in one brief sentence in his *Defense of the American Constitution*: "Power is always abused when unlimited and unbalanced." This anticipated by several generations Lord Acton's profound reflection, based on a tremendous stock of historical erudition: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Simple, unchecked government, according to Adams, is always despotic, whether exercised by a monarch, by aristocrats or by the mass of the people. The only means of preventing government from becoming tyranny is to erect so many checks and balances that ambition counteracts ambition, and power checks power. Writes Adams:

> The nation which will not accept an equilibrium of power must adopt a despotism. There is no other alternative. Rivalries must be controlled, or they will throw all things into confusion; and there is nothing but despotism or a balance of power which can control them.
>
> Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist. But if unlimited or unbalanced power of disposing property be put in the hands of those who have no property, France will find, as we have found, the lamb committed to the custody of the wolf.

Like Burke, a thinker of very similar cast, Adams is in sharp disagreement with Rousseau, Condorcet and other ideologues of the French Revolution, with their belief in the natural goodness and equality of man. The puritan conscience of Adams makes him suspicious of human nature, especially when men are invested with political power.

> To expect self-denial from men, when they have a majority in their favor and consequently power to gratify themselves is to disbelieve all history and universal experience; it is to disbelieve Revelation and the Word of God, which informs us the heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked.

The thought of Adams, harsh and astringent as it may seem to those who have injured their mental digestion by swallowing too much of the soothing syrup of leftist clichés, never rang more true than in this age of demagogic dictatorships and mass manipulation tyrannies.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

I am more and more convinced that man is a dangerous creature; and that power, whether vested in many or few, is ever grasping, and like the grave, cries "Give, give!"

ABIGAIL ADAMS, letter to her husband, November 27, 1775

Growth of the Webb

Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain, by Sister M. Margaret Patricia McCarran. 612 pp. Chicago: The Heritage Foundation, Inc. $5.00

A well-known British historian, attempting to apologize for the enormous growth of the British Empire during the nineteenth century, declared that Britain had acquired her empire in a "fit of absence of mind." True or not, this was not the cause of the British adoption of socialism. There was nothing haphazard about that. It was all planned that way, planned carefully and patiently, by the Fabian Society.

Sister McCarran's work, which has the honor of being attacked by Representative Wayne Hays, was originally a Ph.D. thesis at the Catholic University of America. It is an exhaustive, almost day-by-day, investigation of the activities of the Fabians during the 1920's. Not meant for light reading, it has enormous merit as an encyclopaedic reference work on the society and its activities.

Many new insights emerge from this book. The general run of historians have propagated a myth that the Fabian Society, the General Staff of the socialist movement, dissolved during World War One and played no role thereafter. Sister McCarran shows that this myth was carefully cultivated by the Fabians themselves, the better to camouflage their actions. Actually, they played a great part in the political life of the 1920's and continue to do so down to the present day.

She also points out that this organization, which probably holds the world's record for political leverage per member, began as a small group of mystics in 1883. It was the product of a merger of members of two spiritualist groups. The main one was an American organization called the Fellowship of the New Life, or Nuova Vita. The British founders were psychical researchers named Edward Pease and Frank Podmore. Some of the original founders wanted the society to become a monastic cultist "Order"; finally, however, they decided to remain in the world and mold it slowly but surely into socialism. What a tragedy for the world that the would-be monastics, led by Havelock Ellis, did not win out! Others who participated early in the Nuova Vita were T. H. Green, John Dewey and Morris Cohen. The eventual roster of Fabian members in Britain reads like a galaxy of British scholars and intellectuals: among them have been Bertrand Russell, Sir Norman Angell, Harold Laski, Vera Brittain, J. B. Priestley, Virginia Woolf, George Catlin, Sir Ernest Barker, Herman Finer, R. H. Tawney, C. E. M. Joad, Graham Wallas, Rebecca West, Sir William Beveridge, Rupert Brooke, Barbara Wootton, G. M. Trevelyan and Arnold Bennett.

One of the most striking parts of the book is the concluding passage, consisting of the testimony of the former Soviet diplomat Igor Bogolepov before the McCarran Internal Security Subcommittee, to the effect that *Soviet Socialism, a New Civilization* was written for its nominal authors, Beatrice and Sidney Webb—deans of the Fabian movement—by the Soviet Foreign Office and the Soviet secret police. This little incident provides a fitting commentary on the aims and methods of Fabianism.

AUBREY HERBERT

Battle for Minds

The Fifth Weapon, by Robert S. Byfield. 67 pp. Distributed by the Bookmailer, Box 101, Murray Hill Station, New York 16, N.Y. $1.00

When Whittaker Chambers abandoned his role in the communist conspiracy he did so under the assumption that he was joining the losing side.

Why should the mightiest productive system the earth has ever witnessed fight a losing battle for the minds of men? Why should a system based on individual freedom ever yield to a system based on collective slavery?

Some pertinent answers to these pressing problems are found in a short hard-hitting work by Robert S. Byfield, United Nations representative for the New York Stock Exchange. Mr. Byfield designates as the "Fifth Weapon" the communist *methodology* and ability to coordinate the now conventional weapons of air power, land power, sea power and psychological warfare.

The Fifth Weapon employs an armory of tactical devices so devastating in their effectiveness that it behooves everyone to learn to spot a communist semantic ruse when it appears. Ignorance and naïveté in the American people are the factors which have made the Fifth Weapon effective.

For example, Mr. Byfield presents a communist lexicon far removed from the idiom of Funk and Wagnall's. Here are some representative communist definitions of words which are being drummed into world acceptance:

> *The People*: the Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.
> *Enemies of the People*: all anti-Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.
> *Traitor*: a particularly active individual among the anti-Communists.
> *Slanderer*: anyone who tells the truth about the Soviet Union.
> *Reactionary*: outside of the Iron Curtain, anyone who isn't a Communist.
> *Fascist*: anyone who believes in capitalism.
> *Anti-Fascist*: a Communist.
> *Progressive*: a Communist sympathizer; a fellow-traveler.
> *Liberation*: conquest of a free country by communist infiltration or force.
> *Monopoly*: any corporate enterprise.

Mr. Byfield has made a telling, documented case for knowing the communist conspiracy for what it is, a conspiracy to "liquidate" America and her system of free enterprise. He shows how various communist propaganda schemes and rhetorical booby traps play seductively on American and world ears. It is this Fifth Weapon which, in the final analysis, may cancel out our vaunted H-bomb lead.

WILLIAM H. PETERSON



This page is devoted to brief notices of pamphlets, speeches and other reading matter of interest to libertarians. These are not reviews; in condensed and paraphrased form, this is what the authors have to say.

ONE WORLD

Even before old man summer starts to sizzle, One Worlders are warming up their pitches for a UN supergovernment. Sample proposals: 1) membership will be compulsory—if the interventionists have their way, the UN will be a tar baby we'll never get unstuck from; 2) disarmament will be enforced by police owing exclusive allegiance to the UN—these police, who could be Communists, will be posted on our land whether we like it or not; 3) the Court of International Justice will have exclusive jurisdiction over any matter concerning the interpretation of the UN Charter—exit our right to call any UN move unconstitutional.

Proposed Amendments to UN Charter, July 1955, by Mrs. J. A. Rogers. 6 pp. Tucson, Arizona. Single copy free

SOCIALISM

Small fry, like kittens, puppies and minnows, have to grow up. Too bad. Sometimes they grow up to be suckers for the communist line. Sometimes they become goldfish, "covered with guilt." The goldfish "feels guilty because his income is greater than his ability." He has money, and his name looks good on commie fronts. The crab, though, is different. He was born to grab the Red bait. He crabs about everything. "If he is challenged and gets into hot water —Presto! He turns bright pink!" Get it? The book's for kiddies, a warning from an ex-FBI undercover agent—and with dandy illustrations.

The Queer Fish, by Herbert A. Philbrick and Frank C. Wright, Jr. 33 pp. New York: Oceana Publications. $1.00

We are in a race between education and catastrophe; the soul of communism lies in the philosophy of socialism as it is taught even in our own universities. Marxian communism and do-good socialism are economic equivalents. For example, communism categorically denounces profits as immoral; and socialism, while seemingly mealy - mouthed about it, subscribes to this belief. The very heart of the conflict in our times, therefore, is not between Communists on the one hand, and Socialists, collectivists and free enterprisers on the other, but between those who consider profits moral, and those who don't. Communism is nothing more than socialism with brass knuckles.

Capitalist Counter Attack, by L. L. B. Angas. 31 pp. New York: Major L. L. B. Angas, Inc., 480 Lexington Avenue. $1.00

FREEDOM

"He avoided the mass-mind, not only because he found it very uninteresting, but because he thought nothing could be done to improve it. If there was to be any improvement in society it would have to come by way of improvement in the individuals who compose it; for, in the final analysis, society is only an agglomeration of individuals, not an entity in itself. So Nock put in a lifetime bettering Nock, and since he had chosen writing as a profession he made a point of polishing his style to the point where it became the envy of his contemporaries."

Gentle Nock at Our Door (a personal reminiscence of Albert Jay Nock), by Frank Chodorov. Faith and Freedom, February 1955. Spiritual Mobilization: 1521 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 17, Cal. $.25 issue, $2.00 subscription

No clear understanding or appreciation of our American way of life can be gained without knowing the conditions under which men lived for 6,000 years before the American Revolution. Men have often fought for freedom; they achieved it only when they realized that what the government gives, the government can take away. And does. That's why the Constitution limits government. But the Constitution is a piece of paper; it can be ripped by revolution, burned by conquerors or flushed by the amendments of a people ignorant of the ideals and principles which underlie our liberty.

American Handbook, by Harry T. Everingham. Chicago: The Everingham Company, 35 E. Wacker Drive. $.25

"Our republican form of representative government, which is popularly called democracy, is based on the assumption that man is created in the image of God and, with God's help, is capable of self government. Every authority on our form of government is in agreement that government by the people will function successfully if, and only if, the electorate is 1) educated in the principles and practices of that form of government and 2) motivated . . . to put those principles into operation."

Freedom Is Not Free, by Wellington J. Griffith, Jr. 64 pp. Cincinnati: The C. J. Krehbiel Company. $1.00

ECONOMICS

There are many advantages to capitalism, but the most extraordinary feature of this economic system is that it is tailored to the desires and material good of the consumer. Under no other system is the consumer so courted; on this level, there is complete equality between the housewife and the mistress of Buckingham Palace. The consumer is courted because of the freedom he enjoys to "look around," do some window shopping. He forces business interests to compete for his attention. Businessmen may make profits if they are successful at guessing what consumers want. But their profits are only temporary, while the advantage to the consumer is permanent.

Freedom to Shop Around, by Hart Buck. 18 pp. Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc. Single copy free